No. 1 v. No. 2 and 3 as its employees. By an order

(v) In the circumstances, as indicated above, the petitioner company, conten ding, inter alia, that optical fibre, cables and accessories do not fall within the purview of the taxable goods as described under Entry 4 of the Schedule to t he Act of 2001 and, hence, the petitioner company was not liable to pay entry ta x on the said items and that the threat of invoking the bank guarantee by the re spondent No. 1, if permitted, would prejudice the right and interest of the peti tioner company, came to this Court seeking, with the help of the present writ pe tition, appropriate writ or writs setting aside and quashing the communications, dated 30.12.2003, 19.01.2004, 17.11.2004, and 16.12.2004, aforementioned, where by payment of entry tax on the said items were sought to be collected by the res pondents. The petitioner company also sought for appropriate writ or writs sett ing aside and quashing the letter, dated 30.10.2004, whereby the State responden ts had, inter alia, directed the respondent No. 1 to deduct, at source, the amo unt of entry tax from the pending bills of the petitioner company. The petition er had also sought for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to invo ke the said bank guarantee. (vi) While issuing Rule, the Court, on 12.01.2005, passed an interim order al lowing the respondent company to hold the bank guarantee furnished by the petiti oner company with further direction that the petitioner company shall extend the validity of the said bank guarantee if the writ petition was not disposed of ea rlier than November, 2005. In terms of the interim direction, so given, the ban k guarantee stands extended.

3. I have heard Dr. A. K. Saraf, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. R. Dubey, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7. I have also heard Mr. S. N. Sarma, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Taking this Court through the provisions of Section 2(b), which defines 4. the term ’entry of goods into a local area’, Section 2(c), which defines ’local area’, and Section 2(d), which defines ’importer’ and also Entry 4 of the Sched ule to the Act of 2001, Dr. Saraf submits that Entry 4 does not include the item s, in question, namely optical fibre, cables and accessories. Drawing attention of this Court to the contents of Entry 4, which reads (cid:28)sound transmitting equip ment including telephones, mobile phones, pagers and component and parts thereof (cid:29), Dr. Saraf contends that in the expression (cid:28)sound transmitting equipment inclu ding telephones, mobile phones, pagers and component and parts thereof (cid:29), the wo rd ’including’ has not been used as a word of enlargement; rather, the word ’i ncluding’ has been used, according to Dr. Saraf, in a restricted sense and is exhaustive by nature inasmuch as ’sound transmitting equipment’ would include, u nder Entry 4, only telephones, mobile phones, pagers and component and parts the reof and not any other item, such as, optical fibres, cables and accessories. T he basis, for the submissions so made by Dr. Saraf, is that where two or more wo rds, susceptible of analogous meaning, are clubbed together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colour from, a nd are qualified by, each other, the meaning of the general word being restricte d to a sense analogous to that of the less general. In Entry 4, submits Dr. Sar af, the terms included within the expression ’sound transmitting equipment’ are clarificatory and reflects exhaustiveness. Had the intention of the legislature been to bring, within the meaning of Entry 4, all possible sound transmitting e quipments, it was, contends Dr. Saraf, quite unnecessary to specifically mention therein only telephones, mobile phones, pagers and components and parts thereof , for, telephones, mobile phones and pagers, otherwise also, fall within the exp ression ’sound transmitting equipment’. The only purpose, according to Dr. Sara f, in specifying the items ’telephone, mobile phones and pagers and components a nd parts thereof’ is that only these items shall be treated as ’sound transmitti ng equipment’ and shall be exigible to entry tax. Thus, the intention of the l egislature, reiterates Dr. Saraf, is not to include everything that may be regar ded as sound transmitting equipment. Telephones, mobile phones, pagers and comp onents and parts thereof, ordinarily, fall, points out Dr. Saraf, within the exp ression ’sound transmitting equipments’ and, hence, the word ’including’, which has preceded the words ’ telephones, mobile phones, pagers and components and pa rts thereof’ was not meant to expand the meaning of the term ’sound transmittin g equipment’, but was aimed at clarifying as to what items would be included w ithin the expression ’sound transmitting equipment’. Thus, the word ’including’ , emphasizes Dr. Saraf, has been used in Entry 4 in order to give a limited me aning to the expression ’sound transmitting equipment’ and would, therefore, inc lude only telephone, mobile phones, pagers and components and parts thereof and no other item. Support for his submissions is sought to be derived by Dr. Saraf from State of U.P. v. Raja Anand Brahma Shah, reported in (1969) 1 SCR 362, Sou th Gujrat Roofing Tiles Manufacturing Association v. State of Gujrat, (1976) 4 S CC 601, Godfrey Phillip India Ltd., v. State of U.P. (2005) 139 STC 537 and Subh ash and Steel Rolling Industries v. State of Gujarat (1982) 50 STC 305.

5. Controverting the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. Dub ey has submitted that optical fibre, cables and accessories are covered by Entry 4 of the Schedule to the Act of 2001 inasmuch as sound transmitting equipment w ould embrace, within its sweep, the optical fibre, cables, joining box, terminat ion box, joining kits which are nothing but paraphernalia of transmitting/receiv ing devices of sound telecommunication. The word ’including’, appearing in Entr y 4, should be read, contends Mr. Dubey, as a word of extension and not as a wor d of limitation. In support of his submissions, Mr. Dubey has placed reliance o n State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, reported in 1960 SC 610, CIT Andhra Pradesh v. M/s Tajmahal Hotel, Secunderabad (1971)3 SCC 550 and Regional Direct or, Employees State Insurance Corporation v. High Land Coffee Works of P.F.X. Sa ldanha and Sons (1991) 3 SCC 617.

6. Resisting the submissions made by Mr. Dubey, Dr. Saraf contends that non e of the decisions, which Mr. Dubey relies upon, clarifies as to when the word ’ include’ shall be treated to be expansive or exhaustive. All these decisions, points out Dr. Saraf, merely interpret the given words or items in the context o f the provisions of the relevant statute and should, therefore, be treated to be confined to the facts of the given cases. It is submitted by Dr. Saraf that wh en a word or an item does not, ordinarily, fall within the sweep of a term, whic h an enactment seeks to give by using the word ’include’ or ’including’, such a definition has to be treated as expansive by nature and not exhaustive; wherea s, when the words, which are included within a term, which an enactment seeks to define, ordinarily, also falls within the sweep of the term (which the enactmen t defines), such a definition has to be treated as exhaustive and would, therefo re, include, within the term, which has been defined, only such items, which are sought to be included within the defined term. The decisions, therefore, cited on behalf of the State respondents, are not, according to Dr. Saraf, applicable to the facts of the present case. As far as Mr. S. N. Sarma, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf o 7. f the OIL is concerned, his submission is that if this Court holds that optical fibre, cables and accessories are not taxable items under the Act of 2001, the r espondent company may be given the liberty to realize the amount deposited by th em with the State respondents in order to avoid penal charges. Should this Cour t, submits Mr. Sarma, hold that ’optical fibre, cables and accessories’ are tax able items under the Act of 2001, the OIL may be allowed to realize from the wri t petitioners the amount already deposited by the OIL, with the State Government , as entry tax. In the light of the rival submissions made before me on behalf of the pa 8. rties, it is clear, as already indicated above, that the moot question, which fa lls for determination, in the present writ petition, is as to whether optical fi bre, cables and accessories are items covered by the Act of 2001? A search for an answer to the above question brings me to Section 3, whi

9. ch contains the charging provisions. This Section reads as under: (cid:28)3. Levy of Tax - (1) There shall be levied and collected an entry tax on the e ntry of the goods specified in the Schedule into any local area for consumption , use or sale therein at the rates shown against each item in the said Schedule and such tax shall be paid by every importer of such goods (cid:28)whether he imports s uch goods on his own account or on account of his principal or any other person or takes delivery or is entitled to take delivery of such goods on such entry (cid:29)

10. ’Entry of goods into a local area’ is defined in Section 2(b) of the Act of 2001. Section 2(b) reads, (cid:28)Entry of goods into a local area (cid:29) with all its g rammatical variations and cognate expressions means entry of the goods as specif ied in the Schedule into a local area from any place outside (cid:28)that local area in cluding a place outside (cid:29) the State for consumption, use or sale therein. (cid:29)

11. From a combined reading of Section 3 and Section 2(b) of the Act of 2001 , what becomes abundantly clear, and is, in fact, not in dispute, is that entry tax is leviable only on the goods, which are specified in the Schedule to the Ac t of 2001.

12. While it is contended by the writ petitioners that optical fibre, cables and accessories are not covered by the Schedule to the Act of 2001, the State r espondents contend that these items, being sound transmitting equipments, are co vered by Entry 4 of the Schedule to the Act of 2001.

13. As the controversy, in the present writ petition, relates to the interpr etation of Entry 4, necessary it is that the contents of Entry 4 be put to a coo l and dispassionate analysis for the purpose of determining if the optical fibre , cables and accessories can be held to have been included within the expression ’sound transmitting equipment’. Entry 4 is, therefore, reproduced below: (cid:28)Sound Transmitting equipment including Telephones, mobile phones, pager s and component and parts thereof. (cid:29) From the contents of Entry 4, what becomes transparent is that while def 14. ining the expression ’sound transmitting equipments’, the items, such as, optica l fibre, cables and accessories have not been specifically mentioned as items co vered by the expression ’sound transmitting equipment’. In fact, it is not in d ispute that the items, namely, optical fibre, cables and accessories are not spe cifically mentioned in the Schedule to the Act of 2001. The question, therefore , which needs to be determined is, as to what the word ’including’, appearing in Entry 4, conveys.

15. While it is the contention of the writ petitioners that the word ’includ ing’, which appears in Entry 4, implies limitation and exhaustiveness and that t he expression ’sound transmitting equipment’ shall not be treated to include an y item other than telephones, mobile phones, pagers and components and parts the reof, the State respondents contend that the word ’including’, which appears in Entry 4, has been used by the legislature for the purpose of giving expanded mea ning and would include, within its sweep, all such items, which are sound transm itting equipments and since optical fibre, cables and accessories are sound tran smitting equipments, these items shall be treated to have been automatically inc luded within the meaning of the expression ’sound transmitting equipment’. It a lso needs to be pointed out, at this stage, that the writ petitioners further co ntend that optical fibre, cables and accessories are not sound transmitting equi pments. The State respondents, however, do not agree and contend that optical fi bre, cables and accessories fall within the expression sound transmitting equipm ent. Without entering into the controversy as to whether optical fibre, cables a nd accessories are or are not sound transmitting equipments, let me, first, dete rmine if telephones, mobile phones, pagers and components and parts thereof are the only sound transmitting equipments, which are exigible to entry tax under th e Act of 2001.

16. While considering the above aspect of the case, what needs to be borne i n mind is that though the word ’including’ is, generally, used as a word expres sing enlargement, it may have to be, in a given context, construed to have been used in a restricted sense. Where the term ’including’ is used as an extending force, it adds to the word or phrase a meaning, which naturally does not belong to such word or phrase. The use of the word ’including’ in the restrictive se nse is not wholly unknown in interpretation of the statutes. In fact, Lord Watso n, in Dilworth Vs. Commissioner of Stamps, reported in 1899 AC 99, observed, (cid:28)Th e word \include\ is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to en large the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statue; and w hen it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also th ose thing which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. But the word \include\ is susceptible of another construction, which may becomes imp erative, if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the words or e xpressions defined. It may be equivalent to \mean and include\, and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposed of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions. (cid:29) 17. Having taken note of the above, the Apex Court observed, (cid:28)In our opinion the word (cid:28)including (cid:29) is intended to clarify or explain the concept of land held or let for purposes ancillary to agriculture. The idea seems to be to remove an y doubts on the point whether waste land or forest land could be held to be capa ble of being held or let for purposes ancillary to agriculture. We must, therefo re, held that forest land or wasteland in the area in dispute cannot be deemed t o be an estate within clause (a) (iii) unless it was held or let for purposes an cillary to agriculture. There is no dispute that the cultivated portion of Parga na Agori would fall within clause (a)(iii). (cid:29)

18. From what has been observed by Lord Watson in Dilworth (supra), it is ab undantly clear that it is not always necessary that the word ’including’ would c onvey expansiveness nor is it necessary that the word ’including’ shall always b e interpreted to include, within its sweep, such items, which may not be general ly included within the term, which is sought to be defined by using the word ’in cluding’. When the word ’including’ is not used as a word of expansion, it imp lies limitation. The test, therefore, is as to whether an item, which has been d efined to be included within an expression, which is sought to be defined by an enactment, naturally belongs to the expression, which is sought to be defined. If an item naturally belongs to, and falls within the meaning of, the word or e xpression, which the enactment seeks to define, there is really no sense in incl uding such an item within such a word or expression unless the inclusion is for the purpose of clarification or illustration indicating exhaustiveness and limit ation.

19. There is no dispute that the expression ’sound transmitting equipment’ includes, within its natural meaning, telephones, mobile phones, pagers and comp onents and part thereof. In this view of the matter, there is really no purpose in specifically including telephones, mobile phones, pagers and components and parts thereof within the expression ’sound transmitting equipment’. The only r ational purpose, which can be attributed to such a legislation, is that by using the word ’including’ in Entry 4, the legislature intended to convey that it is only telephones, mobile phones, pagers and components and parts thereof which, as sound transmitting equipments, are exigible to entry tax. Thus, the word ’inc luding’ , which appears in Entry 4, cannot but be held to have been used in a re strictive sense and the legislative intention is not to include any sound transm itting equipment except telephones, mobile phones, pagers and components and par ts thereof or any derivative thereof within the expression ’sound transmitting e quipment’. If this interpretation is held to be correct, it is not really mater ial as to whether optical fibre, cables and accessories are or are not sound tra nsmitting equipments. It is only if the word ’including’ , appearing in Entry 4, is held to have been used for the purpose of expansion that it would become n ecessary to determine if optical fibre, cables and accessories fall, otherwise a lso, within the meaning of the expression ’sound transmitting equipment’ so as t o bring these items within the sweep of entry tax .

20. I am guided to adopt the above view from the decision in South Gujarat R oofing Tiles Manufacturing Association Vs. State of Gujrat, reported in (1976) 4 SCC 601, wherein the Apex Court was required to examine as to whether Mangalore Pottery roofing tile manufacturers would be covered by Entry 22 of Part-I of th e Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The said Entry read as under: (cid:28)Employment in Potteries Industry. Explanation - For the purpose of this entry potteries industry includes the manu facture of the following articles of pottery, namely : (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) Crockery. Sanitary appliances and fittings. Refractories. Jars. Electrical accessories. Hospital ware. Textile accessories. Toys. Glazed tiles. (cid:29)

21. On examination of the question as to whether the word ’including’, which appears in the Explanation to the expression ’Employment in potteries industry’ , had been used in a restrictive sense or by way of expansion, the Apex Court h eld that there is no inflexible rule that the word ’including’ should be read always as a word of expansion without reference to the context. Clarified a thre e-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, speaking through AC Gupta, J, in South Gujar at Roofing Tiles Manufacturing Association (supra), as under: (cid:28)Pottery in a wide sense will take in all objects that are made form clay and ha rdened by fire, from crude earthen pots to delicate porcelain. Hence it is difficult to agree that ’includes’ as used in the explanation to ent ry 22 has that extending force. The explanation says that for the purpose of ent ry 22, potteries industry includes the manufacture of the nine ’articles of pott ery’ specified in the explanation. If the object specified are also (cid:28)articles of pottery (cid:29) then these object are already comprised in the expression (cid:28)potteries i ndustry (cid:29). It hardly makes any sense to say that potteries industry includes the manufacture of articles of pottery, if the intention was to enlarge the meaning of potteries industry in any way. The inclusion in the list of objects which are well-recognised articles of pottery makes it plain that the explanation was add ed to the entry not by way of abundant caution. If it had been the legislature i ntention to bring within the entry all possible articles of pottery. It was quit e unnecessary to add an explanation. The word ’includes’ has been used here in the sense of ’means’, this is the only construction that the word can bear in the context. In that sense it is not a w ord of extension, but limitation, it is exhaustive of the meaning which must be given to potteries industry for the purpose of entry 22. The use of the word ’in cludes’ in the restrictive sense is not unknown. (cid:29)

22. Since ’pottery’ , in a wide sense, would mean all objects, which are mad e of clay and hardened by heat, whether the item is a crude earthen pot or a del icate porcelain, there is no meaning in specifying nine articles of pottery unde r the Explanation to Entry 22 unless the object of specifying the nine articles of pottery were meant to convey exhaustiveness. No wonder, therefore, that the Apex Court made it clear that if the intention was to enlarge the meaning of the pottery industries, then, the inclusion of the well recognized articles of pott ery, within the meaning of the term ’potteries industry’, would be meaningless. To put it a little differently, had it been the legislative intention to bring, within Entry 22, all possible articles of pottery, it was, as observed by the S upreme Court, quite unnecessary to add an explanation and enlist therein only ni ne items of pottery. Similar is the case at hand. If the expression ’sound tra nsmitting equipment’, which appears in Entry 4, were intended to include all equ ipments of sound transmission, then, there was really no purpose in bringing, wi thin sweep of the expression, ’sound transmitting equipment’, only three items , namely, telephones, mobile phones, pagers and components and parts thereof, an d exclude thereby other items of ’sound transmitting equipment’.

23. Another clear case of the word ’including’ having been used as clarific atory or illustrative of a general expression is the case of State of U.P. v. Ra ja Anand Brahma Sahi, reported in (1967) 1 SCR 362. In Raja Anand (supra), the Apex Court was required to construe Article 31A(2) as enacted by the Constituti on (17th Amendment) Act, 1964. The relevant extract of Article 31A(2) reads as under: (cid:28)31A. (2) In this article (a) the expression ’estate’ shall in relation to any local area have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in that area and shall also include (i) & & & & & & & & &.; (ii) & & & & & & & & &; (iii) any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of building and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agricultural l abourers and village artisans. (cid:29)

24. Explaining as to whether waste land or forest land could be held to be c apable of being held or let for the purposes ancillary to agriculture, the Apex Court held, in Raja Anand (supra), thus, (cid:28)In our opinion the word (cid:28)including (cid:29) is intended to clarify or explain the concept of land held or let for purposes anc illary to agriculture. The idea seems to be to remove any doubts on the point wh ether waste land or forest land could be held to be capable of being held or let for purposes ancillary to agriculture. We must, therefore, hold that forest lan d or wasteland in the area in dispute cannot be deemed to be an estate within cl ause (a) (iii) unless it was held or let for purposes ancillary to agriculture. (cid:29)

25. From the decision in Raja Anand (supra), it becomes clear that the word ’including’ can be used, in a given context, for the purpose of clarification o r explanation and it is not necessary that the word ’include’ would always conve y expansiveness. In the present case, when telephones, mobile phones and pagers fall within the term ’sound transmitting equipment’ , there was, if Mr. Dubey’ s contention is to be accepted, no purpose in specifying these items in Entry 4, while defining as to what items would be included within the term ’sound transm itting equipment’. Had telephones, mobile phones and pagers not been the items , which are, normally, regarded as sound transmitting equipments, then, telephon es, mobile phones and pagers, appearing under Entry 4, could have been held to h ave been included, within the expression ’sound transmitting equipment’, by way of enlargement. Enlargement is required for the purpose of covering only such items, which do not, ordinarily, belong to the class within which an item is sou ght to be included. But when an item, otherwise, also stands included within a term, which is defined, the implication would be that the item, mentioned by way of inclusion, is clarificatory and imposes limitation.

26. Having taken note of the decision, in South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufa cturers Association (supra), a Constitution Bench, in Godfrey Philips Ltd and an other Vs State of UP and others, reported in (2005) 4 SCC 186, observed at para 77 thus: (cid:28)77. together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as i t were, their colour from and are qualified by each other, the meaning of the ge neral word being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general. As Where to or more words are susceptible of analogous meaning are clubbed said in Maxwell on the interpretation of statutes, 12th Edition page 289. (cid:28)Words, and particularly, general words, cannot be read in isolation, their colo ur and content are derived from their context. (cid:29)

27. In Reserve Bank of India Vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and others, reported in (1987) 1 SCC 424, the Supreme Court, having taken note of the observations made in Dilworth’s case (supra), and also some other au thorities, which explained the meaning of the word ’include’, held: (cid:28)32. We do not think it necessary to launch into a discussion of either Dilwort h’s case (Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps, 1899 AC 99) or any of the other ca ses cited. All that is necessary for us to say is this : Legislatures resort to inclusive definitions (1) to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases so as to ta ke in the ordinary, popular and natural sense of the words and also the sense wh ich the statue wishes to attribute to it, (2) to include meanings about which th ere might be some dispute, or (3) to bring under one nomenclature all transactio ns possessing certain similar features but going under different names. Dependin g on the context, in the process of enlarging, the definition may even become ex haustive. We do not think that by using the word ’includes’, in the definition i n Section 2(a) of the Act, Parliament intended to so expand the meaning of prize chit as to take in every scheme involving subscribing and refunding of money. T he word ’includes’, the context shows, was intended not to expand the meaning of ’prize chit’ but to cover all transactions or arrangements of the nature of pri ze chits but under different names. (cid:29) (Emphasis is added)

28. From the above observations made in Peerless General Finance and Investm ent Co. Ltd. (supra), what becomes clear is that inclusive definition is resorte d to by the legislature (i) to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases by taking in not only such words or terms, which fall within their ordinary, popular and natural sense, but also the sense, which the statue wishes to attribute to it, (ii) to include meanings about which there may be some controversy or dispute or (iii) to bring under one nomenclature, all transactions possessing certain simi lar features, but going under different names. In Peerless General Finance and I nvestment Co. Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that the wo rd ’include’ may not always be used by the legislature for the purpose of enlarg ement; rather, in a given case, the word ’include’ may indicate exhaustiveness. As recently as in N.D.P. Namboodripad (dead) by LRS Vs. Union of India a 29. nd others, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 502, the Apex Court has pointed out that the word ’include’ conveys different meanings in different context and that in a gi ven case, when the word ’include’ ropes in certain items, which would not, norma lly, be part of such items, the word ’include’ may be taken to have been used fo r the purpose of enlarging the definition, but when the word ’include’ is used f or roping in terms, which are merely illustrative in nature, then, it may imply limitation. 30. In the case of Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra), which Mr. Dubey places re liance upon, the question, which fell for determination was as to whether a ’hos pital’ is covered by the definition of ’industry’ as contained in Section 2(j) o f the Industrial Disputes Act.

31. From a careful reading of the observations made in Hospital Mazdoor Sabh a (supra), what transpires is that having found that the word ’industry’ has bee n defined by Section 2(j) to mean, inter alia, business, trade, undertaking, ma nufacture or calling of employers, etc, which are all words of wide meaning and import, the Apex Court concluded that the word ’includes’, which appear in Secti on 2(j), indicates expansiveness and not restrictiveness. Based on this conclusi on, the Apex Court held that ’hospitals’ come within the definition of ’industry ’. Thus, the decision, in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra), has no application to the facts of the present case, for, the word ’including’, which appears in Secti on 2(j), is wholly different in context than the word ’including’, which appears in Entry 4 of the Scheduled to the Act of 2001.

32. Coming to the case of M/S Taj Mahal Hotel, Secundrabad (supra), what may be noted is that the question, which fell for determination in this case was as to whether sanitary and pipe lines fittings in a building, which run as hotel, would fall within the meaning of the word ’plant’, which appears in Section 10(2 )(vi-b) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. Section 10(5) of the Act defined the word ’ plant’ to include the items, such as, vehicles, books, scientific apparatus and surgical equipments purchase for the purpose of business, profession or vocation .

33. In M/S Taj Mahal Hotel, Secundrabad (supra), having found that Section 1 0(5) included within the word ’plant’, items, such as, vehicles and books, which do not, ordinarily, fall within the meaning of the word ’plant’, the Apex Court held that inference would be that the word ’include’ has been used for the purp ose of enlarging the definition of the word ’plant’. Thus, the legislative inten t, in M/S Taj Mahal Hotel, Secundrabad (supra), was to give the word ’plant’ a w ide meaning and that was why, the words ’books’ and ’vehicles’ were included wit hin the definition of the term ’plant’, though ’plant’ does not, ordinarily, inc lude ’vehicles’ and ’books’. To the case at hand, therefore, the decision, in M/ S Taj Mahal Hotel, Secundrabad (supra), can be of no help to the respondents.

34. The cases of High Land Coffee Works of P.F.X. (supra) and Municipal Corp oration of Greater Bombay (supra) are also cases, wherein the word ’include’ has been considered and interpreted within the meaning and scheme of the statute co ncerned. None of these two decisions lays down any law of general proposition an d none of these two decisions can be said to have taken a view, which is differe nt from, and not in consonance with, the decision in South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Association (supra).

35. What emerges from the above discussion is that none of the authorities, cited by Mr. Dubey, lays down that the word ’include’ or ’including’, occurring in a definition clause, will always reflect the legislative intent to expand the meaning of the term sought to be defined. Hence, it is not necessary that alway s and invariably, the word ’include’ or ’including’, which appears in a statute, would be aimed at expanding the meaning of the term, sought to be defined, by u sing the word ’include’ or ’including’. Where the word ’include’ or ’including’ brings within the sweep of a term such word or words, which carry very wide mean ing or which do not, ordinarily, fall within the term, which is sought to be def ined, then, the term, which is sought to be defined, must be construed as compre hending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and impor t, but also those things, which the interpretation clause declares that they sha ll include. However, when the word ’include’ or ’including’ is used, in interp retation clauses, for the purpose of including within the definition of a term a particular item, which would, otherwise also, fall within such a term, such use of the word ’include’ or such inclusive definition of a given term would imply exhaustiveness and limitation. When this test is applied to the facts of the pre sent case, it becomes transparent that by using the word ’including’ in Entry 4, the legislature intended to illustrate as to what items the expression ’sound t ransmitting equipment’ would convey. It further logically follows that under Ent ry 4, ’sound transmitting equipment’ would include only telephones, mobile phone s, pagers and components and parts thereof and no other item, such as, optical f ibres, cables and accessories. Situated thus, it is clear, I do hold, that no en try tax, in terms of Entry 4, of the Act of 2001 can be imposed on the entry of goods, such as, optical fibres, cables and accessories.

36. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this writ petition su cceeds and the impugned communications, dated 30.12.2003 and 19.01.2004, issued by the respondent No.5, namely, Superintendent of Taxes, Guwahati, Unit-C, and a lso the communications, dated 17.11.2004, 08.12.2004 and the fax message, dated 16.12.2004, issued by the OIL, shall stand set aside and quashed. The impugned n otification, dated 30.10.2004, issued by the respondent No.6, namely, Deputy Sec retary to the Govt. of Assam, Finance (Taxation) Department, Guwahati, shall als o stand set aside and quashed. Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are directed not to in voke the bank guarantee, dated 26.06.2003, aforementioned for the purpose of rea lization of any entry tax in respect of the items, in question, namely, optical fibres, cables and accessories. The amount, if any, deposited by the Oil India L imited towards the payment of entry tax on optical fibres, cables and accessorie s to the State Government shall be refundable to the Oil India Limited. The inte rim directions, passed in this case, on 12.01.2005, are hereby made absolute.

37. nd disposed of. However, there shall be no order as to costs. With the above observations and directions, this writ petition shall sta