High Court · 2014

Both Mr. D.K. Sarmah, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. B. Choudhury, the learned Standing Counsel for Education Department have been hear d extensively. 2. Aggrieved by the stoppage of the regular time scale of pay by the respo ndent authorities to her with effect from November, 2003, the petitioner is fili ng this writ petition for appropriate relief. The material facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as stipendiary teacher on a monthly stipend o f Rs.900/- per month by the order dated 19.6.1995 in terms of the direction of t his Court in C.R. No.1089/1995. She came to be posted at Biltila L.P. School. On e of the terms and conditions of the appointment is that she would be allowed th e time scale of pay after successful completion of the Assam Junior Basic Traini ng. However, the respondent authorities never sent her for the training although many other similarly situated stipendiary teachers were deputed for the trainin g. Finally, by the order date 14-2-2001 issued by the Deputy Inspector of School s, Silchar allowed her to draw the time scale of pay of ‘3,130-6,600/- per month with other allowances from January, 2001. Her happiness turned out to be tempor ary as the time scale of pay extended to her was subsequently withdrawn with eff ect from November, 2003, and the same was replaced by a monthly stipend of ‘1,80 0/- on the ground that she did not complete the Assam Basic Training. 3. According to the petitioner, it is not that she had ever refused to unde rgo the training when being deputed or offered. In the meantime, the petitioner on her own underwent training of similar nature namely, the Certificate in Prima ry Education (CPE) organized by the Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNO U) and successfully completed the same with an overall grade point of 3.66 and G rade B, which is categorized as very good qualitative level. At this stage, it m ay be noted that the Government of Assam in the Education (Elementary) Departmen t in the meantime issued the notification dated 11.4.2003 declaring teachers, wh o have worked as teachers against sanctioned posts for at least 10 years and hav e successfully completed certificate (Course) in Primary Education (CPE) conduct ed by IGNOU in (cid:28)Distance Mode (cid:29), as (cid:28)Trained Teachers (cid:29). Armed with this, the peti tioner once again approached the Respondent No. 2 requesting him to pay her the time scale of pay. Even after this, the time scale was denied to her whereupon she approached this Court in WP(C) No.1222/2009. This Court by the order dated 2 3.3.2009 closed the writ petition by leaving the petitioner to submit an appropr iate representation before the Respondent No.2 so as to enable him to take neces sary steps in terms of the order dated 11.4.2008 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.482/2003. This order was promptly communicated to the Res pondent No.2, who, however, issued the impugned order on the ground already stat ed above. Aggrieved by this, she is now initiating this second round of litigati on. 4. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the re spondent authorities cannot take advantage of their own failure to send the peti tioner for the training for denying the benefit of time scale of pay to her inas much as she has refused to undergo the basic training; it was the respondent aut horities who never deputed her for the training. According to the learned couns el for the petitioner, the refusal of the respondent No. 2 to deny the time scal e to the petitioner even after she had completed the basic training on her own i nitiative is arbitrary and absolutely unfair, more so, he is taking advantage of his own failure to depute her on training. He, therefore, submits that the impu gned is illegal and is liable to be quashed.

5. On the other hand, Mr. B. Choudhury, the learned Standing Counsel for E ducation Department submits that the SCERT does not recognize the course underta ken by the Assam Junior Basic Training as the same is not contemplated by the or der of appointment of the petitioner and, as such, the impugned order does not s uffer from any infirmity calling for interference of this Court. He further subm its that the petitioner was appointed in the year 1995 and her eligibility is to be governed the rule applicable at the time when she was appointed as stipendia ry teacher inasmuch as the eligibility criteria cannot be given retrospective ef fect. It is further contended by the learned standing counsel that there is a di fference between the Junior Basic Training imparted by the SCERT and the CPE und er the IGNOU. In the case of the Junior Basic Training Course imparted by the SC ERT, the duration of the training is for one year out of which three months is devoted for practical activities and school based activities of the teachers in their own schools with approximately one hundred seventy one working days for th e rest of the nine months training in various training centres like DIET/BTC, et c. However, in the case of CPE, the training is only for six months distance mod e training course where classes are held only on Saturdays and Sundays. He, ther efore, submits that the two training courses cannot be compared and CPE training undergone by the petitioner cannot satisfy the requirement of the training cont emplated by the order of appointment of the petitioner. He finally contends that when no specific circular/notification is issued by the Government of Assam sta ting that the stipendiary teachers and/or fixed pay teachers who had successfull y completed the training under the IGNOU are to receive regular time scale of pa y, the Respondent No. 2 cannot allow the petitioner to draw such time scale of p ay. He, therefore, strenuously argues that this writ petition is liable to be di smissed being devoid of merit. 6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties and having perused the pleadings and materials on record, I am of the view that thi s writ petition deserves to be allowed. At the outset, it may be observed that t he respondent authorities, who have the duty to depute the petitioner for underg oing the Assam Junior Basic Training, did not do so for reasons best known to th em. Having denied her the opportunity to undergo such training, they cannot use this deficiency on their part as the ground for rejection of the claim for time scale of pay to the petitioner. Secondly, the petitioner on her own had already completed the certificate course in Primary Education under IGNOU by 2008. As pe r the notification dated 11.4.2003, the Government of Assam has also declared th ose teachers working against sanctioned post for at least 10 years and have succ essfully completed the CPE conducted by the IGNOU in ’Distance Mode’ as trained teachers. In other words, by this notification, the training undergone by the pe titioner at IGNOU has conferred upon her the qualification of (cid:28)Trained Teacher (cid:29). Once the petitioner is treated as ’trained teacher’ by the operation of the sai d Notification dated 11-4-2003, there is no need for a separate notification/cir cular from the Education Department of Assam to declare again that stipendiary t eacher such as the petitioner who had completed CPE under the IGNOU, is entitled to receive regular time scale of pay like the stipendiary teachers passed the J unior Basic Training during July to December, 2008. To say the least, the view t aken by the respondent No. 2 is somewhat perverse and arbitrary: he is unnecessa rily indulging in the exercise of semantic or what they call legalistic hair spl itting. In that view of the matter, I have no hesitation to hold that the decisi on of the Respondent No. 2 in the impugned order suffers from irrationality, whi ch cannot be sustained in law. 7. For the reasons stated in the foregoing, this writ petition succeeds. Th e impugned order dated 23.3.2010 is accordingly quashed. The Respondent No. 2 is , therefore, directed to pay the salary and allowances of the petitioner on the basis of the time scale of pay admissible to her with effect November, 2003 with in a period of 3 (three) months from the date of receipt of this judgment.