High Court · 2010

On receiving such information from a reliable intelligence source in the night of 10-07-2004 that she was lodged in the vicinity in the area Ban Kampu Mayyie L ekaei of Imphal, the Company Commanders of Assam Rifles stationed at Sinjami wer e alerted and an operation was ordered to nab her. Accordingly, at about 12.50 a.m. in the morning of 11.07.2004 a Mobile Vehicle Check Post was set up in the general area of Sanjmai which recorded an intelligence input that S.S. Corporal Hanthoi was at her residence at Kampu Mayyie Lekaei. Immediately two Tata Mini Trucks were sent on different routes and two armoured gypsies were dispatched to the house of the cadre and at about 3 a.m. on 11-07-2004 a cordon was thrown ar ound her house. The door of the house on being knocked, it was opened by Mr. Sa ilendra Singh, the younger brother of cadre, whereupon the house was searched an d S.S. Corporal Hinthoi @ Monoroma Devi arrested fromthere to be handed over to the local police. According to the petitioners, certain incriminating materials were also recovered from her. They averred that an arrest memo was duly prepar ed and witnessed as per the standard operative procedure as prescribed by the hi gher authority and a (cid:28)no damage claim certificate (cid:29) was also obtained being signe d and witnessed by the family members present. A copy thereof was also furnishe d to them.

05. At about 3.30 a.m. the personnel on operation decided to proceed towards the concerned police station to hand over the arrested lady cadre with the incriminating documents and accordingly a call was made to the control room thereof to arrange for a lady constable. According to the writ petitioners, at that point of time, the arrested cadre informed the patrol party that if she was not handed over to the police, she would deliver a radio set and hand grenade w hich were at her disposal. Following a dialogue with her mother, the latter wen t inside the house with two members of the patrol party and handed over to them one Singapore made Kenwood radio set and one Chinese made fragmentation type han d grenade both kept in a white cloth bag. A seizure memo was prepared duly sign ed and witnessed.

06. It was at that stage that S.S. Corporal Monoroma Hanthoi further revealed that there was a AK-47 Rifle in the possession of another lady cadre, namely S.S. Rubi living in the general area of Sinjamai. On being led by her, t he patrol party, according to the writ petitioners moved from place to place, bu t in vain. By that time it was about 4.45 a.m. and there was sufficient daylight , so much so, that the movement of the patrol party alongwith the arrested cadre was in the clear view of the members of the public present on the road. While the patrol party moved towards Waripok as suggested by Monoroma Devi, the latter requested for a temporary reprieve to ease herself. The request was acceded to and the patrol party took position at about 30-35 meters away from her to allow her the required privacy. The writ petitioners have asserted that it was then all of a sudden that Monoroma Devi started to flee through a gap in the nearby h edge. As inspite of repeated orders of the guard commander to stop, she defied the instructions, he (guard commander) fired a shot in the air to warn her and i nstinctively the other members of the patrol party fired at her legs following w hich she suffered bullet injuries to which she eventually succumbed.

07. The writ petitioners averred that on the vicious and hostile p ropaganda that was unleashed against the Assam Rifles thereafter at the behest o f the underground elements and their sympathisers alleging rape and killing of M onoroma Devi, a mass public hysteria was whipped up in the State of Manipur and more particularly in Imphal thus posing a serious threat to the lives of its per sonnel. Meanwhile, however the Commission was appointed by the Notification dated 12-07 -2004 and it issued summons to the petitioners to appear before it. The writ pe titioners also averred about serious threat to the lives of the personnel who ha d participated in the operation as well as their families from the terrorist org anizations. Situated thus, though from time to time, prayers were made with the Commission to conduct its proceedings in camera and also to guard against discl osure of their identities, the same remained unheeded. Being so placed, the pet itioners sought to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court seeking to annul t he proceedings of the Commission, inter alia on the ground that the State of Man ipur was not the appropriate authority to constitute the same in view of Section 2(a)(i) of the Act, 1952. They also challenged the proceedings of the Commissi on to be wanting in jurisdiction in the teeth of their protection U/s.6 of the A ct, 1958 sans the prior sanction of the Central Government. They also referred to a Army Court of Inquiry constituted on 12-07-2004 on the same incident and co mplained that inspite of necessary summons, neither the family members of the de ceased, nor any other civil witness did respond thereto. The writ petitioners a lso stated that the forensic report was awaited by the Army Court of Inquiry.

08. While the writ petitions were pending, Smti. Thangjam Ongbi Khum anld Devi and Shri Thangjam Dolendro Singh, the mother and the brother of the de ceased filed interim application in WP(C) No.6187/2004 seeking their impleadment as respondents therein. In the said application they alleged that at about 3.3 0 a.m. on 11-07-2004 some personnel of 17th Assam Rifles had entered into the ho use of the deceased situated at Ban Kampu Mayyie Lekaei and arrested her. They admitted of the issuance of an arrest memo to the family members of the deceased , but alleged that she was thereafter killed by the personnel of the Assam Rifle s and her dead body was abandoned near Kelrao Wangkhem along Ngariyan Yairapok R oad.

09. They further averred that on 12-07-2004 the applicant No.2 lodge d a written report with the Officer-in-Charge, Irilbong Police Station about the arrest and murder of Monoroma Devi on which Irilbong Police Station FIR No.30(7 )/2004 case U/s.302/34 IPC was registered. The applicants also referred to the formation of the People’s Action Committee on 12-07-2004 in deference to the sen timents of the local populace expressing condemnation over the episode and also apprehension of lack of safety and security due to the illegal acts committed by the Assam Rifles. The applicants justified the constitution of the Commission by the State of Manipur vide the impugned notification dated 12-07-2004 and als o referred to the order of this Court passed in WP(C) No.5817/2004 permitting it (Commission) to further its proceedings. In this background, applicants expres sed their desire to contest the challenge to the constitution of the Commission and its proceedings being vitally interested in the issues. 10. This Court by the order dated 18-05-2005 after hearing the parti es allowed the prayer and directed their impleadment as Respondent Nos.4 and 5 i n WP(C) No.6187/2004. These respondents however did not file additional pleadin gs.

11. The respondent-State in its exhaustive counter justified the con stitution of the Commission and the terms of reference outlining the contour of its fact finding pursuit. While admitting that at the relevant time, the entire State of Manipur had been declared to be (cid:28)disturbed area (cid:29) it however categorica lly pleaded that the Armed Forces present thereat had not been detailed in aid o f the civil authority and that the Assam Rifles do not share any information wit h the State Government. The answering respondent in details with reference to the relevant judicial pron ouncements set out the constraints on the exercise of the special powers of the Armed/Security Forces in course of their counter insurgency operations in a dist urbed area and in terms of the Act, 1958. While admitting that after the incide nt, in which Monoroma Devi had died, the Assam Rifles had lodged an FIR with the Irilbong Police Station to the effect that she was shot at her legs while fleei ng and that she succumbed to the injuries, the answering respondent also referre d to a different version laid by the younger brother of the deceased alongwith o ther leaders of the local organizations in a memorandum submitted with the State Government on 11-07-2004 alleging that she had been killed while in the custody of the Assam Rifles and that the (cid:28)no claim certificate (cid:29) had been extracted from the family members at gun point. It was further averred that in the face of la rge-scale protests and demonstration that followed, which threatened to snowball into a serious crisis, if prompt appropriate action was not taken, the State Go vernment, in response to its commitment of protecting the rights and liberties o f the citizens decided to have the facts and circumstances leading to the death of Monoroma Devi enquired by the Commission.

12. The answering deponent clarified that thereby it did not seek to enquire into the powers and functions of the Assam Rifles, but such a course wa s construed to be unavoidably warranted having regard to the public importance o f the issue before taking remedial steps as necessary. The state dismissed the petitioners’ plea that the uproar over the incident was at the behest of the und erground factions and also stressed upon the steps taken by it for providing ade quate security to the personnel of the Assam Rifles who were required to appear before the Commission as well as in general. The security measures taken by the State Government at the venue of the Commission and other strategic places were also detailed in the affidavit. The answering respondent expressed ignorance about the day-to-da y proceedings of the Army Court Inquiry said to be in progress. It asserted tha t having regard to the purpose of the enquiry, the Commission had been validly c onstituted under the Act, 1952 and that the same by no means could be repudiated as an encroachment on the power of the Union Government. It also asserted that as the enquiry by the Commission is not a legal proceeding within the meaning o f Section 6 of the Act, 1958, no prior sanction of the Central Government was es sential and therefore the impugned notification dated 12-07-2004 was valid.

13. In its affidavit the Respondent No.3, the Union of India affirme d about the constitution of a Court of Inquiry by the Commander, 9th Sector of t he Assam Rifles under Rule 177 of the Army Rules, 1954 to enquire into the incid ent of alleged custodial death of Monoroma Devi. While pointing out that the Co urt of Inquiry was constituted on 12-07-2004 it was further averred that during the course thereof, it revealed from the report of the Central Forensic Science Laboratory, Kolkata being C.F.S.L. EE/04(M.A.N.I) dated 09-08-2004 that traces o f semen had been detected on the petticoat supposedly worn by the deceased at th e time of her death. As the said disclosure seemed to suggest commission of rap e on the deceased before her death, the Army Court of Inquiry decided to subject all the personnel of the Assam Rifles taking part on the operation on 11-07-200 4 to blood tests and to compare their DNA profiles with that extracted from the traces of semen to ascertain the truth or otherwise of the allegation of sexual abuse on the deceased by the members of the patrol party. The answering respond ent asserted that pursuant to the said orders of the Court of Inquiry, blood sam ples of all the concerned personnel of the Assam Rifles were taken by the civil doctors at the Regional Institute of Medical Science (RIMS), Imphal and were con cealed and forwarded to the C.F.S.L., Koklata for DNA profile and further compar ison with the semen stain found on the petticoat stated to be worn by the deceas ed at the time of her death. The answering respondent also disclosed that in th is regard the Army Court of Inquiry reportedly requested the Manipur State Foren sic Laboratory, Civil Police and the State Bureaucracy for allowing C.F.S.L., Ko lkata to arrange for comparison of the DNA profile of the semen stain and thos e extracted from the blood samples of the Assam Rifles personnel but to no avail . The Union of India, through its counter, however endorsed the writ petitioners’ plea of lack of competence and jurisdiction of the State of Manipur to constitu te the Commission to enquire into the act/conduct of the Assam Rifles personnel who were at the relevant time acting as members of the armed forces in aid of ci vil authority. By order dated 24.05.006 passed by the learned Single Judge in Re view Petition No. 95/2005, the observation made in paragraph 25 of the impugned judgment and order recording the concurrence of Mr. Misra, with the views expres sed by Shri Dutta and Shri Gonzalvis was expunged. 14. Mr. Gonsalves, has persuasively argued with reference to Entry 2 and 2A of the Union List as well as Entry 1 and 2 of the State List that having regard to the acts of criminality perpetrated by a phalanx of the Assam Rifles personnel, the same could by no means be comprehended to be within their duties as such in the aid of civil power and therefore the State of Manipur was wholly within its power and jurisdiction to appoint the Commission to probe into the fa cts leading to the unfortunate incident involving the deceased. As the acts com plained were visibly beyond the official duties envisaged by the personnel of th e Assam Rifles, dischargeable in the aid of civil power as contemplated in Entry 2A of the Union List, but assuredly come within the domain of police surveillan ce, the State of Manipur, in view of the width and amplitude of the purview of E ntry 2 of the State List was authorized to constitute the Commission and prescri be the terms of reference as outlined in the Notification dated 12-07-2004, he u rged.

15. The learned Senior Counsel insisted that as the alleged acts of rape and murder of Monoroma Devi by the culpable personnel of the Assam Rifles a re wholly unrelated to the deployment of any armed force of the Union or the pow ers, jurisdiction, privilege and liabilities of the members thereof, in course o f such detailment, but instead are gory instances of individual excesses, the ch allenge to the lack of the jurisdiction of the State of Manipur to constitute th e Commission for enquiring into the facts relatable to the incident is obviously misconceived. While asserting that the proceedings of the Commission unerringl y establish that Monoroma Devi had been raped and shot at from a close range by some personnel of the Assam Rifles acting with prior concert, the learned Senior Counsel urged that the offending acts were palpably illegal and inhuman besides being in defilement of basic human dignity and right. The learned Senior Counse l, in particular contended that in the operation claimed to have been undertaken by the Assam Rifles, they had as well consciously flouted the imperatives to be observed as laid-down in plethora of decisions by the Apex Court and this Court to ensure fairness in the process in recognition to the basic human rights. To reinforce his arguments Mr. Gonsalves, placed reliance on the decision of the Ap ex Court in 1998 (2) SCC 109, (Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights Vs. Union of India (UOI) and of this Court in AIR 1989 Gau 81, (Border Security Force (B.S .F.) Vs. State of Meghalaya and Ors.). Mr. Mishra, appearing for the State while generally subscribing to the pleas adv anced on behalf of the appellants in Writ Appeal No.135/2006 has maintained that the Commission was appointed primarily to enquire into the facts leading to the incident and the terms of reference clearly demonstrate that the impugned Notif ication does not trench upon the areas covered by Entry 2 or 2(A) of the Union L ist. The learned Senior Counsel while admitting that as required U/s.3 of the A ct, 1958 a notification had been issued by the State Government declaring areas mentioned therein to be disturbed areas has urged that deployment of any armed f orce in aid of civil power ipso facto does not denude it (State Government) of i ts power and responsibility vis-à-vis public order. Mr. Mishra contended that ha ving regard to the groundswell of the seething protests and demonstrations from all sections of the society demanding uproar for determining the actual state-of -affairs, the State Government, in response to its solemn commitment for transpa rent governance decided to institute a fact-finding enquiry and hence constitute d the Commission vide the impugned notification.

16. As the progression of events following the incident manifested t ell tale signs of fast deterioration in public order, this initiative was taken to ascertain the correct facts. Mr. Mishra, has urged that as an armed force of the Union on deployment, has to essentially act in co-ordination with the State Police, the civil power of the State therefore does not cease to exist and thus in a given fact situation necessitating its intervention in the interest of pub lic order and tranquility, it cannot afford to remain a mute spectator. The learned Senior counsel with particular reference to the words (cid:28)with respect to (cid:29) applied in Article 246 of the Constitution of India and the (cid:28)Trenching Doctr ine (cid:29) has urged that the respective powers of the parliament and the State legisl ature to enact laws on the listed entries have to be adjudged on the measure of the canon of (cid:28)pith and substance (cid:29) and thus viewed the impugned decision of the G overnment is unassailable. Mr. Mishra, added that the limited use of the procee dings of the Commission as contemplated by the Act, 1952 or the mere possibility of the State not taking any action on the report thereof eventually does not si gnify absence of its power to constitute such Commission in matters of public or der. With reference amongst others to the progress report of the criminal cases registered on the information alleged as well as an extract of the report of th e Sarkaria Commission, on the deployment of Union Armed Forces in a State for pu blic order duties, Mr. Mishra insisted that the impugned decision of the State G overnment was indispensably warranted in the facts and circumstances in order to maintain public order and therefore having regard to he scheme of the Act, 1952 , the impugned notification is valid. The following decisions were cited to but tress his arguments:- 1988 (2) GLR 159, (Smti. Luithukla Versus Rishang Keishing & Others), 1988 (3) S CC 609, (Kehar Singh and Ors. Vs. State(Delhi Administration), (1977) 4 SCC, 59 6[I](Bhajan Singh Versus State of Punjab), 1998 (2) SCC 109, (Naga People’s Mov ement of Human Rights vs. Union of India), AIR 1947 PC 60, (Prafulla Kumar Mukhe rjee and others v Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna, The Advocate-General of Bengal- Intervener) AIR 1941 PC 47, (M.M.R.M Chettiar Firm v. S.R.M.S.L. Chettiar Firm and others), (1994) 3 SCC 569, (Kartar Singh Versus State of Punjab), 2004 (4) S CC 489, (Special Reference No.1 of 2001 etc.), 2002 (8) SCC 228, (Union of India (UOI) AND Ors. Vs. Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers College), AIR 1989 BOMBAY 8 1, (Union of India, v. Piedade Fernandes), 1998 (3) GLR 250, (Union of India & O rs. Versus State of Manipur & Ors.).

17. The learned Asstt. Solicitor General has dismissed the State Gov ernment’s plea of emerging issue of public order as a justification for the cons titution of the Commission contending that the notification declaring the State of Manipur to be a disturbed area since 1980 belied the same. As the Assam Rifl es had been admittedly deployed in aid of civil power, having regard to Entry 2A of the Union List and Section 2(a)(i) and (ii) of the Act, 1952, the Commission could not have been constituted by the State Government with the terms of refer ence as engrafted in the notification dated 12-07-2004. Mr. Sarma, pointed out that the omission on the part of the State Government to request the Central Gov ernment to appoint a Commission to enquire into the incident or to obtain sancti on for the prosecution of the concerned personnel of the Assam Rifles demonstrat ed lack of application on its part as well as collateral considerations informin g the impugned decision. Referring to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the Union of India, Mr. Sarma, argued that not only no cooperation was extended to f urther the Court of Inquiry on the incident, a parallel process was initiated, t hough bereft of any power to do so. Not only the decision to constitute a Commis sion in the attendant facts and circumstances lacks authority, there being no ba sis whatsoever for the satisfaction necessary as a condition precedent obligated by Section 3 of Act, 1952, the impugned notification is wanting in bona fide as well, he urged.

18. Mr. Bhattacharjee appearing for the appellants in Writ Appeal No .560/2005 and 561/2005 has reiterated that the deployment of the 17th Assam Rifl es having been made in Manipur at the instance of the State Government following a declaration that its territories were a disturbed area, has maintained that t he impugned notification has the potential of permitting a roving enquiry into t he activities of its personnel within the scope of such deployment and is thus c learly beyond the power and authority of the State Government. According to him , the impugned notification amounts to substantial inroads in the prohibited are a curved out by Entry 2A of the Union List and therefore the impugned decision a s well as the proceedings of the Commission with its report are non est in law a nd on facts. He further urged blatant violation of the procedure prescribed by the Act, 1952 in the conduct of the Commission.

19. Mr. Bhattacharjee in order to brace up his pleas recited relianc e on the decision of the Apex Court in 2004 (2) SCC 553, (Bharat Hydro Power Cor pn, Ltd. And Ors. Vs. State of Assam and Anr.), 2004 (9) SCC 438, (Hindustan Lev er and Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr.), 2002 (9) SCC 232, (ITC LTD.VERS US AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE AND OTHERS). Mr. Mishra, in reply pointed out that the affidavit-in-oppositio 20. n filed on behalf of the Respondent No.3 not having been affirmed by a person du ly authorized by the concerned department, the contents thereof ought not to be taken cognizance of. The contentious pleadings and the competing arguments have been 21. duly taken note of. The cardinal issue pertains to the legality or otherwise of the constitution of the Commission vide the notification dated 12.07.2004. Tha t at the relevant time the entire State of Manipur had been declared to be a dis turbed area under section 3 of the 1958 Act is a matter of record and stands amp ly demonstrated by a series of notifications to that effect laid in course of th e arguments. The 17th Assam Rifles stood deployed in Manipur at that time and h ad admittedly partaken in the operation in course of which Manorama Devi was arr ested from her residence at Bamon Kampu Mayai Leikai in the wee hours of 11.07.2 004. That she was found dead later in the morning with several bullet injuries on her body is also not in dispute. Whereas, the Assam Rifles plead that the de ployed personnel on the operation had to open fire as Manorama Devi attempted t o flee inspite of their repeated cautions taking advantage of the relaxation ac corded to her to ease herself as requested, her family members alleged brutal ra pe on her by them (Assam Rifles personnel) and cold blooded murder by mercilessl y shooting her from a close range. The First Information Reports lodged by Nb. Sub Digambar Dutt of 17th Assam Rifles C/o.99 A.P.AO, one of the writ petitioner s in WP(C) No.6187/2004 and Shri Thangjam Dolendro Meitei, the brother of the de ceased and registered respectively as FIR No. 29(7)/04 IBG P.S under section 307 IPC, 10/13 UA (P) Act. & 5 Expl.Sub. Act read with 6(1-A) IWT Acts and FIR No. 30(7)/04 Irilbung P.S. under section 302/34 IPC reveal the basic facts.

22. Noticeably, however, the FIR submitted by the brother of the dec eased at the earliest point of time, did not allege commission of rape on the de ceased. Be that as it may, the incident seems to have stirred up intense advers e public opinion to rock the entire State with series of animated protests and d emonstrations sweeping the nook and corner thereof. The State Government pleadin g it to be the guardian of public peace and tranquillity has sought to justify t he constitution of the Commission only for inquiring into the facts leading to t he episode for causing necessary steps to be taken, if any, in accordance with l aw. The writ petitioners, personnel of the aforementioned unit of the Assam Rif les have questioned the competence of the State Government in appointing the Com mission and detailing the terms of reference for its inquiry. The radix of the impugnment assuredly is entrenched in Entry-2 and 2-A of List-I and Entry-1 and Entry-2 of List-II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India as well as the definition of (cid:28)appropriate government (cid:29) provided in section 2(a)(i) & (ii) of the Act, 1952. The formidable significance and the determinative bearing th ereof vindicate their ready reference. Extracts of this entries and the definit ion of (cid:28)appropriate Government (cid:29) would thus be apt: - (cid:28)List - Union List 2. Naval, military and air forces; any other armed forces of the Union & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & &

2.A. Deployment of any armed force of the Union or any other force subject to th e control of the Union or any conteingent or unit thereof in any State in aid of the civil power; powers, jurisdiction, privileges and liabilities of the member s of such forces while on such deployment ...... & & & & & & & & & & &. (cid:29) (cid:28)List-II State List 1. Public order (but not including [the use of any naval, military or Air force or any other armed force of the Union or of any other force subject to the contr ol of the Union or of any contingent or unit thereof] in aid of the civil power) .

2. Police (including railway and village police) subject to the provisions of en try 2A of List-I. (cid:29) ACT 1952 (cid:28)2(a) (cid:28)appropriate Government (cid:29) - means (i) the Central Government, in relation to a Commission appointed by it to make an inquiry into any matter relatable to any of the entries enumerated in List-I or List-II or List-III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution; and (ii) the State Government, in relation to a Commission appointed by it to make a n inquiry into any matter relatable to any of the entries enumerated in List-II or List-III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. (cid:29)

23. Section 3 of the Act, 1952 empowers the (cid:28)appropriate Government (cid:29) , if it is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do to appoint, by notificat ion in the Official Gazette, a Commission of Inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and perform such functions within such time as may be specifi ed. The section discloses that such an appointment would be mandatory if backed by a resolution to that effect by the Parliament or as the case may be by, the Legislature of the State, though otherwise discretionary subject to the satisfac tion to that effect to be entertained by the appropriate Government. Considerin g the contours of the present adjudication, reference to the other provisions of this enactment is in essential.

24. The Act, 1958, which is a legislation to enable certain special powers to be conferred upon members of the armed forces in the disturbed areas i n the State as referred to in the preamble thereof it also authorizes the Govern or of State or the Administrator of that Union Territory or the Central Governme nt, as the case may be, to declare by notification in the Official Gazette, the whole or such part of such State or Union Territory to be a disturbed area if he is of the opinion, that the same is in such a disturbed or dangerous condition that the use of armed forces in aid of civil power is necessary. Whereas, section 4 enumerates the special powers of the armed forces deployed in a disturbed area, section 5 mandates that any person arrested and taken into cu stody has to be made over to the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station with the least possible delay, together with a report of the circumstances occa sioning the arrest. Section 6, affords protection to persons acting under the A ct so much so, that no prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding can be instit uted against them, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government i n respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers con ferred by the statute. 25. Reference to the contents of the impugned notification would com plete the preface. Expedient it would be to quote the relevant excerpts thereof : - (cid:28)GOVERNMENT OF MANIPUR SECRETARIATE HOME DEPARTMENT NOTIFICATION Imphal, the 12th July, 2004, No. 8/1(1)/2004-H(P-2): Whereas, in a join representation dated 11.07.2004, subm itted by (i) Shri Thangjam Dolendro Meetei, younger brother of Km. Th. Monorama Devi @ Henthoi, (ii) Smt. Saglsem Homdonbi Devi, General Secretary, Bamonkampu D evelopment Association (Youth Centre, Irilbung) and (iv) Shri Wahengbam Inao Luw ang, Secretary Pureiromba Youth Club, Bamonkampu, Imphal, it has been reported t hat Kumari Thangjam Monorama Devi @ Henthoi (30 yrs) D/o. of (L) Th. Birahari Si ngh of Mamon Kampu Mayai Leikai, BPO-Irilbung, P.S. - Irilbung of Imphal East Di strict, Manipur was arrested by the personnel of 17th Assam Rifles on 11.07.2004 at 0330 hrs. from her residence at Bamonkampur Mayai Leikai after giving arrest memo and was later found dead in the same morning at Yaipharok Maring village; Whereas, it is alleged in the said joint representation that Km. Th. Man 2. orama Devi was healthy at the time when she was arrested by the personnel of 17t h Assam Rilfes by issuing Arrest Memo and that she was killed while in their cus tody; 3. Whereas, it is also alleged in the said representation that the personne l of 17th Assam Rifles forcibly made the family members to sign at gun point a (cid:28) o Claim Certificate (cid:29) stating that (cid:28)Troops of Assam Rifles has apprehended Th. M onorama Devi from her house at 3.30 a.m. on 11th July, 2004 and searched the hou se in present of family members and the undersigned don’t have any claim against them. It is further stated that Security Force personnel haven’t misbehaved wi th women folk or not damaged any property (cid:29); 4. Whereas, the People’s Action Committee Against the Brutal Custody Killin g of Th. Monorama Devi, Bamonkampu By 17th Assam Rifles has also alleged that Km . Th. Monorama Devi was killed in custody by the 17th Assam Rifles personnel aft er arresting her from her residence at Bamonkampu Mayai Leikai, Imphal East Dist rict; 5. Whereas, the State Government considers that the matter involved is of (cid:28) public importance (cid:29) and is of the opinion that it is necessary to appoint a Commi ssion of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into a definite matter of public importance, namely, the alleged killing of Km. Th. Monorama Devi; 6. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (60 of 1952), the Governor of Manipur is hereby pleased to appoint a Commission of Inquiry to be presided over by Shri C. Upend ra Singh, (Retd.) District and Session Judge, Manipur. 7. The terms of reference of the Commission shall be as follows: - a) to inquire into the facts and circumstances leading to the death of K m. Th. Monorama Devi on 11.07.2004; b) to identify responsibilities on the person/persons responsible for th e death of Km. Th. Monorama Devi; c) to find out any matters incidental thereto; d) to recommend measures for preventing the recurrence of such incidents (cid:29)

26. The State Government as the notification divulges comprehended (cid:28) public importance (cid:29), as the impelling necessity for the appointment of the Commis sion of Enquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into alleged killing of Km. Th. Manorama Devi. The terms of reference as the notification reveal were to i ) inquire into the facts and circumstances leading to the death of Km. Th. Manor ama Devi on 11.07.2004, ii) to identify responsibilities on the person/persons r esponsible for her death, iii) to find out any matter incidental thereto and iv) to recommend measures for preventing the recurrence of such incident. The scope of the probe by the Commission principally was thus to investigate the facts and circumstances leading to the death of Km. Th. Monoram a Devi and to identify the responsibilities of the person/persons involved in th e incident. This assumes significance in view of the persistent plea of the Sta te Government that the purpose of the Commission was only to ascertain the facts leading to the death of Km. Th. Monorama Devi.

27. As the scope of the inquiry has a vital bearing on the validity or otherwise of the constitution of the Commission in the present context, the u nderlying import and the notion of (cid:28)appropriate Government (cid:29) as defined under the Act, 1952 demands a correct discernment. Section 2 (a) of the Act, 1952, defines appropriate Government to mean the Centr al Government, in relation to a Commission appointed by it to make an inquiry in to any matter relatable to any of the entries enumerated in List-I, List-II or L ist-III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India and the State Gover nment into any matter relatable to any of the entries enumerated in List-II or L ist-III. Palpably therefore, the Central Government is empowered to appoint a C ommission for any matter relatable to any of the entries enumerated in either of the three lists. The State Government is endowed with the power only if the in quiry is into any matter relatable to any of the entries in List-II or List-III. In other words, it would be impermissible for the State Government to appoint a Commission for making inquiry into any matter relatable to any of the entries enumerated in List-I. The entries in the legislature lists relevant for the pre sent debate have been referred to hereinabove. There is no dissension at the Ba r that the analogy of the doctrine of (cid:28)pith and substance (cid:29) invocable in the inte r play of such entries in the list, is applicable to identify the (cid:28)appropriate G overnment (cid:29) under the Act, 1952. A little dilation on this proposition qua the a uthorities cited is warranted at this juncture. The competence of the Provincial Legislature to enact the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938, in terms of section 100 and 107 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and the related Lists arose for scrutiny in ALSPPL Subrahmanyan Chett iar (Supra) before the Federal Court. His Lordship Gwyer C.J., while observing that the Act was an attempt to deal with the problems of rural indebtedness as w ell as delineation of the legislative powers between the Federal and the Provinc ial Legislatures devised by the scheme of the 1935 Act, propounded that the prin ciples laid down by the Judicial Committee in a long series of decisions for the interpretation of the British North America Act, 1867 were acceptable as a guid e for the interpretation of the similar provisions of the Government of India Ac t,1935. His Lordship concluded thus- (cid:28)it must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation, though purporting to deal with a subject in one list, touches also on a subject in another list a nd the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely intertwined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large numb er of statutes being declared invalid because the Legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere. Hence the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee whereby the impugned statute is examined to as certain its (cid:28)pith and substance (cid:29), or its (cid:28)true nature and character (cid:29), for the pu rpose of determining whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this l ist or in that. (cid:29)

28. Lordship Sulaiman, J, in his supplementary view on the doctrine of (cid:28)pith and substance (cid:29) observed that though every effort had been made to make the three lists as comprehensive and exhaustive as well as exclusive as possible , in view of the large number of items in the three lists, it is almost impossib le to prevent a certain amount of overlapping. His Lordship remarked that absol utely sharp and distinct lines of demarcation are not always possible and rigid and inflexible watertight compartments cannot be ensured. A hard and fast rule of exclusion derived from the strict literal language of section 100 therefore w as quite impracticable and unworkable, he added.

29. Referring to the decision of the Federal Court in United Provinc es Vs. Mt. Atiqa Begum (41) 28 AIR 1941 FC 16, dealing with Canadian cases, his Lordship recalled that one must look to the true nature and character (cid:29) and to th e (cid:28)pith and substance (cid:29) of the legislation. His Lordship ruled that having regar d to the successive pronouncements of the Privy Council, it is unreasonable to a ssume that the Parliament contemplated from the words (cid:28)with respect to (cid:29) in the A ct, 1935, that any overstepping beyond the limit, howsoever small or insignific ant and any encroachment upon the field of List-I, howsoever unimportant, should make the Act wholly void. While emphasising that incidental encroachment is no t really forbidden, His Lordship underlined the necessity first to ascertain whe ther the enactment impugned is (cid:28)with respect to (cid:29) any of the matters in List-II a nd if not to construe it as incompetent. It was held that so long as it can be shown that all the provisions contained therein fall within List-II or List-III, the Provincial Legislature was deemed to be competent prima facie unless the la w could be demonstrated to be in respect of any matter in List-I or was void on account of any repugnancy.

30. The Privy Council in Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee and Ors. (Supra), was amongst others seized with the question as to whether Bengal Money-lenders A ct, 1940, incidentally trenched upon the matters reserved for the Federal Legisl ature under section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and if so the effec t thereof. Their Lordships too while tracing the genesis to the British North A merica Act and the Australian Commonwealth Act, reiterated the practical experie nce of the non-feasibility of a clear cut and absolute demarcation of powers of Legislatures to prevent overlapping thereof. While propounding the theory of (cid:28)p ith and substance (cid:29) or the true nature and character of the enactment for the pur pose of ascertain whether it is a legislation (cid:28)with respect to (cid:29) matters in the l ist earmarked for the legislature involved, the Privy Council also indicated the reliefs and adjudged the permissible extent of the invasion into the other legi slative domain as a relevant factor to determine the validity or otherwise of th e enactment. The same view, however, with reference to Article 246 of the Con 31. stitution of India resounded in Kartar Singh (Supra). Their Lordships while dwe lling on the principles to be applied for construing the entries in the legislat ive lists, held that those must not be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense and that widest amplitude must be accorded to the language thereof. Their Lords hips observed that sometimes the entries in different lists or the same list may be found to overlap or to be in direct conflict with each other. In such an ev entuality it is the duty of the Court to find out the true intent and purpose an d to examine the particular legislation in its (cid:28)pith and substance (cid:29) to determine whether it fits in one or other of the lists. It was held that the doctrine of (cid:28)pith and Substance (cid:29) was applied while the leg islation with regard to the particular enactment is challenged with reference to the entries in the various lists i.e. a law dealing with the subject in one lis t, is also touching on a subject in another list. Their Lordships propounded th at if on a scrutiny of the enactment in question it is found that it is in subst ance one on a matter assigned to the legislature enacting it then it is as a who le valid, notwithstanding any incidental entrenchment upon matters beyond its co mpetence i.e. on a theme included in the list belonging to other legislature. I ncidental encroachment by a legislature beyond its domain and upon another legis lative sphere was thus held to be not totally forbidden.

32. Apart from a wholesome reiteration of the above dictum, the Apex Court in Union of India and Ors. Vs. Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers College ( Supra), elucidated that the rule of widest construction notwithstanding, the sam e would not enable the legislature to enact a law relating to matter which has n o rational connection with the subject matter of an entry. Their Lordships caut ioned against extension of the meaning of the words beyond their reasonable conn otation in anxiety to preserve the power the legislature. It was reiterated tha t the doctrine of (cid:28)pith and substance (cid:29) signified that if an enactment substantia lly falls within the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the leg islature which enacted it, it could not be held to be invalid, merely because it incidentally encroached on matters assigned to another legislature. Their Lord ships added that when a law is impugned as being ultra-vires of the legislative competence, the true character of the legislation needs to be ascertained and th e question of the intrusion into the territory of another legislation is to be m easured not by the degree but by the substance thereof.

33. That in the cases of apparent conflict in legislative jurisdicti ons, a resolution thereof by a reconciliation of the dissenting entries is to be the judicial endeavour had been highlighted by the Apex Court in ITC Ltd. Vs. A gricultural Produce Market Committee (Supra). Their Lordships therein enounced that only when such resolution was not possible that the Courts should be called upon to decide the question of legislative competence.

34. In affirmation of the above view, the Apex Court in Bharat Hydro Power Corporation Ltd. Anr. (Supra), expounded that for applying the principle of (cid:28)pith and substance (cid:29) regard ought to be had to, viz, i) to the enactment as a whole, ii) its main objects, and iii) the scope and effect of its provisions.

35. In the same premise, the Apex Court in Special Reference NO. 1 O F 2001, IN RE(Supra), held that Entries in the lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India themselves do not empower legislation, but only outlin e the fields thereof. It was propounded that an entry nevertheless cannot be in terpreted so as to cancel or obliterate another or render it otiose and that in case of apparent conflict it ought to be the duty of the Court to iron out the c rease and resolve the same so as occasion a workable harmony. In elaboration, the Apex Court while recalling its above compreh 36. ension in Welfare Association, A.R.P. Maharashtra & Anr. Vs. Ranjit P. Gohil & O rs., 2003 [2] SCR 139, propounded that express words employed in an entry would necessary include incidental and ancillary matters so as to make the legislation effective and, therefore, the scheme of the enactment under scrutiny, its objec t and purpose, its true nature and character and the pith and substance thereof are to be analysed. The preponderant and irrefutable judicial exposition of this pro 37. found tenet of legislative dichotomy ratifies incidental transition beyond the t opical domains otherwise constitutionally prescribed, if the quintessence of the legislation assailed is substantially lodged within such confines. The trespass or the divagation has to be necessarily incidental and not substantial, casual and not deliberate. An endeavour in such an event for a reconciliation to accom plish harmonized existence appears to be a solemn imperative, unless the repugna ncy is irreconcilable to the degree of mutual mutilation. In this pursuit, th e scheme of the enactment as a whole, its principal objects, nature and characte r thereof, scope and effect of its provisions and the nexus thereof with the goa l that it seeks to subserve must be objectively analysed. Not only, the legisla tive topics demand a liberal construction with encompassing amplitude, the inbui lt restrictions ought not to be enlarged to decimate the purport and the intende d utility thereof.

38. While responding to the challenge to the vires of the Act, 1952 in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia & Ors. Vs. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Ors., AIR 19 58 SC 538, their Lordships while negating the same, enunciated that a Commission has no power of adjudication in the sense of passing an order which can be enfo rced proprio vigore and is only entrusted to investigate and record its findings and recommendations on the matters covered by the terms of reference. Their Lo rdships observed that the inquiry or the report cannot be looked upon as a judic ial inquiry/ report. It was however, held that as such an inquiry would necessar ily involve investigation into facts, it is ancillary that the Commission should express its own view for the consideration of the appropriate Government in ord er to enable it to take such measures as it may think fit to do. It was iterate d as well, that the statements made by any person before the Commission of Inqui ry under section 6 of the Act, 1952 is wholly inadmissible in evidence in any fu ture proceedings, civil or criminal. Their Lordships rejected the contention th at the conduct of individual or company cannot possibly be a matter of public im portance to warrant the constitution of a Commission otherwise allowed under the Act.

39. While dwelling on Entry 94 of List-I and Entry-45 of List-III to the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India and interpreting the words (cid:28)f or the purpose of (cid:29), their Lordships held that the scope of the inquiry so contem plated was not unnecessarily limited to the particular or specific matters enume rated in any of the entries in the list, but would extend to inquiries into coll ateral mattes which may be necessary for the purpose, legislative or otherwise r elatable thereto.

40. Entry-2 and 2A of the Union List and Entry No. 1 & 2 of the Stat e List when viewed in adjancy project that though the State Legislature is autho rized to enact laws on public order, such an empowerment is truncated if the the me relates to the use of naval, military or air force or any other armed force o f the Union or of any other force subject to the control of the Union or of any contingent or unit thereof in aid of the Civil Power. A State Legislature thus though can legislate on public order to permit and sustain constitutional govern ance within its territorial limits, it is prohibited from undertaking that enter prise if the topic has a nexus to the deployment of naval, military and armed fo rces or other armed forces of the Union or any contingent or Unit thereof in any State in the aid of Civil Power. The necessary incidences of such deployment, namely, powers, jurisdictions, privileges and liabilities of the members of such forces as Entry-2A of List-I testifies are also within the exclusive preserve o f the Parliament. This notwithstanding, having regard to the judicially recogni zed philosophy of schematic harmony of the legislative prerogatives founded on t he doctrine of (cid:28)pith and substance (cid:29), the State Legislature retains its dominion to enact laws with respect to the residuary realm of public order for a secured administration of its provisional democratic polity. An incidental, peripheral or limbic overreach on to the otherwise segregated thematic terrain reserved for the Parliament would not be an anathema, if its law essentially is one embedded within the permitted frontiers. No unwarranted and fancied enlargement of the restrictions and the territorial inhibitions dissentient to the avowed dictum of ’pith and substance’ is either comprehensible or sanctionable. In course of an exhaustive and dialectical analysis of the provi 41. sions of the Act, 1958, the vires whereof had been assailed, the Apex Court in N aga People’s Movement of Human Rights Vs. Union of India (1998) 2 SCC 109, had r uled that though Entry-1 of the State List qualified the State Legislature to le gislate on issues with respect to maintenance of public order, the field encompa ssing the use of armed forces in the aid of Civil Power had been carved out ther efrom to be entrusted exclusively to the Parliament. Their Lordship propounded that the expression (cid:28)in aid of the civil power (cid:29) in Entry-1 of the State List and Entry 2-A of the Union List imply that the deployment of the armed forces of th e Union would be for the purpose of enabling the civil power in the State to dea l with the situation affecting maintenance of public order necessitating the det ailment. Elaborating that the word (cid:28)aid (cid:29) postulates the continued existence of the authority to be aided, their Lordships enunciated that it signified that eve n after the deployment of the armed forces, the civil power would continue to fu nction. Their Lordships held that the Act, 1958 was not a law for maintenance of public order under Entry-1 of the State List. It was authoritatively stated that the power to make a law provi 42. ding for deployment of the armed forces of the Union in aid of civil power in th e State did not comprehend a prerogative to enact a legislation so as to enable the armed forces of the Union to supplant or act as a substitute of the civil po wer in the State. Their Lordships concluded that a conjoint reading of Entry-2- A of the Union List and Entry-1 of the State List would be that in the event of deployment of the armed forces of the Union in the aid of the civil power in a S tate, it would operate in the State concerned in cooperation with the civil admi nistration so that the situation which had necessitated the deployment is effect ively dealt with and normalcy is restored.

43. With special reference to section 4 & 5 of the Act, 1958, their Lordships pronounced that the statute did not envisage supplantation or substitu tion of the civil power of the State by the armed forces and that it only enable s it (armed forces) to assist the civil power of the State in dealing with the d isturbed conditions affecting the maintenance of public order in the disturbed a rea. It was further clarified that conferment of the power on the Central Gover nment under section 3 of the Act, 1958, to declare an area in a State to be a di sturbed area did not signify taking over of the State administration by the army or by other armed forces of the Union and it was thus desirable that the State Government should be consulted and its co-operation ought to be taken while maki ng such a declaration. It was held that declaration of any area to be a disturb ed area would necessarily be attendant upon an existing grave situation of law a nd order thereat. It was observed in that context that a situation of internal disturbance involving the local population, however, would require a different a pproach. Their Lordships also detailed the items of (cid:28)Do’s and Don’ts (cid:29) issued by the Army Headquarters and to be adhered to by the armed forces providing aid to the civil authority. As would be apparent therefrom the same required in emphatic terms an express coordination between the armed forces and the local civil administrat ion before and during any operation by the former under the enactment. In concl usion their Lordships reiterated that the expression (cid:28)in aid of civil power (cid:29) in Entry-2A of List-I and Entry-1 of List-II signified that the deployment of the a rmed forces would be for the purpose of enabling the civil power in the State to deal with the situation affecting maintenance of public order necessitating the detailment and that the word (cid:28)aid (cid:29) postulates continued existence of the author ity to be aided. While reaffirming that the statute did not contemplate effacem ent of the civil power of the State by the armed forces of the Union, the Apex C ourt emphasised upon the use of minimal force for effective action thereunder an d delivery of the person arrested to the officer in-charge of the nearest police station with the least possible delay so as to facilitate his production before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours excluding the time taken for the journey from the place of arrest to the Court. Directions were also issued to strictly follow the instructions contained in the list of (cid:28)Do’s and Don’t (cid:29) issued by the army authorities and for suitable amendment to bring them in alignment with the guidelines contained in the judgment. The Apex Court in Romesh Thappar Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1950 S 44. C 124, enunciated that public order was an expression of wide connotation and si gnifies a state of tranquility prevailing, among the members of a political soci ety as a result of the internal regulations enforced by the Government. A clear distinction was outlined between public order and security of a state. The differentiation between law and order, public order and the security of Stat e was highlighted in Ram Monohar Lohia Vs. State of Bihar & Ors, AIR 1966 SC 740 . Their Lordships concluded with reference to Article 246 (1) of the Constituti on of India that the ambit of the field of legislation with respect to (cid:28)public o rder (cid:29) under Entry-I of List-II has to be confined to situations of lesser gravit y having a bearing within the boundaries of a State and activities of a more ser ious nature which threaten the security and integrity of the country as a whole would fall within the realm of Entry-I of the Union list relating to defence of India and in any event under the residuary power conferred on the Parliament.

45. The decision of the Apex Court in Kehar Singh and Ors. (Supra), has also been introduced to hint at the limited use of the statements made by a witness before a commission under the Act, 1952 in any other civil or criminal p roceeding. 46. This Court in Smti. Luithukla Vs. Rishang Keishing & Ors., (1988 ) 2 GLR 59, in clear terms proclaimed that the armed forces deployed under the A ct, 1958, though extensively empowered thereby, their authority is to be confin ed within its limits and is never intended to supplant the ordinary machinery fo r maintaining law and order or for that matter public order. The armed forces ar e really applied to supplement the working of ordinary law enforcing machinery i t held. It was emphasised as well that the armed forces under the aforementioned enactment must act in cooperation with the district administration and not as a n independent body and though entitled to some free play as far as their operati onal activities are concerned, they must take the civil authorities into confide nce and work in harmony. The appointment of commission by the State of Manipur under the 47. Act, 1952, amongst others to ascertain whether the army had picked up Shri Y. Sa namacha Singh from his house in the mid night of February 12, 1993, was assailed in Union of India & Ors. Vs. State of Manipur & Ors. (Supra), on the ground tha t it was beyond its competence having regard to the Entry-2 and 2-A of List-I an d Entry-1 of List-II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. It w as contended that the subject matter of the inquiry was located in Entry-2 and 2 -A of List-I and that the Central Government was the only appropriate authority to constitute the Commission of Inquiry. The contextual facts reveal the stand of the State Government to the effect that the object and purpose of the commiss ion was not to inquire into the powers, function, liabilities and jurisdiction o f the armed forces, who had been detailed to act in aid of civil Administration, but only to probe on the disappearance of Shri Y. Sanamacha Singh and ascertain his whereabouts. That the disappearance of Shri Y Sanamacha Singh had created a serious law and order problem in the State and had assumed a matter of public importance relating to public order, was also mentioned. On a scrutiny of the terms of the reference, this Court conclude 48. d that the State Government did not intend the Commission to make an inquiry abo ut the powers and functions of the members of the forces of the Union or other j urisdictional privileges and, therefore, held that the decision impugned fell wi thin the purview of public order as enumerated in Entry-1 of List-II of the Seve nth Schedule to the Constitution of India. It was held, having regard to the pu blic importance generated by the disappearance of Shri Sanamacha Singh and the r esultant deterioration in the law and order of the State that the decision of th e State Government to constitute the Commission did not suffer from any illegali ty or error.

49. Following an incident of firing on a crowd in the West Garo Hill District of Meghalaya, a one man Inquiry Commission was constituted by the Stat e Government to report on the causes and nature of the disturbances and the circ umstances leading to such armed intervention. In the writ proceeding initiated by the Border Security Forces challenging the competence of the State Government to appoint such a Commission, the pleadings disclosed that the firing was resor ted to not in the invitation of the civil authorities and was on the individua l accord of the officer concerned. The challenge as in the instant appeal was founded on Entry-2 and 2-A of List-I of Entry-1 of List-II in the Seventh Schedu le to the Constitution of India.

50. This Court noticing, amongst others, that the Boarder Security F orces had not, at the relevant time, been deployed in aid of civil power or at t he invitation of the civil authorities, recorded the failure on the part of the writ petitioners to cite the law emasculating the State to appoint a Commission as done. This Court rejected the plea of harassment and humiliation at the hand s of the state authorities and trivialization of the morale and confidence of th e members thereof as an argument in despair.

51. Hon’ble Hansaria, J (as he was then) in endorsement of the above , reaffirmed the basal ordainment on legislative competence that if the enactmen t is within the general scope of affirmative words of empowerment and does not v iolate any express condition or restriction by which the power is limited, it is not for any Court of justice to inquire further, or to enlarge those conditions and restrictions. His Lordship elucidated that if any Commission of Inquiry, though relatable to disruption of public order, does not require any inquiry in to the matter covered by the exclusionary part of Entry-1, no further restrictio n can be imposed on the power of the State Government. Judged in the contextual facts, it was held that the precept of (cid:28)pith and substance (cid:29) being relatable to disruption of public order, the incidental encroachment on the working of the ar med forces would not introduce any infirmity in the impugned notification. The deployment of the Assam Rifles in the State of Manipur thus 52. obviously did not spell excision of the civil power of the State administration for all practical purposes. As a corollary, the State Government not only retai ned its dominion and authority to attend to the immediate demands of public orde r emerging within its territory limits, but was essentially obliged to respond t hereto under the scheme of constitutional Governance.

53. The subsisting disturbed and volatile existence of its territori es or a part thereof warranting declaration of disturbed area(s) necessitating t he deployment of armed forces in aid of civil power, ipso facto, cannot and ough t not denote denudation of the power of the concerned State Government to envisi on and adopt initiatives to effectively quell a surfacing public order if immine nt on the anvil. The declaration of a disturbed area on a conscious evaluation of the sustained state of affairs in the locality concerned therefore cannot be construed to preclude a State Government to visualize and enforce steps to succe ssfully thwart a perceptible law and order situation or meet the exigencies of p ublic order writ large on the progression of contemporaneous events. Such a tum ult in the pub