Judgment · High Court · 2012

One Shri Dharani Deka lodged a first information before the Offi 3. cer-in-Charge, Dhemaji Police Station on 03-02-2001 alleging that at around 12 n oon of that day while his sister Smt. Beauty Deka was alone in his house, two yo uths entered into his house and committed rape on her. The said information was treated as FIR and on the basis of the same, Dhemaji P.S. Case No.10/2001 u/s 44 8/376/34 IPC was registered. In the course of the investigation, the police arre sted some persons including the two accused. The victim identified both the accu sed in the test identification parade (TIP), which was conducted in the Dhemaji district jail. On completion of the investigation, the police submitted charge-s heet against both the accused persons u/s 448/376(2)(g)/34 IPC. Being exclusivel y triable by a Court of Session, the case was thereafter committed to the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Dhemaji, whereupon it was registered as Sessions Case No.31(DH)/2002.

A prima facie case having been found against the two accused, th e learned trial Court framed charge against them under the aforesaid sections, t o which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In the course of the tr ial, the prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses. The defence side also exa mined 5 witnesses. Their plea was that of total denial. On perusal of the eviden ce adduced and after hearing both the sides, the learned Sessions Judge convicte d both the accused under the aforesaid two provisions and sentenced them as indi cated above.

Heard Dr. Y. K. Phukan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants as amicus curiae, assisted by Ms. K. Baruah, learned counsel. Also h eard Mr. K. Munir, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam for the State.

Dr. Phukan, learned senior counsel fairly submits that from the evidence on record, it will be difficult to dislodge the finding of guilt record ed by the learned Court below. He, however, contends that the learned Court belo w went wrong in treating the offence as a case of gang rape which led to the imp osition of the minimum sentence of 10 years. According to him, the appellants ar e in jail since 27-04-2004 and during the investigation stage also, they were in custody for 23 days. He, therefore, submits that the sentence should be reduced to the period already undergone and the appellants be directed to be released a ccordingly.

Mr. Munir, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor on the other hand submits that there is no infirmity in the findings given by the learned Se ssions Judge, who rightly convicted the appellants u/s 376(2)(g) as well as u/s 448 IPC. In so far the sentence is concerned, he submits that even in a case of gang rape, as per the first proviso to sub-section (2) of section 376 IPC, the C ourt has the discretion to impose a lesser sentence but the same must be for ade quate and special reasons.

In view of the submissions made by the learned counsels, the sco pe of this appeal has considerably narrowed down. Since the conviction and sente nce under Section 448 IPC has not been questioned, the same has not been gone in to by the Court. The moot question which now confronts the Court is whether it w as a case of rape or gang rape and whether the sentence imposed should be reduce d to the period undergone. To answer this question, a brief survey of the releva nt evidence adduced may be necessary.

At that outset, let us examine the evidence of the prosecutrix h erself. She is PW-9. She stated that at the time of occurrence she was staying a t the official quarter of her elder brother, the informant PW-1, who was serving at the relevant time in the police wireless station. On the fateful day, both h er brother and sister-in-law, who is a school teacher, went to attend their duti es. She was alone at home. At about 12 noon, while she was watching television, the two accused persons, whom she could identify as the two persons standing in the dock, entered into the house/room and closed the door. Thereafter, they comm itted rape on her. Before leaving, the accused threatened her not to inform anyb ody. Though her brother came home in the afternoon for lunch, she did not inform him out of fear and shame. In the evening, when her sister-in-law came home fro m school, she informed her about the whole incident, who in turn reported the ma tter to her husband, the PW-1. Thereafter, the PW-1 lodged the FIR. She has stat ed that the police recorded her statement on the same evening and that she had t old the police that she would be able to identify the accused if they were produ ced before her. She was examined by the doctor PW-8 at the Dhemaji Civil Hospita l on the next day. Her inner wear was seized by the police vide the Ext-2 seizur e list, which was subsequently sent for forensic examination. Her statement was also recorded a couple of days after the incident on 05-02-2001 by the Judicial Magistrate u/s 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which was exhibi ted as Ext.5. In that statement, she stated in clear and specific terms about th e incident and gave vivid description of the accused persons. She stated that af ter a few days, she was taken to the Dhemaji jail where she could identify the t wo accused from about 50 boys in the TIP conducted in the presence of the Magist rate. She was categorical in saying that the two persons standing in the dock we re the persons she had identified in the TIP and they were the persons who had c ommitted rape on her. Pointing towards the appellant No.1, she stated that he wa s the one who had gagged her mouth.

The evidence of the prosecutrix PW-9 is clear, specific and unwa vering. There is complete corroboration between her exhibit-5 statement recorded u/s 164 Cr.P.C. and her deposition is Court. There is no reason to disbelieve h er evidence. Though it is a settled legal proposition that conviction on a charg e of rape can be maintained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, neverthele ss, in the present case, her evidence stood corroborated by the evidence of the other witnesses, including the medical evidence. In such circumstances, in the c onsidered opinion of this Court, the charge of rape against the two accused stoo d conclusively proved.

Having held the two guilty of committing rape, the next question which therefore arises for consideration is whether it was a case of gang rape. Gang rape is not defined in the IPC. Under section 376(2)(g), it is provided th at whoever commits gang rape shall be punished with RI for a term which shall no t be less than ten years but which may be for life and shall also be liable to f ine. Under the proviso, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, the Court may impose a lesser sentence. As per Explanation 1, where a woman is raped by one a more in a group of persons acting in furtherance of thei r common intention, each of the persons shall be deemed to have committed gang r ape within the meaning of the said sub-section.

From a reading of the above explanation, it is clear that when a woman is subjected to rape by even one person from out of a group of persons ac ting in furtherance of their common intention, each of the persons of that group would be deemed to have committed gang rape. A group of persons to constitute a gang would mean a body of several persons. The ordinary dictionary meaning of t he word gang is an organized group of people. Group means a number of people loc ated, gathered or classed together. According to the Black’s Law Dictionary, Six th Edition, a gang means any company of persons who go about together or act in concert, mainly for criminal purpose. Company would mean a group or body of peop le acting together. Therefore, to form a gang, there certainly has to be more th an two members. To constitute the offence of gang rape, there must be a group of several persons i.e., at least more than two persons, acting in furtherance of their common intention to commit rape on the victim woman and even if one out of the group had actually committed the offence of rape, each of the persons of th e group shall be deemed to have committed the said offence.

In the present case, the two appellants committed rape on the pr osecutrix. No other person accompanied the two appellants. The evidence on recor d does not indicate that the two appellants were members of a group or a gang an d in furtherance of their common intention, the two had committed rape on the vi ctim woman. Therefore, in view of the discussions made above and in the consider ed opinion of this Court, though the two appellants had committed the offence of rape, it was not a case of gang rape. Considering the same, the conviction of t he appellants is altered from 376(2)(g) IPC to one under Section 376(1) IPC. There is one more aspect which needs to be noted. The learned tr 14. ial Court on the same day on which he convicted the two accused persons, heard t hem on the point of sentence and imposed the sentence. Considering the seriousne ss of the offence for which the appellants were convicted and the severity of th e sentence which awaited them, the learned trial Court ought not to have passed the sentence on the day of conviction itself without giving adequate time and op portunity to the accused to make submissions on the sentence, as even in a convi ction u/s 376(2)(g), discretion is with the Court to impose a sentence lesser th an the minimum prescribed.

The two appellants are young men and they were in their early tw enties when they committed the offence. They are now serving their sentence sinc e 27-04-2004 i.e., for more than 8(eight) years. During the investigation stage also, they were in custody for some days.

riod already undergone by the appellants. Considering the above, the sentence imposed is reduced to the pe

ove. The appellants are directed to be released forthwith. The appeal accordingly stands allowed to the extent indicated ab Before parting with the record, this Court would like to place o 18. n record its appreciation of the assistance rendered by the learned amicus curia e.

Registry to send down the LCR. No cost.