Delhi High Court
Case Details
WP(C) 4880/2012 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE I.A. ANSARI THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE P.K. MUSAHARY At the root of controversy in both these writ petitions, made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, lies the amendments to sub-Rule (1) of Rule 4 of T he Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as t he ’Recruitment Rules, 1954’), by virtue of the Indian Police Service (Recruitm ent) Amendment Rules, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the ’Amendment Rules, 201 1’), which have been brought into force with effect from 29.08.2011. (ii) Prior to the coming into force of the Amendment Rules, 2011, the Recruit ment Rules, 1954, had been framed by the Central Government, in exercise of its power under Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the All India Services Act, 1951 (he reinafter referred to as the ’1951 Act’), after holding, in terms of the provisi ons of sub-Section (3) of the 1951 Act, consultation with the Governments of the States concerned for recruitment. Immediately preceding introduction of the Amendment Rules, 2011, Sub-Rul (iii) e (1) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, prescribed two modes of recruitm ent, namely, (i) by competitive examination as embodied in Rule 4(1)(a) and (ii) by promotion of substantive members of a State Police Service as embodied in Ru le 4(1)(b). In short, thus, Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 195 4, provided, immediately before the Amendment Rules, 2011, two distinct methods of recruitment to Indian Police Service, namely, (i) by competitive examination and (ii) by promotion of substantive members of a State Police Service. By Amendment Rules, 2011, Clause (b) of Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 4 of the Re (iv) cruitment Rules, 1954, was amended by sub-dividing Clause (b) into Clause (b) an d (c) and prescribing thereunder two distinct methods of recruitment inasmuch as the amended Clause (b) and (c) read, (b) by limited competitive examination, (c ) by promotion of members of a State Police Service. (v) Thus, with the coming into force of the Amendment Rules, 2011, altogethe r three distinct methods of recruitment were embodied in the Recruitment Rules, 1954, these three methods being (i) by competitive examination as provided in Ru le 4(1)(a); (ii) by a limited competitive examination as provided by the amendme nts incorporated in Rule 4 (1) (b); and (iii) by promotion of members of a State Police Service as provided pursuant to the amendment embodied in Rule 4(1) (c). By the Amendment Rules, 2011, Rule 8 had been introduced to the Recruitm (vi) ent Rules, 1954, whereby detailed provisions for holding Limited Competitive Exa mination (in short, ’LCE’) for recruitment to the Indian Police Service have bee n made, clarifying therein that LCE shall be conducted, at such intervals, as th e Central Government may, in consultation with the Union Public Service Commissi on (in short, ’the UPSC’), determine from time to time. The Regulations, relatin g to eligibility criteria and other essential conditions of recruitment to the I ndian Police Service by taking resort to the LCE, had also been framed and these Regulations had been named and styled as Indian Police Service (Appointment by Limited Competitive Examination) Regulations, 2011, (in short, ’the Amendment Re gulations 2011), which came into force on 03.03.2012 and which were laid, on 25. 04.2012, in the Parliament, in terms of the provisions of Sub-Section (2) of Sec tion 3 of the 1951 Act. Pursuant thereto, the UPSC issued an advertisement, on 1 0.03.2012, inviting applications for holding of the LCE. (vii) Though prior to the holding of the LCE by the UPSC, the provisions, made by the Central Government introducing LCE as a method of recruitment to the Ind ian Police Service, had been challenged, in Delhi High Court, by way of a Public Interest Litigation, which had given rise to Writ Petition (C) No.1610/2012 (Za kat Foundation of India Vs. Union of India and others), the writ petition was, h owever, dismissed by the Delhi High Court on 25.04.2012. Subsequent to the decis ion of the Delhi High Court, LCE was held on 20.05.2012. The Amendment Rules, 2011, which provided for LCE, had also been put to challenge, in the Supreme Court, by Writ Petition (C) No.326/2012; but t (viii) he Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition on 27.08.2012. (ix) The introduction of the LCE by the Amendment Rules, 2011, to the Recrui tment Rules, 1954, came to be challenged, by way of Original Application (in sho rt, ’OA’) No. 112/2012, in the Central Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati Bench ( hereinafter referred to as the ’learned Tribunal’), too, by six officers, who ar e members of the Assam Police Service, the challenge being, broadly stated, on t he ground that the amendments, in question, were wholly illegal inasmuch as the Amendment Rules, 2011, which were purported to have been framed in exercise of the Central Government’s power under Section 3(1) of the 1951 Act could not hav e been legally framed, for, in order to amend Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 1 954, the Central Government ought to have, in the light of the provisions of the 1951 Act read with the Recruitment Rules, 1954, consulted the Joint Cadre Autho rity (i.e., the ’Assam-Meghalaya Joint Cadre Authority’), in respect of the Stat e of Meghalaya and the State of Assam, but the same having not been done, the Am endment Rules, 2011, were not tenable in law. (x) The second ground of challenge, posed to the Amendment Rules, 2011, was that the amendments were devoid of any cogent nexus with the objects sought to be ac hieved thereunder and that the amendments could not have been made without havin g, first, made suitable amendments in the Indian Police Service (Fixation of Cad re Strength) Regulation, 1955, and the Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 . Yet another ground of challenge, made to the Amendment Rules, 2011, was that t he amendment Rules had abridged the scope of promotion of the State Police Servi ce Officers, such as, the applicants in OA No.112/2012 and persons similarly sit uated inasmuch as they might become junior to those, who were, in the State Poli ce Service, presently junior to the applicants. The Amendment Rules, 2011, were further challenged on the ground of being irrational, arbitrary, unreasonable, u nfair, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as the upper age and the lower age limits, prescribed for the ca ndidates of the LCE, were, according to the applicants-private respondents, in O A No. 112/12, not based on any validly assignable reasons. (xi) Though the applicants, in the OA No.112.2012, had sought for, inter alia, i nterim directions staying operation of the Amendment Rules, 2011, and the advert isement, dated 10.03.2012, published by the UPSC, the learned Tribunal did not g rant any such interim relief except prohibiting declaration of the result of the selection process.
Legal Reasoning
(xii) However, by its order, dated 14.09.2012, the learned Tribunal has accept ed the contentions of the applicants, in OA 112/2012, particularly, their conten tion that the Amendment Rules, 2011, were wholly illegal, the same having been m ade without the Central Government having consulted the Assam-Meghalaya Joint Ca dre Authority, in respect of the State of Assam and Meghalaya, and that the Amen dment Rules, 2011, were arbitrary and discriminatory inasmuch as the right of pr omotion, which had been conferred on the applicants by virtue of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, stood abridged by the Amendment Rules, 2011, and the amendments we re, therefore, violative of Articles 14 and 16. (xiii) Having, thus, accepted the contentions of the applicants in OA No.112/20 12, the learned Tribunal allowed the OA No. 112/2012 and quashed and set aside t he Government Notification, bearing No. GSR 660(E), dated 29.08.2011, issued by the Ministry of Personnel, Department of Personnel & Training, Government of Ind ia, whereunder Amendment Rules, 2011, had been framed and bought into force with effect from 03.03.2012. Aggrieved by the decision, so reached, the present two writ petitions, n (xvi) amely, WP(C) 4880/2012 and WP(C) 5337/2012, have been filed, under Article 226 o f the Constitution of India, putting to challenge the learned Tribunal’s decisio n, dated 14.09.2012. (xvii) It may be carefully noted that while WP(C) 4880/2012 has been instituted by the Union of India, WP(C) 5337/2012 has been instituted by some of those per sons, who had, pursuant to the Amendment Rules, 2011, and the consequential adve rtisement, dated 10.03.2012, published by the UPSC, already participated in the selection process, but who were not made parties to the OA No.112/2012. 2. We have heard Mr. H. P. Raval, learned Additional Solicitor General of I ndia, appearing for the writ petitioners in WP(C) 4880/2012 and for the responde nt Nos. 7 and 8 in WP(C) 5337/2012. We have also heard Mr. D. K. Mishra, learn ed Senior counsel, appearing for the writ petitioners in WP(C) 5337/2012, and Mr . N. Dutta, learned Senior counsel, appearing for the private respondents in bot h the writ petitions, the private respondents being the applicants in OA 112/201 2. We have further heard Mr. D. Kabir, learned counsel, appearing for the writ p etitioners in WP(C) No.5337/2012, who had not been impleaded in OA 112/2012, tho ugh, as pointed out above, they had already participated in the selection proces s pursuant to the advertisement, dated 10.03.2012, published by the UPSC. 3. In order to correctly appreciate the various contentions, which were rai sed in OA 112/2012, and the challenge posed to the decision of the learned Tribu nal by the present two writ petitions, certain facts, which are material but not in dispute, need to be, first, taken into account. BACKGROUND FACTS: 4. The history of the controversy, leading to the present two writ petition s, can be traced to the 1951 Act. At the time of enactment of the 1951 Act, ther e were two services, namely, Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service. As there was absence of provisions in Article 312 similar to the ones as included in Article 309, the Government of India was compelled to deal with m any of the matters by means of non-statutory executive orders. It was, therefore , felt necessary that Parliament should provide the requisite statutory authorit y to enable the Government of India to carry on the day-to-day management of the All India Services and also to take and promulgate decisions on matters relatin g to the recruitment and conditions of service from time to time. With this obje ct in mind, the 1951 Act came into force, with effect from 29.10.1951, in order to (as the Preamble declares) regulate the recruitment and the conditions of ser vice of persons appointed to All India Services common to the Union and the Stat es. 5. Section 3 of the 1951 Act is titled as Regulation of Recruitment and Con ditions of Service. Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 provides that the Central Gover nment may, after consultation with the Governments of the States concerned, incl uding the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and by notification in the Official Gazett e, make rules for regulating recruitment and the conditions of service of person s appointed to All India Service. 6. In exercise of powers conferred by Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the 1 951 Act, the Central Government, after consultation with the Governments of the States concerned, made the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954, whic h are, as already indicated above, being referred to as the Recruitment Rules, 1 954. Besides the Recruitment Rules, 1954, the Central Government also, in exerc ise of its powers conferred by sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the 1951 Act, mad e the Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, and the All India Service (Join t Cadre) Rules, 1972. 7. What may, now, be noted is that the Recruitment Rules, 1954, envisaged, initially, two modes of recruitment, namely, (i) by competitive examination, and (ii) by promotion of substantive members of a State Police Service. A third mode of recruitment was introduced into the Recruitment Rules, 1 8. 954, way back on 11.03.1968, in exercise of the Central Government’s power under Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the 1951 Act. The necessity of the third mode o f recruitment was felt, when a large number of Emergency Commissioned Officers a nd Short Service Commissioned Officers of the Armed Forces of India, who were co mmissioned during Indo-China war of 1962 and who were subsequently released from the service of the Armed Forces of India after cessation of Indo-China war of 1 962, became jobless, culminating into unrest and resentment amongst such officer s. In order to, therefore, provide employment/rehabilitation opportunities to su ch officers, the Central Government, vide Ministry of Home Affairs Notification No. 1/2/66-AIS(I)-B, dated 01.10.1966, introduced a new rule, namely, Rule 7 A, in the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954, which, as already indica ted above, are being referred to as the Recruitment Rules, 1954, whereby provis ions were made for recruitment by selection of persons from among released Emerg ency Commissioned Officers and Short Service Commissioned Officers. 9. Because of introduction of Rule 7A in the Recruitment Rules, 1954, the C entral Government subsequently amended Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, wi th effect from 29.01.1966 vide Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India Not ification No. 1/2/67-AIS(I)-B, dated 11.03.1968, by substituting Rule 4 (1) (aa) and, upon being so amended, the said Rule stood as follows: (cid:28)4. Method of recruitment to the Service:- (1) Recruitment to the Service, after the commencement of these rules, shall be by the following methods, namely:- by a competitive examination; (a) (aa) by selection of persons from among the Emergency Commissioned Officers a nd Short Service Commissioned Officers of the Armed Forces of the Union @ (cid:28)who w ere commissioned on or after the 1st November, 1962 but before the 10th January, 1968, or who had joined any pre-Commission training before the latter date, but who are commissioned on or after the date (cid:29) and who are released in the manner s pecified in sub-rule (1) of rule 7 A. (b) by promotion of substantive members of a State Police Service.\ (Emphasis added) As the days rolled by, the suitable, amongst the Emergency Commissioned 10. Officers and Short Service Commissioned Officers of the Armed Forces of India, w ere selected and recruited to the Indian Police Service by taking resort to the provisions of Rule 4(1)(aa) of the Recruitment Rules, 1954. With the object bein g fulfilled, Rule 4(1)(aa) came to be finally deleted by virtue of the Governmen t of India Notification No.14015/51/96-AIS-IB, dated 31.12.1997. 11. Consequently, the Recruitment Rules, 1954, once again, provided two mode s of recruitment, namely, (i) by competitive examination; and (ii) by promotion of substantive members of a State Police Service. 12. By virtue of the Amendment Rules, 2011, which, as already indicated abov e, came into force with effect from 29.08.2011, a third mode of recruitment by L imited Competitive Examination, which is being referred to as LCE, had been intr oduced by making necessary amendments in Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 4 of the Recruitme nt Rules, 1954, by insertion of a Clause (b) of Sub-Rule (1) Rule 8 and it was t he newly introduced mode of recruitment by LCE, which, as already indicated abov e, had came to be challenged in OA No.112/2012. 13. As the OA No.112/2012 has been allowed by the learned Tribunal, we have, before us, the present two writ petitions challenging the learned Tribunal’s or der, dated 14.09.2012, whereby the learned Tribunal has set aside and quashed, w e have already pointed above, the introduction of LCE by the Amendment Rules, 20 11. It is also noteworthy that before the learned Central Administrative Tri 14. bunal, Guwahati Bench, could render its decision in OA No.112/2012, the Supreme Court, as already mentioned above, dismissed the Writ Petition (Civil) No.326/20 12 on 27.08.2012, whereby the Amendment Rules, 2011, had been put to challenge. While dismissing the writ petition, the Supreme Court pointed out that the petit ioners, in WP(C) No.326/2012, had not disclosed as to how they were adversely af fected by the impugned amendments and that the persons, who had passed the Limit ed Competitive Examination (i.e., LCE) conducted by the UPSC in the month of May , 2012, and the personality test held on 06.08.2012, had not been impleaded as p arty respondents and without hearing these persons, no relief could be provided and that the petitioners should have had, first, availed the remedy by filing an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Notwithstanding the fact that those, who had already passed written exam 15. ination, held in the month of May, 2012, and who had already appeared in the per sonality test, held on 06.08.2012, were not been impleaded as party-respondents to the OA No.112/2012, the learned Central Administrative Tribunal has neverthel ess allowed the OA No. 112/2012 and, as already indicated above, set aside and quashed the impugned Amendment Rules, 2011, whereby LCE, as a third mode of recr uitment, had been introduced and the Amendment Regulations, 2011, stood notified , on 03.03.2012, embodying therein various eligibility criteria for recruitment by means of LCE. 16. As the petitioners in WP(C) No.5337/2012 had not been made parties to OA No.112/2012, they, having participated in the newly selected process of LCE, ha ve been adversely affected by the impugned decision of the learned Tribunal, the ir writ petition, namely, WP(C) 5337/2012, is as much relevant as the writ petit ion, which the Union of India has filed and which has given rise to WP(C) No.488 0/2012. 17.
Decision
While the petitioners, in the writ petition, namely, WP(C) No.4880/2012, filed by the Union of India are hereinafter referred to as the ’State petitione rs’, the petitioners, in WP(C) No.5337/2012, are hereinafter referred to as the ’private petitioners’; whereas the applicants, in OA No.112/2012, are hereinaft er referred to as the applicants-private respondents. 18. Before proceeding further and entering into the merit of the present two writ petitions and the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned order , dated 14.09.2012, passed, in OA No.112/2012, we may, perhaps, need to point ou t, once again, that the constitutional validity of the Amendment Rules, 2011, wh ich came into effect on 29.08.2011, was challenged in OA No.112/2012 along with the validity of the Amendment Regulations, 2011, framed by a notification, dated 03.03.2012, and the advertisement, dated 10.03.2012, published by the UPSC for filling up the posts by limited competitive examination, i.e., LCE. 19. The learned Central Administrative Tribunal has, as already mentioned ab ove, allowed the OA and struck down the impugned Amendment Rules, 2011, and set aside the advertisement, dated 10.03.2012, by its impugned order, dated 14.09.20 12. The grounds, on which the learned Central Administrative Tribunal has interf ered with the impugned rules and the advertisement, are as under: (a). The Joint Cadre Authority was not consulted; (b). Inclusion of the additional category of officers as a feeder cat egory to Indian Police Service is devoid of any cogent nexus with the object sou ght to be achieved; (c). Upper age limit and lower the limit prescribed for limited compe titive examination are discriminatory; (d). Rule 4(1)(b) of the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules co nfers right on the applicant for being considered for promotion to the Indian Po lice Cadre. Abridgement of such a right is discriminatory; (e). Chances to be considered for promotion of the applicant would b e bleak as per the amendment rules; and (f). In the opinion of the learned Tribunal, therefore, the amendment s are absolutely arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, discriminatory and violative o f Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 20. Considering the fact that both these writ petitions, made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, have put to challenge the learned Tribunal’s d ecision, in OA No.112/2012, arrived at on 14.09.2012, it necessarily implies tha t the petitioners seek from this Court a writ in the nature of certiorari for th e purpose of correction of the records of the Tribunal by setting aside the orde r, dated 14.09.2012, passed by the learned Tribunal. 21. Let us, therefore, take into account the various grounds on which the le arned Tribunal has chosen to interfere with the impugned amendments introduced b y the Amendment Rules, 2011. Was consultation, in the present case, with the Joint Cadre Authority im perative before making amendments of Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954 or, in other words, whether the Amendment Rules, 2011, were bad in law for having been made in exercise of the Central Government’s power conferred by Sect ion 3(1) of All India Service Act, 1951, but without consulting the Joint Cadre Authority? 22. In view of the fact that it was the scheme of LCE, introduced by making amendment in Clause (b) of Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954 , which had generated the heat and led the applicants-private respondents herein to institute OA No.112/2012, let us, in order to clearly understand as to what change the amendments had brought about in Clause (b) of Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 4 Before making of the Amendment Rules, 2011, Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 4 of th of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, reproduce Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 4 before it (i.e. , Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 4) underwent amendments by the impugned Amendment Rules, 2011. 23. e Recruitment Rules, 1954, read as under: (cid:28)Method of recruitment to the service: 4(1) Recruitment to the Service, after th e commencement of these rules, shall be by the following methods, namely:- 4(1)(a) by a competitive examination; 4(1)(aa) [Deleted] 4(1)(b) by promotion of substantive members of a State Police Service. (cid:29) 24. Before coming to the change introduced by the impugned Amendment Rules, 2011, it is, once again, necessary to point out that Rule 4(1(aa) was introduced , as already indicated above, on 11.03.1968, in order to accommodate a large num ber of Emergency Commissioned Officers and Short Service Commissioned Officers o f the Armed Forces of India, who were commissioned during Indo-China war of 1962 and who were subsequently released from the service of the Armed Forces of Indi a after cessation of Indo-China war of 1962, and, in course of time, when suitab le ones from amongst the Emergency Commissioned Officers and Short Service Commi ssioned Officers of the Armed Forces of India had already been selected and recr uited by taking resort to the provisions of Rule 4(1)(aa) of the Recruitment Rul es, 1954, Rule 4(1)(aa) came to be deleted by the Government of India’s notifica tion, dated 03.12.1997, leaving Rule 1(a) and Rule 1(b) intact. With the deleti on of Rule 1(aa), Rule 1(a) and Rule 1(b) of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, read a s under: (cid:28)4(1)(a) by a competitive examination; 4(1)(aa) [Deleted] 4(1)(b) by promotion of substantive members of a State Police Service. (cid:29) 25. The impugned Amendment Rules, 2011, had, as already indicated above, div ided Clause (b) of Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, into t wo parts, by laying down two distinct modes of recruitment, namely, (i) by limit ed competitive examination and (ii) by promotion of members of a State Police se rvice. 26. Thus, with the amendment, so introduced by the impugned Amendment Rules, 2011, Rule 4(1) would, now, if valid, read as under : (cid:28)Method of recruitment to the service: 4(1) Recruitment to the Service, after th e commencement of these rules, shall be by the following methods, namely:- 4(1) by a competitive examination. 4(1)(aa) [deleted] 4(1)(b) by limited competitive examination. 4(1)(c) by promotion of members of a State Police Service. (cid:29) 27. reunder Rule 4(1)(aa) came to be deleted, have already been pointed out above. We may also hasten to point out, once again, that the circumstances, whe 28. A comparative reading of Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules , 1954, prior to the amendment thereof by the impugned Amendment Rules, 2011, vi s-à-vis Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 4 as contained in the impugned Amendment Rules, 201 1, would clearly show that while Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules , 1954, had prescribed, immediately preceding the impugned Amendment Rules, 2011 , two modes of recruitment, namely, (a) by a competitive examination and (b) by promotion of substantive members of a State Police Service; the impugned Amendme nt Rules, 2011, have, now, made valid 3 (three) modes of recruitment possible, t hese 3 (three) modes of recruitment being (a) by a competitive examination; (b) by limited competitive examination; and (c) by promotion of members of a State P olice Service. 29. It is, however, pertinent to note, now, that it was not the amendment of Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, by virtue of the Amendme nt Rules, 2011, prescribing LCE as one of the modes of recruitment, which had ma de the applicants-private respondents herein aggrieved and taken them to the lea rned Tribunal. Far from this, it is the applicants-private respondents’ interpre tation of Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, which had reall y led the applicants-private respondents to the learned Tribunal. 30. No wonder, therefore, that challenging the validity of the amendments of Rule 4(1)(b) of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, made by the impugned Amendment Rul es, 2011, the petitioners contended, in OA No.112/2012, and they have also conte nded before this Court that the impugned Amendment Rules, 2011, are invalid inas much as the introduction of the LCE as one of the modes of recruitment is in bre ach of Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954. 31. In support of their above contention, the applicants-private respondents had contended before the learned Tribunal and they contend before this Court, t oo, that introduction of LCE as a third mode of recruitment is bad in law, beca use the Central Government, before making the amendments in Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, by the impugned Amendment Rules, 2011, ought to have consulted , but has not consulted , the Joint Cadre Authority, though re quired by Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954. 32. In order to sustain their objection to the Amendment Rules, 2011, the a pplicants-private respondents, as already indicated above, refer to, and rely up on, Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, which read as under: (cid:28)4(2) Subject to the provisions of these rules, (a) the method or methods of recruitment to be adopted for the purpose of fillin g up any particular vacancy or vacancies as may be required to be filled during any particular period of recruitment, shall be determined by the Central Governm ent in consultation with the Commission and the State Government concerned: (b) the number of persons to be recruited by each method shall be determined on each occasion by the Central Government in consultation with the State Governmen t concerned.\ 33. Coupled with the above, referring to Rule 2(f) of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, the applicants-private respondents contend that the expression ’State Gov ernment concerned’, in relation to a Joint Cadre, means the Joint Cadre Authorit y and a Joint Cadre, in the light of Rule 2(b) of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, m eans a Joint Cadre as defined in the Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, which is hereinafter referred to as the Cadre Rules, 1954. 34. There is no doubt, as contended by the applicants-private respondents, t hat the expression ’State Government concerned’, in relation to Joint Cadre, mea ns a Joint Cadre Authority. This is clearly reflective from Rule 2(f) of the Rec ruitment Rules, 1954, which states as under : (cid:28)2(f) ’State Government concerned’, in relation to a Joint Cadre, means the Join t Cadre Authority. (cid:29) 35. If Rule 4(2) of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, is read, in the light of cl ause (f) of Rule 2, what becomes clear is that Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Rec ruitment Rules, 1954, requires the Central Government to consult, apart from the Commission (i.e., UPSC), the Joint Cadre Authority in relation to a Joint Cadre . 36. As the States of Assam and Meghalaya have a Joint Cadre, the consultatio n, in the light of clause (a) of Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4, would mean consultation with the Joint Cadre Authority. 37. The learned Tribunal took the view that the Amendment Rules, 2011, were bad in law, because the Central Government had not consulted the Joint Cadre Au thority in the context of Assam and Meghalaya, though such a consultation was, i n the light of the provisions of sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules , 1954, necessary. 38. For taking the above view, the learned Tribunal has pointed out that Rul e 2(f) of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, prescribes that the expression ’State Gov ernment concerned’, in relation to Joint Cadre, means Joint Cadre Authority and, as such, prescription of Section 3 of the All India Services Act, 1951, has not been complied with inasmuch as consultation with the Joint Cadre Authority had not taken placed in the present case, though so required. The relevant observati ons, appearing in this regard, at para 24 of the impugned order of the learned T ribunal, read as under: (cid:28)24. It is well understood rule of law sanctified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court i n the case of Narbada Prasad Vs. Chhaganlal & others, reported in AIR 1969 SC 39 5, that if a thing is to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all and other modes of compliance are excluded. Indisputably, Joint Cadre Authority was not consulted. Section 3 of the All India Services Act , 1951, prescribes regulation of recruitment and conditions of service. It is st ipulated in sub-section (1) of Section 3 that the Central Government may, after consultation with the Governments of the State concerned and by notification in the official Gazette make rules for regulation of recruitment and the conditions of service of persons appointed to an All India Service. In the IPS (Recruitmen t) Rules, 1954, Rule 2(f) prescribes ’State Government concerned’, in relation t o a Joint Cadre, means the ’Joint Cadre Authority’. As such, as per prescription of Section 3 of the All India Services Act, 1951, consultation with the Joint C adre Authority in the context of Assam-Meghalaya is a necessary requirement. Whi le incorporating the present amendment, this requirement was not complied with f or the reasons best known to the respondents. The rule cannot be sacrificed at t he alter of administrative convenience or celerity. For convenience and justice, as Lord Atkin felicitously put it, are often not on speaking terms. When consul tation is mandatory, its infraction renders the action illegal. (cid:29) (Emphasis added) 39. In order to determine if what the learned Tribunal has concluded is or i s not correct, it is imperative that the provisions, embodied in Section 3 of th e All India Services Act, 1951, which is being referred to as the ’1951 Act’, be taken note of. Section 3 is, therefore, reproduced below: (cid:28)3. Regulation of recruitment and conditions of service. (1) The Central Government may, after consultation with the Governments of the S tates concerned, including the State of Jammu and Kashmir and by notification in the Official Gazette make rules for the regulation of recruitment, and the cond itions of service of persons appointed to an All-India Service. (1-A) The power to make rules conferred by this section shall include the power to give retrospective effect from a date not earlier than the date of commenceme nt of this Act, to the rules or any of them but no retrospective effect shall be given to any rule so as to prejudicially affect the interests of any person to whom such rule may be applicable. (2) Every rule made by the Central Government under this section and every regul ation made under or in pursuance of any such rule, shall be laid., as soon as ma y be after such rule or regulation is made, before each House of Parliament whil e it is in session for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in o ne session or in two or more successive sessions and if before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification in such rule or regulation or both Houses agree that such rule or regulation should not be made, the rule or regul ation thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as t he case may be, so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be wi thout prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule or r egulation. (cid:29) (Emphasis is added) 39a. Though, at a little latter stage of this judgment, we would revert, once again, to the provisions embodied in Section 3 of the 1951 Act, it needs to be noted, for the present, that Section 3 of the 1951 Act requires the Central Gove rnment to consult the ’Government of the State concerned’ in order to make Rules for regulation of recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to an all India service. The expression used in Section 3, namely, ’Governments of the States concerned’, is quite distinct and different from the expression ’Sta te Government concerned’, which expression appears in Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954. The two expressions, namely, ’Governments of the St ates concerned’ and ’State Government concerned’, are not one and the same. Whil e the State Government concerned is an expression, which appears in the Recruitm ent Rules, 1954, and it has been defined, with the help of Rule 2(f), as Joint C adre Authority in relation to a Joint Cadre, the expression, ’Governments of the States concerned’, is used in Section 3 of the 1951 Act without prescribing or describing therein that the expression, ’Governments of the States concerned’, w ould mean, in a case of Joint Cadre, a Joint Cadre Authority. 40. The expression ’State Government concerned’, which appears in the Recrui tment Rules, 1954, has to be, therefore, read by limiting its meaning, as define d by Rule 2(f), to the Recruitment Rules, 1954, and the said expression, namely, ’State Government concerned’, cannot be extracted from Recruitment Rules, 1954, and implanted in place of the expression, ’Governments of the States concerned’ , which expression has been used in Section 3 of the All India Services Act, 195 1 (i.e., the 1951 Act). 41. We may pause here to point out that the Recruitment Rules, 1954, stand b orn in exercise of the power conferred on the Central Government by Section 3 of the 1951 Act and not vice versa. Consequently, the expression ’State Government concerned’, appearing in the Recruitment Rules, 1954, has to be read, while int erpreting the Recruitment Rules, 1954, and the interpretation, attributed to the expression, ’State Government concerned’, cannot be imported and read into Sect ion 3 of the All India Services Act, 1951, which uses an entirely different expr ession, namely, ’Governments of the States concerned’. 42. The Joint Cadre Authority, in the case of a Joint Cadre, is, therefore, required to be consulted by the Central Government, in the light of the provisio ns of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, when the Central Government is requited to de termine the method or methods of recruitment, which it has to adopt for the purp ose of filling up of any particular vacancy or vacancies, which may be required to be filled during any particular period of recruitment. Clause (b) of Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 of Recruitment Rules, 1954, further lays down that the number of persons to be recruited by each method shall be determined, on each occasion, b y the Central Government in consultation with the State Government concerned. Thus, Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, does not em 43. power the Central Government to prescribe any new method or methods of recruitme nt other than ones, which may stand already prescribed in Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, by the Central Government in exercise of its po wer under Section 3 of the 1951 Act upon consultation with the ’Governments of t he States concerned’. 44. The power to prescribe mode or methods of recruitment, in the light of t he provisions of Section 3 of the 1951 Act, vests in the Central Government, tho ugh this power has to be exercised after consulting the ’Governments of the Stat es concerned’. Within the prescribed methods of recruitment, what method has to be resorted in order to fill up a particular vacancy, on a given occasion, is f or the Central Government to decide after consulting the UPSC and also the ’Stat e Government concerned’, which expression, in relation to a Joint Cadre, would o bviously mean Joint Cadre Authority. 45. The Joint Cadre Authority, as already indicated above, came into existen ce by framing of Rules pursuant to sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the 1951 Act, the rule being All India Services (Joint Cadre) Rules, 1972. Thereafter, other connected rules were amended by incorporating and defining the word Joint Cadre Authority. 46. What is of immense importance to note is that Section 3(1) of the 1951 A ct was not amended in order to make Joint Cadre Authority as an authority requir ed to be consulted by the Central Government, while framing rules in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 3(1) of the 1951 Act. Logically speaking, ther efore, Section 3(1) of the 1951 Act casts no obligation on the Central Governmen t to consult Joint Cadre Authority. The learned Tribunal fell into serious error in reading the definition o 47. f the expression, ’Joint Cadre Authority’, while determining the question as to whom the Central Government is required to consult at the time of framing rules in exercise of its powers under Section 3(1) of the 1951 Act. The learned Tribu nal also fell into error in omitting to notice the fact that Rule 2(f) of the Re cruitment Rules, 1954, was added after framing of the All India Services (Joint Cadre) Rules, 1972, and that the definition of the expression, ’Joint Cadre Auth ority’, as contained in Rule 2(f) of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, was added and no corresponding change was introduced, even thereafter, into the provisions of Section 3(1) of the 1951 Act. While dealing with the above aspect of the case, it is also noteworthy t 48. hat Rule (2) of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, which embodies various definitions, including the definition of ’Joint Cadre’, clearly states that the definitions are to be read as given in these rules unless the context otherwise requires. The expression Joint Cadre Authority, which appears in the Recruitment R 49. ules, 1954, (which is a delegated piece of legislation) cannot be read into the statutory provisions of Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the All India Services A ct, 1951 (i.e., the 1951 Act’) for, such a reading would amount to amendment of Section 3 of the All India Services Act, 1951, which is impermissible in law ina smuch as such an amendment can be made only by a competent legislature, namely, the Parliament, and not by a process of interpretation, which is, otherwise also , alien to the rules of interpretation of parent as well as delegated legislatio ns. 50. It needs to be borne in mind that the Recruitment Rules, 1954, have been made by the Central Government in exercise of its power conferred by Section 3( 1) of the parent enactment, namely, All India Services Act, 1951, and the presen tly impugned Amendment Rules, 2011, have also been made by the Central Governmen t in exercise of its power conferred by Section 3(1) of the same parent enactmen t, namely, All India Services Act, 1951. For the purpose of making the Recruitm ent Rules, 1954, the Central Government was, as we have already discussed above, required to consult the ’Governments of the States concerned’ and not the Joint Cadre Authority. Similarly, for the purpose of the amendments, in question, na mely, Amendment Rules, 2011, consultation with ’Governments of the States concer ned’ was required and no consultation with the ’State Government concerned’ was required, which, in the light of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, in relation to a J oint Cadre, means a Joint Cadre Authority. 51. To put it a little differently, Rule 4(2) of the Recruitment Rules, 1954 , as rightly pointed out by Mr. Raval, learned ASG, has very limited scope inasm uch as Rule 4(2) of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, has to be resorted to by the Ce ntral Government at the time of adopting the method or methods of recruitment, w hich may have already been prescribed, for the purpose of filling up of any vaca ncy or vacancies during a given period of recruitment. 52. The learned ASG is also correct in his submission that Sub-Rule (2) of R ule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, mandates a consultation, which is wholly d istinct and different from the consultation envisaged in Section 3(1) of the 195 1 Act inasmuch as consultation, as envisaged by Section 3(1), is while making Ru les and/or Regulations for the purpose of formulating the process of recruitment and conditions of service, while consultation, in respect of Rule 4(2), would l imit itself to the filling up of vacancies by adopting the method or methods of recruitment, which may have been prescribed by making Rules and Regulations by t he Central Government in exercise of its power conferred by Section 3(1) of the 1951 Act. 53. Thus, though the expression ’consultation’ appears in the Recruitment Ru les, 1954, as well as Section 3 of the 1951 Act, consultees are quite distinct a nd different inasmuch as consultation, spoken of by Section 3 of the 1951 Act, d oes not envisage consultation with the Joint Cadre Authority and it is for this reason that two distinct expressions have been used in the parent enactment, nam ely, the 1951 Act, on the one hand, and the sub-ordinate legislation, namely, th e Recruitment Rules, 1954, on the other, the parent Act, namely, the 1951 Act, u sing the expression ’Governments of the States concerned’ and the subordinate le gislation, namely, the Recruitment Rules, 1954, using the expression ’State Gove rnment concerned’. 54. The above position becomes clearer from the fact that while consultation with the ’Governments of the States concerned’, as spoken of by Section 3(1), d oes not envisage any ’consultation’ with the UPSC, Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, does envisage ’consultation’ by the Central Government not only with the ’State Government concerned’, but also with the UPSC. 55. In short, the term, State Governments concerned, defined by Rule 2(f) of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, as Joint Cadre Authority, in relation to a Joint C adre, is limited in its scope and application to the Rules alone and does not ex tend to the parent legislation, i.e., the 1951 Act. 56. Resultantly, therefore, the definition, which Rule 2(f) of the Recruitme nt Rules, 1954, attributes to the expression ’State Government concerned’, canno t be referred to, or relied upon, while interpreting the expression ’Governments of the States concerned’, which appears in Section 3(1) of the 1951 Act. This i nference is strengthened from the fact that Clause (b) of Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954, provides that the number of persons be recruite d by each method shall be determined, on each occasion, by the Central Governmen t in consultation with the UPSC and the State Government concerned. 57. In fact, the Cadre Rules, 1954, which the applicants-private respondents have relied upon, is, one may point out, once again, framed by the Central Gove rnment by virtue of the powers conferred on it by Section 3(1) of the 1951 Act a fter consultation with the ’Governments of the States concerned’ and not with th e ’State Government concerned’, which expression has a specific meaning attribut ed to it by virtue of Rule 2(f) of the Recruitment Rules, 1954. 58. In answer to the question, posed above, one, therefore, cannot but hold that no ’consultation’ in making the impugned Amendment Rules, 2011, was require d to be made by the Central Government with the UPSC and/or the Joint Cadre Auth ority, wherever a Joint Cadre Authority exists. Far from this, ’consultation’, in the light of the provisions of Section 3(1) of the 1951 Act, was needed, for framing the impugned Amendment Rules, 2011, with the ’Governments of the States concerned’ and none else. 59. We, now, advert to yet another aspect of ’consultation’, which has been passionately advanced before us on behalf of the applicants-private respondents. In this regard, we may point out that though the learned Tribunal has not discu ssed if any consultation with the State Governments was done in the present case and, if so, whether such consultation was effective or not, Mr. N. Dutta, learn ed Senior counsel, has sought to assail the Amendment Rules, 2011, on the ground that the Central Government did not even consult the Governments of the States concerned in the true letter and spirit of sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the 1 951 Act. 60. Strictly speaking, when it had not been raised before the learned Tribun al and the learned Tribunal, too, has not dealt with the question as to whether any consultation with the State Government had taken place before bringing into force the impugned Amendment Rules, 2011, it is not necessary for us to deal wit h this aspect of the case. 61. Be that as it may, in order to effectively dispose of the writ petitions , we have heard the learned counsel for the parties concerned on the question if any consultation had taken place between the Central Government and the ’Govern ments of the State Governments’, in terms of sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the 1951 Act, before the Amendment Rules, 2011, were framed and, if so, whether suc h consultation was effective and adequate? 62. While considering the above aspect of the case, it needs to be borne in mind that the word ’consultation’ has been used in the Constitution as well as i n statutes and in delegated legislations in different contexts. No uniform mean ing can be attributed to the word ’consultation’ appearing in all the provisions of the Constitution, statutes, rules and regulations. The word ’consultation’ is seen to bear different meaning in different situations. 63. As an illustration, one may refer to Article 217 and Article 233 of the Constitution of India. In the case of appointment of a judicial officer or of a Judge of the High Court or of persons to be appointed to a judicial tribunal, consultation has been, by and large, construed as mandatory; whereas the word, ’ consultation’, in some cases, has also been construed as directory. Mr. D. K. M ishra, learned Senior counsel, is not incorrect, in this regard, when, in order to show that the word, consultation, cannot have the same meaning in all situati ons, refers to, and relies upon, the cases of N. Kannadasan Vs. Ajay Khose, repo rted in (2009) 7 SCC 1, Chandramouleswar Prasad Vs. Patna High Court, reported i n (1969) 3 SCC 56, Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association Vs. Union of In dia, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 441, State of UP Vs. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava (AIR 1957 SC 912) and the Indian Administrative Service (SCS) Association Vs Union o In N. Kannadasan (supra), the Supreme Court has observed, at paragraph 5 f India, reported in 1993 Suppl (1) SCC 730. 64. 0 and 156, as follows: (cid:28)50. A Chief Justice of a High Court, thus, before making recommendations for hi s appointment in terms of Section 16 of the Act, must satisfy himself that the r ecommendee has/had those basic qualities. While making recommendations the Chief Justice performs a constitutional duty. If while discharging his duty, he finds a former Judge to be ineligible, the question of his being considered for appoi ntment would not arise. If such a person cannot be recommended being unfit or in eligible to hold the post, it would not be correct to contend that despite the s ame he fulfils the eligibility criteria. Whether the condition (cid:28)has been a Judge (cid:29) is not necessary to be construed for the purpose of Article 217 of the Constit ution of India, it is required for the purpose of interpreting Section 16 of the Act as to whether he should be recommended for being appointed as a Chairman of the State Commission. xxx xxx xxx 156. It is difficult to accept the submission of Mr K.K. Venugopal that such (cid:28)co nsultation (cid:29) would not be (cid:28)concurrence (cid:29) as like the Collegium in the matter of ma king recommendation for appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts where the view of the Collegium shall have the primacy. For appointment a s President of the State Commission, the Chief Justice of the High Court shall h ave the primacy and thus the term (cid:28)consultation (cid:29) even for the said purpose shall mean (cid:28)concurrence (cid:29) only. (cid:29) From the case of N. Kannadasan (supra), what can be clearly gathered is In Chandramouleswar Prasad (supra), the Supreme Court observed, at parag (Emphasis is added) 65. that ’consultation’ was interpreted to mean concurrence. 66. raph 7, as under: (cid:28)7. The question arises whether the action of the Government in issuing the noti fication of October 17, 1968 was in compliance with Article 233 of the Constitut ion. No doubt the appointment of a person to be a District Judge rests with the Governor but he cannot make the appointment on his own initiative and must do so in consultation with the High Court. The underlying idea of the article is that the Governor should make up his mind after there has been a deliberation with t he High Court. The High Court is the body which is intimately familiar with the efficiency and quality of officers who are fit to be promoted as District Judges . The High Court alone knows their merits as also demerits. This does not mean t hat the Governor must accept whatever advice is given by the High Court but the Article does require that the Governor should obtain from the High Court its vie ws on the merits or demerits of persons among whom the choice of promotion is to be limited. If the High Court recommends A while the Governor is of opinion tha t B’s claim is superior to A’s it is incumbent on the Governor to consult the Hi gh Court with regard to its proposal to appoint B and not A. If the Governor is to appoint B without getting the views of the High Court about B’s claims vis-a- vis A’s to promotion, B’s appointment cannot be said to be in compliance with Ar ticle 233 of the Constitution. The correspondence noted above which passed betwe en the High Court and the Secretariat from 28th September, 1968 to 7th October, 1968 shows that whereas the High Court had definitely taken the view that Misra as the senior Additional District and Sessions Judge should be directed to take charge from Chakravarty, the Government was not of the view that according to th e records in its appointment department Misra was the senior officer at Shahabad among the Additional District and Sessions Judges. Government never suggested t o the High Court that the petitioner was senior to Misra or that the petitioner had a better claim than Misra’s and as such was the person fit to be appointed t emporarily as District and Sessions Judge. Before the notification of October 17 , 1968 Government never attempted to ascertain the views of the High Court with regard to the petitioner’s claim to the temporary appointment or gave the High C ourt any indication of its own views with regard thereto excepting recording dis sent about Misra’s being the senior officer in the cadre of Additional District and Sessions Judges at Arrah. Consultation with the High Court under Article 233 is not an empty formality. So far as promotion of officers to the cadre of Dist rict Judges is concerned the High Court is best fitted to adjudge the claims and merits of persons to be considered for promotion. The Governor cannot discharge his function under Article 233 if he makes an appointment of a person without a scertaining the High Court’s views in regard thereto. It was strenuously contend ed on behalf of the State of Bihar that the materials before the Court amply dem onstrate that there had been consultation with the High Court before the issue o f the notification of October 17, 1968. It was said that the High Court had give n the Government its views in the matter; the Government was posted with all the facts and there was consultation sufficient for the purpose of Article 233. We cannot accept this. Consultation or deliberation is not complete or effective be fore the parties thereto make their respective points of view known to the other or others and discuss and examine the relative merits of their views. If one pa rty makes a proposal to the other who has a counter proposal in his mind which i s not communicated to the proposer the direction to give effect to the counter p roposal without anything more, cannot be said to have been issued after consulta tion. In our opinion, the notification of October 17, 1968 was not in compliance with Article 233 of the Constitution. In the absence of consultation the validi ty of the notification of October 17, 1968 cannot be sustained. (cid:29) (Emphasis is added) From the decision in Chandramouleswar Prasad (supra), it is clear that ’ 67. consultation’ requires exchange of information and views between the persons inv olved in the process of ’consultation’. 68. In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association vs. Union of India, rep orted in (1993) 4 SCC 441, the word ’consultation’, appearing in Article 217, ha s been construed as ’short of concurrence’. The relevant observations, appearin g at para 125, 197 and 450, read as under: (cid:28)125. A five-Judge Bench of this Court in Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court while interpreting the word ’consultation’ as appearing in Article 233 of the Constitution has observed as follows: (cid:28)Consultation with the High Court under Article 233 is not an empty formality. S o far as promotion of officers to the cadre of District Judges is concerned the High Court is best fitted to adjudge the claims and merits of persons to be cons idered for promotion. The Governor cannot discharge his function under Article 2 33 if he makes an appointment of a person without ascertaining the High Court’s views in regard thereto. It was strenuously contended on behalf of the State of Bihar that the materials before the Court amply demonstrate that there had been consultation with the High Court before the issue of the notification of October 17, 1968. It was said that the High Court had given the Government its views in the matter; the Government was posted with all the facts and there was consulta tion sufficient for the purpose of Article 233. We cannot accept this. Consultat ion or deliberation is not complete or effective before the parties thereto make their respective points of view known to the other or others and discuss and ex amine the relative merits of their views. If one party makes a proposal to the o ther who has a counter-proposal in his mind which is not communicated to the pro poser, the direction to give effect to the counter-proposal without anything mor e, cannot be said to have been issued after consultation. (cid:29) *** 197. The foregoing considerable deliberation leads to an inexorable conclusion t hat the opinion of the Chief Justice of India in the process of constitutional c onsultation in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court and the High Courts as well as transfer of Judges from one High Court to a *** *** nother High Court is entitled to have the right of primacy. In sum, the above lo gical conclusion and our social sense dictate: Like the Pope, enjoying supremacy in the ecclesiastical and temporal affairs, th e CJI being the highest judicial authority, has a right of primacy, if not supre macy, to be accorded to his opinion on the affairs concerning the ’Temple of Jus tice’. It is a right step in the right direction and that step alone will ensure optimum benefits to the society. xxx xxx xxx 450. It is obvious, that the provision for consultation with the Chief Justice o f India and, in the case of the High Courts, with the Chief Justice of the High Court, was introduced because of the realisation that the Chief Justice is best equipped to know and assess the worth of the candidate, and his suitability for appointment as a superior Judge; and it was also necessary to eliminate politica l influence even at the stage of the initial appointment of a Judge, since the p rovisions for securing his independence after appointment were alone not suffici ent for an independent judiciary. At the same time, the phraseology used indicat ed that giving absolute discretion or the power of veto to the Chief Justice of India as an individual in the matter of appointments was not considered desirabl e, so that there should remain some power with the executive to be exercised as a check, whenever necessary. The indication is, that in the choice of a candidat e suitable for appointment, the opinion of the Chief Justice of India should hav e the greatest weight; the selection should be made as a result of a participato ry consultative process in which the executive should have power to act as a mer e check on the exercise of power by the Chief Justice of India, to achieve the c onstitutional purpose. Thus, the executive element in the appointment process is reduced to the minimum and any political influence is eliminated. It was for th is reason that the word ’consultation’ instead of ’concurrence’ was used, but th at was done merely to indicate that absolute discretion was not given to anyone, not even to the Chief Justice of India as an individual, much less to the execu tive, which earlier had absolute discretion under the Government of India Acts. (cid:29) (Emphasis is added) 69. As already indicated above, the Supreme Court, in Supreme Court Advocate s-on-Record Association (supra), while interpreting the word ’consultation’, hel d that the word ’consultation’, appearing in Article 233 of the Constitution, co nveys short of concurrence. However, while interpreting the word ’consultation’ the Supreme Court, i 70. n State of UP vs. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava (AIR 1957 SC 912), held that the word ’consultation’, appearing in Article 320(3), is not mandatory. The relevant ob servations, made in Manbodhan Lal Srivastava (supra), read as under: (cid:28)7. Article 320 does not come under Chapter I headed (cid:28)Services (cid:29) of Part XIV. It occurs in Chapter II of that part headed (cid:28)Public Service Commissions (cid:29). Articles 320 and 323 lay down the several duties of a Public Service Commission. Article 321 envisages such (cid:28)additional functions (cid:29) as may be provided for by Parliament o r a State Legislature. Articles 320 and 323 begin with the words (cid:28)It shall be th e duty & & & & &. (cid:29), and then proceed to prescribe the various duties and functions of the Union or a State Public Service Commission, such as to conduct examinations for appointments; to assist in framing and operating schemes of joint recruitme nt; and of being consulted on all matters relating to methods of recruitment or principles in making appointments to Civil Services and on all disciplinary matt ers affecting a civil servant. Perhaps, because of the use of the word (cid:28)shall (cid:29) i n several parts of Article 320, the High Court was led to assume that the provis ions of Article 320(3)(c) were mandatory, but in our opinion, there are several cogent reasons for holding to the contrary. In the first place, the proviso to A rticle 320, itself, contemplates that the President or the Governor, as the case may be, (cid:28)may make regulations specifying the matters in which either generally, or in any particular class of case or in particular circumstances, it shall not be necessary for a Public Service Commission to be consulted. (cid:29) The words quoted above give a clear indication of the intention of the Constitution makers that they did envisage certain cases or classes of cases in which the Commission need not be consulted. If the provisions of Article 320 were of a mandatory characte r, the Constitution would not have left it to the discretion of the Head of the Executive Government to undo those provisions by making regulations to the contr ary. If it had been intended by the makers of the Constitution that consultation with the Commission should be mandatory, the proviso would not have been there, or, at any rate, in the terms in which it stands. That does not amount to sayin g that it is open to the Executive Government, completely to ignore the existenc e of the Commission or to pick and choose cases in which it may or may not be co nsulted. Once, relevant regulations have been made, they are meant to be followe d in letter and in spirit and it goes without saying that consultation with the Commission on all disciplinary matters affecting a public servant has been speci fically provided for, in order, first, to give an assurance to the Services that a wholly independent body not directly concerned with the making of orders adve rsely affecting public servants, has considered the action proposed to be taken against a particular public servant, with an open mind; and secondly, to afford the Government unbiased advice and opinion on matters vitally affecting the mora le of public services. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the Executive Government , when it proposes to take any disciplinary action against a public servant, to consult the Commission as to whether the action proposed to be taken was justifi ed and was not in excess of the requirements of the situation. (cid:29) (Emphasis added) 71. In the Indian Administrative Service (S.C.S.) Assn. -vs- Union of India, reported in 1993 Suppl (1) SCC 730, the meaning of the word ’consultation’ came up for consideration, because in the new seniority Rules, namely, the Indian Ad ministrative Services (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1987, a proviso was added under Rule 3 (3) (ii), which read as follows: (cid:28)Provided that he shall not be assigned a year of allotment earlier than the yea r of allotment assigned to an officer senior to him in that select list or appoi nted to the service on the basis of an earlier Select List. (cid:29) 72. The Supreme Court, in Indian Administrative Service (S.C.S.) Assn. (supr a), noticed that the draft of the 1st Amendment Rules, which was circulated to t he State Governments, omitted to circulate the newly added proviso. It was, in s uch a situation, submitted by the petitioner, in Indian Administrative Service ( S.C.S.) Assn. (supra), that the Rule was bad, because no ’consultation’ with the Governments of the States was done before incorporating the proviso in the new seniority Rules. 73. Rejecting the above contention, the Supreme Court laid down the law gove rning the circumstances, whereunder ’consultation’ would be mandatory or directo ry. The relevant observations, appearing at paragraphs 26 and 27, being relevant , are reproduced below: (cid:28)26. The result of the above discussion leads to the following conclusions: (1) Consultation is a process which requires meeting of minds between the partie s involved in the process of consultation on the material facts and points invol ved to evolve a correct or at least satisfactory solution. There should be meeti ng of minds between the proposer and the persons to be consulted on the subject of consultation. There must be definite facts which constitute the foundation an d source for final decision. The object of the consultation is to render consult ation meaningful to serve the intended purpose. Prior consultation in that behal f is mandatory. (2) When the offending action affects fundamental rights or to effectuate built- in insulation, as fair procedure, consultation is mandatory and non-consultation renders the action ultra vires or invalid or void. (3) When the opinion or advice binds the proposer, consultation is mandatory and its infraction renders the action or order illegal. (4) When the opinion or advice or view does not bind the person or authority, an