High Court
Case Details
Mat.App. 8/2010 BEFORE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. A.K. GOEL HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. GOSWAMI (A.K.Goel, C.J.) This appeal has been preferred against decree of divorce granted ex-part
Legal Reasoning
e by the trial court under the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The parties got married on 11.05.2005, but on account of differences, th e parties separated. The husband filed a divorce petition on the ground of cruel ty. Since the wife did not contest the matter, an ex-parte decree of divorce was granted with the observation that the husband had successfully made out a c ase for dissolution of marriage. Hence, this appeal. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there is no discussion in the order of the trial court in support of the conclusion that case for disso lution of marriage was made out. After referring to the case of the appellant, only discussion in the jud gment is as follows : Taking into consideration of all the aspects discussed above and having
Legal Reasoning
(cid:28)5. heard the learned counsel, Shri DD Bhakta representing the petitioner it is my c onsidered opinion that the petitioner-husband has successfully made out a case f or dissolution of marriage. (cid:29) Learned counsel for the respondent supports the impugned order and in th e alternative submits that the matter be remanded with direction for expeditious hearing. On due consideration, we are of the view that the appeal ought to be all owed on account of patent infirmity in the nature of the order passed by the tri al court which fails to meet mandatory requirement of being a reasoned order. No doubt order is ex parte and no issues were framed. The fact remains that marria ge cannot be dissolved in absence of proof of a statutory ground of divorce. Thi s obligates the Court to record a clear and specific finding that such a ground has been made out. Such finding ought to be based on analysis of evidence on rec ord. It is clear from the operative part of order quoted above that this has not been done in the present case. We may, in this context, refer to the observatio ns in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594 on the need for reasons in support of decision even of a quasi judicial authority : (cid:28)35. The decisions of this Court referred to above indicate that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the approach of this Court is more in line wit h that of the American courts. An important consideration which has weighed with the court for holding that an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicia l functions must record the reasons for its decision, is that such a decision is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Co nstitution as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Arti cle 227 of the Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded, would enable this Court or the High Courts to effectively exercise the appellate or supervisory p ower. But this is not the sole consideration. The other considerations which hav e also weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the requirement of re cording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introdu ce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in deci sion-making. In this regard a distinction has been drawn between ordinary courts of law and tribunals and authorities exercising judicial functions on the groun d that a Judge is trained to look at things objectively uninfluenced by consider ations of policy or expediency whereas an executive officer generally looks at t hings from the standpoint of policy and expediency. 36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exer cise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the othe r considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, a re of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reas ons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it exclude s chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of de cision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its app lication cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision o r judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be re corded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising qua si-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject t o appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court o f law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in c ontroversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the ord er is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revis ional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge. (cid:29) We are, thus, even without expressing any opinion on merits unable to su stain the impugned order.
Decision
Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order and rema nd the matter to the trial court for a fresh decision in accordance with law. The parties may appear before the Trial Court for further proceedings on 7th August, 2013. Having regard to the fact that it is an old matter, the Trial Court may expedite its decision preferably within three months from the next date. The appeal stands disposed of.