High Court
Case Details
WP(C) 2280/2013 BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE B.K. SHARMA By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 23 .4.2013, by which, the authority in the KAAC has settled the Entry Tax Gate for the period from 1.4.2013 to 31.3.2014 with the highest regular tenderer i.e. the respondent No. 4. According to the petitioner, the ground of rejection of his t ender, which is non-furnishing of land revenue clearance certificate (LRCC) is n ot sustainable in law. The petitioner himself admitted in paragraph-5 of the wri t petition that the LRCC was submitted which was in the name of his wife Smti Ru pali Kilingpi. According to the petitioner, she had represented him as his fathe r to the application form. Be it stated here that as against the bid amount of R s. 71,50,510/- of the petitioner, the bid offered by the respondent No. 4 is Rs. 51,71,235.
Legal Reasoning
Earlier the settlement was made in favour of one Sri Ajit Timung challenging whi ch the petitioner had approached this Court by filing writ petition being WP(C) No. 2078/2013, which was disposed of on 22.4.2013 as it was submitted by the lea rned Standing Counsel, KAAC that vide order dated 5.4.2013, the settlement was c ancelled. Thereafter the settlement having been made in favour of the respondent No. 4, the petitioner has once again approached this Court by filing the instan t writ petition. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondent No. 3 representing the KAAC, it has been stated that as per the requirement of the NIT, the tenderer were to su bmit their upto date LRCC. However, the petitioner did not submit uptodate LRCC. He only submitted land revenue clearance certificate standing in the name of on e Smti. Rupali Kilingpi. He also failed to furnish the name of his father/mother and in the tender application, he stated himself to be the wife of Rupali Kilin gpi. I have heard Mr. R.P. Sarmah, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. H. Terangpi learned counsel for the petitioner. I have also heard Mr. J. Chutia, learned St anding Counsel, KAAC and Mr. D. Das, learned counsel representing the respondent No. 4. I have considered the entire materials on record including records produ ced by the learned Standing Counsel, KAAC. The NIT dated 21.01.2013 was issued inviting bids from the intending tenderer. A s per the terms and conditions of the NIT (Clause i) (1), the person belonging t o ST(H) shall enclose the documents indicated therein along with the tender appl ication. The documents amongst other are the LRCC (up-to-date). What the petitio ner produced is the LRCC standing in the name of his wife. Although the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the LRCC standing in the name of the wife of the petitioner was sufficient, but on being pointed out as to whether th e same relates to the land belonging to the petitioner or whether it was made kn own in the tender document that the petitioner would rely upon the LRCC of his w ife coupled with the fact that the said requirement was in respect of ST(H), no clarification could be furnished. As stated in the counter-affidavit, the petitioner did not submit up-to-date LRC C. What he has submitted is the LRCC standing in the name of one Smti Rupali Kin lingpi, whom the petitioner claims to be his wife. Interestingly, in the tender document, he also did not name his parents but identified himself as the wife of said Smti Rupali Kilingpi. This being the position the authority in the KAAC re jected the tender of the petitioner and settled the same with the respondent No. 4. In Poddar Steel Corporation Vs. Ganesh Engineering Work reported in AIR 1991 SC 1579, the Apex Court classifying the requirement of tender notice into non-essen tial or ancillary, held that if it is essential, the same is required to be enfo rced rigidly but in the later case the same may be deviated from. In Monarch In frastructure (P) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation reporte d in (2000) 5 SCC 287, the Apex Court set aside the award of contract to a tende rer who at the time of submission of tender did not satisfy one of the condition s of eligibility, which was subsequently deleted after the expiry of the time li mit for submission of tenders but before opening thereof. In Air India Ltd Vs. C ochin International Airport Ltd. reported in (2000) 2 SCC 617, emphasising on th e need to comply with the norms, standards and procedure in awarding contract by State or its instrumentality, it was held by the Apex Court that the State can choose its own method. It was further held that the Court cannot interfere with the discretion exercised by the authority and the Court should exercise its disc retionary power with great caution and only in furtherance of overwhelming publi c interest. In the said case, the Apex Court having noticed that the limited glo bal competitive bidding having been accepted on the last date fixed, it was not open to the authority to initiate negotiation with another party behind the back of the other party and thereby permitting the said party to revise its offer. In Benjamin Lalrinawma Vs. State of Mizoram reported in 2005 (3) GLT 580, this C ourt upholding the rejection of the particular tender on the ground of non-submi ssion of authorization, distributorship/dealership certificate as per conditions of NIT, held that submission of such certificate was essential condition for a valid tender and that the authority rightly declared the said tender as invalid. In Mahananda Gogoi Vs. State of Assam reported in 2009 (3) GLT 144 also this Co urt dealing with upholding the rejection of the petitioner’s tender on the groun d of non-submission of (cid:28)No Debt Certificate (cid:29), although consequence of non-compli ance was not mentioned in the NIT, held that there must be strict adherence to t he conditions of the NIT. In Bikash Bora Vs. State of Assam reported in 2003 (2) GLT 485, the Division Bench of this Court held that non-fulfillment of conditio ns required for submission of valid tender was fatal to the tenders submitted by the appellant. In the said case, the appellant, although, was the highest bidde r but did not submit the Loan Clearance Certificate and Sales tax Clearance Cert ificate. It was argued that the said requirements were not essential but only an cillary. The Division Bench held that submission of such certificates was essent ial condition for valid tender and accordingly upheld the cancellation of the se ttlement made in favour of the appellant. Applying the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions and having regard t o the fact that the petitioner did not submit the LRCC, there was nothing wrong in rejecting its tender on merit applying the sound discretion in the matter. Above being the position, I do not find any merit in the writ petition and accor dingly, it is dismissed.