High Court · 2012

BACKGROUND FACTS 3. t as under: (i) Some significant amendments have been made in the Unlawful Activities (Preve ntion) Act, 1967, by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008, t he amendment having come into force on 31.12.2008. The amendments, amongst othe rs, introduced certain conditions, whereby the powers of the court, under Sectio n 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, have come to be restricted by placing s ome fetters on the court’s discretion to allow an accused person to go on bail. Basistha P.S. Case No. 170/2009, under Section 120B/121/121(A) IPC read (ii) with Section 25(1B) (A) Arms Act, was, initially, registered against two accused persons, namely, Phojendra Hojai and Babulal Kemprai, on the ground that, on 01 .04.2009, at about 4-00 p.m., when vehicle Nos. AS-01-AH-1422 and AS-01-1-0609 w ere intercepted at 14th Mile G.S. Road, Guwahati, and searched, both the accused , suspected to be cadres and linkmen of a banned organization, namely, DHD (J), were found in the vehicles, wherefrom a sum of rupees one crore, in cash, and tw o pistols were recovered, the money being meant for purchase of arms and ammunit ions for the said banned organization. The accused were accordingly taken into custody and investigation was started by the Assam Police. On being produced be fore the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, Guwahati, the two accused aforementi oned were remanded to police custody. (iii) On 18.05.2009, both the accused, namely, Phojendra Hojai and Babulal Kem prai, were granted bail by the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Secti on 439 Cr.PC., in Bail Application No. 1637/2009. (iv) On 31.05.2009, Mohit Hojai, the then Chief Executive Member, N. C. Hills Autonomous Council, and R. H. Khan (i.e., the accused-appellant herein), who is not only the Deputy Director, Social Welfare Department, but also the Liaison O fficer, N. C. Hills Autonomous Council, were arrested by Assam Police and, on th eir production before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, they were remanded to police custody for two days. The Court, on the prayer for extension of polic e custody made by the Investigating Officer of the Assam Police, allowed further extension of the police custody for a period of two more days by its order, dat ed 02.06.2009. However, further prayer for custodial interrogation was rejected by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, who, however, granted permission to th e Investigating Officer to interrogate the present accused-appellant, Redaul Hus sain Khan, in Central Jail, Kamrup, Guwahati. (v) While investigation of Basistha Police Station Case No.170/2009 aforemention ed was pending with the State police, the Central Government, in exercise of its power under Section 6(5), read with Section 8 of the NIA Act, directed, on 01.0 6.2009, investigation of the said case by the National Investigation Agency (in short, ’the NIA’). In terms of the directions, so issued by the Central Governm ent, the NIA registered a case under the NIA Act, the Case being NIA Case No. 1/ 2009. (vi) Before, however, registration of the case aforementioned by the NIA, thr ee more persons, namely, 1. Mihir Barman @ Jewel Garlossa @ Debojit Sinha, 2. Ah sringdaw Warisha @ Partha Warisha (i.e., the present appellant), and 3. Sameer A hmed, were arrested by the Assam Police, at Bangalore, in connection with Basist ha Police Station case aforementioned. The NIA moved, on 05.06.2009, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, and filed FIR in the NIA Case No. 1/2009 aforementi oned. On 06.06.2009, the accused persons were, on being produced before the Chi ef Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, remanded to police custody. In terms of the or der, passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, on 06.06.2009, Basistha P.S. Case No. 170/2009 aforementioned was tagged with the NIA Case No. 1/2009 and, on the basis of the application made by the NIA, the Court allowed accused Mohit Hojai and R. H. Khan to be taken into custody by the NIA for a period of 10 days and t he three accused, namely, 1. Mihir Barman @ Jewel Garlossa @ Debojit Sinha, 2. A hsringdaw Warisha @ Partha Warisha (i.e., the appellant herein), and 3. Sameer A hmed, were remanded, for a period of 14 days, to the custody of the NIA. (vii) By a Gazette notification, dated 09.07.2009, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, in exercise of its powers under Section 3 of t he Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, DHD(J), along with its factions, wings and front organizations, came to be declared as ’unlawful organization’. (viii) Three of the accused persons, namely, R. H. Khan, Ahsringdaw Warisa @ Pa rtha Warisha (i.e., the appellant herein) and Sameer Ahmed, then, approached thi s Court seeking to invoke its jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC. None of the a ccused aforementioned applied for bail to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, or to the Sessions Judge, Kamrup; rather, they applied for bail, directly, to t his Court under Section 439 Cr.PC. (ix) One of the important questions, which arose before the High Court, in th e matter of application for bail, which the three accused aforementioned had so made, under Section 439 Cr.PC, to this Court, was as to whether the bail applica tions were maintainable at all in law. (x) Upon a threadbare discussion, the said three bail applications, made under S ection 439 CrPC, seeking to invoke High Court’s jurisdiction to grant bail in fa vour of the accused aforementioned, were rejected, on 29.07.2009, by one of us ( Ansari, J.) on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, laying down, inter alia, that under the scheme of the provisions contained in the NIA Act read with the provi sions of remand and bail, as stand incorporated in the Code of Criminal Procedur e, a person , arrested in connection with an offence, under the NIA Act, can be remanded to custody, police or judicial, by the Special Court, where the Specia l Court has been constituted, or by the Court of Session, where the Special Cour t has not been constituted. The Court also held that the source of power of the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, to consider an applic ation for bail is traceable to, and governed by, the provisions of Section 437 C r.PC. and while considering such an application for bail, the Special Court or t he Court of Session, as the case may be, will not exercise the power of bail as if it is considering an application for bail under Section 439 and, consequently , the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, would have all the limitations, which a Magistrate has, while deciding an application for bail, under Section 437 Cr.PC, and the provisions, contained in Section 439 Cr.PC, ca nnot be resorted to for the purpose of granting bail and it was also held by the High Court, in its order, dated 29.07.2009, aforementioned, that against an ord er, passed by a competent court, rejecting bail, or granting bail, the remedy of an aggrieved party lies in preferring an appeal to the High Court, in terms of Section 21(4) of the NIA Act and the remedy, therefore, in such a situation, doe s not lie in making any application under Section 439 Cr.PC. This Court, therefo re, held in its order, dated 29.07.2009, that such an appeal, according to the N IA Act, would require hearing by a Division Bench of the High Court and that in such an appeal, even the merit of the order, granting or refusing bail, can be q uestioned. The decision came to be reported, in (2009) 3 GLT 855 (Redaul Hussai n Khan & Ors vs. State of Assam & Ors). While laying down the law, as indicated hereinbefore, the Court observed and held as under: What emerges from the above discussion is that it is the Special Court u (cid:28)77. nder the NIA Act, or the Court of Session, when the Special Court has not been c onstituted, where an accused is required to be produced if he is arrested in con nection with an offence punishable under the NIA Act and, upon his production, i t is the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, which shall have the power to grant bail. The source of power of the Special Court or the Co urt of Session, as the case may be, to consider an application for bail is trace able to, and governed by, the provisions of Section 437 of the Code and while co nsidering such an application for bail, the Special Court or the Court of Sessio n, as the case may be, will not exercise the power of bail as if it is consideri ng an application for bail under Section 439 and, consequently, the Special Cour t or the Court of Session, as the case may be, would have all the limitations, w hich a Magistrate has, while deciding an application for bail, under Section 437 of the Code. XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX

106. What surfaces from the above discussion, held, as a whole, is that except a s provided in Section 167(2-A) of the Code, a person, arrested in connection wit h an offence, under the NIA Act, can be remanded to custody, police or judicial, by the Special Court, where the Special Court has been constituted, or by the C ourt of Session, where the Special Court has not been constituted. In view of th e fact that the NIA Act envisages a situation, wherein an investigation, as in t he present case, may be entrusted to the National Investigation Agency after the State police had made some investigation, it further follows that once the inve stigation, under the scheme of the NIA Act, is taken over by the Agency, it is t he Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, which can authoriz e further detention of an arrested accused. When such an arrested accused applie s for bail to the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, the source of power to consider such an application for bail lies in Section 437 an d not Section 439 of the Code. Even a High Court cannot invoke its powers under Section 439, to grant bail if it has been refused by the Special Court or the Co urt of Session, as the case may be, nor can the High Court, in exercise of its p ower, under Section 439, cancel bail if bail has been granted to such an accused by the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be. If the bail h as been refused or granted by the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, the aggrieved party may, however, prefer an appeal, in terms of Sec tion 21, to the High Court. Such an appeal has to be heard by a Division Bench o f the High Court and in such an appeal, the merit of the order, granting or refu sing bail, can be questioned. In the backdrop of the position of law, as indicated above, it becomes c 107. lear that the present three applications for bail, which have been made under Se ction 439 of the Code, are not entertainable in law and must, therefore, fail. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, all these three bail 108. applications are hereby dismissed as not maintainable. (cid:29) ed) (Emphasis is add (xi) Complying with the position of law, as had been laid down, in Redaul Hus sain Khan (supra), the appellant herein (i.e., Ashringdaw Warisa) filed an appli cation before the Sessions Judge (Special Court), Kamrup, Guwahati, seeking bail ; but his bail application came to be rejected. (xii) A charge-sheet came to be laid, on 17.11.2009, before the learned Speci al Court, by the NIA, against as many as 14 accused persons, including the appel lant herein and all the arrested persons, whose names have been mentioned above. The three accused persons, namely, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, Debasish Bhattacharjee @ Bappi, and Sandeep Kumar Ghosh @ Sambhu, had applied for bail, but their appl ications for bail were rejected by the learned Special Court on 31.12.2009. As against the order, rejecting their prayer for bail, they had preferred appeals, under Section 21 of the NIA Act, to this Court, and these appeals were also dism issed by a Division Bench of this Court on 28.05.2010. The decision of the Divis ion Bench stands reported as Jayanta Kumar Ghosh and others Vs. State of Assam a nd others, reported in 2010 (4) GLT 1. Similarly, the present accused-appellant, Ashringdaw Warisha, too, on failing to obtain bail from the learned Special Cou rt, had, after filing of the charge-sheet against him and others, preferred appe al, but this appeal, too, having been heard, was dismissed by the said Division Bench of this Court on 28.05.2010. The decision, with regard to dismissal of the appeal of the present accused-appellant, Ashringdaw Warisha, too, stands report ed in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh and others (supra). (xiii) Thereafter, the present appellant, Ashringdaw Warisa, applied for bail i n the learned Special Court, which came to be registered as M.C. (BA) No.32/2011 . The above application for bail having been rejected, on 16.09.2011, by t 4. he learned Special Judge, this appeal, under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, has, now, been preferred by the present appellant, his case being, in brief, thus: Th e appellant’s earlier application for bail was rejected on the ground that the a ppellant had been staying with Jewel Garlosa, Chairman of DHD(J), at Bangalore, at the time of his arrest and that the appellant was involved in a cash transact ion, at Guwahati, whereby money passed to DHD(J), though the appellant is comple tely innocent, he was appointed as a peace facilitator and it was necessary, on the part of the appellant, to be with Jewel Garlosa in order to convince him to come to negotiation table with the Government and it was because of the efforts made by the appellant that the members of DHD(J) agreed and submitted a memorand um, containing proposal for peace talks, in the month of July, 2008, to the Home Minister through Joint Secretary, Govt. of India. The appellant had in his poss ession, at the time of his arrest, documents to show that he was a peace facilit ator between the Government, on the one hand, and DHD(J), on the other, and all these documents were also seized by the NIA, but the said documents do not found place in the seizure memo furnished by the NIA. Though the appellant applied to the learned Special Judge, NIA, to call for copies of the documents from the G OC, Eastern Command, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India, and Special Branc h, Police Station Kahilipara, Guwahati, so as to prove the appellant’s case that he was a peace facilitator, this application was turned down. Though the appell ant applied for obtaining these documents to various Government agencies, his re quests have not been conceded to. In the meanwhile, however, in order to facilit ate the peace talk, applications, seeking bail, were made by Jewel Garlosa, Chai rman, DHD(J), and Niranjan Hojai, Commander-in-Chief, DHD(J), and though their a pplications were not resisted by the NIA, the learned Special Judge did not allo w their application for bail, whereupon both the said accused, Jewel Garlosa and Niranjan Hojai, preferred an appeal, which gave rise to Criminal Appeal No.126/ 2011, and a Division Bench of this Court has passed an order, on 12.08.2011, gra nting interim bail for a period of four months so that the said two accused coul d not initiate peace talks and since thereafter, the said interim bail has been extended from time to time. 5. The NIA has resisted the Bail Application by filing their affidavit-in-o pposition, wherein they have reiterated the case, which they had submitted earli er, when the present appellant’s appeal, namely, Criminal Appeal No. 35/2010, wa s taken up by this Court for consideration and decision, by this Court, in the a ppeal, which the appellant had preferred, was rendered, the decision having been reported in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh (supra). PRELIMINARY OBJECTION TO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 12/2012 BY THE NIA

6. What may, now, be noted is that the appeal, which has arisen out of NIA Case No. 1/2009, has been resisted, at its threshold, by the NIA, by contending, inter alia, that the appellant, Ahsringdaw Warisha @ Partha Warisha, had earlie r filed his application for bail, in NIA Case No. 1/2009, and the prayer for bai l having been rejected by the learned Special Court, the appellant had preferred , under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, an appeal to this Court and, as this Cour t, too, upheld the order of the learned Special Court rejecting the appellant’s prayer for bail and thereby dismissed the appellant’s appeal, namely, Criminal A ppeal No. 35/2010, and this appeal, in the absence of any change in the circumst ances of the case and in the absence of any new fact having emerged on record, i s not sustainable and may, therefore, be dismissed. 7. Repeated applications for bail, submits Mr. Das, have been discouraged b y the Supreme Court and, though the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to bail applications, the person, moving the bail application, if his applications for bail were already rejected, must show new grounds, or change in the circumst ances or some new facts having emerged or come on record, which, according to hi m, entitles him (i.e., the applicant) to apply afresh for bail. Reliance, in su pport of his submissions, is placed by Mr. Das on the decision, in State of T.N. -vs- S.A. Raja, reported in (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein the Supreme Court observe d as under: (cid:28)Where a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the responden t for certain reasons and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the ap pellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fr esh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unle ss there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, t he principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the r epeated filing of the bail applications without there being any change of circum stances would lead to bad precedents. (cid:29) (Emphasis is added)

8. In the case at hand, submits Mr. Das, there is no change in the circums tances and since not only learned Special Court, but this Court, too, did not fi nd it fit, in the past, to allow the present appellant, Ashringdaw Warisa, to go on bail in the face of the facts of the case at hand and the law relevant there to, the appellant, logically speaking, could not have sought for bail, in the le arned Special Court, without any change in the circumstances and/or without any new material having come on record in his favour. 9. To put it a little differently, when the learned Special Court’s earlier order, rejecting bail, in NIA Case No. 1/2009, has been upheld by this Court in appeal and thereby the order of the learned Special Court stands, by operation of law, subsumed into the appellate order, passed by this Court, in the appellan t’s earlier appeal, it logically follows that unless there is any change in the circumstances, or some new grounds are shown, the bail application, in NIA Case No. 1/2009, wherein charge-sheet was submitted, on 17.11.2009, is not sustainabl e; but, so far as the appeal, arising out of the rejection of the present appell ant’s prayer for bail by the learned Special Court, in NIA Case No. 2/2009, wher ein charge-sheet was submitted on 18.10.2010, is concerned, the same can be hear d and decided on merit. 10. In the case at hand, particularly, NIA Case No. 1/2009, contends Mr. Das , the appellant, Ashringdaw Warisa, has not been able to show, reiterates Mr. Da s, any new ground warranting change in the conclusions of this Court, which it h ad arrived at, while considering the appellant’s earlier appeal against the lear ned Special Court’s order rejecting his application for bail. We may pause here to point out that similar preliminary objection had be 11. en raised, in Criminal Appeal No.14/2012, which was an appeal preferred under Se ction 21(4) of the NIA Act by accused Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, and, while responding to the preliminary objection, it had been also pointed out, on behalf of accuse d-appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, that Jewel Garlosa and Niranjan Hojai had been granted (as contended by the present appellant too) interim bail by a Division Bench of this Court, on 12.08.2011, and, hence, there was no reason why the accu sed-appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, be not extended the similar benefit. As the present appellant, Ahsringdaw Warisa, too, makes, in effect, same submissions, a s has been done by accused-appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, to impress upon this Court that he was entitled and ought to be, therefore, allowed to go on bail, it is necessary to point out how the response of the accused-appellant, Jayanta Ku mar Ghosh, had been dealt with by this Court and how this Court came to the conc lusion that granting of interim bail to accused Jewel Garlosa (who was arrested with the present appellant) and Niranjan Hojai cannot be made a ground for allow ing another accused, such as, the present appellant, to go on bail. The relevan t observations, made in Criminal Appeal No. 14/2012, by this Court are, therefor e, reproduced below: (cid:28)APPELLANT’S REPLY TO THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF THE NIA 29. Attempting to repel the above submissions, made on behalf of the NIA, re sisting the maintainability of Criminal Appeal No. 14/2012, which has arisen out of NIA Case No. 1/2009 (wherein charge-sheet was submitted on 17.11.2009, and t he learned Special Court has kept its order, on the framing of charges, reserved ) and, apprehending, perhaps, that the failure of the appellant, Jayanta Kumar G hosh, to obtain bail, in NIA Case No. 1/2009, would frustrate the appellant’s at tempt to obtain his liberty on bail even if he happens to be granted bail in NIA case No. 2/2009, Mr. P. K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, has submitted that there has been change in circumstances of the present case inasmuch as a ’truce’ has been entered into between the Government of India and the State Government, on the one hand, and DHD(J), which had been, at one point of time, declared as an unlawful association, on the other, and, pursuant to this ’truce’, Niranjan H ojai, who was alleged to be the Commander-in-Chief of the DHD(J), and its Chairm an, Jewel Garlossa @ Mihir Barman @ Debojit Sinha, had applied for bail in the S pecial Court, but the learned Special Court declined, on 21.07.2010, to grant th em bail, whereupon the said two accused preferred an appeal, which gave rise to Crl. Appeal No. 126/2011. 30. It needs to be pointed out, submits Mr. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, that it was contended by the NIA and also the State of Assam, in learned Specia l Court, that on the demand of the civil society, a peace process stood initiate d with the said outfit and in consonance with the said peace process, the Govern ments, both, the Central as well as State, had initiated dialogue with the said outfit and, in the such circumstances, the release of the said two appellants, n amely, Niranjan Hojai and Jewel Garlossa, would be necessary to sign a peace acc ord between the said outfit and the State of Assam so that there could be a perm anent solution to the insurgency problem in the North Cachar Hills area. 31. It has been pointed out by Mr. P. K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, th at a Division Bench of this Court, in its order, dated 12.08.2011, passed in Cri minal Appeal No. 126/2011, did make an observation that the learned Special Cour t’s rejection of bail, in the light of the interpretation given by it to the pro visions of Section 43(D)(5) of the UA(P) Act, is correct, but as the submission, made before the High Court, was that the appellants were not asking for bail, b ut only interim bail to participate in the peace process and, as the NIA and the Government of Assam had no objection to the interim bail, the High Court grante d interim bail to Niranjan Hojai, the self-styled Commander-in-Chief, and Jewel Garlossa, the self-styled Chairman of the said unlawful outfit. 32. Thus, according to Mr. P. K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, while the persons, who had allegedly led DHD(J) and had allegedly wielded and used arms i llegally and indulged in terrorist and disruptive activities, have been allowed the liberty of bail, because the interim order for bail, which was initially for a period of four months, has been subsequently extended, in the name of ’truce’ , the present appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, who was allegedly a mere provider of fund to DHD(J), has been denied bail, interim or otherwise, and has been kept incarcerated for almost three years.

33. In effect, thus, the alleged chief architects of the DHD(J) are, points out Mr. Goswami, on interim bail, though they were the ones, who had, according to the NIA, taken to arms illegally and controlled and used their cadres for var ious disruptive activities; whereas the present appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, is accused of having provided fund to the said outfit by means of misappropriati on of government funds and by carrying the money, so misappropriated, to Mohit H ojai, who was the Chief Executive Member, N.C. Hills Autonomous Council, and who , according to the NIA, was chosen and made the Chief Executive Member of the N. C. Hills Autonomous Council, by removing his predecessor-in-office with the help of threatening call made by Niranjan Hojai, so that the activities of the DHD(J ) could be effectively carried out with the help of Mohit Hojai, but the said Ni ranjan Hojai, now, is enjoying, at the behest of the Government, the benefit of interim bail. This apart, points out Mr. Goswami, a large number of the cadres of the said one-time banned unlawful association, DHD(J),have been recruited int o the regular police force of the State. When persons, who allegedly took to arms, according to the NIA, are enjo 34. ying the freedom and liberty of bail, though in the form of interim bail, there is no rational cause, grieves Mr. Goswami, for resisting the bail of the present appellant and this, according to Mr. Goswami, is the change in the circumstance s since the time the last appeal, seeking bail by the present appellant, was dis missed by this Court. 35. Yet another ground for seeking present appellant’s bail, points out Mr. Goswami, is that the CBI had registered a case with regard the misappropriation of funds by the public servants in N.C. Hills Autonomous Council, because the NI A had declined to investigate into the case, though the NIA did have the power, under the NIA Act, to investigate such cases, too; and, in the charge-sheet, whi ch the CBI has submitted, in this regard, the present appellant’s name does not figure as an accused. Coupled with the above, it is further submitted by Mr. Goswami, learned 36. Senior counsel, that the most important ground, which the appellant, Jayanta Kum ar Ghosh, seeks to press for consideration is that this Court had observed, in t he earlier round of litigation, that, while considering an appeal, under Section 21 of the NIA Act, arising out of an order either granting bail or rejecting ba il by the Special Court, constituted under the NIA Act, this Court does not, whi le sitting as an appellate Court, enjoy the special power, which the High Court, otherwise, enjoys under Section 439 of the Code. This proposition of law, acco rding to Mr. Goswami, needs to be reviewed inasmuch as this Court, contends Mr. Goswami, while sitting, in appeal, against an order rejecting bail or granting b ail, passed by the learned Special Court, is not denuded of the special power, w hich it has and, otherwise, enjoys under Section 439 of the Code. In other words, what Mr. Goswami contends is that notwithstanding the re 37. strictive provisions, contained in proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, d isempowering the Court from granting bail to an accused if the Court, on perusal of the case diary or the report, made under Section 173 Cr.PC, is of the opinio n that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against t he accused are prima facie true, this Court, in an appeal under Section 21 of th e NIA Act, has, nevertheless, the special power, under Section 439 of the Code, to grant bail to an accused, who may, otherwise, be covered by the proviso to Se ction 43D(5). Besides the merit of this appeal, which includes the duration of incarce 38. ration of the appellant (which we would deal with later), there are, thus, three specific grounds for seeking an order of bail in the present appeal, namely, (i ) ’truce’, (ii) the charge-sheet, filed by the CBI, does not implicate the appel lant and (iii) restrictive provisions, embodied in Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) A ct, do not apply to the High Court, when the High Court exercises its appellate jurisdiction under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, because the High Court remains free to take recourse to its special power conferred by Section 439 Cr.PC and gr ant, in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, bail to a person, whose case may fall within the ambit of the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act. CONCEPT OF PROVISO TO SECTION 43D (5) We pause, at this stage, for a moment to point out that while dealing wi 39. th the concept of the proviso to Section 43D(5), the Division Bench, in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh Vs. State of Assam, reported in 2010 (4) GLT 1, observed and held as to what the expression prima facie and the expression true, which appear in the proviso to Section 43D(5), convey. The relevant observations, made in this rega rd, read as under: Before proceeding further, it is also, to our mind, necessary to ascerta ’63. in as to what the scope of the proviso to Section 43-D(5) is and when would this proviso be attracted. While dealing with this aspect of the appeal, it is nece ssary to bear in mind that the proviso to Section 43-D(5) states that such accus ed person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a pe rusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is ’prima facie true’. The expression, ’prima facie true’ i s an expression, which does not, ordinarily, appear in penal statutes. 64. Let us, therefore, ascertain as to what the word ’prima facie’ means. Th e word, prima facie, has been described in the Black’s Law Dictionary as: (cid:28)suffi cient to establish fact or raise a presumption unless disproved or rebutted (cid:29). Re buttable presumption means an inference drawn from certain facts that establish a prima facie case, which may be overcome by the introduction of contrary eviden ce. Rebuttable resumption also means prima facie presumption or disputable presu mption or conditional presumption. 65. The Concise Dictionary of Collins has defined, prima facie, as an adject ive thus: (cid:28)At first sight; as it seems at first. (cid:29) (cid:28)And prima facie evidence is a n evidence that is sufficient to establish a fact or to raise a presumption of t he truth unless controverted. (cid:29) 66. Warton’s Law Lexicon defines that a prima facie case does not mean a cas e proved to the hilt, but a case, which can be said to be established if the evi dence, which is led in support of the same, are believed. 67. t p. 530 (AIR 1958 SC 79 at p. 85), observed thus: (cid:28) & & &. A prima facie case does The Supreme Court, in Marlin Burn Ltd. V. R. N. Banerjee, 1958 SCR 514 a not mean a case proved to the hilt, but a case, which can be said to be establi shed if the evidence, which is led in support of the same, were believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out, the relevant consider ation is whether, on the evidence led, it was possible to arrive at the conclusi on, in question, and not whether that was the only conclusion, which could be ar rived at on that evidence. (cid:29) 68. The meaning of the word, ’prima facie’, given in Marlin Burn Ltd. (supra ), has been followed by the Supreme Court, in its later decision, in The Managem ent of the Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. B. Dasappa, M.T. represented by the Binny Mills Labour Association, reported in (AIR 1960 SCC 13 52). 69. From the meaning, attributed to the word, ’prima facie’, by various dict ionaries, as indicated above, and the observations, made by the Supreme Court, i n its decisions, in The Management of the Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mill s (supra), what clearly follows is that prima facie is a Latin word, which mean s, ’At first sight or glance or on its face’ and, in common law, it is referred to as ’the first piece of evidence of fact’, i.e., considered true unless revoke d or contradicted. 70. In the face of the above observations made by the Supreme Court, it may be construed that prima facie case would mean whether the inference drawn is a p ossible inference or not. The word, ’true’, according to Collins Dictionary, means something, whic 71. h is not false, fictional or illusory, but factual and confirming with reality o r exactly in tune. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines True as : (cid:28)Something, which is in accordance with fact or reality (cid:29). 72. g with fact, not false (cid:29). 73. Thus, the expression, ’prima facie true’, would mean that the court shal l undertake an exercise to determine as to whether the accusations, made against the accused, are inherently improbable and/or wholly unbelievable. Ordinarily, while considering a complaint, made against an accused, the court assumes the c ontents of the complaint to be true and correct and, then, proceed to decide as The word, ’true’ has been defined, in World Book Dictionary, as (cid:28)Agreein to whether the allegations, made in the complaint, make out a case of commission of offence by the accused or not. No exercise is required to be undertaken by the court to determine the truthfulness or veracity of the accusations. However , when the word, ’prima facie’, is coupled with the word, ’true’, it implies tha t the court has to undertake an exercise of cross-checking the truthfulness of t he allegations, made in the complaint, on the basis of the materials on record. If the court finds, on such analysis, that the accusations made are inherently improbable, or wholly unbelievable, it may be difficult to say that a case, whic h is prima facie true, has been made out. 74. The term ’true’ would mean a proposition that the accusation brought aga inst the accused person, on the face of the materials collected during investiga tion, is not false. The term false again would mean a proposition, the existence of which cannot be a reality. While arriving at a finding whether there are rea sonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima f acie true or false, the Court can only look into the materials collected during investigation; and, on its bare perusal, should come to a finding that the accus ation is inherently improbable. However, while so arriving at a finding, the Cou rt does not have the liberty to come to a conclusion, which may virtually amount to an acquittal of the accused.

75. In the case of State of Gujrat vs Gadhvi Rambhai Nathabai, reported in ( 1994)5 SCC 111, the Supreme Court while dealing with the principles governing th e granting of bail under the TADA, observed : (cid:28)8.It is true that for the purpose of grant of bail, the framers of the Act re quire the Designated Court to be satisfied that there were reasonable grounds fo r believing that the accused concerned was not guilty of such offence but this p ower cannot be exercised for grant of bail in a manner which amounts virtually to an order of acquittal, giving benefit of doubt to the accused person after w eighing the evidence collected during the investigation or produced before t he court. At that stage the Designated Court is expected to apply its mind as to whether accepting the allegations made on behalf of the prosecution on their face, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused co ncerned was not guilty of the offence. At that stage the Designated Court is not required to weigh the material collected during the investigation. (cid:29) 76. In short, thus, on a bare reading of the materials, as may have been col lected during investigation, if the Special Court finds that the materials, so c ollected, are sufficient to form, when assumed to be true, an opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations, made against the accuse d, are prima facie true, the Special Court will be dis-empowered from releasing the accused on bail. At the stage of bail, no minute scrutiny or microscopic di ssection of the materials, collected during investigation, shall be undertaken b y the Special Court. Credibility or otherwise of the materials collected would not be the subject-matter of scrutiny. What, at best, the Special Court can do, and shall do, is to examine if the accusations made, on the basis of the materi als collected, are wholly improbable. When the materials are, on examination by the Special Court, are found to be not wholly improbable and the Special Court finds, on assuming such materials to be true, that the accusations, made against an accused, as regards commission of an offence under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UA(P) Act, are prima facie true, such materials would be enough to at tract the bar imposed by the proviso to Section 43-D(5). 77. To put it a little differently, the Special Court is required to examine the materials, collected during investigation, assuming the same to be true and if, such materials, on such examination and consideration, are found to make ou t a case against the accused, the Special Court has to determine if there is any such thing in the materials, so collected, which would make the case, which has been made out against the accused, as a wholly improbable case. If the Special Court, on undertaking such an exercise, finds reasonable grounds to infer that the case, which has been made out against the accused, is not wholly improbable, the case would be treated as a case, which is sufficient for the Special Court to form an opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusat ions, made against the accused, are prima facie true.

78. The expression, ’reasonable ground’, means something more than prima fac ie ground, which contemplates a substantially probable case for believing that t he accused is guilty of the offence(s) alleged. Under Section 437 CrPC, an accu sed is not to be released on bail if there appear reasonable grounds for believi ng that he has been guilty of an offence, which is punishable with death or impr isonment for life. Under Section 437 CrPC, the burden is on the prosecution to show existence of reasonable ground for believing that the accused is guilty. H ence, the presumption of innocence, which always runs in favour of the accused, is displaced only on the prosecution showing existence of reasonable ground to b elieve that the accused is guilty. (See Union of India vs. Thamissharasi, report ed in (1995) 4 SCC 190, and Union of India vs. Shiv Shankar Kesari, reported in (2007) 7 SCC 798).

79. Coupled with the above, the proviso to Section 43-D(5) does not require a positive satisfaction by the court that the case against the accused is true. What is required is a mere formation of opinion by the court on the basis of th e materials placed before it. The formation of opinion cannot be irrational or arbitrary. Such formation of opinion cannot be based on surmises and conjecture s; but must rest on the materials collected against the accused. Since the pres umption of innocence runs in favour of the accused, it logically follows that if there are, in given circumstances, grounds for believing that the case, against the accused, is true, a case of commission of offence under Chapter IV or Chapt er VI of the UA(P) Act, 1967, can be said to have been made out and when such a case is made out, it would be tantamount to saying that reasonable grounds exist for opining that the accusations are prima facie true. In such a case, the bar , imposed by the proviso to Section 43-D(5) on the court’s power to grant bail, gets attracted.

80. We may point out that Section 20(8) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Acti vities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as ’the TADA Act’) (since repealed), laid down that no person, accused of an offence punishable under the said Act, or any rule made thereunder, shall, if in custody, be released on bai l, or on his own bond, unless, amongst others, the court is satisfied, where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, that there are reasonable grounds fo r believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to c ommit any offence, while on bail. Section 20(9) of the Act made it clear that t he limitation on granting of bail, specified in sub-Section (8) of Section 20, i s in addition to the restrictions, which the Code of Criminal Procedure, or any other law, in force, imposes. There are no corresponding provisions, in the NIA Act, as were present i 81. n Section 20(8) and Section 20(9) of the TADA Act. Notwithstanding, however, th e fact that the provisions (as contained in sub-Section (8) and/or sub-Section ( 9) of Section 20 of the TADA Act) no longer find place in the NIA Act, the fact remains that even under the scheme of the NIA Act, the Special Court, as already discussed above, is a ’Court’ other than the High Court and Court of Session. In such circumstances, the limitations, imposed by Clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-S ection (1) of Section 437 CrPC, are applicable to the Special Court too. In add ition thereto, when a case falls within the ambit of the proviso to Section 43-D (5), there would be an additional bar, on the part of the Special Court, to rele ase an accused on bail, the bar being that the Special Court shall not release t he accused on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code, is of the opinion that there are ’reasonable grounds’ for believing that the accusation against such person i s prima facie true.’ (Emphasi s is added) ’TRUCE’ - IF CAN BE A GROUND FOR BAIL

40. Before we enter into the question as to whether this Court, while sittin g in appeal, under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, would continue enjoying its pow er under Section 439 of the Code, notwithstanding the restrictive provisions con tained in Section 43D(5), we must point out that, having heard the submissions m ade by Mr. Goswami with regard to the ’truce’, which is said to have been entere d into between the State, on the one hand, and the DHD(J) and its chief function aries, on the other, this Court wanted to determine if such a ’truce’, as had be en entered into, and the granting of bail, because of such ’truce’, despite the restrictive provisions for bail contained in the proviso to Section 43D(5) of th e UA(P) Act, is sustainable in law, for, the ’truce’, if not sustainable in law, or, if the ’truce’, so entered into, runs contrary to the Constitutional scheme of governance and does not empower the Court to grant bail in a case of present nature, then, the present appellant cannot complain of discrimination and canno t take advantage of such a ’truce’, or the order of interim bail, which may have been passed as a sequel to the said ’truce’. If, on the other hand, the ’truce ’, which is claimed to have been entered into between the DHD(J) and the Governm ent, is in accord with the constitutional scheme of governance and the relevant legislation in force, then, notwithstanding the resistance to this appeal offere d by the NIA and the State, the appellant does have a case for consideration, be cause it would be highly unreasonable, unjust, unfair and irrational to refuse t o grant bail to the appellant, when the appellant was, according to the NIA, me rely a fund raiser; whereas the persons, who took to arms and were allegedly inv olved in various terrorist activities, have been enjoying the liberty of bail, t hough in the form of interim bail, for, no relief can be granted by a Court, in the form of interim relief, if the Court is not empowered to grant, ultimately, the relief, which it has granted in the form of interim relief. 41. We, therefore, directed issuance of notices to, amongst others, the Unio n of India and the State Government so that we could be apprised of the position of law in the matter and thereby decide effectively not only this appeal, but a ll other appeals, which are pending before us and are being heard by us. 42. In order to make it explicit as to why we directed notices to be issued, as mentioned hereinabove, we reproduce the order below, which was passed, on 26 .04.2012, by this Court. ’We have heard Mr. D.K. Das, learned Senior counsel, for the NIA, Mr. Chetry, l earned Senior Govt. Advocate, Mr. Z. Kamar, learned Public Prosecutor, Assam, an d Mr. R. Sharma, learned ASG. Certain facts, surfacing, during the course of hearing of these appeals, are, so mewhat, not only astonishing, but even shocking. All these appeals are against t he orders passed by the learned Special Judge rejecting the applications for bai l of the appellants, who have allegedly committed offences under the UA(P) Act, 1967, by, primarily, funding the terrorist gangs or terrorist acts. What transpi res, broadly speaking, is that there are two categories of persons, involved in the terrorist acts, one, who had allegedly wielded arms, and the other, who had allegedly arranged funds for such activities. While, those, who had allegedly fu nded the terrorist gangs or terrorist acts, are incarcerated, but those, who had allegedly wielded arms and acted as members of the terrorist gangs, are either in a camp, which the State Government has set up, or they have been recruited as members of the State police force. Those, who have been so recruited, were, acc ording to the materials as available today, had been members of the terrorist ga ng. This apart, the terrorist gang also had leaders and the leaders are on inter im bail, because National Investigating NIA (in short, ’the NIA’) has not raised any objection to their being released on bail inasmuch as the State Government has entered into some kind of ’truce’ with the leaders of the terrorist gang and wants to use them for resolving the dispute. No political dialogue can, however , override the Constitution and the scheme of Constitutional governance, or else , people’s faith, in rule of law, would completely evaporate, particularly, when , those, who had been allegedly wielding arms, are found to be free, and those, who had allegedly funded the terrorist acts, are behind the bar. One of the submissions, made on behalf of another set of appellants, in similar appeals, is that the ’truce’, which has been entered into by the State Governmen t and the Government of India with DHD(J) is a ground for reconsideration of bai l of the appellants. In short, thus, the ’truce’, in question, has become the gr ound for seeking bail. If such a policy is permitted to be continued, the result would be that we would have a class of people in this country, who may violate the law with impunity a nd receive support from the Government in the name of bringing them into mainstr eam; whereas the State would be punishing those, whose crime may not be as serio us as of the ones, who are receiving support from the Government. Such an approa ch does not appear to have prima facie support from the Constitution and the law s of this country, because the State, in exercise of its sovereign power, cannot override the Constitution and the laws and all its actions have to be, and must always be, subject to, and consistent with, the scheme of governance as envisag ed by the Constitution. We, therefore, feel constrained to find out from the State as well as the Union Government as to what is their policy decision, whether such a policy decision h as the backing of the Constitution and laws of this country and, to be more prec ise, whether it is permissible for the State to keep the criminal cases pending without formally withdrawing them, but take no action in accordance with law or take action contrary to law inasmuch as the proviso to Section 43D(5) of UA(P) A ct, 1967, does not permit a Court to grant bail to a person if the Court is of t he opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, is prima facie true. If those, who had allegedly wielded arms, are allowed to go on bail, how can the same law be applied by the State, or resorted to by the State, for keeping the appellants behind bar. This is the dichotomy, which the State has to resolve, an d, for this purpose, requisite facts have to be placed before this Court. For the moment, therefore, we direct the Commissioner and Secretary to the Gover nment of Assam to appear, in person, along with all relevant records and clarify to this Court as to what is the Government’s policy, for what reason the policy has been adopted and whether the policy has the backing of law. In order to com prehensively understand the issues and decide these appeals effectively, we dire ct that notices be issued to the Union Home Secretary, Attorney General of India and the Advocate General of Assam, too, making the same returnable on 03.05.201 2. We make it clear that in case, we find it absolutely indispensable, we may di rect appearance of the appropriate officer(s) from the Union Home Ministry with all relevant records and also the Director General, NIA. Furnish a copy of this order to the learned Standing Counsel, NIA, learned Senio r Govt. Advocate, Assam, learned Public Prosecutor, Assam, and the learned ASG f or doing the needful. List these appeals, for further hearing, on 30.04.2012.’ (Emphasi s added) 43. In pursuance of the order, dated 26.04.2012, passed by us, both, the Uni on of India as well as the State Government, have filed their affidavits and we have heard, as already indicated above, Mr. H. P. Rawal, learned Additional Soli citor General, on behalf of the Union of India, and Mr. K. N. Choudhury, learned Senior Additional Advocate General, Assam, on behalf of the State Government. We have also heard Mr. P. K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, for the appellant, and Mr. D. Das, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the NIA.

44. The sum and substance of what has been submitted, on behalf of the Union of India and the State Government, to the query raised by this Court, by order, dated 26.04.2012 (reproduced above), is as under: (i) The NCHAC, which is covered by the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, h as been provided, under the scheme of the Constitution, with certain degree of a utonomy, for, the area, covered by NCHAC, consists of tribals. Their autonomy, therefore, includes some measure of legislative and executive power, which inclu de financial and other administrative powers for the purpose of carrying on the administration, in the said area, in a manner, which would protect not only the cultural identity of the people of the area concerned, but also would, at the sa me time, improve their living standards, education and economy. With the emerge nce of militancy in the area, development activities were adversely affected in the entire region. In course of time, various groups launched arms struggle aga inst the State raising issues of social, economic, cultural, ethnic and politica l rights for the people of the NCHAC. (ii) Realising the futility of violence, a faction of the DHD (i.e., Dima Halang Daogah) came forward, in the year 2002, for peace negotiation with the Governme nt of India, seeking solution to their grievances within the ambit of the Consti tution of India, while another faction of DHD opposed such peace talks. This op position group of militants, eventually, formed a terrorist gang, known as DHD(J ), under the leadership of Jewel Garlossa and Niranjan Hojai as their Chairman a nd Commander-in-Chief respectively. (iii) After the NIA was entrusted with the investigation of the case, which had given rise to NIA Case No. 1/2009, the situation changed and a demand was raised by some members of the civil society to bring the misguided militant youths to the mainstream of the society. The scheme for surrender-cum-rehabilitation of m ilitants was, therefore, initiated by the government with the object of weaning the misguided youths and hardcore militants from being strayed into the fold of militancy. (iv) The Government, both the Central as well as the State, have been, therefore , following a multi-pronged policy to deal with the insurgency and militant acti vities. The ’truce’, which is one of the grounds for seeking bail by the presen t appellant, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, is, thus, a step towards the holistic approach , which the State government, in tandem with the Central Government, has adopte d in order to restore normalcy in the area, which falls under NCHAC, and since t he peace process, so initiated, could not have been successfully concluded if th e leaders of the militant outfit remained incarcerated in jail, the Government d ecided that the leaders of the DHD(J), particularly, its Chairman, Jewel Garloss a, and its Commander-in-Chief, Niranjan Hojai, may be provided with interim bail in order to facilitate the dialogue for peace and for reaching necessary conclu sion, in this regard. (v) Pursuant to this understanding, an application for bail was moved by Jew el Garlosa and Niranjan Hojai, in the learned Special Court, but the learned Spe cial Court, relying upon the proviso to Section 43D(5), declined to grant bail. The said two accused, namely, Jewel Garlosa and Niranjan Hojai, therefore, pref erred an appeal, under Section 21 of the NIA Act, and, as already indicated abov e, a Division Bench of this Court, by its order, dated 12.08.2011, passed in Crl . Appeal No. 126/2011, allowed the said two persons to go on bail subject to cer tain conditions imposed by the Court. 45. Besides what have been mentioned above, Mr. Rawal, learned Additional So licitor General of India, has, referring to the provisions of Articles 73 and 16 2 of the Constitution of India, submitted that the executive power of the Union , under Article 73, and the executive power of the State, under Article 162, are co-extensive with their respective legislative powers and, hence, whatever can be done or could have been done by way of legislation, the Union as well as the State can do so in exercise of their respective executive powers, too, meaning t hereby that in exercise of executive power, the State or the Union, as the case may be, can adopt a policy to enter into a dialogue with the militants so as to bring them to mainstream. The ’truce’, in question, is, according to Mr. Rawal, a result of such a policy decision of the Government and the Court would not, or dinarily, interfere with such a policy decision. 46. The present initiative for ’truce’, contends learned Additional Solicito r General, is not outside the scheme of the Constitution of India and the laws, in force, in India, inasmuch as the executive power of the State or of the Union is co-extensive with their respective legislative powers and it is not necessar y that there must be a legislation in existence or a legislation in force in ord er to enable the Executive to adopt a policy and implement the same in exercise of its executive powers. Reliance is heavily placed, on this proposition, by Mr . Rawal, learned Additional Solicitor General, as well as Mr. K. N. Choudhury, l earned Sr. Additional Advocate General, on the decision of the Supreme Court, in Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and others Vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1955 SC 549).

47. Notwithstanding what has been submitted by the learned Addl. Solicitor G eneral of India, it needs to be placed on record that there can be no dispute th at the executive powers of the Union or the State are co-extensive with their re spective legislative powers; but one can also not lose sight of the fact that th e exercise of executive powers is subject to the provisions of the Constitution. This position was also not disputed. We have, therefore, having regard to the s ubmissions made by the State as well as the Central governments, pointedly put t o the learned Addl. Solicitor General if there is a legislation in place, whethe r the Union or the State, as the case may be, can, in exercise of its executive powers, take action contrary to the legislation. Keeping in tune with the dignit y of the high office, which he holds, and the fairness, which such an office dem ands, the unhesitant answer of Mr. Rawal to the query, so put to him by the Cour t, was that neither the Centre nor the State can do an act, in exercise of its e xecutive powers, if the act is contrary to a legislation. 48. The logical extension of what Mr. Rawal has submitted and Mr. KN Choudhu ry, learned Advocate General, has not disputed, is that if the case of Niranjan Hojai and Jewel Garlosa were covered by the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA( P) Act, then, they could not have been enlarged, on bail, by the learned Special Court and the High Court, as an appellate Court, cannot interfere with such an order, when the learned Special Court’s order is not contrary to, or inconsisten t with, the proviso to Section 43D(5). 49. When the above aspect of the matter was pointedly put to Mr. Rawal and M r. Choudhury, none of them claimed that even if the cases of Niranjan Hojai and Jewel Garlosa were covered by the proviso to Section 43D(5), they could have bee n enlarged on bail, interim or otherwise, by the High Court in exercise of its a ppellate jurisdiction under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act. 50. Clearly, therefore, release of the said two accused persons, on interim bail, were, even according to the Government, not supported by law and, hence, t heir release, on interim bail, cannot be cited as an example by the present appe llant to demand that he, too, be released on bail, or else, the State would be d iscriminating him as against those, who had taken resort to arms. The law, on th is subject, is more than abundantly clear. Before a person alleges discrimination, he must show that the action, wh 51. ich was taken in favour of someone, but is being refused to be taken in his case , was in accordance with law meaning thereby that if an action, executive or oth erwise, of the Union or the State, is found to be contrary to law, then, no pers on can claim that the State must repeat such act in the name of removing discrim ination. 52. Noticing that the High Courts, in exercise of their writ jurisdiction, h ave been passing orders to remove discrimination and thereby asking the authorit ies concerned to repeat the illegality, the Supreme Court has expressed its anxi ety on such approach and has laid down the position of law, in Chandigarh Admini stration & Anr. vs. Jagjit Singh and Anr., reported in (1995) 1 SCC 745, in the following words: ’8. We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be called o ne, on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court is unsustainab le in law and indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many such ins tances, we think it necessary to deal with such pleas at a little length. Genera lly speaking, the mere fact that the respondent authority has passed a particul ar order in case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground fo r issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be allowed and valid or it might not b e. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his ca se, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basi s of issuing a writ compelling the respondent authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the re spondent authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat the illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done accor ding to law- indeed, wherever, it is possible, the Court should direct the app ropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law - but eve n if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis f or its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent authority to repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can suc h illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discriminatio n. Giving effect to such please would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other per son is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and similar rel ief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners’ case is similar to the other persons’ case. But then why examine another person’s case i n his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present be fore the Court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the Court to the relief ask ed for in the facts and circumstances of his case, than to enquire into the corr ectness of the order made or action taken in another person’s case, which other person is not before the case nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course - barring exceptional situations - would neither be advisable nor desira ble. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particu lar order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must b e repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and il legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of t he authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial word. (What is the position in the case of orders passed by author ities in exercise of their quasi-judicial power, we express no opinion. That can (Emphasis is added) be dealt with when a proper case arises’.

53. What follows from the above discussion is that the ’truce’ does not give any right to the present appellant to demand his release on bail, when the ’tru ce’ and the subsequent action, which the Government has taken pursuant to such ’ truce’ of getting Niranjan Hojai and Jewel Garlosa released, by ignoring the law , such an action of the Government cannot be said to be a validly changed situat ion warranting the appellant’s release on bail. If we acted wrongly in the past, though may be unconsciously, it would not be fair, on our part, to act wrongly today and that, too, fully conscious that our action was earlier wrong.