Judgment · High Court · 2012

The appellant and other members of the Panchayat moved a No-Confidence M 2. otion dated 18.2.2010, but since the meeting for purpose was not held, as requir ed under the provisions of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994, W.P.(C) No.1953 of 201 0 was filed in this Court. Vide order dated 25.6.2010, a direction was issued to the Deputy Commissioner to take action in accordance with law. Accordingly, mee ting was held to consider the No-Confidence Motion on 7.8.2010, in which eight o ut of ten members of the Panchayat voted against the writ petitioner which inclu ded two members who had ceased to be members on account of their resignation on 10.12.2009.

#3. The writ petitioner approached this Court under Article 226 of the Const itution on the ground that out of the total ten members, no-confidence motion co uld be passed under Section 15(1) of the Act by two-third of the (cid:28)total members (cid:29) , which was seven and since only six members voted in support of the no-confiden ce motion, the same was invalid.

#4. The appellant contested the writ petition by submitting that as two memb ers had resigned, there were only eight members out of whom two-third voted agai nst the writ petitioner.

#5. eld the plea of the writ petitioner as follows :- Learned Single Judge, on interpretation of Section 15(1) of the Act, uph (cid:28) Therefore, this Court holds that the said two members, i.e., Sri Rahimuddin Ba rbuiyan, and Sri A.A. Mazumdar had submitted their resignation letters which wer e accepted by the competent authority, and having resigned from membership of th e Gaon Panchayat on 10.12.2009, they were not entitled to participate in the sai d meeting held on 7.8.2010. Accordingly, their votes could not have been counted . Consequently, the number of valid votes which were cast in favour of the No co nfidence Motion would be only 6 (six) and not 8 (eight). [22] The next issue to be decided is to ascertain the total number of members of the BB Gaon Panchayat for the purpose of the No Confidence Motion pr oceedings undertaken under Section 15 of the Assam Panchayat Act. Under Section 6 of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994 the Gaon Panchayat consists of 10 members to be directly elected by the voters of the territorial constituencie s of the Gaon Panchayat and the President of the Gaon Panchayat, who will be ele cted directly by the voters of the territorial constituencies of the Gaon Pancha yat area. As such, the total number of members of a Gaon Panchayat would be eleven i.e., (10+1 = 11). Under Section 15 of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994, (cid:28)Every President or Vice-Pres ident shall be deemed to have vacated his office forthwith when resolution expre ssing want of confidence in him is passed by a majority of two third of the tot al numbers of members of the Goan Panchayat. (cid:29) Thus, the dispute in the present petition revolves round the interpretation of t he words, (cid:28)two third of the total numbers of members of the Goan Panchayat (cid:29). The petitioner contends that the total number of the Gaon panchayat would mean t he sanctioned strength of the Gaon panchayat and not the existing, irrespective of the fact that some members may have resigned or ceased to be members of the G aon panchayat. On the other hand, the Respondents contend that the total number of the Gaon pan chayat would mean the existing strength of the Gaon Panchayat since, members who tender their resignation or demit office due to death or otherwise, cease to be members and cannot be counted as members for the purpose of determining the tot al member of the Gaon Panchayat. A similar issue arose before this Court (as then High Court of Assam and Nagaland) in (cid:28)Samiruddin Ahmed vs. S. D. O., Mangaldoi and others, reported in AIR 1971 ASSAM AND NAGALAND 163 in which the Court while interpreting the words \at least a minimum of two-thirds of total number of members\ as found in Secti on 27 (1) (b) of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1959 held as follows: (cid:28) & &..The matter, therefore, turns upon the construction of Section 27 (1) (b). What is the meaning of the words - \at least a minimum of two-thirds of total nu mber of members\ in Section 27 (1) (b). It is contended by the petitioner that t he total number of members must be the total sanctioned strength of the Gaon Pan chayat which is admittedly thirteen. On the other hand, it is submitted by the r espondents that two-thirds must have relation to the existing members functionin g at the time. Since one member was already dead and another has ceased to be a member of the Gaon Panchayat, the total number of members for the purpose of thi s section on the material date is eleven and not thirteen. The presence of eight members in the meeting of 3rd June therefore, fulfils the requirement of Sectio n 27 (1) (b). We are unable to accept the submission of the respondents. There i s no warrant for adding a word \existing\ in Section 27 (1) (b) to qualify the w ords \number of members\. Under this section a President immediately ceases to b e a President on passing of a motion of no-confidence against him by three-fifth majority of the minimum requisite members present. Such a provision under the l aw resulting in deprivation of an office has to be strictly construed as it affe cts the right of an elected office-bearer to continue for the normal span of his office. (cid:29) We may also add that it is now well settled principle of law tha [23] t wherever, the words of the statutes are clear and not ambiguous, principle of literal rule should be adopted, i.e., the provisions should be given its plain a nd normal reading without adding and ignoring any words. Any departure from such plain reading would be permissible only if such a plain reading leads to any ab surdity or repugnancy or irrationality. In this regard we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court rendere d in Afcons Infrastructure Limited v. Cherian Varkey Construction Company Privat e Limited, (2010) 8 SCC 24, where it was held, (cid:28)20. The principles of statutory interpretation are well settled. Where the wor ds of the statute are clear and unambiguous, the provision should be given its p lain and normal meaning, without adding or rejecting any words. Departure from t he literal rule, by making structural changes or substituting words in a clear s tatutory provision, under the guise of interpretation will pose a great risk as the changes may not be what the legislature intended or desired. Legislative wis dom cannot be replaced by the Judge’s views. As observed by this Court in a some what different context: (cid:28)6. & When a procedure is prescribed by the legislature, it is not for the court to substitute a different one according to its notion of justice. When the legi slature has spoken, the judges cannot afford to be wiser. (cid:29) (See Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Lt. Governor of Delhi4, SCC p. 301, para 6.)

#21. There is however an exception to this general rule. Where the words used in the statutory provision are vague and ambiguous or where the plain and normal me aning of its words or grammatical construction thereof would lead to confusion, absurdity, repugnancy with other provisions, the courts may, instead of adopting the plain and grammatical construction, use the interpretative tools to set rig ht the situation, by adding or omitting or substituting the words in the statute . When faced with an apparently defective provision in a statute, courts prefer to assume that the draftsman had committed a mistake rather than concluding that the legislature has deliberately introduced an absurd or irrational statutory p rovision. Departure from the literal rule of plain and straight reading can howe ver be only in exceptional cases, where the anomalies make the literal complianc e with a provision impossible, or absurd or so impractical as to defeat the very object of the provision. We may also mention purposive interpretation to avoid absurdity and irrationality is more readily and easily employed in relation to p rocedural provisions than with reference to substantive provisions.

21.1. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn., p. 228), under the capti on (cid:28)modification of the language to meet the intention (cid:29) in the chapter dealing w ith (cid:28)Exceptional Construction (cid:29) states the position succinctly: (cid:28)Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical constr uction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactme nt, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, which can hard ly have been intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the mean ing of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by de parting from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular wo rds, or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground that the legislature could n ot possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications mad e are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. Wh ere the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman’s unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except i n a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. (cid:29) This Court in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh5 approved and adopted the said approach. (cid:29) 21.2. In Shamrao V.Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana6 this Court reiterate d the principle from Maxwell : (AIR p.327,para 12) (cid:28)12. &.. if one construction will lead to an absurdity while another will effect to what common sense would show was obviously intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act must be rejected even if the same words used i n the same section, and even the same sentence, have to be construed differently . Indeed, the law goes so far as to require the courts sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words if by doing so absurdity and inc onsistency can be avoided. (cid:29)

21.3. In Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd. 7 this Court while reiterating th at courts will have to follow the rule of literal construction, which enjoins th e court to take the words as used by the legislature and to give it the meaning which naturally implies, held that there is an exception to that rule. This Cour t observed : (SCCp.295, para 12) (cid:28)12. &.. That exception comes into play when application of literal construction of the words in the statute leads to absurdity, inconsistency or when it is sho wn that the legal context in which the words are used or by reading the statute as a whole, it requires a different meaning. (cid:29) 21.4 (cid:28) & & & the object of the construction of a statute being to ascertain the will of In Mangin v. IRC 8 the Privy Council held : (AC. p.746E) the legislature it may be presumed that neither injustice nor absurdity was int ended. If therefore a literal interpretation would produce such a result, and th e language admits of an interpretation which would avoid it, then such an interp retation may be adopted. (cid:29)