Sri Jayanta Kumar Ghosh v. The National Investigation Agency

Mr. D.K. Das, SC, NIA, B E F O R E THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE I.A. ANSARI THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE A.C. UPADHYAY Dates of hearing 13.03.2012, 19.03.2012, 14.05.2012 & 07.06.2012 : 27.01.2012, 22.02.2012, 24.02.2012, Date of delivery of Judgment & order : 10.09.2012 JUDGMENT & ORDER (Ansari, J.) INTRODUCTION: When pitted against each other, which one is more important ? liberty of a perso n, or the security of the State ? Society has struggled to find a uniform answe r to this question in all its stages of civilization. There was a time, when th e concern of the security of the State made rulers ignore the question of person al liberty of his subjects. As the civilizational standards started rising, par ticipation of the people in the governance of the State started increasing. The experience taught the people that ignoring personal liberty, in all cases and i n all circumstances, may prove counter-productive inasmuch as it may turn the ru ler ? whether an individual or a group of persons ? into a despot and dictator . Ignoring personal liberty may even slide the State to the brink of tyranny a nd, eventually, plunge the State into such a catastrophe as could destroy the St ate itself. 2. The human civilization, therefore, realized that a balance has to be str uck between the two. While the concern of the security of the State, in all cond itions and always, may not be allowed to override the concerns of civil liberty, the civil liberty must also be subjected to certain restrictions so that the li berty does not become a licence to do anything, which anyone pleases to do, for, civil liberty, beyond a point, may also prove disastrous for the State inasmuch such licencees would tempt to ignore the law and defeat thereby the very rule o f law, which is the cherished goal of civil liberty. Fortunately, in India, her Constitution creates a balance between the t 3. wo conflicting interests ? civil liberty and security of the State. All laws, in India, have to, therefore, withstand the test of this constitutional balance. With the spread of terrorism, human civilization has been put under severe str ain inasmuch as terrorism is, now, testing our value system. Do we allow the co ncerns of civil liberty to be ignored in order to escape the horrors of terroris m? Should we learn to forget the values, which we have attached so far to an in dividual’s human rights, even if he is an offender? No wonder that ’terrorism’ has become, in the present day world, the greatest threat to human civilization.

4. The concern for security of the State has, therefore, forced the State t o make more and more stringent laws. Lest the State also does not become as ins ensitive as a terrorist, all the acts of the State and the laws, made by the Sta te, must be tested and interpreted on the touchstone of human rights. A successf ul State administers its laws with meaning and effect. (See National Investigati on Agency Vs. Redaul Hussain Khan, reported in 2010 (3) GLT 302. In the light of the above observations made on the constitutional guaran 4a. tee of civil liberty vis-à-vis horrors of terrorism, we, now, come to the presen t appeal. BACKGROUND FACTS : 5. The material facts, giving rise to the present appeal, may, in brief, be set out as under: (i) Some significant amendments have been made in the Unlawful Activ ities (Prevention) Act, 1967, (in short, ’the UA(P) Act’) by the Unlawful Activi ties (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008, the amendments having come into force on 31.12.2008, which introduced and defined certain terms, such as, terrorist act, terrorist gang, terrorist organization, unlawful association and unlawful activi ty and made, inter alia, punishable a ’terrorist act’ under Section 16 and, by S ection 17, while the UA(P) Act, as amended by the Unlawful Activities (Preventio n) Amendment Act, 2008, made raising of fund for terrorist act punishable, the U A(P) Act also provided punishment for conspiracy, act of abetment, etc, for comm ission of terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of terrorist ac t. This apart, the UA(P) Act made ’membership’ of a terrorist gang or terrorist organization punishable offences and also provided punishment for those, who hol d or held proceeds of terrorism. The UA(P) Act made, under Section 38, even ’ass ociation’ by a person with a terrorist organization a punishable offence, if one associates with a terrorist organization with intention to further its activiti es or if he professes to be associated with a terrorist organization with intent ion to further its activities. (ii) The UA(P) Amendment Act, 2008, has also introduced Section 43D and put r estrictions, by the proviso to Sub-Section (5) of Section 43D, on the Court’s po wer to grant bail by imposing condition that an accused shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on perusal of the case diary, or on the r eport, made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, ’the Code’), is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that t he accusation against such person is prima facie true. Thus, the UA(P) Act, 1967 , as the same stands today, puts serious fetters on the Court’s discretion to al low an accused to go on bail. (iii) Yet another development from the enactment of NIA Act, 2008, whi ch came into force on 31.12.2008, is that the Central Government stands empowere d to constitute a special agency to be called National Investigation Agency (in short, NIA) for investigation and prosecution of offences under the acts specifi ed in the Schedule of the NIA Act. Section 11 also empowers the Central Governme nt to constitute Special Courts and, it is out of the order, passed by such a Sp ecial Court rejecting bail of the present appellant, that this appeal has been p referred as provided by Section 21(1) of the NIA Act read with Section 21(4) the reof. (iv) Basistha P.S. Case No. 170/2009, under Section 120B/121/121(A) IPC read with Section 25(1B) (A) Arms Act, was, initially, registered against two accused persons, namely, Phojendra Hojai and Babulal Kemprai, on the ground that, on 01 .04.2009, at about 4-00 p.m., when vehicle Nos. AS-01-AH-1422 and AS-01-1-0609 w ere intercepted at 14th Mile G.S. Road, Guwahati, and searched, both the said ac cused, suspected to be cadres and linkmen of a banned organization, namely, DHD (J), were found in the vehicles, wherefrom a sum of rupees one crore, in cash, a nd two pistols were recovered, the money being meant for purchase of arms and am munitions for the said banned organization. The accused were accordingly taken into custody and investigation was started by the Assam Police. On being produc ed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, Guwahati, the two accused afore mentioned were remanded to police custody. (iv) While investigation of Basistha Police Station Case No.170/2009 aforementi oned was pending with the State police, the Central Government, in exercise of i ts power under Section 6(5), read with Section 8 of the National Investigation N IA Act, 2008 (in short, ’the NIA Act’), directed, on 01.06.2009, investigation o f the said case by the National Investigation NIA (in short, ’the NIA’). In ter ms of the directions, so issued by the Central Government, the NIA registered a case under the NIA Act, the Case being NIA Case No. 1/2009. (v) Before, however, registration of the case aforementioned by the NIA, thr ee more persons, namely, 1. Mihir Barman @ Jewel Garlossa @ Debojit Sinha, 2. Ah sringdaw Warrisha @ Partha Warisha, and 3. Sameer Ahmed, were arrested by the As sam Police, at Bangalore, in connection with Basistha Police Station case aforem entioned. The NIA moved, on 05.06.2009, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, a nd filed FIR in the NIA Case No. 1/2009 aforementioned. On 06.06.2009, the accu sed persons were, on being produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup , remanded to police custody. In terms of the order, passed by the Chief Judic ial Magistrate, on 06.06.2009, Basistha P.S. Case No. 170/2009 aforementioned wa s tagged with the NIA Case No. 1/2009 and, on the basis of the application made by the NIA, the Court allowed accused Mohit Hojai and R. H. Khan to be taken in to custody by the NIA for a period of 10 days and the three accused, namely, 1. Mihir Barman @ Jewel Garlossa @ Debojit Sinha, 2. Ahsringdaw Warrisha @ Partha W arisha, and 3. Sameer Ahmed, were remanded, for a period of 14 days, to the cust ody of the NIA. (vi) On 11.06.2009, on the prayer of the NIA, the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, added Sections 17/18/19 of the UA(P) Act, 1967, to the NIA Case No. 1/2009 aforementioned and, on the prayer of the NIA, the Court of the C hief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, remanded the accused to judicial custody, in p urported exercise of its power under Section 167 of the CrPC, on the ground that no court has so far been constituted under the NIA Act. (vii) By a Gazette notification, dated 09.07.2009, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, in exercise of its powers under Section 3 of t he UA(P) Act, 1967, DHD(J) along with its factions, wings and front organization s came to be declared as ’unlawful organization’. (viii) Three of the accused persons, namely, R. H. Khan, Ahsringdaw Warisa @ Pa rtha Warisha and Sameer Ahmed, then, approached this Court seeking to invoke its jurisdiction under Section 439 of the Code. None of the accused aforementioned applied for bail to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, or to the Sessions Ju dge, Kamrup; rather, they applied for bail, directly, to this Court under Sectio n 439 of the Code (ix) One of the important questions, which arose before the High Court, in th e matter of application for bail, which the three accused aforementioned had so made under Section 439 Cr.PC to this Court, was: whether the bail applications w ere maintainable in law.

6. Upon a threadbare discussion, the said three bail applications, made un der Section 439 of the Code, seeking to invoke High Court’s jurisdiction to gran t bail in favour of the accused aforementioned, were rejected, on 29.07.2009, by one of us (Ansari, J.) on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, laying down, inte r alia, that under the scheme of the provisions contained in the NIA Act read wi th the provisions of remand and bail as stand incorporated in the Code of Crimin al Procedure, a person , arrested in connection with an offence, under the NIA Act, can be remanded to custody, police or judicial, by the Special Court, where the Special Court has been constituted, or by the Court of Session, where the S pecial Court has not been constituted. 7. This Court, in the said three bail applications, also held that the sour ce of power of the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, to consider an application for bail is traceable to, and governed by, the provisio ns of Section 437 Cr.PC. and while considering such an application for bail, the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, will not exercise th e power of bail as if it is considering an application for bail under Section 43 9 and, consequently, the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, would have all the limitations, which a Magistrate has, while deciding an ap plication for bail, under Section 437 Cr.PC and the provisions, contained in Sec tion 439 Cr.PC, cannot be resorted to for the purpose of granting bail and it wa s also held by the High Court, in its order, dated 29.07.2009, aforementioned, t hat against an order, passed by a competent court, rejecting bail, or granting b ail, the remedy of an aggrieved party lies in preferring an appeal to the High C ourt, in terms of Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, and in not making any applicatio n under Section 439 of the Code This Court, therefore, held in its order, dated 29.07.2009, that such an appeal would require hearing by a Division Bench of the High Court and that in such an appeal, even the merit of the order, granting or refusing bail, can be questioned. The decision came to be reported, in (2009) 3 GLT 855 (Redaul Hussain Khan & Ors vs. State of Assam & Ors). While laying do wn the law, as indicated hereinbefore, the Court observed and held as under: (cid:28)77. nder the NIA Act, or the Court of Session, when the Special Court has not been c onstituted, where an accused is required to be produced if he is arrested in con nection with an offence punishable under the NIA Act and, upon his production, i t is the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, which shall have the power to grant bail. The source of power of the Special Court or the Co urt of Session, as the case may be, to consider an application for bail is trace able to, and governed by, the provisions of Section 437 of the Code and while co nsidering such an application for bail, the Special Court or the Court of Sessio n, as the case may be, will not exercise the power of bail as if it is consideri ng an application for bail under Section 439 and, consequently, the Special Cour t or the Court of Session, as the case may be, would have all the limitations, w hich a Magistrate has, while deciding an application for bail, under Section 437 What emerges from the above discussion is that it is the Special Court u of the Code. XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX

106. What surfaces from the above discussion, held, as a whole, is that except a s provided in Section 167(2-A) of the Code, a person, arrested in connection wit h an offence, under the NIA Act, can be remanded to custody, police or judicial, by the Special Court, where the Special Court has been constituted, or by the C ourt of Session, where the Special Court has not been constituted. In view of th e fact that the NIA Act envisages a situation, wherein an investigation, as in t he present case, may be entrusted to the National Investigation NIA after the St ate police had made some investigation, it further follows that once the investi gation, under the scheme of the NIA Act, is taken over by the Agency, it is the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, which can authorize f urther detention of an arrested accused. When such an arrested accused applies f or bail to the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, the so urce of power to consider such an application for bail lies in Section 437 and n ot Section 439 CrPC. Even a High Court cannot invoke its powers under Section 43 9, to grant bail if it has been refused by the Special Court or the Court of Ses sion, as the case may be, nor can the High Court, in exercise of its power, unde r Section 439, cancel bail if bail has been granted to such an accused by the Sp ecial Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be. If the bail has been re fused or granted by the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may b e, the aggrieved party may, however, prefer an appeal, in terms of Section 21, t o the High Court. Such an appeal has to be heard by a Division Bench of the High Court and in such an appeal, the merit of the order, granting or refusing bail, can be questioned. In the backdrop of the position of law, as indicated above, it becomes c 107. lear that the present three applications for bail, which have been made under Se ction 439 CrPC, are not entertainable in law and must, therefore, fail.

108. applications are hereby dismissed as not maintainable. (cid:29) In the result and for the reasons discussed above, all these three bail (Emphasis added)

8. Complying with the position of law, as had been laid down by this Court, in Redaul Hussain Khan and others (supra), one of the accused, namely, Redaul H ussain Khan, filed an application before the Sessions Judge (Special Court), Kam rup, Guwahati, seeking bail, but his bail application came to be rejected on 14. 08.2009. Thereafter, on an application, made by the NIA, on 27.08.2009, the lea rned Sessions Judge (Special Court), Kamrup, Guwahati, by its order, dated 28.08 .2009, extended the period for completion of investigation into the case by a fu rther period of 60 days in terms of Section 43-D(5)(b) of the UA(P) Act read wit h Section 167 Cr.PC. 9. The order, dated 14.08.2009, aforementioned passed by the learned Sessio ns Judge (Special Court), Kamrup, Guwahati, rejecting the bail applications came to be challenged by Redaul Hussain Khan, before a Division Bench of this Court, by way of appeal under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act. The said appeal was dismis sed by a Division Bench of this Court on 19.09.2009. In the meanwhile, however, the Special Court, Central Bureau of Investig 10. ation, Assam, Guwahati, was notified by the Central Government, in exercise of i ts power under Section 11(1) of the NIA Act, vide Gazette notification, dated 01 .09.2009, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, as the ’S pecial Court’ for the purpose of the NIA Act. 11. As against the dismissal of his appeal and rejection of bail by the or der, dated 19.09.2009, passed by a Division Bench as mentioned above, one of the accused, namely, Redaul Hussain Khan, carried the matter, by way of a Special L eave Petition, to the Supreme Court. By its decision, pronounced on 09.11.2009, reported in (2010) 1 SCC 521 (Redaul Hussian Khan vs. State of Assam & Ors.), th e Supreme Court observed, inter alia, that it had been pointed out, on behalf o f the Union of India, that there was little doubt that even on the date, when ac cused Redaul Hussain Khan was apprehended, DHD(J) had been indulging in terroris t act, although it came to be declared as an ’unlawful association’ some time la ter, i.e., on 09.07.2009. The Supreme Court made it clear, in its order, dated 0 9.11.2009, that having considered the submissions, made before it, it was unable to agree with the submissions, made on behalf of the accused-petitioner, Redaul Hussain Khan, that to the facts of the case, the provisions of the UA(P) Act, 1 967, were not attracted. The Supreme Court further held that it was unable to a ccept the submissions, made on behalf of the petitioner, Redaul Hussain Khan, t hat merely because of the fact that DHD(J) had not been declared as an ’unlawful organization’, when Redaul Hussain Khan was arrested, the said organization cou ld not have been taken to have been indulging in terrorist act, or that the peti tioner could not have been alleged to have the knowledge of such activities of t he DHD(J). With the conclusions, so reached, as indicated above, the Supreme Court 12. rejected Redaul Hussain Khan’s application for bail by laying down that the lear ned Sessions Judge (Special Court), Kamrup, Guwahati, had the jurisdiction to ex tend the time for completion of investigation in terms of the amended provisions , introduced by way of Section 43-D(5)(b) of the UA(P) Act, read with Section 16 7 CrPC. The relevant observations, made by the Supreme Court, in Redaul Hussain Khan (supra), read as under: (Emphasis added) (cid:28)15. Mr. Rawal submitted that although Mr. Ghosh had referred to some newspaper reports indicating that there was a possibility of amnesty being granted to the members of DHD(J), the same was yet to materialize, and, on the other hand, it a lso indicated that the said organization was indulging in terrorist activities. Accordingly, in view of the definition of \terrorist act\ in Section 15 of the 1 967 Act and the provisions of Sections 13 and 17 thereof, there was little doubt that even on the date when the petitioner was apprehended, DHD(J) was indulging in terrorist acts, although, it came to be declared as an \unlawful association \ sometime later. Mr. Rawal urged that having regard to the above, the Special L eave Petitions filed against the order of the High court refusing to grant bail were liable to be dismissed. 16. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respectiv e parties and we are unable to agree with Mr. Ghosh that the provisions of the U A(P) Act, 1967, would not be attracted to the facts of the case. We are also una ble to accept Mr. Ghosh’s submissions that merely because DHD(J) had not been de clared as an \unlawful association\ when the petitioner was arrested, the said o rganization could not have indulged in terrorist acts or that the petitioner cou ld not have had knowledge of such activities. 17. Accordingly, Mr. Ghosh’s submissions regarding the grant of statutory ba il have to be rejected since, in our view, the learned Sessions Judge (Special C ourt) had the jurisdiction to extend the time for completion of the investigatio n. (cid:29) 13. Thereafter, three more persons, namely, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, Debasish B hattacharjee @ Bappi and Sandeep Kumar Ghosh @ Sambhu, came to be arrested on 30 .10.2009. On their production before the Special Court, they were remanded to c ustody. 14. A charge-sheet came to be laid, on 17.11.2009, before the learned Speci al Court, by the NIA, against as many as 14 accused persons including those pers ons, whose names have been mentioned above. Three of the accused persons, namel y, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh (i.e., the appellant herein), Debasish Bhattacharjee @ Ba ppi, and Sandeep Kumar Ghosh @ Sambhu, had jointly applied for bail, but their a pplications for bail were rejected by the learned Special Court on 31.12.2009. As against the order, rejecting their prayer for bail, as indicated above, they had preferred appeals, under Section 21 of the NIA Act, to this Court. Similarly , accused Ashringdaw Waris and accused Samir Ahmed, too, on failing to obtain ba il from the learned Special Court, had, upon filing of the charge-sheet against them, preferred appeals. As far as accused Redaul Hussain Khan is concerned, he filed, after the 15. charge-sheet already stood laid by the NIA, an application for bail, in the Spec ial Court, at Guwahati, itself, on the ground of his sickness. By order, dated 2 5.01.2010, the learned Special Judge granted interim bail to accused Redaul Huss ain Khan and this direction for interim bail was, eventually, made absolute on 2 9.01.2010. Aggrieved by the order, dated 29.01.2010, whereby accused Redaul Huss ain Khan was granted bail, the NIA preferred an appeal, which gave rise to Crimi nal Appeal No.25/2010. The appeal has been allowed and the order, granting bail in favour of accused Redaul Hussain Khan, has been set aside by a separate judgm ent and order delivered by us. 16. While resisting the application for bail, made by accused Redaul Hussain Khan, on the ground of his sickness, what the NIA had submitted is relevant in order to help this Court take a holistic view of the case of the NIA and to corr ectly appreciate the case as against the present appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, in the present two appeals. The case of the NIA, which NIA had submitted in Re daul Hussain Khan, as indicated hereinbefore, was, and has remained, in substanc e, thus: (a) During the course of investigation, accused Redaul Hussain Khan and Mo hit Hojai were arrested on 31.05.2009. During a search conducted at the house of Redaul Hussain Khan, an amount of Rs.4,00,000/- was recovered in cash. The sei zure of huge cash, which had been made, on 01.04.2009, from Phojendra Hojai and Babul Kemprai and also recovery of money, in cash, from Redaul Hussain Khan was part of a large criminal conspiracy to wage war against the State by the accus ed involved in the case aforementioned including Redaul Hussain Khan. (b) In furtherance of the said criminal conspiracy, which was held in Novemb er, 2008, in Guwahati, North Cachar Hills and other places and under the directi ons of Niranjan Hojai, Commander-in-Chief of DHD(J), Depolal Hojai, the then ele cted Chief Executive Member (CEM) of North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council (in s hort, NCHAC), resigned from the office to make way for Mohit Hojai to assume cha rge as the new CEM, because, Depolal Hojai had been threatened by Niranjan Hojai that unless he (Depolal Hojai) resigned, as had been directed, he would face th e same fate as his predecessor in-office, who had been killed. It is, thus, und er threat and intimidation, exerted on Depolal Hojai, by Niranjan Hojai, that De polal Hojai had resigned and Mohit Hojai became the CEM. The removal of Depola l Hojai, by Mohit Hojai, created the desired impact, it installed a sense of pan ic and terror and thereby spread, in the employees and people of NCHAC, deep sen se of terror disabling them from questioning any illegality, which they were dir ected by Mohit Hojai and his group of people to carry out. (c) Consequently, Mohit Hojai and other public servants including Redaul Hussain Khan, contractors, such as, the present appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, and som e others siphoned huge sums of money by threat and extortion from NCHAC and the money, so collected from various illegal means including extortion, misappropria tion, etc., used to be carried to Guwahati, Kolkata and Bangalore and, then, thr ough channelized hawala operators, sent out of the country and utilized in purch asing and importing arms and ammunitions for carrying on the subversive activiti es of DHD(J), which had come to be notified as an ’unlawful association’, within the meaning of Section 2(m) of UA(P) Act, as mentioned above. The investigation, conducted at Halflong, revealed defalcation of Govern (d) ment funds for the purpose of helping terrorist activities of DHD (J) and the sa id Redaul Hussain Khan, while working as Deputy Director, Social Welfare Departm ent, had allegedly the sole control of the finances of the Social Welfare Depart ment inasmuch as he used to keep all cheque books, pass-books and other related papers with him only and used to make payments to the suppliers personally witho ut receiving the materials for which orders were placed and, after obtaining rec eipts from the suppliers, he gave the receipts, bills, challans and vouchers to the office staff with instructions to process the same for payment and make rele vant entries of the office records. The office staff processed the bills for pay ment and made relevant entries in the office records without actually receiving the articles or stock. The interrogation of the office staff revealed that they were threatened by Redual Hussain Khan to do so and that the staff of the said o ffice had been carrying out illegal directions of Redaul Hussain Khan, because o f fear and threat to their lives. (e) Accused Redaul Hussain Khan applied for bail at different stages of inve stigation, but the same came to be rejected by the Special Court, the High Court and also the Supreme Court. In the past, accused Redaul Hussain Khan had cited different reasons for obtaining bail including a plea that he was to appear in M BA examination and the illness of his mother. During pendency of Criminal Appeal No.148/2009, arising out of an appeal preferred under Section 21(4) by the resp ondent, Redaul Hussain Khan, challenging therein the order of the learned Specia l Court refusing to grant him bail. Redaul Hussain Khan had been allowed by the High Court to meet his mother in the hospital, while being escorted by police; b ut the accused never met his mother in the hospital, because his mother was not seriously ill as had been misrepresented before the High Court and that she alre ady stood discharged by the hospital. (f) A charge-sheet, as already mentioned above, was laid, in the Special Cou rt, against as many as 14 accused including Redaul Hussain Khan, who figures as A-4, in the charge-sheet, and the present appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, who fi gures as accused in the said charge-sheet. 17. What may, now, be noticed is that, while the NIA’s appeal, which had bee n preferred, under Section 21 of the NIA Act, against the learned Special Court’ s order (as mentioned above), granting bail to accused Redaul Hussain Khan on th e ground of his sickness, was allowed and thereby accused Redaul Hussain Khan’s bail was cancelled, all other appeals, including the appeal, preferred by the pr esent appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, to this Court, against rejection of his pr ayer for bail by the learned Special Court, came to be rejected by a Division Be nch of this Court, by judgment and order, dated 28.05.2010. In short, thus, the order of the learned Special Court, rejecting the pr 18. ayer for bail, which the present appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, had applied for , was upheld by this Court in the appeal aforementioned. While the decision, in Redaul Hussain Khan’s case stands reported in 2010 (3) GLT 302 (National Invest igation Agency vs. Redaul Hussain Khan), the decision, in the appeals of the pre sent appellant and others, stands reported in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh and others vs. State of Assam and others, reported in 2010 (4) GLT 1.

19. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his appeal by this Court, the appellant, J ayanta Kumar Ghosh, carried the matter, by way of Special Leave, to the Supreme Court, the Special Leave Petition being SLP (Crl) 5416 of 2010, wherein the Supr eme Court, while declining to interfere with the dismissal of the appeal, gave l iberty to the petitioner (i.e., the present appellant) to apply afresh for bail, if so advised. The relevant observations, made by the Supreme Court, in its or der, dated 29.09.2011, passed in the said Special Leave Petition, read as under: (cid:28) &..considering the nature of the charges, which have been brought against the P etitioner and the other accused persons, we are not inclined to interfere with t he order of the High Court refusing to grant bail to the petitioner, but, at the same time, we are of the view that the trial should not be delayed any further. & & & &.this order will not prevent the petitioner from making any fresh applicati on for bail, if so advised. (cid:29) (Emphasis added) Thus, the Supreme Court, while declining to interfere with the High Cour 20. t’s order refusing to grant bail to the appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, did not stop him from making application for bail ’if so advised’. This shows that the r ejection of bail of the appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, by the High Court, was c orrect, though the appellant was given the option to apply afresh for bail ’if s o advised’. The question, therefore, is: whether the Supreme Court permitted the appellant to make repeated applications for bail even if there were no change i n the circumstances of the case? Before answering the question, posed above, what may be noted is that th 21. e present appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, made applications seeking bail, in the Special Court, in both the cases, namely, NIA Case No. 1/2009 and NIA Case No. 2/2009. However, as the applications for bail, filed by the appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, were rejected by the learned Special Court, Assam, by order, dated 23.12.2011, these two appeals, namely, Crl. Appeal No. 12 of 2012, and Crl. Appe al No. 15 of 2012, have been preferred by the appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, un der Section 21(4) of the NIA Act. 22. What may also be noted is that in the learned Special Court, hearing, wi th regard to the framing of charge, in NIA Case No. 1/2009, has been concluded. Considering, however, the fact that there are as many as 14 (fourteen) accused and each accused has his own counsel and every counsel has made his submissions in the matter of framing of charges, the learned Special Court, due to intricate nature of the questions, which have been raised, has, according to what the NIA has submitted before this Court, kept the order, on the framing of charges, res erved in NIA Case No. 1/2009. 23. We have heard Mr. P. K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, appearing on be half of the appellant in both the appeals, and Mr. D. K. Das, learned Senior cou nsel, appearing for the NIA. We have also heard Mr. H. P. Rawal, learned Additi onal Solicitor General, who has appeared on behalf of the Union of India, and Mr . K. N. Choudhury, learned Senior Additional Advocate General, Assam. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION TO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.12/2012 BY THE NIA 24. What may, now, be noted is that the appeal, which has arisen out of NIA Case No. 1/2009, has been resisted, at its threshold, by the NIA, by contending, inter alia, that the appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, had earlier filed his appl ication for bail, in NIA Case No. 1/2009, and the prayer for bail having been re jected by the learned Special Court, the appellant preferred, under Section 21(4 ) of the NIA Act, an appeal to this Court and, as this Court, too, upheld the o rder of the learned Special Court rejecting the appellant’s prayer for bail and thereby dismissed the appellant’s appeal, the appellant carried his grievances t o the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court, too, did not interfere with the orde r of rejection of bail, though it granted the appellant the liberty to apply for bail afresh, if so advised.

25. Repeated applications for bail, submits Mr. Das, have been discouraged b y the Supreme Court and, though the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to bail applications, the person, moving the bail application, if his applications for bail were already rejected, must show new grounds, or change in the circumst ances or some new facts having emerged or come on record, which, according to hi m, entitles him (i.e., the applicant) to apply afresh for bail. Reliance, in su pport of his submissions, is placed by Mr. Das on the decision, in State of T.N. -vs- S.A. Raja, reported in (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein the Supreme Court observe d as under: (cid:28)Where a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the responden t for certain reasons and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the ap pellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fr esh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unle ss there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, t he principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the r epeated filing of the bail applications without there being any change of circum stances would lead to bad precedents. (cid:29) (Emphasis is added) In the case at hand, submits Mr. Das, there is no change in the circums 26. tances and since not only learned Special Court, but this Court, too, and, there after, the Hon’ble Supreme Court have not found it fit to allow the appellant, J ayanta Kumar Ghosh, to go on bail in the face of the facts of the case at hand a nd the law relevant thereto, the appellant, logically speaking, cannot seek bail , once again, without any change in the circumstances and without any new materi al having come on record in his favour. 27. To put it a little differently, when the learned Special Court’s earlier order, rejecting bail, in NIA Case No. 1/2009, has been upheld by this Court in appeal and thereby the order of the learned Special Court stands, by operation of law, subsumed into the appellate order, passed by this Court, in the appellan t’s earlier appeal, and, hence, unless there is any change in the circumstances, or some new grounds are shown, the bail application, in NIA Case No. 1/2009, wh erein charge-sheet was submitted, on 17.11.2009, is not sustainable; but, so far as the appeal, arising out of the rejection of the present appellant’s prayer f or bail by the learned Special Court, in NIA Case No. 2/2009, wherein charge-she et was submitted on 18.10.2010, is concerned, the same can be heard and decided on merit. 28. In the case at hand, particularly, NIA Case No. 1/2009, contends Mr. Das , the appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, has not been able to show, reiterates Mr. Das, any new ground warranting change in the conclusions of this Court, which it had arrived at, while considering the appellant’s earlier appeal against the le arned Special Court’s order rejecting his application for bail. APPELLANT’S REPLY TO THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF THE NIA 29. Attempting to repel the above submissions, made on behalf of the NIA, re sisting the maintainability of Criminal Appeal No. 14/2012, which has arisen out of NIA Case No. 1/2009 (wherein charge-sheet was submitted on 17.11.2009, and t he learned Special Court has kept its order, on the framing of charges, reserved ) and, apprehending, perhaps, that the failure of the appellant, Jayanta Kumar G hosh, to obtain bail, in NIA Case No. 1/2009, would frustrate the appellant’s at tempt to obtain his liberty on bail even if he happens to be granted bail in NIA case No. 2/2009, Mr. P. K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, has submitted that there has been change in circumstances of the present case inasmuch as a ’truce’ has been entered into between the Government of India and the State Government, on the one hand, and DHD(J), which had been, at one point of time, declared as an unlawful association, on the other, and, pursuant to this ’truce’, Niranjan H ojai, who was alleged to be the Commander-in-Chief of the DHD(J), and its Chairm an, Jewel Garlossa @ Mihir Barman @ Dobijit Sinha, had applied for bail in the S pecial Court, but the learned Special Court declined, on 21.07.2010, to grant th em bail, whereupon the said two accused preferred an appeal, which gave rise to Crl. Appeal No. 126/2011. 30. It needs to be pointed out, submits Mr. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, that it was contended by the NIA and also the State of Assam, in learned Specia l Court, that on the demand of the civil society, a peace process stood initiate d with the said outfit and in consonance with the said peace process, the Govern ments, both, the Central as well as State, had initiated dialogue with the said outfit and, in the such circumstances, the release of the said two appellants, n amely, Niranjan Hojai and Jewel Garlossa, would be necessary to sign a peace acc ord between the said outfit and the State of Assam so that there could be a perm anent solution to the insurgency problem in the North Cachar Hills area. 31. It has been pointed out by Mr. P. K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, th at a Division Bench of this Court, in its order, dated 12.08.2011, passed in Cri minal Appeal No. 126/2011, did make an observation that the learned Special Cour t’s rejection of bail, in the light of the interpretation given by it to the pro visions of Section 43(D)(5) of the UA(P) Act, is correct, but as the submission, made before the High Court, was that the appellants were not asking for bail, b ut only interim bail to participate in the peace process and, as the NIA and the Government of Assam had no objection to the interim bail, the High Court grante d interim bail to Niranjan Hojai, the self-styled Commander-in-Chief, and Jewel Garlossa, the self-styled Chairman of the said unlawful outfit. Thus, according to Mr. P. K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, while the 32. persons, who had allegedly led DHD(J) and had allegedly wielded and used arms i llegally and indulged in terrorist and disruptive activities, have been allowed the liberty of bail, because the interim order for bail, which was initially for a period of four months, has been subsequently extended, in the name of ’truce’ , the present appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, who was allegedly a mere provider of fund to DHD(J), has been denied bail, interim or otherwise, and has been kept incarcerated for almost three years. In effect, thus, the alleged chief architects of the DHD(J) are, points 33. out Mr. Goswami, on interim bail, though they were the ones, who had, according to the NIA, taken to arms illegally and controlled and used their cadres for var ious disruptive activities; whereas the present appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, is accused of having provided fund to the said outfit by means of misappropriati on of government funds and by carrying the money, so misappropriated, to Mohit H ojai, who was the Chief Executive Member, N.C. Hills Autonomous Council, and who , according to the NIA, was chosen and made the Chief Executive Member of the N. C. Hills Autonomous Council, by removing his predecessor-in-office with the help of threatening call made by Niranjan Hojai, so that the activities of the DHD(J ) could be effectively carried out with the help of Mohit Hojai, but the said Ni ranjan Hojai, now, is enjoying, at the behest of the Government, the benefit of interim bail. This apart, points out Mr. Goswami, a large number of the cadres of the said one-time banned unlawful association, DHD(J),have been recruited int o the regular police force of the State. 34. When persons, who allegedly took to arms, according to the NIA, are enjo ying the freedom and liberty of bail, though in the form of interim bail, there is no rational cause, grieves Mr. Goswami, for resisting the bail of the present appellant and this, according to Mr. Goswami, is the change in the circumstance s since the time the last appeal, seeking bail by the present appellant, was dis missed by this Court. Yet another ground for seeking present appellant’s bail, points out Mr. 35. Goswami, is that the CBI had registered a case with regard the misappropriation of funds by the public servants in N.C. Hills Autonomous Council, because the NI A had declined to investigate into the case, though the NIA did have the power, under the NIA Act, to investigate such cases, too; and, in the charge-sheet, whi ch the CBI has submitted, in this regard, the present appellant’s name does not figure as an accused. 36. Coupled with the above, it is further submitted by Mr. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, that the most important ground, which the appellant, Jayanta Kum ar Ghosh, seeks to press for consideration is that this Court had observed, in t he earlier round of litigation, that, while considering an appeal, under Section 21 of the NIA Act, arising out of an order either granting bail or rejecting ba il by the Special Court, constituted under the NIA Act, this Court does not, whi le sitting as an appellate Court, enjoy the special power, which the High Court, otherwise, enjoys under Section 439 of the Code. This proposition of law, acco rding to Mr. Goswami, needs to be reviewed inasmuch as this Court, contends Mr. Goswami, while sitting, in appeal, against an order rejecting bail or granting b ail, passed by the learned Special Court, is not denuded of the special power, w hich it has and, otherwise, enjoys under Section 439 of the Code. In other words, what Mr. Goswami contends is that notwithstanding the re 37. strictive provisions, contained in proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, d isempowering the Court from granting bail to an accused if the Court, on perusal of the case diary or the report, made under Section 173 Cr.PC, is of the opinio n that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against t he accused are prima facie true, this Court, in an appeal under Section 21 of th e NIA Act, has, nevertheless, the special power, under Section 439 of the Code, to grant bail to an accused, who may, otherwise, be covered by the proviso to Se ction 43D(5). 38. Besides the merit of this appeal, which includes the duration of incarce ration of the appellant (which we would deal with later), there are, thus, three specific grounds for seeking an order of bail in the present appeal, namely, (i ) ’truce’, (ii) the charge-sheet, filed by the CBI, does not implicate the appel lant and (iii) restrictive provisions, embodied in Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) A ct, do not apply to the High Court, when the High Court exercises its appellate jurisdiction under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, because the High Court remains free to take recourse to its special power conferred by Section 439 Cr.PC and gr ant, in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, bail to a person, whose case may fall within the ambit of the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act. CONCEPT OF PROVISO TO SECTION 43D (5) 39. We pause, at this stage, for a moment to point out that while dealing wi th the concept of the proviso to Section 43D(5), the Division Bench, in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh Vs. State of Assam, reported in 2010 (4) GLT 1, observed and held as to what the expression prima facie and the expression true, which appear in the proviso to Section 43D(5), convey. The relevant observations, made this regard, read as under: Before proceeding further, it is also, to our mind, necessary to ascerta (cid:28)63. in as to what the scope of the proviso to Section 43-D(5) is and when would this proviso be attracted. While dealing with this aspect of the appeal, it is nece ssary to bear in mind that the proviso to Section 43-D(5) states that such accus ed person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a pe rusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is ’prima facie true’. The expression, ’prima facie true’ i s an expression, which does not, ordinarily, appear in penal statutes. Let us, therefore, ascertain as to what the word ’prima facie’ means. Th 64. e word, prima facie, has been described in the Black’s Law Dictionary as: (cid:28)suffi cient to establish fact or raise a presumption unless disproved or rebutted (cid:29). Re buttable presumption means an inference drawn from certain facts that establish a prima facie case, which may be overcome by the introduction of contrary eviden ce. Rebuttable resumption also means prima facie presumption or disputable presu mption or conditional presumption.

65. The Concise Dictionary of Collins has defined, prima facie, as an adject ive thus: (cid:28)At first sight; as it seems at first. (cid:29) (cid:28)And prima facie evidence is a n evidence that is sufficient to establish a fact or to raise a presumption of t he truth unless controverted. (cid:29)

66. Warton’s Law Lexicon defines that a prima facie case does not mean a cas e proved to the hilt, but a case, which can be said to be established if the evi dence, which is led in support of the same, are believed.

67. t p. 530 (AIR 1958 SC 79 at p. 85), observed thus: (cid:28) & & &. A prima facie case does The Supreme Court, in Marlin Burn Ltd. V. R. N. Banerjee, 1958 SCR 514 a not mean a case proved to the hilt, but a case, which can be said to be establi shed if the evidence, which is led in support of the same, were believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out, the relevant consider ation is whether, on the evidence led, it was possible to arrive at the conclusi on, in question, and not whether that was the only conclusion, which could be ar rived at on that evidence. (cid:29)

68. The meaning of the word, ’prima facie’, given in Marlin Burn Ltd. (supra ), has been followed by the Supreme Court, in its later decision, in The Managem ent of the Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. B. Dasappa, M.T. represented by the Binny Mills Labour Association, reported in (AIR 1960 SCC 13 52).

69. From the meaning, attributed to the word, ’prima facie’, by various dict ionaries, as indicated above, and the observations, made by the Supreme Court, i n its decisions, in The Management of the Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mill s (supra), what clearly follows is that prima facie is a Latin word, which mean s, ’At first sight or glance or on its face’ and, in common law, it is referred to as ’the first piece of evidence of fact’, i.e., considered true unless revoke d or contradicted.

70. In the face of the above observations made by the Supreme Court, it may be construed that prima facie case would mean whether the inference drawn is a p ossible inference or not.

71. The word, ’true’, according to Collins Dictionary, means something, whic h is not false, fictional or illusory, but factual and confirming with reality o r exactly in tune. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines True as : (cid:28)Something, which is in accordance with fact or reality (cid:29).

72. g with fact, not false (cid:29). The word, ’true’ has been defined, in World Book Dictionary, as (cid:28)Agreein Thus, the expression, ’prima facie true’, would mean that the court shal 73. l undertake an exercise to determine as to whether the accusations, made against the accused, are inherently improbable and/or wholly unbelievable. Ordinarily, while considering a complaint, made against an accused, the court assumes the c ontents of the complaint to be true and correct and, then, proceed to decide as to whether the allegations, made in the complaint, make out a case of commission of offence by the accused or not. No exercise is required to be undertaken by the court to determine the truthfulness or veracity of the accusations. However , when the word, ’prima facie’, is coupled with the word, ’true’, it implies tha t the court has to undertake an exercise of cross-checking the truthfulness of t he allegations, made in the complaint, on the basis of the materials on record. If the court finds, on such analysis, that the accusations made are inherently improbable, or wholly unbelievable, it may be difficult to say that a case, whic h is prima facie true, has been made out.

74. The term ’true’ would mean a proposition that the accusation brought aga inst the accused person, on the face of the materials collected during investiga tion, is not false. The term false again would mean a proposition, the existence of which cannot be a reality. While arriving at a finding whether there are rea sonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima f acie true or false, the Court can only look into the materials collected during investigation; and, on its bare perusal, should come to a finding that the accus ation is inherently improbable. However, while so arriving at a finding, the Cou rt does not have the liberty to come to a conclusion, which may virtually amount to an acquittal of the accused. In the case of State of Gujrat vs Gadhvi Rambhai Nathabai, reported in ( 75. 1994)5 SCC 111, the Supreme Court while dealing with the principles governing th e granting of bail under the TADA, observed : (cid:28)8.It is true that for the purpose of grant of bail, the framers of the Act re quire the Designated Court to be satisfied that there were reasonable grounds fo r believing that the accused concerned was not guilty of such offence but this p ower cannot be exercised for grant of bail in a manner which amounts virtually to an order of acquittal, giving benefit of doubt to the accused person after w eighing the evidence collected during the investigation or produced before t he court. At that stage the Designated Court is expected to apply its mind as to whether accepting the allegations made on behalf of the prosecution on their face, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused co ncerned was not guilty of the offence. At that stage the Designated Court is not required to weigh the material collected during the investigation. (cid:29)

76. In short, thus, on a bare reading of the materials, as may have been col lected during investigation, if the Special Court finds that the materials, so c ollected, are sufficient to form, when assumed to be true, an opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations, made against the accuse d, are prima facie true, the Special Court will be dis-empowered from releasing the accused on bail. At the stage of bail, no minute scrutiny or microscopic di ssection of the materials, collected during investigation, shall be undertaken b y the Special Court. Credibility or otherwise of the materials collected would not be the subject-matter of scrutiny. What, at best, the Special Court can do, and shall do, is to examine if the accusations made, on the basis of the materi als collected, are wholly improbable. When the materials are, on examination by the Special Court, are found to be not wholly improbable and the Special Court finds, on assuming such materials to be true, that the accusations, made against an accused, as regards commission of an offence under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UA(P) Act, are prima facie true, such materials would be enough to at tract the bar imposed by the proviso to Section 43-D(5).

77. To put it a little differently, the Special Court is required to examine the materials, collected during investigation, assuming the same to be true and if, such materials, on such examination and consideration, are found to make ou t a case against the accused, the Special Court has to determine if there is any such thing in the materials, so collected, which would make the case, which has been made out against the accused, as a wholly improbable case. If the Special Court, on undertaking such an exercise, finds reasonable grounds to infer that the case, which has been made out against the accused, is not wholly improbable, the case would be treated as a case, which is sufficient for the Special Court to form an opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusat ions, made against the accused, are prima facie true.

78. The expression, ’reasonable ground’, means something more than prima fac ie ground, which contemplates a substantially probable case for believing that t he accused is guilty of the offence(s) alleged. Under Section 437 CrPC, an accu sed is not to be released on bail if there appear reasonable grounds for believi ng that he has been guilty of an offence, which is punishable with death or impr isonment for life. Under Section 437 CrPC, the burden is on the prosecution to show existence of reasonable ground for believing that the accused is guilty. H ence, the presumption of innocence, which always runs in favour of the accused, is displaced only on the prosecution showing existence of reasonable ground to b elieve that the accused is guilty. (See Union of India vs. Thamissharasi, report ed in (1995) 4 SCC 190, and Union of India vs. Shiv Shankar Kesari, reported in (2007) 7 SCC 798).

79. Coupled with the above, the proviso to Section 43-D(5) does not require a positive satisfaction by the court that the case against the accused is true. What is required is a mere formation of opinion by the court on the basis of th e materials placed before it. The formation of opinion cannot be irrational or arbitrary. Such formation of opinion cannot be based on surmises and conjecture s; but must rest on the materials collected against the accused. Since the pres umption of innocence runs in favour of the accused, it logically follows that if there are, in given circumstances, grounds for believing that the case, against the accused, is true, a case of commission of offence under Chapter IV or Chapt er VI of the UA(P) Act, 1967, can be said to have been made out and when such a case is made out, it would be tantamount to saying that reasonable grounds exist for opining that the accusations are prima facie true. In such a case, the bar , imposed by the proviso to Section 43-D(5) on the court’s power to grant bail, gets attracted.

80. We may point out that Section 20(8) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Acti vities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as ’the TADA Act’) (since repealed), laid down that no person, accused of an offence punishable under the said Act, or any rule made thereunder, shall, if in custody, be released on bai l, or on his own bond, unless, amongst others, the court is satisfied, where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, that there are reasonable grounds fo r believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to c ommit any offence, while on bail. Section 20(9) of the Act made it clear that t he limitation on granting of bail, specified in sub-Section (8) of Section 20, i s in addition to the restrictions, which the Code of Criminal Procedure, or any other law, in force, imposes.

81. There are no corresponding provisions, in the NIA Act, as were present i n Section 20(8) and Section 20(9) of the TADA Act. Notwithstanding, however, th e fact that the provisions (as contained in sub-Section (8) and/or sub-Section ( 9) of Section 20 of the TADA Act) no longer find place in the NIA Act, the fact remains that even under the scheme of the NIA Act, the Special Court, as already discussed above, is a ’Court’ other than the High Court and Court of Session. In such circumstances, the limitations, imposed by Clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-S ection (1) of Section 437 CrPC, are applicable to the Special Court too. In add ition thereto, when a case falls within the ambit of the proviso to Section 43-D (5), there would be an additional bar, on the part of the Special Court, to rele ase an accused on bail, the bar being that the Special Court shall not release t he accused on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code, is of the opinion that there are ’reasonable grounds’ for believing that the accusation against such person i s prima facie true. (cid:29) dded) ’TRUCE’ - IF CAN BE A GROUND FOR BAIL 40. Before we enter into the question as to whether this Court, while sittin g in appeal, under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, would continue enjoying its pow er under Section 439 of the Code, notwithstanding the restrictive provisions con tained in Section 43D(5), we must point out that, having heard the submissions m ade by Mr. Goswami with regard to the ’truce’, which is said to have been entere d into between the State, on the one hand, and the DHD(J) and its chief function (Emphasis is a aries, on the other, this Court wanted to determine if such a ’truce’, as had be en entered into, and the granting of bail, because of such ’truce’, despite the restrictive provisions for bail contained in the proviso to Section 43D(5) of th e UA(P) Act, is sustainable in law, for, the ’truce’, if not sustainable in law, or, if the ’truce’, so entered into, runs contrary to the Constitutional scheme of governance and does not empower the Court to grant bail in a case of present nature, then, the present appellant cannot complain of discrimination and canno t take advantage of such a ’truce’, or the order of interim bail, which may have been passed as a sequel to the said ’truce’. If, on the other hand, the ’truce ’, which is claimed to have been entered into between the DHD(J) and the Governm ent, is in accord with the constitutional scheme of governance and the relevant legislation in force, then, notwithstanding the resistance to this appeal offere d by the NIA and the State, the appellant does have a case for consideration, be cause it would be highly unreasonable, unjust, unfair and irrational to refuse t o grant bail to the appellant, when the appellant was, according to the NIA, me rely a fund raiser; whereas the persons, who took to arms and were allegedly inv olved in various terrorist activities, have been enjoying the liberty of bail, t hough in the form of interim bail, for, no relief can be granted by a Court, in the form of interim relief, if the Court is not empowered to grant, ultimately, the relief, which it has granted in the form of interim relief. We, therefore, directed issuance of notices to, amongst others, the Unio 41. n of India and the State Government so that we could be apprised of the position of law in the matter and thereby decide effectively not only this appeal, but a ll other appeals, which are pending before us and are being heard by us. 42. In order to make it explicit as to why we directed notices to be issued, as mentioned hereinabove, we reproduce the order below, which was passed, on 26 .04.2012, by this Court. (cid:28)We have heard Mr. D.K. Das, learned Senior counsel, for the NIA, Mr. Chetry, l earned Senior Govt. Advocate, Mr. Z. Kamar, learned Public Prosecutor, Assam, an d Mr. R. Sharma, learned ASG. Certain facts, surfacing, during the course of hearing of these appeals, are, so mewhat, not only astonishing, but even shocking. All these appeals are against t he orders passed by the learned Special Judge rejecting the applications for bai l of the appellants, who have allegedly committed offences under the UA(P) Act, 1967, by, primarily, funding the terrorist gangs or terrorist acts. What transpi res, broadly speaking, is that there are two categories of persons, involved in the terrorist acts, one, who had allegedly wielded arms, and the other, who had allegedly arranged funds for such activities. While, those, who had allegedly fu nded the terrorist gangs or terrorist acts, are incarcerated, but those, who had allegedly wielded arms and acted as members of the terrorist gangs, are either in a camp, which the State Government has set up, or they have been recruited as members of the State police force. Those, who have been so recruited, were, acc ording to the materials as available today, had been members of the terrorist ga ng. This apart, the terrorist gang also had leaders and the leaders are on inter im bail, because National Investigating NIA (in short, ’the NIA’) has not raised any objection to their being released on bail inasmuch as the State Government has entered into some kind of ’truce’ with the leaders of the terrorist gang and wants to use them for resolving the dispute. No political dialogue can, however , override the Constitution and the scheme of Constitutional governance, or else , people’s faith, in rule of law, would completely evaporate, particularly, when , those, who had been allegedly wielding arms, are found to be free, and those, who had allegedly funded the terrorist acts, are behind the bar. One of the submissions, made on behalf of another set of appellants, in similar appeals, is that the ’truce’, which has been entered into by the State Governmen t and the Government of India with DHD(J) is a ground for reconsideration of bai l of the appellants. In short, thus, the ’truce’, in question, has become the gr ound for seeking bail. If such a policy is permitted to be continued, the result would be that we would have a class of people in this country, who may violate the law with impunity a nd receive support from the Government in the name of bringing them into mainstr eam; whereas the State would be punishing those, whose crime may not be as serio us as of the ones, who are receiving support from the Government. Such an approa ch does not appear to have prima facie support from the Constitution and the law s of this country, because the State, in exercise of its sovereign power, cannot override the Constitution and the laws and all its actions have to be, and must always be, subject to, and consistent with, the scheme of governance as envisag ed by the Constitution. We, therefore, feel constrained to find out from the State as well as the Union Government as to what is their policy decision, whether such a policy decision h as the backing of the Constitution and laws of this country and, to be more prec ise, whether it is permissible for the State to keep the criminal cases pending without formally withdrawing them, but take no action in accordance with law or take action contrary to law inasmuch as the proviso to Section 43D(5) of UA(P) A ct, 1967, does not permit a Court to grant bail to a person if the Court is of t he opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, is prima facie true. If those, who had allegedly wielded arms, are allowed to go on bail, how can the same law be applied by the State, or resorted to by the State, for keeping the appellants behind bar. This is the dichotomy, which the State has to resolve, an d, for this purpose, requisite facts have to be placed before this Court. For the moment, therefore, we direct the Commissioner and Secretary to the Gover nment of Assam to appear, in person, along with all relevant records and clarify to this Court as to what is the Government’s policy, for what reason the polic