Judgment · High Court · 2012

Learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground of availa bility of alternative statutory remedy. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant. Learned counsel for the respondents could not assist the Court on the ground that records were not avai lable with him. He could also not tell the Court whether order dated 1.8.2007 ha d been implemented and if not, reasons for the same when no stay was in operatio n. Learned counsel for the appellant has put forth following contentions :- (i) Alternative remedy of appeal was no bar to entertain the writ petition w hen question is legal and there are onerous conditions of pre-deposit before hea ring the appeal. (ii) ellate order against the suspension of the licence. The show cause notice was invalid in view of the observations in the app In support of the above submissions, learned counsel for the appellant h as relied upon the following judgments :- (a) 54 SC 403); (b) 1) 5 SCC 697}; (c) rs {(2003) 2 SCC 107}; (d) Himmatlal Harilal Mehta -Vs.- State of Madhya Pradesh and others (AIR 19 Union of India and others -Vs. Tantia Construction Private Limited {(201 Harbanslal Sahnia and another -Vs.- Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and othe Aslam Mohammad Merchant -Vs.- Competent Authority and others {(2008) 14 SCC 186}; (e) of U.P. and others {(2004) 13 SCC 665}; and (f) SC 182. Durga Enterprises (P) Ltd. and another -Vs.- Principal Secretary, Govt. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. -Vs.- Income-tax Officer, Bhopal {AIR 1961 We are unable to accept the above submissions. Before we advert to the case law cited by learned counsel for the appellant, we may observe that general rule is not to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution when a statutory remedy is available unless exceptional circumstances are made out. In this connection, reference may be made to U.P. St ate Spinning Co. Ltd. -Vs.- R.S. Pandey and another (2005) 8 SCC 264 laying down as follows :- (cid:28)20. In a catena of decisions it has been held that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is a vailable under the Act, unless exceptional circumstances are made out.

#21. In U.P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karamchari Sang h (2004) 4 SCC 268 it was held that when the dispute relates to enforcement of a right or obligation under the statute and specific remedy is, therefore, provid ed under the statute, the High Court should not deviate from the general view an d interfere under Article 226 except when a very strong case is made out for mak ing a departure. The person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the proces s as provided under the statute. To same effect are the decisions in Premier Aut omobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke (1976) 1 SCC 496, Rajasthan SRTC v. Kr ishna Kant (1995) 5 SCC 75, Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Municipal Corpn. of Ahm edabad (2002) 2 SCC 542 and in Scooters India v. Vijai E.V. Eldred (1998) 6 SCC

#22. In Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant (1995) 5 SCC 75, it was observed as follow s: (SCC pp. 91-92, para 28) (cid:28)[A] speedy, inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of disputes arising between workmen and their employers. The idea has been to ensure that the workme n do not get caught in the labyrinth of civil courts with their layers upon laye rs of appeals and revisions and the elaborate procedural laws, which the workmen can ill-afford. The procedures followed by civil courts, it was thought, would not facilitate a prompt and effective disposal of these disputes. As against thi s, the courts and tribunals created by the Industrial Disputes Act are not shack led by these procedural laws nor is their award subject to any appeals or revisi ons. Because of their informality, the workmen and their representatives can the mselves prosecute or defend their cases. These forums are empowered to grant suc h relief as they think just and appropriate. They can even substitute the punish ment in many cases. They can make and remake the contracts, settlements, wage st ructures and what not. Their awards are no doubt amenable to jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 as also to the jurisdiction of this Court under Ar ticle 32, but they are extraordinary remedies subject to several self-imposed co nstraints. It is, therefore, always in the interest of the workmen that disputes concerning them are adjudicated in the forums created by the Act and not in a c ivil court. That is the entire policy underlying the vast array of enactments co ncerning workmen. This legislative policy and intendment should necessarily weig h with the courts in interpreting these enactments and the disputes arising unde r them. (cid:29)

#23. In Basant Kumar Sarkar v. Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd. AIR 1964 SC 1260, the Con stitution Bench of this Court observed as follows: (SCR p. 920) (cid:28)It is true that the powers conferred on the High Courts under Act 226 are very wide, but it is not suggested by Mr Chatterjee that even these powers can take i n within their sweep industrial disputes of the kind which this contention seeks to raise. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the conten tion, we would confirm the finding of the High Court that the proper remedy whic h is available to the appellants to ventilate their grievances in respect of the said notices and circulars is to take recourse to Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, or seek relief, if possible, under Sections 74 and 75 of the Act. (cid:29) The above position was recently highlighted in Hindustan Steel Works Con struction Ltd. v. Employees Union (2005) 6 SCC 725. . 24. Accordingly, the conclusion is inevitable that the High Court was not ju stified in entertaining the writ petition. Usually when writ petition is enterta ined notwithstanding availability of alternative remedy and issues are decided o n merits, this Court is slow to interfere merely on the ground of availability o f alternative remedy. But the facts of the present case have special features, w hich warrant interference. (cid:29) We may now refer to the judgment relied upon on behalf of the appellant. In Harbanslal Sahnia, it was found that dealership licence was cancelled on irrelevant and non-existent ground and the order was found to be without jur isdiction. In Himmatlal Harilal Mehta, the situation was somewhat similar. In Ta ntia Construction Private Limited, the High Court entertained the writ petition having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case that the writ petition er was required to execute extended quantity of work without any justification. In Aslam Mohammad Merchant, the show cause notice was found to be illegal agains t which a writ petition was held to be maintainable. In Durga Enterprises (P) Lt d., the writ petition was pending for 13 years and dismissal thereof on the grou nd of availability of alternative remedy was held to be not justified. In Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd., the writ petition was entertained against refusal of the I.T.O. to carry out the direction of the appellate authority. All these cases are instances of exceptional situations and not of gener al rule. The present case is not at par with the cases relied upon. The requirement of pre-deposit in taxing statutes is well known and has been upheld. Reference may be made to State of Tripura -Vs.- Manoranjan Chakrabo rty and others (2001) 10 SCC 740. Moreover, the third proviso to Section 15 of t he Act provides for dispensing with the requirement of such deposit either uncon ditionally or subject to such conditions as it may impose, in case of undue hard ship. There is no reason why the grounds which have been urged before this Cou rt cannot be urged before the appellate authority. Thus, no ground is made out t o interfere with the order of learned Single Judge. The appeal is dismissed.