Judgment · High Court · 2012

(A. K. Goel, CJ) This appeal has been preferred against order of learned Single Judge all 1. owing the writ petition of the respondent and quashing orders dated 3.9.2004, 27 .11.2004 and 5.5.2005 terminating the services of the respondent by way of remov al on the ground of concealment of material information about his antecedents, a t the time of entry into service.

#2. The respondent-writ petitioner applied for and was selected and appointe d to the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) and posted in the year 1999. L ater, it came to the notice of the department that the writ petitioner had been arrested and proceeded against in connection with cases registered with Patan Ta luka Police Station (i) C.R. No.106/97 under Section 323, 294(B), 506, (2) 144 o f IPC, and (ii) CR No.164/97 U/S 323/504/144 of IPC and 135 of B.P. Act. The said cases were compromised after entry of the writ petitioner into service. Ac cordingly, a charge-sheet was given alleging misconduct of giving false informat ion in the attestation form after his appointment. After due enquiry the charges were held to be proved and the petitioner was removed from service which order was upheld in departmental appeal in revision.

#3. ourt. Aggrieved by the order of termination, the petitioner approached this C The question that falls for consideration is as to whether because of su Learned Single Judge held that withholding of the information was a mist 4. ake of a young person which could be condoned and extreme penalty of removal fro m service was not proper. The finding recorded is as under : (cid:28)12. ch minor mistake committed by the petitioner when he was young and energetic sho uld attract extreme penalty of removal from service. The Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Police and others vs. Sandeep Kumar, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 644, has held that in such matter, approach should be to condone such indiscret ions made by young people rather than brand them as criminal for the rest of the ir life. The fact of the matter is that although a criminal proceeding was launc hed against the petitioner but eventually he was honourably acquitted from the s aid proceeding. The particular entries made by the petitioner will have to be co nsidered in the touchstone of the said fact. The petitioner at the very threshol d of his service career might have committed a minor mistake in not mentioning a bout his involvement in a criminal case, from which he was eventually acquitted but that by itself in my considered view cannot attract the extreme penalty of r emoval from service. 13. For all the aforesaid reasons, I am inclined to accept the writ petition by setting aside and quashing the impugned orders dated 3.9.2004, 27.11.2004 an d 5.5.2005. Consequently, the petitioner shall be reinstated in service maintain ing the continuity in service. However, it is made clear that the petitioner wil l not be entitled to any back wages. The respondents shall now pass appropriate orders towards reinstatement of the petitioner in service as expeditiously as po ssible but at any rate not later than 15.9.2011. (cid:29)

#5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

#6. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned Single Judge failed to take into account the principles of law propounded in various judgmen t of the Hon’ble Supreme Court including (1) Delhi Administration v. Sushil Kum ar, 1996 (11) SCC 605, (2) Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Ram Ratan Yadav, 200 3 (3) SCC 437, (3) R. Radhakrishnan v. Director General of Police, 2008 (1) SCC 660, (4) Union of India v. Bipad Bhanjan Gayen, 2008 (11) SCC 314, (5) Secreta ry, Department of Home, A.P. v. B. Chinnam Naidu, 2005 (2) SCC 746, and (6) Stat e of Haryana v. Dinesh Kumar, 2008 (3) SCC 222 which have been reiterated in a r ecent judgment in Daya Shankar Yadav v. Union of India and others, 2010 (I4) SCC 103. He also submits that the judgment relied upon by learned Single Judge is d istinguishable. Learned counsel for writ petitioner support the impugned order and also 7. points out that a cross appeal has been preferred to claim back wages. However, no arguments have been addressed in support of the said claim.

#8. We have considered the rival submissions. We are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, no interference is called for.

#9. While we appreciate the submission that suppression of material informat ion by a candidate about his antecedents at the time of entry into service may r ender him liable to be proceeded against and the employer has every right to lay down and expect norms of probity, the circumstances of the case cannot altogeth er be ignored by a public authority. The period of service already rendered at t he time to termination, the gravity of the information withheld and other releva nt facts cannot be ignored while exercising the power of taking action.

#10. In the present case, undoubtedly, the writ petitioner concealed the info rmation about his arrest and involvement in criminal cases which are said to hav e been subsequently compromised which certainly entitled the appellants to take appropriate action. However, the fact remains that he had already rendered more than four years of service when this fact came to light and the alleged offence was not very serious in nature. The nature of information withheld is not such w hich, if disclosed, would have adversely affected the writ petitioner. We are no t brushing aside the impropriety in not revealing the information which entitled the appellant to take departmental action which may be perfectly legitimate in view of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. At the same time, as held by the learned Single Judge relying upon another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme C ourt in Commissioner of Police and others vs. Sandeep Kumar, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 644, the misconduct alleged could be considered ’minor’. Question whether the mistake or impropriety was minor or serious may have to be decided from case to case and the Court may interfere only in exceptional circumstances. In the p resent case the appellant has already suffered for his default and has not been held to be entitled to any back wages. We thus, are not inclined to interfere wi th direction for reinstatement without back wages but the appellants will be at liberty to pass such other order of punishment as may be considered appropriate except removal from service.

#11. The appeal will stand disposed of accordingly.