High Court · 2009

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJAN GOGOI HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C.R.SARMA Heard Mr SS Sarma, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr I Choudhury , learned counsel for the respondent. This appeal is directed against the order dated 8.6.2005 passed by a lea rned Single Judge of this Court in WP(C) No. 50/04 (Aizawl Bench). By the afores aid order, the learned Single Judge had directed refund of the contributions mad e by the writ petitioner (the respondent herein) towards pension fund under the State Bank of India (Employees’ Pension Fund) Rules. The learned Single Judge by the aforesaid order had also granted to the petitioner the encashment of privil ege leave available to his credit as on 31.3.2001 i.e. the date of his voluntary retirement. The relevant facts in brief maybe noticed at the outset: The writ petitioner (respondent herein) who joined as a Messenger in the Aizawl Branch of the State Bank of India on 10.10.80 was confirmed in serve w.e .f. 10.4.81. He was allowed to go on voluntary retirement under the VRS Scheme i n force at the relevant point of time. This was w.e.f. 31.3.2001. As benefits in cluding pension claimed to be due to the petitioner following his voluntary reti rement from service were not being granted, the petitioner had approached this C ourt earlier by instituting a writ proceeding registered and numbered as WP(C) N o. 19/04. The said writ petition was disposed of by an order dated 5.4.2004 by d irecting the authorities of the Bank to consider the claims of the petitioner an d pass a speaking order in this regard. By order dated 21.5.2004, the claims of the petitioner for grant of pension under the Pension Rules and the benefit of e ncashment of privilege leave was turned down by the Bank authorities. Aggrieved, the petitioner instituted WP(C) No. 50/04 out of which this appeal has arisen. The learned Single Judge having disposed of the said writ petition in the manner indicated, the respondents in the writ petition have filed the present appeal. In so far as the direction of the learned Single Judge for refund of the contributions made by the respondent (writ petitioner) to the pension fund is c oncerned, Mr Sarma, learned counsel for the appellants has placed before us a co py of the Pension Fund Rules in force in the Bank at the relevant point of time. Referring to the said document, Mr Sarma has submitted that Clause 9(i) and (ii ) of the Rules, by virtue of which an employee was required to make contribution s to the fund, had been deleted w.e.f. 1.4.1968. According to Mr Sarma, in view of the aforesaid deletion of Clause 9(i) and (ii) of the Rules w.e.f 1.4.1968, n o question of the respondent making any contribution to the fund can legitimatel y arise. We have perused the relevant provisions of the Rules. We have also considered th e effect of the deletion of Clause 9(i) and (ii) of the Rules. On such considera tion, it is our considered view that as Clause 9(i) and (ii) stood deleted from the Rules w.e.f. 1.4.1968, the respondent who joined service in the year 1980 an d was confirmed in the year 1981 could not have made any contribution to the fun d. In that view of the matter, we are inclined to reach the conclusion that the direction of the learned Single Judge for refund of the amount of the contributi on made by the respondent to the fund would require modification by us. Accordin gly, the aforesaid part of the order dated 8.6.2005 passed by the learned Single Judge stands interfered with. Coming to the question of encashment of privilege leave, which issue has been found in favour of the writ petitioner (respondent herein) by the learned Single Judge, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants tha t the benefits under the VRS Scheme is a composite package and as the respondent had availed of voluntary retirement earlier than his normal superannuation, he will not be entitled for encashment of privilege leave. We have considered Clause (6) of the VRS Scheme in force in the Bank whi ch specifically provides for (cid:28)encashment of balance of privilege leave as applic able on the relevant date (cid:29). We are told that the relevant date in this regard is

31.3.2001 i.e. the date of coming into effect of the Scheme. If encashment of b alance of privilege leave as on the said date was specifically included in Claus e (6) as one of the other benefits that an employee going on voluntary retiremen t would be entitled to, it cannot be understood as to how the claim of the Bank as noticed above would stand substantiated. If the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants is to be accepted by the Court, naturally, the provision of e ncashment of the balance of privilege leave as on the relevant date would not ha ve been included in Clause (6) of the Scheme in question. That apart, a reading of the judgment of the learned Single Judge indicates that while considering the aforesaid aspect of the case, the learned Single Judge took note of the fact th at the Bank could not produce any document to substantiate that the writ petitio ner (respondent herein) is not entitled to the benefit of encashment of privile ge leave and Clause (15) of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 31.10.79, relied upon in this regard by the appellant Bank, recorded the agreement of the parties to the settlement that encashment of privilege leave available to the credit of an employee at the time of his retirement will have to be paid by the Bank. Th e learned Single Judge taking note of Clause (15) of the said Memorandum of Sett lement arrived at the conclusion that the expression ’retirement’ not having bee n clarified to mean voluntary retirement or normal retirement, the said expressi on must be understood to cover cases of voluntary retirement also. We have given our anxious consideration to the view expressed by the lea rned Single Judge and on such consideration, we express our respectful agreement with the said view. Consequently, we deem it appropriate to affirm the finding of the learned Single judge in so far as the entitlement of the respondent (writ petitioner) to encashment of privilege leave is concerned. Consequently and in the light of the foregoing discussions, this appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above. The appellant Bank shall forthwith grant to the respondent the benefit o f encashment of privilege leave available to his credit as on 31.3.2001 along wi th interest at the rate of 6% per annum.