In Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bom bay & Ors.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the enhancement of re nt is permissible only in accordance with the Rent Control Act and the Housing B oard rules permitting enhancement being against the Rent Control Act are liable to be struck down.

6. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, submitted that the Housing Board was special law and was not controlled by the Rent Control Act. It was, h owever, submitted that the Board had no objection to consider the view point of the petitioners and passing of an appropriate order in the matter. 7. Question for consideration is whether the Housing Board Act and Rules ca n provide for fixation or enhancement of rent of premises of the Housing Board i ndependent of provisions of the Rent Act. In our view, the answer has to be in t he affirmative.

8. In Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bom bay and Ors., (1974) 2 SCC 402, it was held that two procedures can simultaneous ly co-exist if the purpose of law justified classification for different treatme nt. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed:- (cid:28)14. To summarise: Where a statute providing for a more drastic procedure differ ent from the ordinary procedure covers the whole field covered by the ordinary p rocedure, as in Anwar Ali Sarkar case and Suraj Mall Mohta’s case without any gu idelines as to the class of cases in which either procedure is to be resorted to , the statute will be hit by Article 14. Even there, as mentioned in Suraj Mall Mohta case a provision for appeal may cure the defect. Further, in such cases if from the preamble and surrounding circumstances, as well as the provisions of t he statute themselves explained and amplified by affidavits, necessary guideline s could be inferred as in Saurashtra case and Jyoti Pershad case the statute wil l not be hit by Article 14. Then again where the statute itself covers only a cl ass of cases as in Haldar case and Bajoria case the statute will not be bad. The fact that in such cases the executive will choose which cases are to be tried u nder the special procedure will not affect the validity of the statute. Therefor e, the contention that the mere availability of two procedures will vitiate one of them, that is the special procedure, is not supported by reason or authority. (cid:29)

9. In Baburao Shantaram More v. Bombay Housing Board, AIR 1954 SC 153, it w as held that Housing Board was a class by itself which was different from other landlords. It was observed:- (cid:28)6. & &... It is the business of the Government to solve the accommodation proble m and satisfy the public need of housing accommodation. It was for the purpose o f achieving this object that the Board was incorporated and established. It is n ot to be expected that the Government or local authority or the Board would be a ctuated by any profit-making motive so as to unduly enhance the rents or eject t he tenants from their respective properties as private landlords are or are like ly to be. Therefore, the tenants of the Government or local authority or the Boa rd are not in need of such protection as the tenants of private landlords are an d this circumstance is a cogent basis for differentiation. The two classes of te nants are not by force of circumstances placed on an equal footing and the tenan ts of the Government or local authority or the Board cannot, therefore, complain of any denial of equality before the law or of equal protection of the law &.. (cid:29) Different procedure for eviction under the Public Premises Act was held 10. not to be in conflict with the Rent Act in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and Ano. v. Pun jab National Bank & Ors., (1990) 4 SCC 406. It was observed:- (cid:28)64. It would thus appear that, while the Rent Control Act is intended to deal w ith the general relationship of landlords and tenants in respect of premises oth er than government premises, the Public Premises Act is intended to deal with sp eedy recovery of possession of premises of public nature, i.e. property belongin g to the Central Government, or companies in which the Central Government has su bstantial interest or corporations owned or controlled by the Central Government and certain corporations, institutions, autonomous bodies and local authorities . The effect of giving overriding effect to the provisions of the Public Premise s Act over the Rent Control Act, would be that buildings belonging to companies, corporations and autonomous bodies referred to in Section 2(e) of the Public Pr emises Act would be excluded from the ambit of the Rent Control Act in the same manner as properties belonging to the Central Government. The reason underlying the exclusion of property belonging to the Government from the ambit of the Rent Control Act, is that the Government while dealing with the citizens in respect of property belonging to it would not act for its own purpose as a private landl ord but would act in public interest. What can be said with regard to government in relation to property belonging to it can also be said with regard to compani es, corporations and other statutory bodies mentioned in Section 2(e) of the Pub lic Premises Act. In our opinion, therefore, keeping in view the object and purp ose underlying both the enactments viz. the Rent Control Act and the Public Prem ises Act, the provisions of the Public Premises Act have to be construed as over riding the provisions contained in the Rent Control Act.

70. For the reasons aforesaid, we are unable to accept the contention of the lea rned counsel for the petitioners that the provisions contained in the Public Pre mises Act cannot be applied to premises which fall within the ambit of the Rent Control Act. In our opinion, the provisions of the Public Premises Act, to the e xtent they cover premises falling within the ambit of the Rent Control Act, over ride the provisions of the Rent Control Act and a person in unauthorized occupat ion of public premises under Section 2(e) of the Act cannot invoke the protectio n of the Rent Control Act. (cid:29)

11. In Banatwala and Company vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ano., (2011) 13 SCC 446, the question for consideration was: (cid:28)Whether the provisions for fixation of standard rent, and provisions prescribin g other obligations for the landlord such as maintenance of essential services u nder the Rent Control Act concerned viz. the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 as in the present case ( hereinafter referred to as (cid:28)the MRC Act (cid:29)), are applicab le in respect of public premises owned by a corporation such as the first respon dent, Life Insurance Corporation of India ( (cid:28)LIC (cid:29), in short) which is otherwise c overed by the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupa nts) Act, 1971 ( hereinafter referred to as (cid:28) the Public Premises Act (cid:29)) (cid:29) Considering the said question, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: (cid:28)59. There could be provisions for certain purposes in one statute, and for anot her purpose in another statute, though both govern the common field. Thus, in Kr ishna Distt. Coop. Mktg. Society Ltd. v. N.V. Purnachandra Rao, (1987) 4 SCC 99, the issue was, with respect to the application of Section 25-F of the Industria l Disputes Act, to the employees who were otherwise governed under the A.P. Shop s and Establishments Act, 1966. In that context this Court had to examine whethe r there was any conflict between the two Acts and particularly when the A.P. Act was a later Act and it had received the assent of the President. The question w as whether compliance with Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act could be insisted for establishments governed under the Shops and Establishments Act. Thi s Court held that those provisions will be applicable and there was no conflict between the provisions of the two Acts. Section 25-F of the Central Act provided for the conditions precedent for retrenchment, and the non-compliance therewith made the order of retrenchment fatal. Sections 41(1) and (3) of the A.P. Act pr ovided for the authorities to settle the disputes arising out of retrenchment. (cid:29) 85. We have noted the observations of a Bench of three Judges of this Court in J ain Ink Mfg. Co., (1980) 4 SCC 435 that the Public Premises Act has a very limit ed application, whereas the Rent Act is an Act with much wider application than the Public Premises Act. In the present case, the subjects of fixation of standa rd rent and restoration of essential services by the landlord are covered under the MRC Act, but in no way under the Public Premises Act. The Public Premises Ac t, in fact does not claim to cover these subjects. As held by the Constitution B ench in Kesoram Industries Ltd., (2004) 10 SCC 201 the Court has to look at the substance of the matter. Regard must be had to the enactment as a whole, to its main objects and scope of its provisions. Incidental and superficial encroachmen ts are to be disregarded. Eviction and recovery of arrears of rent are alone cov ered under the Public Premises Act. The subject of fixation of rent is different and independent from eviction as held by the Division Bench of the Karnataka Hi gh Court in Bharath Gold Mines, ILR 1988 Kar 3092. That being the position, ther e is no conflict between the MRC Act and the Public Premises Act when it comes t o the provisions in the MRC Act with respect to fixation of standard rent and re quiring the landlord to maintain the essential services and supplies. Therefore, the provisions of the MRC Act in that behalf cannot in any way be said to be re pugnant to those under the Public Premises Act. The presumption is in favour of constitutionality, and the Court is not expected to strike down a provision unle ss the conflict is a real one. In the present matter there is no such real confl ict. (cid:29) In view of above, it cannot be held that Housing Board Act could not pro 12. vide for different procedure for eviction or fixation or enhancement of rent in respect of the premises belonging to the Housing Board. Even though the Board may have statutory authority to fix or enhance ren 13. t and the statutory provisions are not invalid, the Housing Board being a public authority has to act reasonably and fairly. We need not go into the question wh ether there is arbitrariness in the increase of rent in view of a statement made on behalf of the Board that the Board will consider the view point of the petit ioners and pass an appropriate order in accordance with law.