High Court · 2012

02. d Mr. DK Das, learned Standing Counsel, NIA. We have heard Mr. MG Singh, learned counsel for the appellant an

03. The relevant facts briefly stated are that the appellant was arr ested by the National Investigating Agency (for short hereafter referred to as t he NIA) in connection with the aforementioned case on 10.01.2012 and is in custo dy since then till date. According to the appellant, he is wholly innocent of th e charges leveled as he has no nexus whatsoever with the banned outfit, UNLF. He has averred that he had been the Treasurer of a co-operative society, registere d under the Manipur Societies Registration Act, 1989, named, Association of Exte nsive Growers Innovative Service (for short hereafter also referred to as AEGIS) from which he has disassociated himself in the long past. The imputation of the NIA based on oral and documentary evidence purportedly collected during the inv estigation is that he along with N. Bomi Singh and Y. Brajabidhu being at the he lm of the affairs of the AEGIS took various policy decisions pertaining to the a dministration, functioning, marketing and fund raising of the firm/society and i n collusion with senior leaders of the UNLF, as disclosed in the probe and refer red to in the investigation dossier, successfully diverted the money extorted by this banned organization for funding AEGIS and, thus, created a financial base for this proscribed outfit.

04. According to the appellant, these allegations are not corroborat ed by any evidence, oral or documentary and, thus, records of the investigation vis-a-vis him are all fabricated and collusive. As AEGIS, by no means can be ide ntified with UNLF, it being a separate legal entity, he by virtue of being it’s past Treasurer, could not have been implicated in the case. The appellant has as serted that the learned Court below had totally misconstrued the facts and the l aw applicable and had rejected his application for bail erroneously.

05. The NIA, in its affidavit, while endorsing the impugned order of rejection, has detailed the disclosures in the investigation contending that th e same were adequate enough to establish the appellant’s complicity in the offen ces for which he has been charged. According to the NIA, the AEGIS, though a Fru it Processing Unit, is a front company of UNLF established, financed and adminis tered by it. That investigation had established that in pursuant of a larger con spiracy this banned outfit had made substantial investments in AEGIS has been un derlined. According to the NIA, the appellant was managing the whole affairs of AEGIS till he was arrested on 10.01.2012. The NIA has, thus, maintained that the materials collected during the investigation demonstrate, for the present, that the accusation against the appellant is true and, thus, in view of the bar unde r section 43(D) (5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short hereafter referred to as the 1967 Act), his application for bail had been right ly rejected.

06. Mr. Singh has assiduously urged with reference to the relevant e xcerpts of the impugned order that as it would apparent therefrom that the prose cution witnesses, PW 90, N. Netrojit Singh, PW 104, AK Ibochouba Singh, PW 106, B Haridas Sarma, PW 108, Monendra Singh did not incriminate the appellant in any of the activities contemplated by the sections of the 1967 Act under which he h as been charge sheeted, the learned trial Court grossly erred in law and on fact s in rejecting his application for bail. The learned counsel insistently argued that no offence against the appellant for his involvement or association with an y terrorist act contemplated by 1967 Act has even being made out prima facie and that therefore, he ought to have been granted bail, more particularly, as he is languishing in jail since 10.01.2012. Moreover, the investigation in the case b eing complete, in absence of any seizure of arms or disclosure of any material r elating the appellant with any subversive activity amounting to a terrorist act envisaged under section 15 of the 1967 Act, the bar under section 43(D) 95) ther eof was not attracted and, thus, the appellant ought to be released on bail. No other plea has been urged. Mr. Singh to reinforce his above pleas has placed rel iance on the decision of this Court in M. Londhoni Devi Vs. National Investigati on Agency, 2011 (3) GLT 805.

07. Mr. Das, to the contrary has argued that not only the materials gathered in course of the investigation, in abundance, evince the involvement of the appellant in the offence for which has been charge sheeted, a bare perusal of sections 17 and 21 of the 1967 Act would bear out the justification for the r ejection of his prayer for bail by the learned Court below.

08. We have extended our cautious consideration to the pleaded facts and the documents available along with the rival arguments advanced. A plain pe rusal of the impugned order would disclose that the pleas now urged in appeal ar e, in substance, in reiteration of those made and considered by the learned tria l Court. It noticed the relevant contents of the charge sheet bearing on the acc usations leveled against the appellant and also analyzed the statements of the a forementioned witnesses in course of the investigation in connection therewith. It also took into account, amongst others, the communications through Email disc losing the exchanges pertaining to the activities on which the NIA had laid the charge sheet against the appellant on the offences adverted to hereinabove. On a cumulative consideration of all these materials presently a 09. vailable, the learned trial Court recorded its view that in the face of the mand ate of section 43 (D) (5) of the 1967 Act, the prayer for bail, ought not to be granted as the charges brought against him appear to be prima facie true.

10. On an independent scrutiny of the materials now available before this Court, we see no cogent, convincing and weighty reason to differ from the approach, analysis and conclusions conducted/recorded by the learned trial Court . Having regard to the contents of the charge, the statement of witnesses and th e materials referred to by the learned trial Court, we are of the view, in the t eeth of the bar embodied in section 43 (D) (5) of the 1967 Act, the rejection of the prayer for bail cannot be faulted with. At this stage of the proceedings be fore the learned trial Court, when hearing on the issue of framing of charges is in progress, as is submitted at the Bar, we are of the unhesitant opinion, havi ng regard to the gravity of the offences involved that no further dialectical ex ercise vis-a-vis the evidence oral and documentary collected by the investigatin g agency by this Court in appeal is either warranted or is expedient.

11. The decision of this Court in Londhoni Devi (Supra), having rega rd to the materials available against the appellant is of no avail to him for th e present qua his prayer for bail. The appeal is thus dismissed. No costs.