The High Court · 2012

sringdaw Warrisha @ Partha Warisha, and 3. Sameer Ahmed, were arrested by the As sam Police, at Bangalore, in connection with Basistha Police Station case aforem entioned, on 30.05.2009 and 03.06.2009. The NIA moved, on 05.06.2009, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, and filed FIR in the NIA Case No. 1/2009 aforementi oned. On 06.06.2009, the accused persons were, on being produced before the Chi ef Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, remanded to police custody. In terms of the or der, passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, on 06.06.2009, Basistha P.S. Case No. 170/2009 aforementioned was tagged with the NIA Case No. 1/2009 and, on the basis of the application made by the NIA, the Court allowed accused Mohit Hojai and R. H. Khan (i.e., the appellant herein) to be taken into custody by the NIA for a period of 10 days and the three accused, namely, 1. Mihir Barman @ Jewel G arlossa @ Debojit Sinha, 2. Ahsringdaw Warrisha @ Partha Warisha, and 3. Sameer Ahmed, were remanded, for a period of 14 days, to the custody of the NIA. (vii) On 11.06.2009, on the prayer of the NIA, the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, added Sections 17/18/19 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevent ion) Act, 1967, to the NIA Case No. 1/2009 aforementioned and, on the prayer of the NIA, the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, remanded the accuse d to judicial custody, in exercise of its power under Section 167 of the CrPC, on the ground that no court has so far been constituted under the NIA Act. (viii) By a Gazette notification, dated 09.07.2009, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, in exercise of its powers under Section 3 of t he Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, DHD(J) along with its factions, w ings and front organizations came to be declared as ’unlawful organization’. (ix) Three of the accused persons, namely, R. H. Khan, Ahsringdaw Warisa @ Pa rtha Warisha and Sameer Ahmed, then, approached this Court seeking to invoke its jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC. None of the accused aforementioned applied for bail to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, or to the Sessions Judge, Ka mrup; rather, they applied for bail, directly, to this Court under Section 439 C r.PC. (x) One of the important questions, which arose before the High Court, in th e matter of application for bail, which the three accused aforementioned had so made, under Section 439 Cr.PC, to this Court, was as to whether the bail applica tions were maintainable in law. (xi) Upon a threadbare discussion, the said three bail applications, made under Section 439 CrPC, seeking to invoke High Court’s jurisdiction to grant bail in f avour of the accused aforementioned, were rejected, on 29.07.2009, by one of us (Ansari, J.) on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, laying down, inter alia, tha t under the scheme of the provisions contained in the NIA Act read with the prov isions of remand and bail as stand incorporated in the Code of Criminal Procedur e, a person , arrested in connection with an offence, under the NIA Act, can be remanded to custody, police or judicial, by the Special Court, where the Specia l Court has been constituted, or by the Court of Session, where the Special Cour t has not been constituted. The Court also held that the source of power of the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, to consider an applic ation for bail is traceable to, and governed by, the provisions of Section 437 C r.PC. and while considering such an application for bail, the Special Court or t he Court of Session, as the case may be, will not exercise the power of bail as if it is considering an application for bail under Section 439 and, consequently , the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, would have all the limitations, which a Magistrate has, while deciding an application for bail, under Section 437 Cr.PC and the provisions, contained in Section 439 Cr.PC, can not be resorted to for the purpose of granting bail and it was also held by the High Court, in its order, dated 29.07.2009, aforementioned, that against an orde r, passed by a competent court, rejecting bail, or granting bail, the remedy of an aggrieved party lies in preferring an appeal to the High Court, in terms of S ection 21(4) of the NIA Act, and in not making any application under Section 439 Cr.PC. This Court, therefore, held in its order, dated 29.07.2009, that such an appeal would require hearing by a Division Bench of the High Court and that in such an appeal, even the merit of the order, granting or refusing bail, can be q uestioned. The decision came to be reported, in (2009) 3 GLT 855 (Redaul Hussai n Khan & Ors vs. State of Assam & Ors). While laying down the law, as indicated hereinbefore, the Court observed and held as under: What emerges from the above discussion is that it is the Special Court u (cid:28)77. nder the NIA Act, or the Court of Session, when the Special Court has not been c onstituted, where an accused is required to be produced if he is arrested in con nection with an offence punishable under the NIA Act and, upon his production, i t is the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, which shall have the power to grant bail. The source of power of the Special Court or the Co urt of Session, as the case may be, to consider an application for bail is trace able to, and governed by, the provisions of Section 437 of the Code and while co nsidering such an application for bail, the Special Court or the Court of Sessio n, as the case may be, will not exercise the power of bail as if it is consideri ng an application for bail under Section 439 and, consequently, the Special Cour t or the Court of Session, as the case may be, would have all the limitations, w hich a Magistrate has, while deciding an application for bail, under Section 437 of the Code. XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX

106. What surfaces from the above discussion, held, as a whole, is that except a s provided in Section 167(2-A) of the Code, a person, arrested in connection wit h an offence, under the NIA Act, can be remanded to custody, police or judicial, by the Special Court, where the Special Court has been constituted, or by the C ourt of Session, where the Special Court has not been constituted. In view of th e fact that the NIA Act envisages a situation, wherein an investigation, as in t he present case, may be entrusted to the National Investigation Agency after the State police had made some investigation, it further follows that once the inve stigation, under the scheme of the NIA Act, is taken over by the Agency, it is t he Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, which can authoriz e further detention of an arrested accused. When such an arrested accused applie s for bail to the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, the source of power to consider such an application for bail lies in Section 437 an d not Section 439 of the Code. Even a High Court cannot invoke its powers under Section 439, to grant bail if it has been refused by the Special Court or the Co urt of Session, as the case may be, nor can the High Court, in exercise of its p ower, under Section 439, cancel bail if bail has been granted to such an accused by the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be. If the bail h as been refused or granted by the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, the aggrieved party may, however, prefer an appeal, in terms of Sec tion 21, to the High Court. Such an appeal has to be heard by a Division Bench o f the High Court and in such an appeal, the merit of the order, granting or refu sing bail, can be questioned. 107. In the backdrop of the position of law, as indicated above, it becomes c lear that the present three applications for bail, which have been made under Se ction 439 of the Code, are not entertainable in law and must, therefore, fail. 108. applications are hereby dismissed as not maintainable. (cid:29) In the result and for the reasons discussed above, all these three bail (Emphasis is added) Complying with the position of law, as had been laid down, in Redaul Hus (xii) sain Khan (supra), the appellant herein (i.e., Redaul Hussain Khan) filed an app lication before the Sessions Judge (Special Court), Kamrup, Guwahati, seeking ba il, but his bail application came to be rejected on 14.08.2009. Thereafter, on an application, made by the NIA, on 27.08.2009, the learned Sessions Judge (Spec ial Court), Kamrup, Guwahati, by its order, dated 28.08.2009, extended the perio d for completion of investigation into the case by a further period of 60 days i n terms of Section 43D(5)(b) of the 1967 Act read with Section 167 Cr.PC. The order, dated 14.08.2009, of the learned Sessions Judge (Special Cour (xiii) t), Kamrup, Guwahati, rejecting the bail application of the appellant herein, ca me to be unsuccessfully challenged by the appellant herein, namely, Redaul Hussa in Khan and some others, before a Division Bench of this Court by way of an appe al under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act. The said appeal came to be dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 19.09.2009. In the meanwhile, however, the Special Court, Central Bureau of Investig (xiv) ation, Assam, Guwahati, was notified by the Central Government, in exercise of i ts power under Section 11(1) of the NIA Act, vide Gazette notification, dated 01 .09.2009, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, as the ’S pecial Court’. (xv) As against the dismissal of his appeal and rejection of bail by the order, dated 19.09.2009, passed by a Division Bench as mentioned above, the appellant herein carried the matter, by way of a Special Leave Petition, to the Supreme Co urt. By its decision, on 09.11.2009, reported in (2010) 1 SCC 521 (Redaul Hussia n Khan vs. State of Assam & Ors.), the Supreme Court observed, inter alia, that there was little doubt that even on the date, when the petitioner, Redaul Hussai n Khan (i.e., the appellant herein) was apprehended, DHD(J) had been indulging i n terrorist act, although it came to be declared as a ’unlawful association’ som e time latter, i.e., on 09.07.2009. The Supreme Court made it clear, in its orde r, dated 09.11.2009, that having considered the submissions, made before it, it was unable to agree with the submissions, made on behalf of the petitioner, Reda ul Hussain Khan (i.e., the appellant herein) that to the facts of the case, the provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, were not attracted . (xvi) The Supreme Court further held, in Redaul Hussain Khan (supra), that it was unable to accept the submissions, made on behalf of the petitioner, Redaul H ussain Khan (i.e., the appellant herein) that merely because of the fact that DH D(J) had not been declared as an ’unlawful organization’, when Redaul Hussain Kh an was arrested, the said organization could not have been taken to have been in dulging in terrorist act, or that the petitioner could not have been alleged to have the knowledge of such activities of the DHD(J). (xvii) With the conclusions, so reached, the Supreme Court rejected the prese nt appellant’s application for bail by laying down that the learned Sessions Jud ge (Special Court), Kamrup, Guwahati, had the jurisdiction to extend the time fo r completion of investigation in terms of the amended provisions, introduced by way of Section 43-D(5)(b) of the 1967 Act, read with Section 167 CrPC. The rele vant observations, made by the Apex Court, in Redaul Hussain Khan (supra), read as under: (cid:28)15. Mr. Rawal submitted that although Mr. Ghosh had referred to some newspaper reports indicating that there was a possibility of amnesty being granted to the members of DHD(J), the same was yet to materialize, and, on the other hand, it a lso indicated that the said organization was indulging in terrorist activities. Accordingly, in view of the definition of \terrorist act\ in Section 15 of the 1 967 Act and the provisions of Sections 13 and 17 thereof, there was little doubt that even on the date when the petitioner was apprehended, DHD(J) was indulging in terrorist acts, although, it came to be declared as an \unlawful association \ sometime later. Mr. Rawal urged that having regard to the above, the Special L eave Petitions filed against the order of the High court refusing to grant bail were liable to be dismissed.

16. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respectiv e parties and we are unable to agree with Mr. Ghosh that the provisions of the U nlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, would not be attracted to the facts o f the case. We are also unable to accept Mr. Ghosh’s submissions that merely bec ause DHD(J) had not been declared as an \unlawful association\ when the petition er was arrested, the said organization could not have indulged in terrorist acts or that the petitioner could not have had knowledge of such activities.

17. Accordingly, Mr. Ghosh’s submissions regarding the grant of statutory ba il have to be rejected since, in our view, the learned Sessions Judge (Special C ourt) had the jurisdiction to extend the time for completion of the investigatio n. (cid:29) (Emphasis is added) (xviii) A charge-sheet came to be laid, on 17.11.2009, before the learned Speci al Court, by the NIA against as many as 14 accused persons, including the appell ant herein, and all the arrested persons, whose names have been mentioned above. The three accused persons, namely, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, Debasish Bhattacharjee @ Bappi, and Sandeep Kumar Ghosh @ Sambhu, had applied for bail, but their appl ications for bail were rejected by the learned Special Court on 31.12.2009. As against the order, rejecting their prayer for bail, they had preferred appeals, under Section 21 of the NIA Act, to this Court, and these appeals were also dism issed by a Division Bench of this Court on 28.05.2012. The decision of the Divis ion Bench stands reported as Jayanta Kumar Ghosh and others Vs. State of Assam a nd others, reported in 2010 (4) GLT 1. Similarly, accused Ashringdaw Warrisha an d accused Samir Ahmed, too, on failing to obtain bail from the learned Special C ourt, had, after filing of the charge-sheet against them, preferred appeals and these appeals too, having been heard, were dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court. The decisions, with regard to dismissal of appeals of accused Ashringdaw Warrisha and Samir Ahmed, too, stand reported in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh and other s (supra). (xix) As far as the appellant herein, Redaul Hussain Khan, is concerned, he fi led, after the charge-sheet stood laid by the NIA, an application for bail in th e Special Court, at Guwahati, on the ground of his sickness. (xx) Notwithstanding the vehement objection, raised by the NIA, against the pray er for bail made by the appellant herein, Redaul Hussain Khan, on the ground of his sickness, the learned Special Judge, by its order, dated 22.12.2009, allowed accused Redaul Hussain Khan to go on interim bail on the ground of his ill heal th subject to condition that he would appear in the Special Court on 11.01.2010 at 10.30 am. Accused Redaul Hussain Khan did not appear in the Court as had been directed and an application was moved, on his behalf, informing the Court, inte r alia, that Redaul Hussain Khan had, again, been admitted in hospital, on 07.01 .2010, after having been released on bail, on 26.12.2009, with complain of incre ased backache and other complications. On hearing the parties and on considerati on of the relevant medical report, dated 08.01.2010, the interim bail was extend ed by the learned Special Court, while calling for a joint up-to-date medical re port from the departments of medicine and orthopedic of Guwahati Medical College and Hospital (GMCH) on the ground that Redaul Hussain Khan was being treated by the said departments. On production of the medical report, the prayer for making absolute the (xxi) interim bail was renewed by accused Redaul Hussain Khan. The NIA filed its objec tion to the said prayer and, on hearing both sides, the learned Special Court pa ssed, on 25.01.2010, an order directing the Superintendent, Guwahati Medical Col lege and Hospital, to constitute a Medical Board with concerning doctors to exam ine Redaul Hussain Khan thoroughly and to submit report. The medical report was accordingly submitted and, on hearing the NIA and also accused-respondent Redaul Hussain Khan, the learned Special Court made, on 29.01.2010, the interim order of bail absolute. (xxii) The order, dated 29.01.2010, passed by the learned Special Court, grantin g bail to the present appellant, Redaul Hussain Khan, on the ground of his illne ss came to be challenged by way of an appeal preferred by the NIA, under Section 21 of the NIA Act, seeking to get, inter alia, the order, dated 29.01.2010, afo rementioned, set aside. The appeal, so preferred by the NIA, gave rise to Crimin al Appeal No.25/2010. By judgment and order, dated 28.05.2010, a Division Bench of this Court allowed the appeal of the NIA and set aside the impugned order, da ted 29.01.2010, whereby the learned Special Court had allowed the present appell ant, Redaul Hussain Khan, to go on bail on the ground of his illness. This decis ion has come to be reported as National Investigation Agency Vs. Redaul Hussain Khan, reported in (2010) 3 GLT 302. (xxiii) Against this Court’s order refusing, once again, to grant bail t o the accused-appellant, Redaul Hussain Khan, the said accused carried the matte r to the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition, which gave rise to SL P (Crl) No.5063/2010; but, on 25.08.2011, when the matter was called for hearing , accused, Redaul Hussain Khan, sought dismissal of his appeal as withdrawn with leave to him to approach the trial Court, once again, with a fresh application for bail. The above submission, made on behalf of accused Redaul Hussain Khan, see 3. king to get the Special Leave Petition withdrawn, was resisted by the Union of I ndia on the ground that since the High Court had cancelled the bail, which had b een granted by the learned trial Court, it should not be understood by the learn ed trial Court that by virtue of the order, which accused Redaul Hussain Khan wa s seeking, in the Special Leave Petition, the order of the High Court stood set aside or interfered with by the Supreme Court, whereupon the Supreme Court made it absolutely clear that this Court’s order, in the appeal of Redaul Hussain Kha n, cancelling the learned Special Court’s order, granting bail, to accused, Reda ul Hussain Khan, on the ground of his illness, was not being interfered with by the Supreme Court. The relevant portion of the Supreme Court’s order, dated 25. 08.2011, read as under: (cid:28)It is submitted by Mr. Krishnamani that the petitioner does not wish to proceed with SLP(CrlP No.5063 of 2010, and the same may be dismissed as withdrawn, with leave to approach the trial court once again with a fresh application for grant of bail. Learned ASG, Mr. Raval, has opposed such prayer for grant of bail, to the extent that since the High Court had cancelled the bail, which had been gran ted by the trial court, it should not be understood by the trial court that by v irtue of this order, the order of the High Court was being set aside or interfer ed with. Having regard to the submissions made, we allow the prayer made on behalf of the petitioner to withdraw the Special Leave Petition (being SLP (Crl.) No. 5063/10 ) and the same is, accordingly, dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty to the peti tioner to apply to the trial court afresh for grant of bail in the event there a re any change in circumstances or any fresh facts are placed before the court. W e also make it clear that we are not interfering with the order of the High Cour t. (cid:29) (Emphasis is added) 4. forementioned, following two things become transparent, namely: From a careful reading of the Supreme Court’s order, dated 25.08.2011, a (a) the present appellant could not have applied for bail to the learned trial Court afresh seeking bail unless he could show any change in the circumstance or could place fresh facts, in the learned trial Court, entitling him to the grant of bail; and (b) the Supreme Court has made it clear that it was not interfering with the or der of this Court meaning thereby that in National Investigation Agency Vs Redau l Hussain Khan, reported in 2010 (3) GLT 1, the law laid down, with regard to th e contours of the power, in the matter of granting bail to a person, accused of commission of an offence under Chapter IV and/or VI of the Unlawful Activities ( Prevention) Act, 1967, (in short, ’the UA(P) Act’), as well as the ambit of the High Court’s appellate power, as conferred by Section 21(4), have not been disag reed with by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the Supreme Court has also agreed, in its order, dated 25.08.2 5. 011, passed in the said Special Leave Petition, that the present appellant, Redu al Hussain Khan, ought not to have been allowed by the learned Special Court to go on bail on the ground of his illness, which the appellant, Redaul Hussain Kha n, had sought to take resort to, and also that the cancellation of bail by the H igh Court was, in the face of the incriminating materials, which had emerged fro m the case diary, as against Redaul Hussain Khan, and the law relevant thereto, wholly justified and in accordance with law. 6. Having got his Special Leave Petition dismissed by withdrawing the same, as mentioned above, the appellant, Redaul Hussain Khan, filed yet another appli cation, in the learned Special Court, seeking bail. This application for bail wa s rejected by order, dated 21.09.2011, passed by the learned Special Judge, NIA, in NIA Case No.01/2009. Aggrieved by the rejection of his application for bail, the accused-appellant, Redaul Hussain Khan, has, now, impugned the order, dated 21.09.2011, aforementioned, in this appeal.

7. We have heard Mr. D. K. Mishra, learned Senior counsel, appearing on beh alf of the appellant, and Mr. D. K. Das, learned Senior counsel, appearing for t he NIA. We have also heard Mr. H. P. Rawal, learned Additional Solicitor Genera l, who has appeared, on behalf of the Union of India. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION RAISED BY THE NIA TO THE MAINTAINABILITY OF THE PRESENT AP PEAL

8. What may, now, be noted is that the appeal, which has arisen out of NIA Case No. 1/2009, has been resisted, at its threshold, by the NIA, by contending, inter alia, that the appellant, Redaul Hussain Khan, had earlier filed an appli cation for bail, in NIA Case No. 1/2009, and the prayer for bail having been rej ected by the learned Special Court, the appellant preferred, under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, an appeal to a Division Bench of this Court and, the Division Bench, too, upheld the order of the learned Special Court rejecting the appellan t’s prayer for bail and thereby dismissed the appellant’s appeal by order, dated 19.09.2009, passed, in Criminal Appeal No.148/09. The appellant, then, applied for bail on the ground of his illness and, in course of time, when the appellant was granted bail on the ground of his illness, the order was challenged by the NIA by preferring an appeal to this Court under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act. Th e appeal gave rise to Criminal Appeal No.25/2010, which, on being heard, was all owed by a Division Bench of this Court on 28.05.2010 and the order, granting bai l to the accused-appellant on the ground of his sickness, was set aside, the dec ision, in Criminal Appeal No.25/2010, having been reported as National Investiga tion Agency Vs. Redaul Hussain Khan, in 2010 (3) GLT 302. 9. Aggrieved by the order, dated 28.05.2010, aforementioned, whereby the ap pellant’s bail, granted by the learned Special Court, on the ground of his sickn ess, was set aside by this Court, the appellant carried the matter, by way of Sp ecial Leave Petition, to the Supreme Court and this application gave rise to SLP (Crl.) No.5063/2010.

10. It is also pointed out by Mr. Das, learned Standing Counsel, NIA, that w hen the Special Leave Petition came up for hearing, the same was withdrawn by th e present appellant and, consequently, the appellant’s Special Leave Petition wa s accordingly dismissed, but he was given the liberty to apply afresh to the lea rned trial Court for appeal provided ’there is any change in the circumstance or if any fresh facts are placed before the Court.’ In the present case, contends Mr. Das, there is absolutely no change in 11. the circumstance inasmuch as charge-sheet had, on completion of investigation by the NIA, already stood laid, in the learned Special Court, before the present a ppellant had filed his last appeal under Section 21 of the NIA Act, which gave r ise to Criminal Appeal No.25/2010 and that this Court, while deciding Criminal A ppeal No.25/2010, aforementioned, dealt with the merit of the case as had been r evealed by the NIA as against the accused-appellant, Redaul Hussain Khan, and th is Court came to a clear conclusion that the materials, which had surfaced as a result of the investigation, brought the case of the appellant within the ambit of the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act and the appellant was not, the refore, entitled to bail on merit. 12. On merit, therefore, according to this Court’s conclusion, contends Mr. Das, the present appellant was not entitled to bail as there were sufficient inc riminating materials, collected against him by the NIA, bringing his case within the four corners of Chapters IV and VI of the UA(P) Act.

13. However, this Court, points out Mr. Das, learned Senior counsel, did exa mine, in the earlier appeal, namely, Criminal Appeal No.25/2010, if notwithstand ing the fact that the appellant, Redaul Hussain Khan, was, otherwise, not entitl ed to be released on bail on merit, whether he could have still been released on bail on the ground of his sickness, which the appellant had projected in the le arned Special Court. This Court, also points out Mr. Das, came to a clear conclu sion (as recorded in its decision rendered in Criminal Appeal No.25/2010) that e ven on the ground of his sickness, the appellant was, in the facts and attending circumstances of the present case, not entitled to be granted bail.

14. With the conclusions, so reached, further points out Mr. Das, learned St anding Counsel, NIA, the appeal of the NIA was allowed by this Court and the ord er passed by the learned Special Court, granting bail to the appellant on the gr ound of his sickness, was set aside. 15. In the circumstances, as indicated above, Mr. Das contends that the pres ent appellant, while making his application for bail, in the learned Special Cou rt, did not bring any such fact to show that there was any change in the circums tance nor did he place any fresh facts entitling him to be released on bail. In such a situation, according to Mr. Das, making of the application for bail, in t he learned Special Court, by the present appellant, was contrary to, and in viol ation of, the observations made, and the directions given, by the Supreme Court in its order, dated 25.08.2011, aforementioned, passed in SLP (Crl.) No.5063/201 0, inasmuch as the Supreme Court had given the present appellant the liberty to apply for bail provided ’there are any change in the circumstances or any fresh facts are placed before the Court’ and, hence, neither the application for bail, which the appellant had made, in the learned Special Court, was maintainable no r is the present appeal maintainable inasmuch as the rejection of the appellant’ s prayer for bail by the learned Special Court is, in the absence of any change in the circumstances and in the complete absence of any fresh facts having been brought on record, wholly consistent with law and the directions, given in the S pecial Leave Petition, on 25.08.2011, by the Supreme Court. This Court may not, therefore, interfere in the present appeal with the learned Special Court’s orde r rejecting the present appellant’s prayer for bail. So submits Mr. Das.

16. Repeated applications for bail, submits Mr. Das, have, otherwise also, b een discouraged by the Supreme Court and, though the doctrine of res judicata d oes not apply to bail applications, the person, moving bail application, if his applications for bail were already rejected, must show new grounds, or change in the circumstances or must point out some new facts having emerged or come on re cord, which, according to him, entitles him (i.e., the applicant) to apply afres h for bail. Reliance, in support of these submissions, is placed by Mr. Das on the decision, in State of T.N. -vs- S.A. Raja, reported in (2005) 8 SCC 380, whe rein the Supreme Court observed as under: (cid:28)Where a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the responden t for certain reasons and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the ap pellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fr esh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unle ss there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, t he principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the r epeated filing of the bail applications without there being any change of circum stances would lead to bad precedents. (cid:29) (Emphasis is added) In the case at hand, submits Mr. Das, there is no change in the circums 17. tances and since not only the learned Special Court, but even this Court and, th ereafter, the Supreme Court have not found it fit to allow the appellant, Redau l Hussain Khan, to go on bail in the face of the facts of the case at hand and t he law relevant thereto, the appellant, logically speaking, cannot seek bail, on ce again, without any change in the circumstances and without any new material h aving come on record or without any new material having been brought on record a s has been directed by the Supreme Court, in its order, dated 25.08.2011, passed in the Special Leave Petition.

18. To put it a little differently, what Mr. Das contends is that since the learned Special Court’s earlier order, rejecting bail, in NIA Case No. 1/2009, h as been upheld by this Court in appeal, the order of the learned Special Court s tands, by operation of law, subsumed into the appellate order, passed, in the ap pellant’s earlier appeal, by this Court, by virtue of the doctrine of merger, a nd, hence, it logically follows that unless there is any change in the circumsta nces, or some new facts are placed on record, the bail application, in NIA Case No. 1/2009, wherein charge-sheet stand submitted, on 17.11.2009, was not sustain able; but, so far as the appeal, arising out of the rejection of the present app ellant’s prayer for bail by the learned Special Court, in NIA Case No. 2/2009, w herein charge-sheet was submitted on 18.10.2010, is concerned, the same can be h eard and decided on merit. 19. In the present case, particularly, in NIA Case No. 1/2009, clarifies Mr. Das, the appellant, Redaul Hussain Khan, has not been able to show any new grou nd warranting change in the conclusions of this Court, which it had arrived at, while considering the appellant’s earlier appeal, that apart from the fact that the appellant was also not entitled to bail on merit inasmuch as the materials, collected against him by the NIA, gave rise to reasonable ground for believing, in terms of the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, that accusations, ma de against the appellant, were prima facie true the appellant was also not entit led to bail on the ground of his alleged ill-health. Reacting to the above submissions made by Mr. Das, learned Standing Coun 20. sel, NIA, Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Senior counsel, for the appellant, Redaul Hus sain Khan, submits that in Criminal Appeal No.25/2010, no submission had been ma de, on behalf of the appellant, as regards the merit of the case, which had been set up against him by the NIA in the charge-sheet, and, hence, it is open to th e appellant, according to Mr. Mishra, to show, now, before this Court that in th e face of the materials collected by the NIA, the appellant ought to be allowed to go on bail. This apart, according to Mr. Mishra, the appellant’s case was, ac cording to this Court’s decision in Criminal Appeal No.25/2010, fell within the ambit of the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA (P) Act, though the proviso to Section 43D(5) was, submits Mr. Mishra, not at all attracted to the facts of the case at hand inasmuch as the offences, which have been made punishable by Secti ons 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the UA(P) Act cannot, in the face of the materials collected by the NIA, be prima facie said to have been committed by the appellan t. In this regard, Mr. Mishra has taken us through the definition of terrorist a ct as embodied in Section 15 of the UA(P) Act and also contended that so far as the alleged funding, conspiracy, terrorist acts, etc, are concerned, the same ar e not sustainable in the face of the materials on record and the law relevant th ereto. 21. Controverting the submissions, made on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Das, learned Standing counsel, NIA, submits that considering the fact that charge-sh eet had already been submitted, in the learned Special Court, even before the ap pellant’s earlier appeal (Crl. Appeal 25/2010) was considered by this Court and when it had been specifically submitted, on behalf of the NIA, in the said earli er appeal, that there were sufficient incriminating materials against the presen t appellant, it was open to the appellant to repel the submissions, which had be en so made, in the earlier appeal, by the NIA, but the appellant remained wholly silent and did nothing, in this regard, indicating thereby that the appellant h ad nothing to show to establish or convince this Court that the materials on rec ord, collected against the accused-appellant, did not fall within the ambit of t he proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act and the accused-appellant was, con sequently, entitled to bail on merit.

22. It is, therefore, according to Mr. Das, not open to the appellant, now, to contend, in this appeal, that no case has been made out against him, which a ttracts the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, particularly, when the S upreme Court, while dismissing the appellant’s Special Leave Petition, has, in n o uncertain words, made it clear that it (Hon’ble Supreme Court) was not interfe ring with this Court’s order disallowing the appellant’s earlier appeal setting aside the appellant’s bail, granted by the Special Court, particularly, when thi s Court had dealt with the merit of the appellant’s case to determine if the pro viso to Section 43D(5) was or was not attracted and, having come to the conclusi on that in the facts and attending circumstances of the present case, the provis o to Section 43D(5) stood attracted, this Court held that the appellant was not, on merit, entitled to bail and, then, this Court considered if, notwithstanding the fact that the appellant was not entitled to bail, on merit, whether he coul d be given the benefit of his alleged illness in terms of the 1st proviso to Sec tion 437 CrPC and this Court came to the conclusion that even an accused, whose case fell within the ambit of Section 43D(5) of the UA(Petitioner) Act, can be g iven the benefit of the 1st proviso to Section 437 Cr.PC, but so far as the pres ent accused-appellant was concerned, he could not have been given, in the facts and attending circumstances of the case, the benefit of 1st proviso to Section 4 37 Cr.PC and the conclusions, so reached by this Court, have not been interfered with by the Supreme Court in its order, dated 25.08.2011, passed in SLP (Crl.) No.5063/2010, whereby the present appellant’s Special Leave Petition has been di smissed on withdrawal by the present appellant. REVISITING THE FINDINGS IN CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 25/2010 IN THE CONTEXT OF RIVAL S UBMISSIONS MADE ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED

23. While dealing with the rival submissions noted above, it is our duty to point out that in Criminal Appeal No.25/2010, which was decided by this Court, o n 28.05.2010, it was specifically submitted, on behalf of the NIA, that in the l ight of the materials, which had been unearthed, during investigation, against a ccused Redaul Hussain Khan, he was involved in arranging funds for terrorist act ivities and when his acts posed threats to sovereignty, security and integrity o f India, the learned Special Court committed serious error in allowing the accus ed to go on bail. In fact, it was pointed out by Mr. Das, in Criminal Appeal 25/ 2010, that learned Special Court had not considered at all the incriminating mat erials, which had surfaced against the accused Redaul Hussain Khan, and allowed him to go on bail entirely basing the grant of bail on the ground of poor state of health of the accused-respondent (i.e., the appellant herein). Coupled with the above, Mr. Das, learned Standing Counsel, NIA, while de 24. aling with the above aspect of the appellant’s alleged ill health, clearly submi tted, in Criminal Appeal 25/2010, to the effect, inter alia, that the nature of sickness of the appellant was not so serious, which warranted his release on bai l, particularly, when the materials on record clearly showed that the appellant was involved in threatening his staff and others and thereby helped in collectin g funds for terrorist activities and, hence, the release of accused Redaul Hussa in Khan, on bail, in a case of this nature, was against the interest of further investigation and trial inasmuch as accused was capable of tampering with the ev idence and intimidating the witnesses from disclosing the truth before the inves tigating agency and the Court. 25. The relevant submissions, appearing with regard to what have been indica ted above, in Criminal Appeal No.25/2010, are, for the sake of brevity, reproduc ed below: (cid:28)11. , has submitted that in the light of the materials, which had been unearthed dur ing investigation against accused-respondent Redaul Hussain Khan, particularly, when he was involved in arranging funds for terrorist activities and when his ac ts posed threats to sovereignty, security and integrity of India, the learned Sp ecial Court committed serious error in allowing the accused-respondent to go on bail. In fact, points out Mr. Das, learned Special Court did not consider at all the incriminating materials, which have had surfaced against the accused-respon dent, and allowed him to go on bail entirely basing the grant of bail on the gro und of poor state of health of the accused-respondent. 12. Mr. Das further points out that though the State had come forward to esc ort Redaul Hussain Khan for appropriate medical examination and treatment to All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, (in short, ’AIMS’), the learned Special Court, without assigning any reason whatsoever, did not accede to this request of the NIA and got the accused examined at the Guwahati Medical College and Hospital. According to Mr. Das, since the accused-respondent had already bee n under treatment at Guwahati Medical College and Hospital, the investigation ag ency wanted the accused-respondent to be examined by a neutral medical institute , such as, AIMS, so that chance of any kind of manipulation of medical opinion c ould be reduced. Mr. Das has pointed out that even on the face of the medical re port, it cannot be said that the accused-respondent’s sickness was so grave that he could not have been provided with requisite medical treatment, while being k Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. DK Das, learned Senior counsel ept in judicial custody. What the accused-respondent suffers from, submits Mr. D as, is nothing unusual and the nature of his sickness is not so serious, which w ould have warranted his release on bail, particularly, when the materials on rec ord clearly show that Redaul Hussain Khan was involved in threatening his staff and others and thereby helped in collection of fund for the terrorist activities . Release of the accused-respondent on bail, in a case of present nature, is aga inst the interest of further investigation and trial inasmuch as accused is capa ble of tampering with the evidence and intimidating the witnesses from disclosin g the truth before the investigating agency and the Court. In these circumstance s, particularly, when the medical report, which the learned Special Court has re lied upon, does not give any opinion, far less any definite indication, that sup ervised medical treatment, as suggested by the doctors, was not possible to be g iven to the accused-respondent, Redaul Hussain Khan, while keeping him in custod y, the order making the interim directions for bail, passed in favour of the acc used-respondent, absolute was wholly illegal and may, therefore, be interfered w ith. (cid:29)(Emphasis added)

26. We may, now, pause here to point out that with regard to the submissions , which had been made, on behalf of the NIA, in Criminal Appeal No.25/2010, as r egard the incriminating materials, which had been unearthed against the present accused-appellant, whose bail was sought to get cancelled by the NIA, in Crimina l Appeal No.25/2010, no submission had been made, on behalf of the present appel lant, to show that there was no material attracting the offences, which had alle gedly been committed by the present appellant. In fact, the present appellant, who was respondent in Criminal Appeal No 27. .25/2010, did not utter a word and did not dispute that in the light of the mate rials, which had been collected and submitted by the NIA in their charge-sheet, a prima facie case had been made out against him, which attracted the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act disentitling thereby the present appellant from being granted bail on merit. Controverting the submissions, made on behalf of the appellant, Mr. DK M

28. In order to make the above position clearer, the submissions, made on b ehalf of the present appellant in Criminal Appeal No.25/2010, wherein he was res pondent, are also reproduced below: (cid:28)13. ishra, learned Senior counsel, submits that the first proviso to Section 437 Cr. PC. empowers the Special Court to grant bail to an accused on the ground of sick ness and in the facts and attending circumstances of the present case, the learn ed Court below was wholly justified in allowing the accused-respondent to go on bail, particularly, when his condition of health is such that it would threaten his very survival if adequate medical treatment is not provided to him. The accu sed-respondent, in the present case, according to Mr. Mishra, requires proper ho mely atmosphere for improvement and survival. Nothing has been brought on record , points out Mr. Mishra, to show that the doctors of the GMCH are not neutral an d the opinion given by them is a manipulated one. In the absence of any such mat erial, the submissions, which have been made on behalf of the NIA, may not be gi ven any credit. So contends Mr. Mishra. 14. It is contended by Mr. DK Mishra, learned Senior counsel, that in the ca se at hand, apart from the fact that the accused-respondent has been allowed to go on bail on the ground of his sickness, there is no allegation that the accuse d-respondent has, as a matter of fact, interfered with, or attempted to interfer e with, the investigation of the case and/or he has, in any manner, misused the liberty of bail. In such circumstances, contends Mr. Mishra, the impugned order, granting bail, is not, according to Mr. Mishra, interfereable in appeal. Resisting this appeal, Mr. Mishra, learned Senior counsel, has also subm 15. itted that since charge-sheet has already been submitted, the accused-respondent , Redaul Hussain Khan, being a resident of Assam, he has his roots in the local society and there is no chance of his absconding, he could have, therefore, been allowed and he has been rightly allowed by the learned Special Court to go on b ail. Mr. Mishra further submits that the accused-respondent, Redaul Hussain Khan , is prepared to abide by any condition or conditions as may be imposed by this Court. This appeal, contends Mr. Mishra, is wholly misconceived and not sustaina ble in facts and law. (cid:29)

29. From the submissions, which had been made in Criminal Appeal No.25/2010, on behalf of the present appellant, and which we have reproduced above, it beco mes more than abundantly clear that in Criminal Appeal No.25/2010, it was never contended, on behalf of the present appellant, that the materials, collected aga inst him by the NIA, did not make out any case bringing his case within the ambi t of the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, though it was specifically contended, in the said appeal, on behalf of the NIA, that there were sufficient incriminating materials against the appellant, which had surfaced from the inves tigation, but had not been taken into account by the learned Special Court.

30. The appellant, in his earlier appeal (i.e., Criminal Appeal No.25/2010) , had taken recourse to the ’first’ proviso to Section 437 Cr.PC., which is an ’ exception’ to the general power of granting or not granting of bail inasmuch as the ’first’ proviso to Section 437 Cr.PC. makes it clear that even where suffici ent materials exist against a person, accused of commission of an offence, disen titling him, ordinarily, to be released on bail, he can still be released on bai l if he is sick or infirm. It is this exception, which the accused-appellant, Re daul Hussain Khan, had sought to take recourse to and he had, indeed, received b enefit thereof inasmuch as the learned Special Court had, in fact, allowed him t he benefit of the first proviso to Section 437 Cr.PC, because the learned Specia l Court, having rejected the appellant’s earlier application for bail on the gro und of incriminating materials having emerged from the investigation, allowed, n evertheless, the present appellant to go on bail on the ground of his sickness a nd the order, so passed, allowing him to go on bail on the ground of his sicknes s came to be challenged, in the form of appeal, by the NIA in Criminal Appeal No .25/2010. 31. Thus, this Court had no option, but to determine, in Criminal Appeal 25/ 2010, if there were sufficient incriminating materials attracting application of the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act and whether the Court, therefore , stood debarred from allowing, on merit, the present appellant to go on bail. 32. In other words, had the present accused-appellant been entitled to bail on merit, there was no question of cancelling his bail. It had per force become the duty of this Court to examine the question of application of the proviso to Section 43D (5) for the purpose of determining if release of the present appella nt, on bail, stood statutorily barred. This was, therefore, specifically raised, in the last appeal filed by the NIA, if the ’first’ proviso to Section 437 Cr.P C. would apply even to a case, which is, otherwise, covered by the proviso to Se ction 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act. 33. Having, therefore, discussed the incriminating materials, which had been collected against the accused-appellant and having satisfied itself that there were ample materials disentitling the present appellant to go on bail, because t he appellant’s case fell within the ambit of the proviso to Section 43D(5), this Court examined, in Criminal Appeal 25/2010, if a person, whose case fell within the ambit of the proviso to Section 43D(5), was, nevertheless, entitled to the benefit of the ’first’ proviso to Section 437 Cr.PC and, in this regard, this Co urt concluded, in Criminal Appeal No.25/2010, that the ’first’ proviso to Sectio n 437 Cr.PC was available even to a person, whose case is, otherwise, covered by the proviso to Section 43D(5).

34. To put it a little differently, taking note of the rival submissions, ma de on behalf of the parties, this Court, first, satisfied itself if the appellan t’s case fell within the ambit of the proviso to Section 43D(5) and, having foun d that his case did fall within the four corners of the proviso to Section 43D(5 ), this Court undertook the exercise to determine if, on the ground of the natur e of sickness and the offer of treatment, which had been made by the State, the appellant, [who was respondent in Criminal Appeal No.25/2010 and whose case was, otherwise, covered by the proviso to Section 43D(5)], could have been allowed t o go on bail by the learned Special Court and this Court came to a clear finding that the present appellant, in the face of the nature of sickness of the appell ant and in the light of the offer of treatment, given by the State, ought not to have been allowed to go on bail, when his case was, otherwise, covered by the p roviso to Section 43D(5). 35. Consequently, the appeal, which had been preferred by the NIA, was allow ed and the order, granting bail to the present appellant, on the ground of his s ickness, was set aside. The relevant observations, appearing, in this regard, in Criminal Appeal No.25/2010, are reproduced below:

71. A microscopic reading of the 1st proviso to Section 437 shows that this proviso creates an exception to Clause (i) as well as Clause (ii) of Section 437 (1). There is no reason as to why the 1st proviso be not held to be creating an exception even in respect of a case, which is covered by the legally created fic tion of Clause (iii). If the proviso to Section 437(1) can be treated to create an exception to the proviso to Sub-Section (5) of Section 43D, it would fall wit hin the ambit of the power of the Special Court to allow an accused to be releas ed on bail on the ground of his sickness even though the proviso to Sub-Section (5) of Section 43D imposes restrictions on such release as indicated hereinbefor e. 72. We need to bear in mind that Article 21 guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except in accordance with the proced ure established by law. Personal liberty of a person being one of the basic righ ts, any restriction or fetter, on such liberty, has to be strictly construed. Th e law, therefore, which deprives a person of his personal liberty, has to be int erpreted in such a manner, which make such law fair, just and reasonable. XXX XXX 78. A careful reading of the scheme of the provisions contained in Section 4 37 clearly bring out the fact that the Legislature, having taken away the power of a Court, other than the High Court and the Court of Sessions, to grant bail i n the cases, which are covered by Clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 437(1), has al lowed even an accused, who is, otherwise, covered by restrictions contained in C lauses (i) and (ii), to be released on bail on the ground, amongst others, of si ckness. This shows that the legislature wants to ensure that when the restrictio ns, imposed on the liberty of an accused, are pitted against his right not to be deprived of his life (except as may be provided by law), such restrictions do n ot drive a person to death or cause such damage to his well being that he suffers irreparably. After all, the entire aim of inve stigation and trial is to bring a guilty to book. If the person, who faces the a ccusation of being guilty, is not, ultimately, brought to trial due to the fact that he does not survive or survives in such a shape and condition that he canno t be tried at all, the whole purpose of having a lively scheme of investigation and trial would stand defeated. There is, therefore, no manner of doubt, in our mind, that notwithstandi 79. ng the limitations, which have been imposed by the proviso to Section 43D(5), it would still remain open for a Special Court, under the NIA Act, to release an a ccused on bail, on the ground of sickness, by taking resort to the powers confer red on it by the first proviso to Section 437(1) Cr.P.C. However, while consider ing release of a person on bail on the ground of sickness, the materials, appear ing against him, would be relevant inasmuch as the Court may, in a given case, a llow an accused to remain on bail even if his sickness is not of the degree, whi ch would threaten his life provided that the Court is assured of the availabilit y of the accused for further investigation or trial coupled with the reasonable assurance that the accused would, if granted bail, not abuse his liberty. When, however, in the cases of serious nature, there is likelihood of the accused flee ing away from justice or there is reasonable possibility of the accused intimida ting witnesses, threatening them and thereby adversely affecting the investigati on or trial, the Court would have to be cautious in releasing the accused on bai l on the ground of sickness unless the Court forms the view that it is impossibl e for the accused to receive requisite medical treatment, while remaining in cus tody. The ground of sickness can mandatorily become a ground for releasing an ac cused on bail, where the choice is really between protecting the investigation o r trial, on the one hand, to advance the course of justice and protecting the li fe of the accused, on the other, even where there remains a reasonable element o f apprehension that the accused might not remain available for further investiga tion or trial and similar such other considerations. XXX XXX

82. There is nothing, in the language of Section 43D(5), to show that the pr oviso thereto supersedes the 1st proviso to Section 437(1); rather, the proviso to Section 43D(5) imposes a limitation in addition to the limitations, which Cla uses (i) and (ii) of Section 437 (1) impose on the Court’s power to release an a ccused on bail. Thus, the proviso to Section 43D(5) is an additional restriction on the Court’s power to grant bail. This limitation, being of the same nature a nd extent as the limitations imposed by Clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 437(1) C r.PC, do not affect, and keep intact, the 1st proviso to Section 437(1) enabling thereby the Special Court to allow an accused to go on bail on the ground of si ckness. (cid:29) (Emphasis is added) 36. ow, our relevant observations, made in the appellant’s earlier appeal: (cid:28)135. Thus, the case diary contains sufficient materials for forming, at this To make what we have pointed out above explicit, we reproduce, hereinbel stage and until shown otherwise, an opinion that there are grounds for believin g that the accusations, made against the accused-respondent herein, of his invol vement in ’unlawful activities’ and ’terrorist acts’, as defined under the UA(P) Act, 1967, are prima facie true. This apart, the respondent herein is also sho wn to be involved, as a public servant, in acts of manipulation and fabrication of papers, documents and records, such as, bills, receipts, etc. and with the he lp of such manipulated and fabricated papers, documents and records, etc., commi tted dishonest misappropriation of Government fund purportedly making payment to suppliers against supply of materials, though no such materials were ever suppl ied. Thus, there are cogent incriminating materials against Redaul Hussain Khan giving rise to a reasonable belief, at this stage, that he has committed an offe nce, which is punishable, under Section 409 IPC, by even imprisonment for life. He could not have, therefore, been granted bail by the learned Special Court und er Section 437(1) Cr.PC inasmuch as a person, against whom materials exist givin g rise to a reasonable belief that he has committed an offence punishable by imp risonment for life, cannot be held, unless his case falls within the proviso to Section 437(1) Cr.PC. The fact that charge-sheet has been submitted against th e accused-respondent herein does not automatically entitle him to be allowed to go on bail, particularly, when the charge-sheet has been submitted before the ex piry of the statutory period as is applicable to the case at hand. In the pre sent case, as already indicated above, the accused-respondent has already been f urnished the copies of the materials, which the prosecution relies upon, and, he nce, his bail application has to be, obviously, considered in the light of the p owers and limitations of the Special Court. XXX 138. In the case at hand, there is nothing placed before this Court to show t hat the accusations, made against the accused, are inherently improbable nor can the accusations be said to be intrinsically unbelievable. In such circumstances , the materials on record, so long as they remain what they are, speak that the accusations are prima facie true. We have already pointed out above that the p rosecution case is based on the theory of criminal conspiracy. In the case at h and, there are serious incriminating materials showing, at this stage and, until the contrary is shown, that the accused-respondent was a part of the criminal c onspiracy, whereunder the terrorist acts, attributed to the accused-respondent a nd his co-accused, have been committed, though these acts might have been commit ted at different places and at different points of time by different persons. XXX XXX

139. In short, thus, in the face of the incriminating materials, as indicated above, the respondent was not entitled to bail under the proviso to Section 43( D)(5). In fact, the learned Special Court, in the impugned order, has made it c lear that the bail has been granted not because of the fact that there was no ma terial against the respondent herein, but on the grounds of his sickness and als o for the reason that the co-accused had been granted bail, the accused had rema ined in custody for a long time and that his liberty, on bail, was necessary not only for his treatment, but also for preparing his defence. When there was rea sonable ground to believe that the accused had indulged in commission of offence s, under Chapter IV and VI of the UA(P) Act, 1967, and other offences, including one under Section 409 IPC, which is punishable with imprisonment for life, the respondent could not have been released on bail unless his case called for invok ing the Special Court’s power under the 1st proviso to Section 437(1). 140. The State had pointed out, while objecting to the grant of bail, that th e report, dated 16.01.2010, of the doctor of orthopedic and medicine shows that the accused was being treated as an outdoor patient. In his petition, dated 18.0 1.2010, the accused prayed for making the bail absolute on the ground that the a ccused require specialised treatment. Reacting to his submissions, the State po inted out that the accused may be sent to AIIMS for thorough examination by a ne utral Board and definite opinion may be obtained about the seriousness of the re spondent’s illness along with the opinion whether his treatment is possible by p roducing him (the accused-respondent) from jail. 141. What the learned Court did by its order, dated 25.01.2010, was to direct the Superintendent, GMCH, to constitute a Board of ’concerning doctors’ to exam ine the accused thoroughly and to report. When the State had sought for examinat ion of the accused by a Board consisting of doctors, who had not examined and tr eated him in the past, the Court ought to have assigned some reasons as to why i t had not acceded to the request of the State and decided that the Board shall c onsist of those doctors, who are concerned with the treatment of the accused and who had already been examining and treating the accused. There was no harm if t he Court had obtained the opinion of the doctors, from AIIMS, as to what really the state of health of the accused was and whether treatment of the accused was possible, while keeping him in custody, specially when the NIA authority promise d to escort respondent R H Khan to AIMS for appropriate medical examination.

142. The proviso to Section 43D(5) does not permit release of an accused on b ail if the case is found to be prima facie true. The order, dated 29.01.2010, wh ereby interim order was made absolute, shows, if read carefully, that the learne d Court below treated as if the accused-respondent had all along been an indoor patient of the hospital, though it was not true inasmuch as the accused, as rev ealed from the materials on record, was discharged from the hospital on 26-12-20 09, he was to appear in the Special Court on 08-01-2010, he remained in his hous e till 06-01-2010, he was re-admitted, as an indoor patient, in the said hospita l, on 07-01-2010 and did not or could not, therefore, appear, in the Special Cou rt, on 08-01-2010.

143. The findings of the medic