High Court · 2011

As there is virtually a common question of facts and of law in the three writ petitions, suffice it to refer to the controversy involved in WP(C) No. 78 07 of 2004 and our decision thereon will govern the remaining cases. The case of the petitioner in WP(C) No. 7807 of 2004 is that he is carrying on the business of contractual works under various Departments of the Government of Assam and t he Central Government through his proprietorial concern, namely, M/s. S.D. Enter prise having its office at Bharali Complex, G.S. Road, Guwahati. The Government of Assam, through the open tender process and in accordance with the provisions of the Assam Excise Rules, 1945, awarded the contract for wholesale supply of po table alcohol/rectified spirit (Grade) to the Excise Warehouse located at Jorhat for a period commencing from 13-9-2000 to 12-9-2003, for which the agreement da ted 7-9-2000 was executed by him with the Government of Assam. This was followed by the issuance of License at Annexure-B to him so as to enable him to carry ou t the terms of the said agreement. Immediately after execution of this agreement and the issuance of the license in this behalf, he started importing potable al cohol/rectified spirit from different distilleries to the Excise Warehouse, Jorh at at his own cost and against payment of the cost price of the country spirit. Thereafter, a Gazette Notification bearing dated 10-5-2002 (Annexure-H) was issu ed by the State-respondents notifying the Assam General Sales Tax (Amendment) Ac t, 2002, which came into force immediately, to the effect that in the case of co untry spirit mentioned in serial number 27A of Schedule-II, the licensed contrac tor who sells or supplies such item to a licensed retail vendor shall be deemed to be the first point seller who shall be liable to pay tax on the sale price of the item as defined in clause (34) of Section 2 including still head duty payab le thereon . It was further provided therein that the retail vendor while deposi ting the cost price and duty shall also deposit the tax payable under the Act in the designated Bank by challan and hand over one copy of the challan to the con tractor. It is another matter that another Notification was issued on 3-5-2003 n otifying the Assam General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 2003, which substituted th e impugned provision herein thereby making the Officer-in-Charge of the country spirit warehouse, instead of the licensed contractor, liable to pay the said ta x: this amendment came into force immediately. Following the impugned notificati on dated 10-5-2002, the respondent No. 5 vide his letter dated 19-3-2002 (Annexu re-G) informed the Superintendent of Excise, Jorhat, inter alia, that the Govern ment had imposed sales tax surcharge @ 20% on IMFL/country liquor with effect fr om 19-2-2002, and the sale tax surcharge was payable on any country spirit issue d from the Excise warehouse and the same is to be deposited in the Government Tr easury in the appropriate Head of Account with a request to instruct the retail licensees to deposit the sale tax, who had received stock on or after 19-2-2002. A copy of this letter was also forwarded to the Officer-in-Charge, Excise Wareh ouse, Jorhat.

3. Pursuant to the said Notifications dated 10-5-2002 and 10-5-2002, the Sa les Tax Department, Government of Assam started demanding payment of sales tax f rom the petitioner on account of the sale of the country spirit transported by h im as indicated earlier. Contending that the contractual assignments undertaken by him in transporting the country spirit did not constitute a sale exigible to sales tax but is only a transportation contract, he approached the Commissioner of Excise, Assam (respondent 5) for appropriate action. The respondent No. 5 acc ordingly by his letter dated 23-7-2002 (Annexure-I) informed the Commissioner an d Secretary, Government of Assam in the Excise Department that the spirit supply contractors were not supplying country spirit directly to the licensed retail v endors and, as such, they were not required to realise sales tax and the sales t ax is to be paid by such vendors and deposited with the Treasury with the furth er information that the Officer-in-Charge of the Warehouse would issue the spiri t from bottling plant after verification of Treasury Challan for sales tax and f orwarded a copy of the same to the respondent No. 2 for information and necessar y action. Subsequently, the respondent No. 5 by his letter dated 12-9-2002 (Anne xure-J), inter alia, informed the respondent No. 2 that sales tax was to be real ized from the lessees of country spirit, but the practice of issuing Road Permit s to contractors was still in vogue thereby implying the liability of contractor s to pay sales tax and, therefore, to remove possible confusion, had requested h im to issue necessary orders for allowing the contractors to bring spirit from o utside on the strength of export and import permits issued by the Excise Authori ty only and to exempt the practice of issuing Road Permits to these contractors. Thereafter, the Joint Commissioner of Taxes, Assam by his letter dated 13-9-200 2 directed the respondent 3 to allow the vehicles of the contractors carrying th e consignment of spirit on behalf of the State of Assam to cross the Check Gates subject to verification of documents and ensuring that the goods belonged to th e Excise Department of Assam. The net effect of the said letters dated 12-9-2002 and 13-9-2002 is that the authorities had stopped demanding payment of sales ta x by the petitioner in connection with the said sales and that the petitioner ac cordingly submitted monthly supply statements/returns of country spirit without enclosing any sales tax deposit challans to the respondent No. 3.

4. In the year 2003, the State Government issued the Gazette Notification d ated 3-5-2003 notifying the Assam General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 2003 amendi ng Section 8 of the Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993 by inserting Explanation 3(ii) after Explanation 3(i) to Section 8(1) of the Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993 declaring that in the case of country spirit mentioned in serial number 27 A of Schedule-II, the Officer-in-Charge of the country spirit excise warehouse w ho sells or supplies such items to a licensed retail vendor shall be deemed to b e the first point seller who shall be liable to pay tax on the sale price of th e items as defined in clause (34) of Section 2 including excise duty, vend fee, bottling charges and other duty or fee by whatever name called, payable thereon. The retail vendor while depositing cost price and excise duty shall also deposi t the tax payable under this Act into the Government account in the manner presc ribed by a separate challan and hand over one copy of the challan to the Officer -in-Charge of such warehouse. According to the petitioner, the aforesaid Notific ation has clarified the settled position of law that a transport contractor like him is not a first point seller of country spirit and is not, therefore, liable to pay sales tax against the supply of country liquor made by him and that it i s rather the Officer-in-Charge of the Country Spirit Excise Warehouse, who is th e first point seller of the spirit and is thus liable to pay the sales tax on su ch sale price. However, contrary to this settled law, contends the petitioner, t he respondent No. 3 issued notice to him to show cause as to why the submitted r eturns should not be rejected and assessment should not be completed under Secti on 17(5) including taking action as per the provisions of the Assam General Sale s Tax Act, 1993. The application of the petitioner for extending the time to sub mit his show cause reply was not granted by the respondent No. 3, who, instead, proceeded to issue the impugned assessment order on the basis of the best judgme nt assessment. It is contended by the petitioner that the impugned assessment or der is unconstitutional, illegal arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable and is liabl e to be quashed. It is also the contention of the petitioner that Section 4 of t he Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993, in so far as it seeks to bar a person from calling into question the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities before the Hi gh Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, has encroached upon the field of judicial review, which is the basic structure of the Constitution and is, there fore, ultra vires the Constitution and is liable to be struck down. The petition er also alleges that there are a number of excise warehouses in the State of Ass am, which were also leased out on similar terms and conditions to other contract ors for the same period, but they were not assessed for payment of sales tax lik e him, and he has been singled out for hostile discrimination thereby denying hi m equality before the law or of equal protection of law: his fundamental right t o equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution has thus been infring ed. This is how these writ petitions have been filed by the petitioner. The State-respondents resisted the writ petitions and filed their affida 5. vit-in-opposition through the Joint Commissioner of Taxes in the Office of the C ommissioner of Taxes, Assam. According to the answering respondent, Annexure-A a nd Annexure-B, which are the copies of the agreement executed between the petiti oner and the Excise Department and the Deed of License granted by the latter in pursuance of the said agreement unambiguously shows that the petitioner is the s eller of the country spirit lifted by the retail vendors from the concerned ware houses. It is the contention of the answering respondent that the submissions of the petitioner in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the writ petition clearly establish bey ond any doubt that he has been supplying country spirit to various retail vendor s though the modus operandi of the supply is being controlled and regulated by t he Excise Department keeping in mind public interest. It is denied that the peti tioner is a mere transporter of the country spirit. He procures or purchases the country spirit to be eventually supplied to the retail vendors in his own name, for which he obtained registration certificates under both the Assam General Sa les Tax Act, 1993 and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 from the jurisdictional as sessing officer, on the strength whereof, he proceeded to obtain C.S.T. declarat ion forms (cid:28)C (cid:29) as well as delivery notes from the same assessing officer from tim e to time. It is explained by the answering respondent that (cid:28)C (cid:29) forms are issued by a registered dealer of one State to a selling dealer of another State only w hen the former undertakes to utilize goods so purchased for the purpose of re-sa le or use in the manufacture for sale of the result and finished goods. Similarl y, delivery notes in Form 24 of the Act are utilized for importing goods into As sam for the purpose of sale by the concerned importing dealer. Consequently, the conclusion is inevitable that he has been supplying the country spirit to the r etail vendors within the meaning of the charging provisions of the extant sales tax legislation thereby making him liable to pay sales tax irrespective of wheth er he realizes such taxes from his buyers or not. The answering respondent further asserts that the Sales Tax Department r 6. ightly proceeded to levy and recover exigible sales tax on the country spirit su pplied by the petitioner. The letter dated 23-7-2002 of the Commissioner of Exci se is in the form of an individual opinion expressed by him, which cannot be hel d out against the Revenue as some kind of promissory estoppel as accepting such contention would amount to nullifying the mandatory requirements of the law apar t from providing a license to Government or other body to ignore binding provisi ons of law: that would render mandatory provisions of law superfluous and meanin gless. The answering respondent flatly denies that the tax authority stopped ins isting payment of the tax by the petitioner as the proceeding for the assessment and recovery thereof were never suspended: the date of assessment was, however, extended to comply with the principles of natural justice before finalization o f the proceedings. By the Notification dated 3-5-2003, the Officer-in-Charge of the Country Spirit Excise Warehouse has been made liable as the first point sell er only with effect from 3-5-2003 and as for the period from 19-5-2002 to 2-5-20 03, the liability to pay the sales tax remains squarely with the petitioner. Acc ording to the answering respondent, the petitioner seems to have misconception a bout the intent and scope of Section 4 of the Act, which can at best be regarded as a machinery provision facilitating easy and smooth administering of the Act without affecting in any way the substantial rights of the subjects. Since the a mount of tax assessed against him is a statutory liability, any question of suff erance of loss or injury would not entitle him to any claim of exemption. Of cou rse, it would be open to him to proceed against his buyers for realizing the cha rgeable tax if not already factored by him in his bills of cost submitted to the controlling Department. It is further contended by the answering respondent tha t all similarly situated dealers are equally amenable to the charging provisions of the Act and there can simply be no question of any discrimination on the par t of the Revenue while discharging its function. The petitioner could have avail ed of the appellate and revisional fora provided for in the Act itself for redre ssal of his grievance against the assessing officers before approaching this Cou rt. These are the sum and substance of the contentions of the answering responde nt. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the rival parties, it is 7. obvious that the question which, therefore, falls for consideration is whether t he supply of the country spirit in the circumstances set forth above can constit ute a sale or not. In other words, what is the nature of the transaction which w as actually undertaken by the petitioner in supplying the country spirit to the specified warehouses of Assam during the relevant period? It is contended by Mr. N. Dutta, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, that after procurement of the country spirit in the aforesaid manner from different distilleries/bonde d warehouses against payment of cost and other duties payable thereon and transp ortation of the same to the Excise Warehouse, the petitioner did not have any ac cess to the same and it was the Officer-in-Charge, Excise Warehouse, who took ov er the control of the country spirit transported by him till issue of the same t o the retail vendors and although he transported the country spirit to the Excis e Warehouse at his own cost, the same was ultimately issued to the retail vendor by the Officer-in-Charge, Excise Warehouse. Thus, according to the learned seni or counsel, the petitioner cannot be regarded as the seller of the country spiri t, but is merely a transporter of the country spirit. It is the contention of th e learned senior counsel that as the petitioner never sold country spirit to the retail vendors but merely transported the same to the warehouse, the impugned E xplanation 3(ii) to Section 8(i)(a) of the Act under the guise of levying sales tax is in fact imposing a tax on the income earned by the petitioner in carrying out his transport business and is, therefore, without any legislative competenc e: tax on income can be levied only with the authority of Parliament and not by the State Legislature. Drawing our attention to the letter dated 13-9-2002 of th e Joint Commissioner of Taxes, Assam (Annexure-K), the learned senior counsel al so submits that this letter informing the Superintendent of Taxes, inter alia, t hat the Excise Department had been importing spirit from outside the State on be half of the State Government through the petitioner and the vehicles carrying th e above consignment should be allowed to cross the check gate subject to verific ation of documents, would go show that the goods belonged to the Excise Departme nt of Assam: because of this letter, the authority concerned stopped demanding p ayment of sales tax by the petitioner. The learned senior counsel also points ou t that the Assam General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 2003 enacted and enforced su bsequently has further amended Explanation 3(ii) to Section 8 of the Assam Gener al Sales Tax Act, 1993 (as amended in 2002) to the effect that in case of countr y spirit mentioned in serial number 27A, in Schedule II, the Officer-in-Charge o f the country spirit warehouse selling or supplying such items to a licensed ret ail vendor should be deemed to be the first point seller who should be made liab le to pay tax on the sale price of the item as defined in clause (34) of section 2 including excise duty, vend fee, bottling charges and other duty or fee by wh atever named called, payable thereon and submits that this amendment has clarifi ed the settled position that a contractor is not a first point seller of country spirit and is not liable to realise the sales tax against supply of country spi rit. It is thus contended by the learned senior counsel that impugned amendment and the assessment order dated 30-7-2004 made thereunder are unconstitutional, a rbitrary, illegal, unfair, unreasonable and bad in law and should be struck down and quashed accordingly. Lastly, he submits that Section 4 of the Act debarring any person from invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226/227 o f the Constitution to call into question the jurisdiction of the taxing authorit y thereby ousting judicial review is against the basic feature of the Constituti on of India and is, therefore, liable to be declared unconstitutional. In suppor t of his contentions, heavy reliance is placed by him upon the following decisio ns:- (a) Navnit Lal C. Javeri v. IT App. Asst. Commr., AIR 1965 SC 1375; (b) Go vt. of A.P. v. Guntur Tobacco, AIR 1965 SC 1396; (c) Salar Jung Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Mysore, (1972) 1 SCC 23; (d) Vishnu Agencies (P) Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, (1978) 1 SCC 520; (e) State of Punjab and others v. Dewan’s Modern Breweries Ltd., (1979) 2 SCC 210; (f) Assessing Authority-cum-Excise and Taxati on Officer v. East India Cotton Mfg. Co. Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 531; (g) Tripura Goo ds Transport Association and another v. Commissioner of Taxes and others, (1999) 2 SCC 253 and (h) Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Ins pector & Etio and others, (2007) 5 SCC 447.

8. On the other hand, Mr. R. Dubey, the learned counsel appearing for the T axation Department, Government of Assam, supports the impugned amendment as well as the assessment order and submits that it is none but the petitioner who sold the country spirit lifted from the concerned warehouses by the retail vendors, and he alone has the duty to pay the sales tax for the spirit so lifted. Accordi ng to the learned State counsel, the petitioner purchased or procured the countr y spirit, which were eventually supplied to the retail vendors in his name, obta ined registration certificates both under the Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993 and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 from the jurisdictional assessing officers a nd on the strength of such certificates, he also obtained Central Sales Tax (CST ) declaration forms (cid:28)C (cid:29) as well as delivery notes from the assessing officer fro m time to time, which clearly indicates that he was supplying the country spirit to the retail vendors within the meaning of the charging section of the Act: th e activities so carried on by him cannot be treated as purely job work of some type of intermediary. Or else, how could one view his act of obtaining (cid:28)C (cid:29) form as a registered dealer from respondent 3 (Superintendent of Taxes, Unit-D, Guwah ati) and thence making over these items to sellers all in his own name, he quest ions. These are the sum and substance of the contentions of the learned standing counsel. A perusal of the agreement dated 7-9-2000, executed by the petitioner wi 9. th the State-respondents, which is at Annexure-A and the License issued by the S tate-respondents to the petitioner, which is at Annexure-B may provide a key to understanding the whole controversy. The agreement granted the petitioner the co ntract for wholesale supply of potable alcohol/rectified spirit (Grade-I) to the districts of Jorhat, Golaghat and Karbi Anglong in accordance with the terms of the license issued by the Commissioner of Excise. The said agreement and the Li cense visualized, among others, (i) the payment by the petitioner of monthly ren t of the excise warehouse from time to time, (ii) the fixation of the price per London Proof Litre of potable alcohol/rectified spirit by the Government from ti me to time, (iii) the responsibility of the petitioner to procure, supply and tr ansport, at his own cost, the potable alcohol/rectified spirit from the place of manufacture, which may be anywhere in India under Import permits to be issued b y the Commissioner of Excise, Assam to the warehouse, (iv) the sale of the spiri t only to licensed vendors producing passes in the prescribed form and (v) the o bligation of the petitioner to supply to the licensed vendors by way of sale at any warehouse at which the sale of the spirit under the license was permitted. T he aforesaid terms and conditions have been made strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Assam Excise Rules, 1945 and the Instructions relating to Liq uor. Therefore, the agreement can be said to statutory in nature or, at any rate , have a statutory flavour. Admittedly, the supply of the spirit contemplated by the Rules and the said agreement is restrictive in nature. In other words, the freedom of contract exercised by the petitioner is not exactly free.

10. The leading authority on this issue is the decision of a seven-Judge Ben ch of the Apex Court in Salar Jung Sugar Mills Ltd (supra). The question raised therein was as to whether transactions subjected to statutory controls can still be deemed to be a contract came up for consideration before the Apex Court. In that case, the appellants challenged the demand and collection made against them for large sums of money as and for purchase tax and penalty on the purchase of sugarcane from the growers for the period April 1, 1962 to June 30, 1967 and fur ther asked for refund of large sum of money collected as purchase tax. In the fi fties, practically all the States in which sugarcane was grown for the purpose o f manufacturing sugar used to levy cess on sugarcane brought into the premises o f sugar factories. The Mysore State Legislature imposed tax on purchase of sugar cane purchased by sugar factories with the result that the appellants were subje cted to levy of tax on purchase of sugarcane. Three principal contentions were r aised before the Apex Court, namely, there was no mutual assent by and between t he appellants and the growers of sugarcane in regard to supply of sugarcane by t he growers and of the acceptance by the factories and therefore there was no pur chase and sale of sugarcane. Secondly, the appellants were not dealers within th e meaning of Section 2(k) of the Mysore Sales Tax Act. Thirdly, the levy of tax on purchase of sugarcane at different rates in different states was discriminato ry and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the instant case, we a re not concerned with the third contention. After reviewing a number of the earl ier decisions so rendered, the Apex Court held at paragraphs 38, 39, 41 and 44 w hich read thus: (cid:28)38. These decisions establish that statutory orders regulating the supply a nd distribution of goods by and between the parties under Control Orders in a St ate do not absolutely impinge on the freedom to enter into contract. Legislative measures or statutory provisions fixing the price, delivery, supply, restrictin g areas for transactions are all within the realm of planning and basic necessit ies of community. The recent trends in these legal rules delimit the variety of structure of rights and duties which individuals may create by such acts and tra nsactions. The complexity of modern activities and the consequent difficulties o f providing for every eventuality have shaken fervour for freedom of contract as there was during the nineteenth century. The economic environment has changed. The individual freedom is to be reconciled with adequate performance by the Gove rnment of its functions in a highly organised society. Delimiting areas for tran sactions or parties or denoting price for transactions are all within the area o f individual freedom of contract with limited choice by reason of ensuring the g reatest good for the greatest number by achieving proper supply at standard or f air price to eliminate the evils of hoarding and scarcity on the one hand and av ailability on the other. (cid:28)39. In the present case, the parties are certain. The parties are defin ed, namely, that the sugarcane grower is delivering and supplying and the factor y is accepting the goods. The property in the goods is transferred from the grow er to the factory. The transaction is not a gift nor an exchange or hypothecatio n nor a loan. There is consideration for the transfer. Counsel for the appellant s contended that there was no mutual assent because the price was fixed, the qua ntity for supply and delivery was determined, the parties had no choice to go to strangers or outsiders in the open market. In Benjamin on Sale, 8th Ed. at page 68 the law as to mutual assent is stated as this: (cid:28)The assent need not as a gen eral rule be express. It may be implied from their language or from their conduc t; may be signified by a nod or a gesture, or may even be inferred from silence in certain cases; as if a customer takes up wares off a tradesman’s counter and carried them away and nothing is said on other side, the law presumes an agreeme nt of sale for the reasonable worth of the goods. But the assent must in order t o constitute a valid contract, be mutual and intended to bind both sides. It mus t also co-exist on the same amount of time (cid:29). The assent must be mutual and bind both sides. The proposal by one man must be accepted by another and this accepta nce must be unconditional. The assent must be communicated to the other party or some act must be done which the other party has expressly or impliedly offered to treat as a communication. Judged by these standards in the forefront exists t he agreement between the parties in the present case. The statutory orders requi red the parties to enter into agreement. The parties did enter into agreements. The agreement contains intrinsic evidence that the growers agreed to sell and th e factory agreed to buy the goods. (cid:28)41. The agreement between the factory owner and the sugarcane grower fu rnishes the guide to ascertain the real character of the transaction between the parties. These are the features. The factory agrees to buy. The grower agrees t o sell. It is true that 95 per cent of the sugarcane will be sold. The parties h ave the choice to increase the quantity above 95 per cent. The quantity to be bo ught and sold is cultivated or to be cultivated by the grower. The delivery is t o be at the factory. Delivery will be in such lots, on such dates and at such ti me as shall be agreed upon. The mode of delivery may also be within the scope of agreement. The price will be the controlled price. The grower can bargain for a higher price. The sugarcane grower can ask for payment in advance. Payment may be in cash or in kind. The sugarcane will be accepted after inspection. There is scope for rejection of goods. Various columns in the agreement indicate the vil lages where sugarcane is to be cultivated, the names of the varieties of sugarca ne to be cultivated. The last two columns are estimated quantity offered to be d elivered and the period of delivery. All these features indicate with unerring a ccuracy that there is offer, inspection and appropriation of goods to the contra ct. The goods will be accepted by the factory after inspection and price will be paid on delivery. The mutual assent is not only implicit but is also explicit. (cid:28)44. The Control Orders are to be kept in the forefront for appreciating the true character of transactions. It is apparent that the area is restricted. The parties are determined by the order. The minimum price is fixed. The minimu m quantity of supply is also regulated. These features do not complete the pictu re. The entire transactions indicate that the parties agree to buy and sell. The parties choose the terms of delivery. The parties have choice with regard to ob taining supply of a quantity higher than 65 per cent of the yield. The parties c an stipulate for a price higher than the minimum. The parties can have terms for payment in advance as well as in cash. A grower may not cultivate and there may not be any yield. A factory may be closed or wound up and may not buy sugarcane . A factory can reject goods after inspection. The combination of all these feat ures indicates that the parties entered into agreement with mutual assent and wi th volition for transfer of goods in consideration of price. Transaction of purc hase and sale may be regulated by schemes and may be liable to restrictions as t o the manner or mode of sale. Such restrictions may become necessary by reason o f co-ordination between production and distribution in planning the economy of t he country. The contention of the appellants fails. The transactions amount to s ales within the meaning of the Mysore Sales Tax Act. (cid:29) (Underlined for emphasis)

11. That statutory sale under a control order is nevertheless held to be a s ale so long as mutual assent, expressed or implied, is not totally excluded from the transaction and amounts to sale, can also be seen from the decision of anot her seven-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Vishnu Agencies (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commer cial Tax Officer (supra). That was a case where cement being a controlled commod ity in the State of West Bengal, its distribution was regulated by the West Beng al Cement Control Act, 1948 and by the Orders made under Section 3(2) of the Act . Section 3(1) provides, inter alia, for regulation of production, supply and di stribution thereof at a fair price. By the Cement Control Order, 1948 framed und er the Act no sale or purchase of cement can be made except in accordance with t he conditions contained in the written order issued by the Director of Consumer Goods, West Bengal or the Regional Honorary Adviser to the Government of India a t Calcutta or by officers authorised by him at prices not exceeding the notified price. Under the Andhra Pradesh Procurement (Levy) Order, paddy growers in the Andhra Pradesh State were under an obligation to sell the paddy to licensed agen ts appointed by the State Government at the prices fixed by it and the rice mill ers were also under an obligation to sell the milled rice to the wholesale and r etail dealers at a price fixed by the Government. On the question whether the tr ansactions amount to sales under the respective Sales Tax Acts, a seven-Judge Be nch of the Apex Court was unanimous in holding that sales by the allottees of ce ment to the license holders in the State of West Bengal and the transactions bet ween the growers and procuring agents as also those between the rice millers on the one hand and the wholesalers or retailers on the other in the State of Andhr a Pradesh are sales exigible to sales tax in the respective States. In our opini on, the law has been succinctly explained by Hon’ble Justice Beg, C.J. (Retd.) i n his concurring judgment at paragraphs 48 to 52, the summary whereof is found a t the head note of the law report at page 521 as under: (cid:28)It is not really the nomenclature involved but the substance of the transa ction under consideration which matters in such cases. It is true that a conside rable part of the field over which what are called ’sales’ took place under eith er regulatory orders or levy orders passed or directions given under statutory p rovisions, is restricted and controlled by such orders and directions. Deprivati on of property for compensation which may even be described as (cid:28)price (cid:29) does not amount to sale when all that is done is to carry out an order so that the transa ction is substantially a compulsory acquisition. On the other hand, a mere regul atory law even if it circumscribes the area of free choice does not take away th e basic character or the core of sale from the transaction. Such a law which gov erns a class, may oblige sellers to deal only with parties holding licenses who may buy particular or allotted quantities of goods at specified prices but an es sential element of choice is still left to the parties between agreement took pl ace. The agreement despite considerable compulsive element regulating or restric ting the area of free choice may still retain the basic character of transaction of sale. In the former type of case the binding character of the transaction ar ises from the order directed to particular parties asking them to deliver specif ied goods and not from a general order or law applicable to a class. In the latt er type of cases the legal tie, vinculum juris, which binds the parties to perfo rm their obligations remains contractual. The regulatory law merely adds other o bligations such as the one to enter into a tie between the parties indicated the re. Although the regulatory law might specify the terms such as price or parties the regulation is subsidiary to the essential character of the transaction whic h is consensual and contractual. The basis of a contract is (cid:28)consensus ad idem (cid:29). The parties to the contract must agree upon the same thing in the same sense. A greement on mutuality of consideration ordinarily arising from an offer and acce ptance imparted to it enforceability in courts of law. Mere regulation or restri ction of the field of choice does not take away this contractual or essentially consensual binding core or character of the transaction. (cid:29) (Underlined for emphasis)

12. It is against the backdrop of the legal principles enunciated above that we propose to examine the present controversy. To recapitulate the legal positi on, the limitations imposed by a statute or control orders on the normal right o f dealers and consumers to supply and obtain the goods, of the obligations impos ed upon the parties and the penalties prescribed do not militate against the pos ition that eventually the parties must be deemed to have completed the transacti ons under an agreement by which one party has bound itself to supply the stated quantity of the goods to the other party at a price not higher than the notified price and the other consented to accept the goods on the terms and conditions m entioned in the permit or the order of allotment issued in its favour by the con cerned authority. Offer and acceptance need not always be in the elementary form nor indeed does the law of contract or the sale of goods require that consent t o a contract must be express. It is common place that offer and acceptance could be spelt out from the conduct of the parties which covers not only their acts, but omissions as well. Law does not require offer and acceptance to conform to a ny set pattern or formula. In the instant case, the sales tax so demanded is wit h respect to the period commencing from 10-5-2002 to 3-5-2003. In the year 2002, the Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993 had been amended by the Assam General Sal es Tax (Amendment) Act, 2002, which was published in the Gazette Notification da ted 10-5-2002 and had come into force immediately. By this amendment, Explanatio n 3(ii), among others, to Section 8 had been inserted, which were in the followi ng terms: (cid:28)(ii) in case of country spirit mentioned in serial number 27A, in Schedule II, the licensed contractor who sells or supplies such items to a licensed retai l vendor shall be deemed to be the first point seller who shall be liable to pay tax on the sale price or the item as defined in clause (34) of section 2 includ ing still head duty payable thereon. The retail vendor while depositing the cost price and duty shall also deposit the tax payable under this Act in the designa ted bank by challan and hand over one copy of the challan to the contractor. (cid:29)

13. At this stage, it may be useful to have a bird’s eye view of the relevan t provisions of the Rules and the Instructions relating to Liquor. Rules 96 to 1 05 of the Rules deal with the contract for supplying country spirit to warehouse s, while Rules 106 to 132 deals with establishment of warehouses by the Governme nt. Rules 133 to 141 provides for issue of spirits from distilleries and warehou ses. Under this set of Rules, the contractor is required to import the potable a lcohol/rectified spirit from different distilleries/bonded warehouses and then t ransport the same to the Excise Warehouse at his own cost. In terms of Rule 97 o f the Rules, he is entitled to receive only the cost price of the potable alcoho l/rectified spirit imported by him. Under Rule 97(i), all retail vendors, to ens ure that the contract price of the spirit is never exceeded and for the convenie nce of the contractor, are required to pay into treasury the contract price of t he spirit together with the still head duty payable thereon. In terms of Rule 97 (2), the contractor is entitled to receive every month the total amount deposite d in his favour as the cost price during the preceding months. Rule 98 says that the contractor shall not have any interest, direct or indirect, in any retail s hop for the vend of liquor within the area covered by his license, and is bound to observe these and all other rules for the management of the warehouse as may be framed from time to time by the Government. Rule 99 is important, which says that the contractor will be required to maintain such establishment in each ware house as may be deemed necessary by the Excise Commissioner for the storage, red uction and issue of spirit. Then comes Rule 103, which provides that on the expi ry of his license (unless a fresh license has been granted to him) or if his lic ense be cancelled or suspended, the contractor shall be bound to leave, if so or dered by the Excise Commissioner, in each of the warehouses the quantity of spir it prescribed therein, but such quantity so left shall be paid for at the rate a t which the new contractor shall have agreed to supply country spirit to such wa rehouse, or, if such rate be not accepted by him or if there be no such license then at such rate as may be fixed by the Government: the outgoing contractor sha ll within ten days of the receipt of the notice from the District Collector, rem ove the excess quantity from the warehouse on payment of full duty or under bond for payment of duty unless he can arrange its disposal with the incoming contra ctor. If he fails to remove or dispose of all surplus spirits within ten days of the receipt of the written notice from the District Collector, the cost of any establishment which it may be necessary to employ at any of the warehouses may b e recovered from him, and in default of his so doing within one month, the spiri t shall be liable to forfeiture of the discretion of the Excise Commissioner.

14. Rule 104 is also important, which says that the spirit supplied to the w arehouses shall be of good quality according to the standard for the time being prescribed by the Government and shall be the produce of materials specified in the license. If any spirit supplied is found to be of inferior quality or otherw ise unsuitable for issue to licensed vendors, the Officer-in-Charge stop its iss ue and submit a sample to the Excise Commissioner and it may, after analysis, be rejected or destroyed or otherwise dealt with under the orders of the Excise Co mmissioner. Then comes Rule 106, according to which, the contractor is required to maintain at each warehouse such minimum stock of spirits as may from time to time be fixed by the Excise Commissioner and notified by him in writing to the c ontractor. There are, of course, penalties including payment of compensation by the contractor for not complying with this requirement. Under Rule 108, the cont ractor is required to supply the vessels for storage, blending, reducing or issu e of spirit in the warehouse. Section 111 provides that the contractor shall sup ply weighing machines, which are approved by the Excise Commissioner for use in warehouses, for ascertaining the capacities and contents of casks, drums receive d from the distillery. Then Rule 113 requires that the outer door of a spirit wa rehouse shall be locked by two locks, one being supplied by the Government and t he other by the contractor, the keys being retained by the Officer-in-Charge of the warehouse and by the contractor or his authorized representative. Under Rule 115, the contractor is to maintain regular accounts showing the quantity and st rength of spirits received in, issued from and remaining in the warehouse and su ch accounts shall be open at all times to the inspection of the Officer-in-Charg e of the warehouse and of all superior Excise Officers. Then, Rule 135(2) provid es that the spirit may be removed from distilleries or excise warehouse on payme nt of duty. Rule 137, however, says that no spirit is to be removed from any dis tilleries or warehouse without a cover of a pass issued by the Collector or Offi cer-in-Charge, or in the case of issues to licensed retail vendors of country sp irit, under cover of endorsement by the Officer-in-Charge on the duplicate copy of the retail vendor’s license. If the contractor has executed a bond in the pre scribed form, the Officer-in-Charge may issue passes for removal of spirits up t o the quantity covered by the bond.

15. Coming now to Instruction relating to Liquor, under Clause 58, licensed retail vendors in contract supply areas are required to pay into treasury the du ty and cost price and, in the case of settlement under the vend-fee system, for the quantity of spirit which they require. The challans are to be prepared in qu adruplicate, one copy to be kept in the treasury and the remaining three copies to be presented by the vendor or his agent to the Officer-in-Charge of Excise at the District Headquarters after completion in the treasury. The Officer-in-Char ge will endorse on one copy of the challan order authorising the issue of the qu antity of spirit on which duty, cost, cost price, etc. have been paid and is req uired to enter on a second copy a note that the costs price has been entered in the register of certificate for issue of country spirit and then to hand over th ese copies to the vendor or his agent and to keep the third copy in his office. Thereafter, the vendor is required to present the said two copies of the challan s to the Officer-in-Charge of the Spirit Warehouse, who is then required to issu e the spirit and make over the other copy of the Contractor for supply of liquor . The cost price and other duties are deposited in the treasury through treasury challan in the Government Head of Account. The procedure for payment of cost pr ice of the potable alcohol/rectified spirit to the contractor is that the Deputy Commissioner of the concerned district sends a statement showing realization of total cost price of country spirit per month to the Excise Department, Governme nt of Assam with a request to sanction the amount in favour of the contractor an d accordingly, the Excise Department, Government of Assam sanctions the said tot al cost price and issues order to that effect to the Accountant General, Assam T reasury for necessary action, as evidenced by the letters dated 20-8-2003 and 26 -9-2003 (Annexure-D and Annexure-E to the writ petition).

16. We have to extensively refer to the various rules and instructions for b etter appreciation of the issue as to whether the contract entered into between the petitioner and the State-respondents constitutes a mere transportation arran gement or a sale. As already indicated by us earlier, a controlled/regulated sal e can nevertheless be a sale. The limitations imposed by a statute or control or ders on the normal right of dealers and consumers to supply and obtain the goods , of the obligations imposed upon the parties or of the penalties prescribed for violation of the contract do not militate against the position that the transac tion in question is one of sale. From the Rules and Instructions extracted above , it becomes apparent that the contract in question is not purely a contract for transportation. If that were so, nothing more need be done by the petitioner on ce he has supplied the spirit to the warehouse. Webster defines the term ’trans port’ as to carry or convey from one place to another; again, to remove from one place to another; and throughout all the deviation of the word ’transport’, we find the same part of the definition ’to remove’. To recapitulate, the task assi gned to the petitioner by the contract in question was one of transporting the c ountry spirit purchased by him at his own cost from Bihar to the warehouse, for which he was even required to maintain an establishment for the storage, reducti on and issue of spirit and to maintain at the warehouse such minimum stock of sp irits as from time to time fixed by the Excise Commissioner. In other words, aft er transporting the spirits to the warehouse, his contractual duties did not end . On the contrary, he continued to have the custody of the spirits, albeit indir ect or remote, as the warehouse was put under the joint lock of the Officer-in-C harge of the Warehouse and himself. Even after transporting the spirits to the w arehouse, he was required to keep regular accounts showing the quantity and stre ngth of the spirits received in, issued from and remaining in the warehouse. Tho ugh the contract cost price of the spirits together with the still head duty pay able thereon were required to be paid by the retail vendors into treasury, the p etitioner was the ultimate recipient of the cost price and was entitled to recei ve every month the total amount deposited in his favour as the cost price thereo f during the preceding months. The cost price was the fixed whole sale rate, whi ch was determined by tender. It may also be noted that the cost price also inclu ded the cost of carriage from the distillery to the warehouses.

17. As for the method of payment of duty and cost price, the licensed vendor s were required to pay into treasury the duty (still head duty) and cost by chal lans, which were to be in quadruplicate, one copy whereof kept in the treasury while the three remaining copies after completion in the treasury were presented by the vendor or his agent to the Officer-in-Charge of Excise at the District h eadquarters, who then endorsed on one copy of the challan order authorising the issue of the quantity of the spirit on which duty and cost price have been paid and entered on a second copy a note that the cost price had been entered in the register certificate for issue of the country spirit. The Officer-in-Charge hand ed over these two copies to the vendor or his agent and kept the third copy in h is office. The vendor then presented two copies of the challan to the Officer-in -Charge of the spirit warehouse, who issued the spirit and retained in his offic e the copy of the challan authorising the issue of the spirit and made over the other copy of the contractor for the supply of liquor. It is true that there was no direct payment of the cost price of the country spirit between the petitione r and the licensed vendors and that the payments were routed through treasury. T his was to ensure that there was no excess payment of the contract cost price by the licensed retail vendors and also for the convenience of the petitioner. The manner in which the contract was carried out by the petitioner as indicated abo ve, in our judgment, is an indication of the transactions so carried out by the petitioner being impregnated with the character of a sale, albeit a controlled o r regulated sale as provided for in the statute: it cannot, therefore, be said t hat it was a case of transportation contract simpliciter. What is worthy of noti ce in the aforesaid transaction is that there continued to be a relationship, ma y be inchoate, between the petitioner and the State respondents as seller and bu yer. Here, the State respondents collected on behalf of the petitioner the price of the country spirit from the licensed retail vendors the contractual price of the spirits. In the words of the Apex Court, it is not really the nomenclature involved but the substance of the transaction under consideration, which matters in a case of this nature. It is true that consent makes a contract of sale (or what is known as consensus ad idem (cid:29)), but such consent can be expressed or impli ed, total or partial and it cannot be said that unless the offer and acceptance are there in an elementary form, there can be no taxable sale.

18. In the instant case, there was undoubtedly an element of compulsion or r egulation in both the selling and buying, perhaps more for the supplier than for the licensed retail vendor, but then a statutorily regulated/controlled sale ca n nevertheless be a sale as sale can also often take place without volition of a party. So long as the parties trade under the control of the State at the tende r price and accept these as any other law of the State because they must, the co ntract being for a fixed price and the payment being made through treasury and b oth sides having or deemed to have agreed to such a price, such a contract is ju st another example of an implied contract with an implied offer and implied acce ptance by the parties. If a sale, express or implied, is found to exist then the tax must follow. In other words, so long as mutual assent, express or implied, is not totally excluded, the transaction will amount to a sale. In the case at h and, the nature of the contract executed between the petitioner and the State-re spondents plainly shows that the four elements to constitute a sale, namely, com petency of parties, mutual assent of the parties even though the same may not be total, passing of property in the goods supplied by the petitioner to the licen sed retail vendors via the Officer-in-Charge of the warehouse/Excise and Treasur y, and lastly, payment of price, though statutorily controlled, were all present to render the transaction liable to sales tax. Though the parties, the cost pri ce, the warehouse, the supply and acceptance of country spirit transported by th e petitioner in accordance with the provisions of the Rules are all regulated/co ntrolled, all the same, when the cost price of the country spirit paid by the li censed retail vendor was eventually paid every month to the petitioner in terms of Rule 97(2) of the Excise Rules, the contract executed by the petitioner is cl early indicative of sale albeit a statutorily controlled or regulated one. Once it is held that the transaction in question is sale, the impugned provision deem ing the licensed contractor such as the petitioner as the first point seller lia ble to be taxed cannot be faulted with constitutionally or otherwise. In other w ords, the Legislature is not wide off the mark in deeming such a transaction to be a sale. Therefore, Explanation 3(ii) to Section 8(1)(a) of the Assam General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 2002 is intra vires the Constitution and the sales ta x imposed thereby cannot be construed to be a tax on income beyond the legislati ve competence of the State Legislature of Assam. As for the letter dated 23-7-20 02 (Annexure-I) upon which heavy reliance is placed by the learned senior counse l to demonstrate that the Commissioner of Excise himself had held that as contra ctor did not directly supply the supplying country spirit to the lessees, it was not required to realize the sales tax, in the light of our finding that the sup ply of the country spirit by the petitioner in terms of the agreement dated 7-9- 2000 is exigible to sales under the Excise Act, the view taken by the Excise Com missioner is contrary to law and is not binding upon the State-respondents: ther e can be no estoppel against statutory provisions. This letter is, therefore, no n-est and cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner.

19. It is the next contention of the learned senior counsel that Section 4 o f the Assam General Sales Act, 1993 barring any person from calling into questio n the jurisdiction of any authority after receipt of any notice under this Act f rom such authority, is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution as i t takes away the power of judicial review vested in the High Court under Article s 226 and 227 of the Constitution. His argument runs along the following lines. Under our constitutional scheme, every High Court has, by virtue of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the power to issue prerogative writs or orders to all authorities and instrumentalities of the State which function within its ter ritorial jurisdiction. In such situation, no authority or Tribunal located withi n the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court can disregard the law declared by it. The impugned provision, in so far as it seeks to divest the High Court of i ts power of superintendence over all revenue authorities, situated within its te rritorial jurisdiction, violate one of the basic features of the Constitution. H e relies on the decision of the Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India , (1997) 3 SCC 261 to fortify his submissions. Section 4 of the Act reads thus: (cid:28)4. No person shall be entitled to call into question the jurisdiction of an y authority under section 3 after the expiry of 90 days from the date of the rec eipt by him of any notice under this Act from such authority. (cid:29) It will be interesting as well as instructive to compare Section 4 and S ection 39 of the Act, which is in the following terms: (cid:28)39. Save as provided in this Chapter, no assessment made and no order passed u nder this Act or the Rules made thereunder shall be called in question before an y court and no prosecution, suit or other proceeding shall lie against the State Government or any officer thereof for anything done or intended to be done unde r this Act. (cid:29)

20. Reading the two provisions in juxtaposition, it becomes, prima facie, cl ear that while Section 4 insulates any notice issued by any of the authorities e nvisaged by Section 3 after 90 days thereof from any challenge by a person befor e any court including a High Court or the Supreme Court, Section 39 only ousts t he jurisdiction of a court to examine the legality of the assessment made and or der passed under the Act or the Rules made thereunder and grants immunity to the State Government and its officers for anything done or intended to be done in good faith under the Act. As far as the first limb of Section 39 of the Act is c oncerned, the law is now well-settled and was reiterated by the Apex Court very recently, while construing Section 28 of Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, which is virtually couched in similar language, that though the section b ars the jurisdiction of the civil courts from entertaining suits relating to mat ters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Custodian, that cannot bar the jur isdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution (See Shakara C oop. Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabharka, (2011) 5 SCC 607). As noticed above, Section 4 appears to have even barred a writ court from entertaining any complai nt against the exercise of jurisdiction by the revenue authorities appointed und er Section 3 after the expiry of 90 days from the date of the receipt by him of any notice from such authorities. In L.Chandra Kumar (supra), it has been re-aff irmed by the Apex Court that the power vested in the High Courts to exercise jud icial superintendence over the decisions of all courts and tribunals within thei r respective jurisdictions is also a part of the basic structure of the Constitu tion. In our opinion, revenue authorities appointed under Section 3 of the Act a re also tribunals or, at any rate, have the trappings of a tribunal as they are exercising quasi-judicial functions. Ouster of jurisdiction by statutory provisi on may either be express or implied. When the exclusion of jurisdiction is also not expressly stated in the statute, it can be implied. In instant case, though the language of Section 4 does not say so in many words that even the jurisdicti on of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ of certio rari is barred, yet it is to be necessarily implied. When the Legislature intend s to oust the jurisdiction of only civil courts and not the High Courts or the S upreme Court, it has been made apparent by them as indicated by Section 39 of th e Act. We, therefore, hold that Section 4 violates the basic feature of the Cons titution, and cannot be sustained in law. But then, this Court cannot be too tri gger happy in striking down legislations as tersely observed by his Lordship, V. R. Krishna Iyer, J (Retd.) in Bhim Singhji v. Union of, (1981) 1 SCC 166: (cid:28)Reading down meaning of words with loose lexical amplitude is permissible a s part of the judicial process. To sustain a law by interpretation is the rule. To be trigger-happy in shooting at sight every suspect law is judicial legicide. Court can and must interpret words and read their meaning so that public good i s promoted and power misuse is interdicted. (cid:29) The legal position is explained in detail by the Apex Court in M. Rathin aswami v. State of T.N., (2009) 5 SCC 625 at paras 28, 29 and 30 of the judgment . This is what it said: (cid:28)28. It is well settled that to save a statutory provision from the vice of unconstitutionality, sometimes a restricted or extended interpretation of the st atute has to be given. This is because it is a well-settled principle interpreta tion of the statute that the Courts should make every effort to save a statute f rom becoming unconstitutional. If on giving one interpretation the statute becom es unconstitutional, then the Court should prefer the latter on the ground that the legislature is presumed not have intended to have exceeded its jurisdiction.

29. Sometimes to uphold the constitutional validity the statutory provision has to be read down. Thus, in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi (AIR 1945 FC 25), the Federal Court was considering the validity of the Hindu Women’s Property Act, 1 937. In order to uphold the constitutional validity of the Act, the Federal Cour t held the Act intra vires by construing the word (cid:28)property (cid:29) as meaning (cid:28)propert y other than agricultural land (cid:29). This restricted interpretation of the word (cid:28)pro perty (cid:29) had to be given otherwise the Act would have become unconstitutional.

30. Similarly, in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1962 SC 955) this Court had to construe Section 124-A of the Penal Code which relates to the offe nce of sedition which makes a person punishable who (cid:28)by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise, brings or atte mpts to bring into hatred or contempt, excites or attempts to excite disaffectio n towards, the Government established by law (cid:29). This Court gave a restrictive int erpretation to the aforesaid words so that they apply only to acts involving int ention or tendency to create disorder or disturbance of law and order or incitem ent to violence. This was done to avoid the provisions becoming violative of Art icle 19(1)(a) of the Constitution which provides for freedom of speech and expre ssion. (cid:29)

21. The underlying principle which can be culled out from the paragraphs ext racted above is that where the language of the statute leads to manifest contrad iction or ambiguity or defect or omission, the Court can adopt a construction wh ich saves the statutory provision from the vice of constitutional infirmity. In other words, every effort must be made by a Court to save a statutory provision from becoming unconstitutional and (cid:28)not to be trigger-happy shooting at sight ev ery suspect law (cid:29). Of course, the easy course of action to be taken by us is simp ly to declare Section 4 of the Act as ultra vires the Constitution and then quas h the same. If, however, on giving one interpretation, the impugned statutory pr ovision becomes unconstitutional and on another interpretation, it will be const itutional, then the Court should prefer the latter on the ground that the legisl ature is presumed not to have intended to have exceeded its jurisdiction. Here i s a statutory provision of substantial defect ousting judicial review of a Const itutional Court and has the potential of destroying one of the basic features of the Constitution. On the other hand, this Court is not oblivious of the burdens ome and cumbersome process of new legislation for rectification of the defect, w hich will be the inevitable consequence of our striking down the impugned provis ion. Under the circumstances, the via media we have in mind is not to strike dow n the impugned provision but to read down the provision suitably so as to save i t from unconstitutionality. This necessarily warrants giving restrictive interpr etation to Section 4 of the Act by reading the words (cid:28)except in the High Court u nder Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution (cid:29) between the words (cid:28)call in questi on (cid:29) and (cid:28)the jurisdiction of any authority under Section 3 (cid:29). No other contentio n of substantial nature survives for consideration.

22. sposed of with the following orders: The result of the foregoing discussion is that the writ petitions are di The impugned assessment orders dated 20-7-2004 in the three writ petitio (a) ns are valid and enforceable. Section 4 of the Act, in so far as it ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court u nder Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to question the legality of the ex ercise of jurisdiction by the revenue authorities under Section 3, is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution and is, therefore, declared as uncons titutional. (b) However, instead of striking down Section 4 lock stock and barrel, the w ords (cid:28)except in the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution (cid:29) s hall be read into between the words (cid:28)call in question (cid:29) and (cid:28)the jurisdiction of any authority under Section 3 (cid:29) of Section 4 of the Act. (c) The parties are directed to bear their respective costs.