High Court
Case Details
WP(C) 2731/2008 BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN J U D G M E N T AND O R D E R (ORAL) By way of this petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India, petition er seeks quashing of order dated 01-03-2004 issued by the Executive Director (P& A), North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Limited (NEEPCO) superannuating the petitioner from the service of NEEPCO w.e.f. 29-02-2004 on attaining the age of 60 years and for a direction to the respondents to clear all unpaid retirement dues including pay and allowances for the period from 01-03-2004 to 30-04-2007, by considering his date of superannuation as 30-04-2007. 2. Though a number of affidavits have been filed by the parties con troverting each other, Court is of the view that a detailed narration of the con tents of each of the affidavits may not be necessary considering the subject mat ter of the writ petition. Consequently, reference will be made to only those ave rments which the Court considers relevant for the purpose of adjudication of the case. 3. Petitioner had entered service in NEEPCO as Assistant Engineer o n 01-12-1976. At the relevant point of time, he was serving as Deputy General Ma nager (E). Impugned order dated 01-03-2004 was issued which stated that as per t he matriculation certificate of the petitioner, he was 16 years of age as on 01- 03-1960 meaning thereby that his date of birth was 01-03-1944. Accordingly, peti tioner was due to retire from service on 29-02-2004 on attaining the age of supe rannuation of 60 years. Therefore, petitioner was released from the service of N EEPCO w.e.f. 29-02-2004. 4. Petitioner filed a writ petition before this Court praying for payment o f his terminal benefits. The said writ petition was registered as W.P (C) No.280 4/2005. Subsequently, on leave being granted, the said writ petition was withdra wn and the present writ petition has been filed. 5. Petitioner has contended that initially his date of birth was en tered in the service records as 01-03-1944 but later on when he came to know tha t his date of birth so recorded was wrong, he had sworn an affidavit stating his date of birth as 08-04-1947 and submitted the same in the last part of 1990. Re spondents acted upon the said affidavit and corrected his date of birth as 08-04 -1947 in the official records. Accordingly, his date of superannuation should ha ve been 30-04-2007 but by the impugned order, he was forced to retire w.e.f. 29- 02-2004. Petitioner has contended that had he continued in service, he would hav e retired as General Manager as the person junior to him was promoted to the pos t of General Manager after the forced superannuation of the petitioner. He, ther efore, claims salary and other allowances for the period from 01-03-2004 to 30-0 4-2007. Petitioner has further stated that an amount of Rs. 5,29,121.00 under va rious heads has not been paid to him.
Legal Reasoning
Respondents have filed counter affidavit. Stand taken is that pe 6. titioner was superannuated from the service of NEEPCO w.e.f. 29-02-2004 vide the impugned order dated 01-03-2004 but the writ petition was filed on 27-06-2008 i .e. after a lapse of about 4 years without any explanation. Writ petition is, th erefore, hit by delay and laches. Impugned order was issued on the basis of matr iculation certificate of the petitioner, submitted by the petitioner himself at the time of entry into service. Respondents have denied that petitioner’s date o f birth was changed to 08-04-1947 in the official records. Respondents have stat ed that petitioner cannot base his case on internal notings in the official file s as various views are expressed by the officers before the final decision is ta ken. Respondents have further stated that all terminal benefits to which the pet itioner was found due and entitled were sanctioned and paid to him.
Legal Reasoning
7. Petitioner in his reply affidavit has denied the contentions of the respondents made in the counter affidavit and has furnished copies of passpo rt and identity card of NEEPCO wherein his date of birth is shown as 08-04-1947. He has also reiterated his contention that all his pensionery and terminal bene fits have not been paid. 8. Respondents have filed additional affidavit in response to the r eply affidavit filed by the petitioner. While reiterating the averments made in the counter affidavit, respondents have stated that date of birth as recorded in the matriculation certificate has greater evidentiary value under the law and, therefore, they had relied upon the same. It is reiterated that all pensionary and terminal benefits due to the petitioner had been paid and there is no outstanding dues payable to the petitioner. Details of entitlement of the petitioner and the payments made to h im have been furnished in the affidavit. 9. Thereafter, an additional affidavit was filed by the petitioner disputing the contentions of the respondents that nothing is due to the petition er. He has given details of what he claims are due to him. 10. Following this, another affidavit-in-opposition was filed by the respondents clarifying that consequent upon pay revision w.e.f. 01-01-1997, pet itioner became entitled to a further sum of Rs. 28,206/- towards arrear encashme nt for 105 days of earned leave availed during his service period. According to the respondents, the petitioner was entitled to a total sum of Rs. 4,11,146/- (R s. 3,82,940 + Rs. 28,206/-). Out of the aforesaid amount, a sum of Rs. 2,22,854/ - was recoverable from the petitioner under various heads, details of which have been mentioned in the affidavit. After deducting the said amount, the balance a mount of Rs. 1,88,292/- was paid to the petitioner by cheque, which he enchased. 11. Heard Mr. B. Gogoi, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. K .P. Sarma, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, who has also produced the entire service record of the petitioner.
Decision
12. Mr. K.P. Sarma, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respond ents, has raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ p etition on the ground of delay and laches. He submits that the impugned order is dated 01-03-2004 where as the petitioner has challenged the legality of the sai d order by filing the present writ petition on 26-06-2008. This delay of more th an 4 years has not been explained by the petitioner. He, therefore, submits that the writ petition is liable to dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on the following two decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court - (1) (2006) 11 SCC 464 U.P. Jal Nigam and another -Vs- Jaswant Singh and Another (2) (2007) 2 SCC 322 D. Gopinathan Pillai -Vs- State of Kerala and Another 13. Responding to the preliminary objection of the respondents, Mr. B. Gogoi, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that after the impugned ord er was passed, petitioner had approached this Court in the year 2005 itself cont ending that the terminal benefits paid to him covered only a part of his entitle ments and not the entire amount. Subsequently, petitioner filed an application s eeking leave to amend the writ petition by incorporating the challenge to the pr esent impugned order. However, petitioner sought leave of the Court to withdraw the said writ petition and to re-file the same seeking additional reliefs. On le ave being granted, the present writ petition has been filed. Mr. Gogoi, therefor e, contends that there is no delay and laches in filing the present writ petitio n. Making his submissions on the merit of the case, he submits that when the pet itioner’s date of birth is recorded as 08-04-1947 in official documents like the passport and identity card, there was no reason for the respondents to have sud denly retired him from service by relying only on the matriculation certificate without putting him on notice. Referring to the various claims put forward by th e petitioner in the writ petition and the affidavits filed thereafter, he submit s that assertion of the respondents that nothing is due to the petitioner cannot be accepted as the respondents had themselves subsequently admitted that petiti oner became entitled to a further sum of Rs. 28,206/-. 14. Replying to the submissions of learned Counsel for the petitione r, Mr. Sarma, learned senior counsel for the respondents submits that respondent s had accepted the petitioner’s date of birth as given in the matriculation cert ificate, which is the most authentic document and reliable. Therefore, no fault can be found with the decision of the respondents to accept the petitioner’s dat e of birth as recorded in the matriculation certificate. Regarding the claim of the petitioner that he is entitled to further dues on his superannuation, learne d Senior Counsel submits that nothing is due to be paid to the petitioner. Placi ng the entire record before the Court, he submits that whatever was found due to the petitioner was paid to him. In any case, the claim of the petitioner is bas ed on disputed questions of fact which may not be gone into by this Court in a p roceeding under article 226 of the Constitution of India. Additionally, he submi ts that reliance placed by the petitioner on the internal file notings to conten d that the respondents had accepted the corrected date of birth of the petitione r i.e. 08-04-1947 is not justified. Firstly, the file notings indicate diverse v iew points being expressed on the issue which is bound to take place in an admin istrative set up. Secondly, no decision was taken by the respondents to accept 0 8-04-1947 as the date of birth of the petitioner. He submits that it is one thin g to obtain information and documents under the Right to Information Act, 2005 b ut it is altogether a different thing to obtain official documents in an unautho rized manner. Petitioner has not disclosed how he has obtained the office noting s. Therefore, no reliance can be placed on such official notings. In support of his submissions, Mr. Sarma has placed reliance on the following judgments -- (1) AIR 1987 SC 1554 State of Bihar -Vs- Kripalu Shankar Bharat Ram Meena -Vs- Rajasthan High Court and Others (2) (1997) 3 SCC 233 (3) (2002) 7 SCC 719 State of M.P. and others -Vs- Mohanlal Sharma Coal India Limited and another -Vs- Ardhendu Bikas Bhattacharjee and Others (4) (2005) 12 SCC 201 15. Submissions made have been considered. 16. For the sake of conveyance and considering the subject matter of the writ petition, both the preliminary objection and the merit of the challeng e are taken up together and decided accordingly. 17. Impugned order dated 01-03-2004 says that as per the matriculati on certificate issued by the Gauhati University, petitioner was 16 years of age as on 01-03-1960, thereby his date of birth being 01-03-1944. Superannuation age being 60 years, petitioner became due for superannuation on 29-02-2004. Accordi ngly, petitioner stood superannuated from the service of NEEPCO w.e.f. 29-02-200 4. It is not that petitioner was unaware about his date of birth re 18. corded in his matriculation certificate. In paragraph 4 of the writ petition, pe titioner has himself stated that his date of birth recorded in his service book was 01-03-1944. Admittedly, this was as per the matriculation certificate. Petit ioner’s contention that he had sworn an affidavit and submitted the same before the NEEPCO authority in the last part of 1990 stating his date of birth as 08-04 -1947 will not make any material difference inasmuch as the matriculation certif icate was not altered or modified by the competent authority. Stand taken by the petitioner that change in his date of birth as per affidavit was accepted by th e respondents have been categorically denied by the respondents. Nothing has bee n placed on record by the petitioner to show that either the Gauhati University authorities or the NEEPCO authority had issued orders accepting the change in hi s date of birth from 01-03-1944 to 08-04-1947. Petitioner also did not institute any legal challenge in this regard before his superannuation. 19. Though the petitioner’s date of birth as recorded in his passpor t and identity card differs from the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate, the action of the respondents in accepting the date of birth as re corded in the matriculation certificate, which was furnished by the petitioner h imself at the time of entry into service, cannot be faulted. As held by the Apex Court in Mohanlal Sharma (supra), the date of birth as recorded in the matricul ation certificate carries a greater evidential value. In Ardhendu Bikash Bhattac harjee (supra), it has been held by the Apex Court that the issue of correction of date of birth as recorded in the matriculation certificate is essentially a q uestion of fact which may not be gone into by the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction. 20. Admittedly, after the impugned order was passed, petitioner had filed W.P.(C) No.2804/2005. In that writ petition, no challenge was made to the impugned order dated 01-03-2004. Grievance expressed was that he was not paid th e entire terminal benefits. Later on, the said writ petition was withdrawn and o n leave being granted, the present writ petition has been filed. Though this Cou rt might have granted liberty to the petitioner to withdraw the earlier writ pet ition and to file a fresh one with additional reliefs, the fact still remains th at the challenge has been instituted belatedly, after more than 4 years, for whi ch there is no explanation. Why the petitioner did not challenge the impugned or der in the first writ petition has also not been explained. In any case, on the date when the present writ petition was filed, the petitioner would have retired from service even if his date of birth is taken as 08-04-1947. In such circumst ances, the Court is of the view that there is delay and laches in instituting th e present challenge. In so far payment of terminal benefits are concerned, respondent 21. s have stated and have placed the details in the affidavits filed that whatever amount was found due, has been paid to the petitioner. Entire record has been pl aced before the Court by the learned senior counsel for the respondents to show that no further amount is due to the petitioner. In such circumstances, learned senior counsel for the respondents is right in submitting that petitioner’s clai m of being entitled to additional dues would require adjudication of highly disp uted questions of fact. This Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under ar ticle 226 of the Constitution of India would not like to go into such disputed q uestions of fact. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court finds no merit in the writ petition, which is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own cost.