High Court
Case Details
WP(C) 3976/2003 BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. GOEL, CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. GOSWAMI A.K. Goel, CJ This petition seeks declaration of some of the Assam Motor Vehic le Rules, 2003 to be void. At the time of hearing, learned counsel for the petit ioners confined his challenge to Rules 5(5), 23, 26(ii), 46(C)(a), 53(B), 54(e)( ii) & (iii), 57(2)(iv), 63(1)(i) and 94(3). 2. The case of the petitioners is that they represent public servic e and commercial vehicle owners in the State of Assam who have obtained necessar y permits from the Regional Transport Authority as well as the State Transport A uthority. Sections 28, 38, 65, 95, 96, 107, 111, 138 and 176 of the Motor Vehicl es Act, 1988 authorise the State Government to make Rules in respect of the matt ers specified therein. In exercise of the said power, Draft Rules were framed an d notified on 1.8.2002 inviting objections or suggestions thereto within 30 days . Thereafter, the impugned Rules were notified on 15.3.2003. The Rules so notifi ed omitted some of the provisions of the Draft Rules and incorporated some of th e provisions which were not in the Draft Rules. There was no due consideration t o the objections. The impugned Rules were beyond the scope of the rule making po wer and were arbitrary restrictions on rights of the petitioners. 3. At the time of admission of the writ petition, interim order was passed to the effect that question of payment of taxes as contemplated under R ule 46C(a) will be governed by the provisions of the Assam Motor Vehicles Taxati on Act, 1936 and the provisions of Rule 54(e)(ii) shall remain suspended. 4. in Para 36 of the writ petition as follows:- (cid:28)(i) The Act does not authorize the Rule making authority to impose such a condi tion/ restriction and as such the said Rule is ultravires the Act. The grounds on which the Rules have been challenged are set out (ii) Assuming but not admitting that the said Rule is intra vires the Act, it is submitted that the said Rule is violative of Articles 14, 19, 21 and 300-A of t he Constitution of India and is discriminatory, arbitrary, unreasonable and unfa ir. (iii) Rule 54 gives undue and unprincipled advantage and preference to ASTC that is highly discriminatory. There is no rational basis for making such a provisio n in favour of a competitor in business and, as such, the impugned Rule is arbit rary, discriminatory, unreasonable and unfair. (iv) The impugned Rule has the effect of displacing existing business premises. Even the owner is displaced from his own land and he is forced to rent premises to carry on his business. This entirely without any authority of law and it amo unts to imposing highly unreasonable restrictions on the right of a citizen to c arry on his trade/ business and utilize his own land. No such restriction on the owner’s right to use his land can be imposed and, as such, the said Rule is hig hly discriminatory, unreasonable and confiscatory. (v) The drat Rule did not contain the Rule in its present shape. In that view of the matter the impugned Rule is without any authority of law. (vi) The impugned Rule imposes unreasonable and discriminatory restrictions and the same is in violation of Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. (cid:29).
Decision
5. The claim in the writ petition has been contested by the State t hrough the Commissioner, Department of Transport, Govt. of Assam by filing affid avit-in-opposition. It has been stated that uneconomic competition amongst the p ermit holders was detrimental to public interest and the same was sought to be c hecked. Objections to the Draft Rules were duly considered by the Review Committ ee before notifying the Rules. The Rules were within the purview of Chapter V of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The State Government was authorized to impose con ditions for issuing licence to agents or canvassers. The State Government had al so ensured that there was no impediment to free flow of vehicles and public conv enience. In the interest of law and order also, parking/ halting of public servi ce vehicles for picking up and setting down of passengers had to be regulated. L ocation of bus stand had also to take care of availability of amenities like off ice room, cloak room, drinking water etc. Under Chapter VI, the State Government could formulate a scheme for efficient, adequate, economical and properly coord inated road transport service in public interest for any area or route to be ope rated by the State Transport Undertaking to the exclusion, complete or partial, of any other person. The inspecting officers could be given the power of checkin g the vehicles or proficiency of drivers. Under Section 28(2)(d) of the Act, Rul es could be framed for the badges and uniform to be worn by the drivers and fees to be paid for such badges. 6. The Assam State Transport Corporation (ASTC) has also filed an a ffidavit to supplement the submissions made on behalf of the State. It is submit ted that the Corporation was playing a pivotal role by providing, efficient, eco nomic, adequate and properly coordinated road transport service for the convenie nce and greater interest of the public. It has an obligation to provide extensiv e rural connectivity in remote areas and on unprofitable routes. It could, thus, be exempted from payment of permit fee. The buses operated by the ASTC use the ASTC bus stands which are quite congested and if private operators are allowed t o operate in close vicinity of such stands, it will cause traffic congestion/ di sorder in the locality and, therefore, restrictions have been imposed on parking / operations by private bus owners at such locations. 7. he records. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused t 8. Before dealing with the contentions raised in the writ petition, it may be necessary to reproduce the impugned Rules. (cid:28)5.(5) The driver of public service vehicle shall compulsorily wear, while on du ty, a trouser and a bush shirt, both of khaki colour for ordinary vehicles and s ky blue shirt and navy blue pant for Tourist Omni buses/ deluxe buses/ taxies. I f a driver found without uniform shall be fined with Rs. 50/- and that shall be recorded in his Licence. After three such offences his Licence shall be cancelle d. 23. Failure to get Registration mark/ change of address/ Transfer of ownership/ Renewal of certificate of Registration assigned.- If the owner of a motor vehicle or the person in possession of a motor vehicle fails to submit an application for registration of motor vehicle within the pres cribed period as stipulated under rule 47 of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 19 89, or to submit an application for renewal of certificate of registration with the prescribed period as stipulated under rule 52 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 or to submit an application for assignment of new registration mark within the prescribed period as stipulated under rule 54 of the Central Motor R ules, 1989 or to submit an application for recording the change of residence or place of business within the prescribed period as stipulated under sub section ( 1) of Section 49 of the Act or to submit an application for recording the owners hip within the prescribed period as stipulated under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 50 of the Act, as the case may be he may in lieu of any action that may be taken against him under section 177 of the Act be made li able to pay a late fine at the rate as laid down below in addition to the normal fees- Rs. 100.00 (Rupees one hundred) if the application is submitted within 3 (a) 0 days after expiry of prescribed period. (b) Rs. 200.00 (Rupees two hundred) if the application is submitted after 30 days but within 60 days of expiry of prescribed period. (c) 60 days of the expiry of prescribed period. Rs. 300.00 (Rupees three hundred) if the application is submitted after 26.(ii) A fitness certificate can be issued to a vehicle only at the office of t he District Transport Officer where the vehicle is either registered or recorded . But a temporary fitness certificate may be issued at other offices in th e form No. 21(B) for a period not more than 30 days, if the vehicle is stuck off in a place for repair etc. 46 (C) Duration of Permits : (a) A periodic permit for carrying goods and passen gers shall be issued for a duration of minimum one year upto a maximum, period o f 5 years, subject to payment of due Motor Vehicle Taxes for that period of perm it issued. 53. (B) The annual fees for issue of Agents Licence for Goods and Passenger Vehi cles are as follows : CLASS OF LICENCE 1. Passenger Vehicle Additional Branch. 2. Goods Vehicles y Additional Branch. ANNUAL LICENCE FEES Rs. 10,000/- per year. Plus Rs. 600/- per year for every Rs. 20,000/- per year. Plus Rs. 1200/- per year for ever The licences will have to renewed and fresh licences will have to be’ issued as per Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Rules thereof. The Licences shall have to fulfi ll all the conditions laid down by the Government from time to time. 54. (e) (ii) that the place of business of the applicant should not hamper the b usiness of the Assam State Transport Corporation and it must be at least 300 met ers away from the bus stand of ASTC in case of Guwahati City and should be at le ast 100 meters away from ASTC Bus Stands. But if any existing licence is at pres ent working within the distance mentioned above, he will have to shift his place of business to other suitable place within six months from the date of effect o f this rule. (iii) that the licensing authority along with the licence will approve the site map of the place of business of the licencee showing the exact location. 57. (2) (iv) It must fulfill the conditions mentioned in Section 54(e)(ii) & (ii i) of this rule. 63. Validation of permit for use outside the region to which granted: (l) A Regi onal Transport Authority which issues a permit (hereinafter referred. to as the original Transport Authority) may on application, extend the validity of the per mit to any other regions within the State, without such permit being required to be countersigned by the Regional Transport Authority of that other region or re gions, as the case may be, provided : (i) the extension of the validity of the permit does not directly affect the int erest of the ’State’ Transport Undertaking Vehicles’ of the routes in which the vehicles is to ply; 94.(3) State Govt. may issue Instruction from time to time for prohibiting halti ng of private passenger vehicle near the ASTC Bus Stations for taking up and set ting down of passengers. (cid:29). 9. Mr M Dutta, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that t he requirement of the drivers of public service buses to wear uniform, provision for fine of Rs. 300/-, provision for permit fee and agents’ licence fee and int erference with the location of parking were arbitrary and beyond the scope of th e statute and amounted to unreasonable restrictions on the rights of the petitio ners to carry on their business by placing them in disadvantaged position vis-à- vis the ASTC. 10. Learned Addl. Advocate General, Assam supported the impugned Rul es by submitting that the Rules are within the scope and purview of the statute and the restrictions imposed are reasonable in public interest and were not hit by Article 14 or 19 (i)(g) of the Constitution of India. The ASTC under the sche me of the Act had special status as it is functioning not for profit making but for the benefit and welfare of general public. 11. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 seeks to regulate the operation of motor vehicles by keeping in mind the requirement for road safety and transport needs of general public. The Act is successor to the 1939 Act. It inter alia pro vides for licensing of drivers of motor vehicles, registration of motor vehicles and control of transport vehicles by way of permits. There are special provisio ns for the State Transport Undertakings, provisions for regulating construction, equipment and maintenance of motor vehicles, compensation to the victims, requi rement of insurance and punishment and penalty for offences. It is a piece of so cial legislation having in mind the need and convenience of the travelling publi c. To give effect to the Act, the Central Government as well as the State Govern ments are authorized to frame Rules within their respective sphere. There are ei ght provisions which provide for framing of Rules by the State Governments, name ly: (i) Section 28 in Chapter II dealing with licensing of drivers; (ii) Section 38 in Chapter III dealing with licensing of conductors of stage car riages; (iii) Section 65 in Chapter IV dealing with registration of motor vehicles; (iv) Sections 95 and 96 in Chapter V dealing with control of transport vehicles; (v) Section 107 in Chapter VI dealing with special provisions relating to State Transport Undertakings; (vi) Section 111 in Chapter VII dealing with construction, equipment and mainten ance of motor vehicles; (vii) Section 138 in Chapter VIII dealing with control of traffic; and (viii) Section 176 in Chapter XII dealing with Claims Tribunals. have been framed. It is with reference to these provisions that the impugned Rules Question for consideration is whether the impugned Rules are bey 12. ond the scope of the statute and whether they violate the fundamental right of t he petitioners to carry on their business. Further question is whether preferent ial treatment is permissible for the State Transport Corporation. 13. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to observe that while right of equality is a fundamental right, reasonable classification is permissi ble and provisions can be made for giving exclusive right to the State to carry on trade or business to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens. Reasona ble restrictions can be imposed in public interest on right to carry on trade. S uch restrictions, however, must not be arbitrary or excessive and must try to st rike a balance between guaranteed freedoms and the social control necessary. Whi le seeking to protect a fundamental right, Court has to ascertain whether the re striction is reasonable by examining the nature and extent of restriction and it s object not only from the view point of the citizens but also from the view poi nt of the society at large. Individual right has to yield to the larger interest of the community. Under the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act, special status is given to the State Transport Undertakings with the object of providing efficien t road transport service on specified routes. Regulatory mechanism envisages con trol of motor vehicles in respect of their conditions, movement, driving, parkin g and other specified matters. These principles can be taken to be settled by th e binding precedents to which reference may be made. (i) Discrimination & official bias : In J.Y. Kondala Rao & Ors. -vs- Andhra Pradesh State Road Transp ort Corporation & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 82 the question under consideration was whet her Chapter IVA of the 1939 Act which was parimateria to Chapter VI of the prese nt Act offended Article 14 of the Constitution. Answering in the negative, it wa s observed that: (cid:28)10. The next contention is that the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Act, and particularly those of Section 68-C thereof, offend against Article 14 of the Con stitution. The argument is that Chapter IV-A enables the State to make a discrim ination between the State Road Transport Corporation on the one hand and private operators and private transport undertakings on the other, and also to make a s imilar discrimination between the private operators or the private transport und ertakings, and that this discrimination is left to the arbitrary discretion of t he Transport Corporation. It is true that the provisions of this Chapter enable a scheme to be framed conferring a monopoly on the State in respect of transport services to the partial or complete exclusion of other persons. However, the pr ovisions of the scheme do not make any distinction between individuals operating a transport service and private transport undertakings; they are all treated as one class and the classification is only made between the State Transport Under taking and private transport undertakings, whether the business is carried on by individuals or firms or companies. The only question, therefore, is whether suc h a classification offends against the equality clause of the Constitution. Arti cle 14 says: (cid:28)The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal pr otection of the laws within the territory of India. (cid:29) This doctrine of equality h as been so frequently considered by this Court that it does not require any furt her consideration. It has been held that this Article does not prohibit reasonab le classification for the purpose of legislation, but such a classification cann ot be arbitrary but must be based upon differences which have rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. Doubtless in the present case, the Legislat ure placed the State Transport Undertaking in a class different from other under takings. The question is whether the classification made in Chapter IV-A of the Act is just and has reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. The ob ject of Chapter IV-A, as disclosed by the provisions of Section 68-C, is to prov ide in the interest of the public an efficient, adequate, economical and properl y coordinated road transport service. To achieve that object Section 68-C confer s a power on the State Transport Undertaking to prepare a scheme to run the serv ice, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwis e. The classification has certainly reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Ordinarily a State Transport Undertaking, compared with persons or pri vate undertakings, should be in a better position than others to carry on the sa id services for the benefit of the public; administratively, financially and tec hnically it can be expected to be in a far better position than others. It can p rovide more well equipped buses, give better amenities to the travelling public, keep regular timings, repair or replace the buses in emergencies. It may also e mploy efficient supervisory staff to keep things going at an appreciably high st andard. We are not suggesting that there are no individuals or private companies who can efficiently run the service. But the State, compared with individuals, should certainly be in a better position to achieve the object, namely, to impro ve the road transport service in all its diverse aspects. In such a situation, w hen the legislature, which must be presumed to understand and correctly apprecia te the needs of its own people, makes a classification between a State Transport Undertaking and others carrying on the business of transport services, we canno t say that there is no reasonable basis for such a classification. (cid:29) 12. This question was raised in Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. 1955-1 SCR 707 : ( AIR 1954 SC 728). That case dealt with the provisions of the U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951 (U.P. Act II of 1951). Under Section 42(3) of that Act the Government was exempt from taking permits for its own vehicles and it could run any number of buses as it liked without the necessity of taking out permits for them. In f urtherance of the State policy to establish a complete State monopoly in respect of road transport business, the transport authorities began not only to cancel the permits already issued to private operators but also refused to issue permit s to others, who would otherwise be entitled to them. The constitutional validit y of that section was questioned. It may also be mentioned that though that deci sion was given after the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, it was not ba sed upon that amendment, as the Constitution before the amendment governed the r ights of the parties therein. In that situation, adverting to the argument based upon Article 14 of the Constitution, Mukherjea, J., as he then was, made the fo llowing observations at p. 731: (of SCR) : (at p. 740 of AIR) (cid:28)There is no doubt that classification is inherent in the concept of a monopoly ; and if the object of legislation is to create monopoly in favour of the State with regard to a particular business, obviously, the State cannot but be differe ntiated from ordinary citizens and placed in a separate category so far as the r unning of the business is concerned and this classification would have a perfect ly rational relation to the object of the statute. (cid:29) Section 3 of that Act provided that (cid:28)where the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary, in the interest o f general public and for subserving the common good, so to direct, it may declar e that the Road Transport Services in general, or any particular class of such s ervice on any route or portion thereof, shall be run and operated by the State G overnment exclusively or by the State Government in conjunction with railway or partly by the State Government and partly by others in accordance with the provi sions of this Act (cid:29). It was contended therein that, as the State could choose any and every person i t liked for the purpose of being associated with the transport service and as th ere were no rules to guide its discretion, that provision would offend against A rticle 14 of the Constitution. It was pointed out on behalf of the State that th e discretion under Section 3 of that Act was not uncontrolled as that could only be done by granting of permits in accordance with the provisions of the Motor V ehicles Act. Accepting the construction suggested, this Court held that the disc retion to be exercised by the State would be a regulated discretion guided by st atutory rules. But in the instant case, no liberal construction of the provision s need be resorted to, for Chapter IV-A of the Act in specific terms provides a complete and, in the circumstances, satisfactory machinery for reasonably regula ting the exclusion of all or some of the private operators from the notified are a or route. We, therefore, hold that the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Act d o not infringe the equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. (cid:29) It was further held that authorities taking decision could not b e held to be actuated by bias against private operators. Reference may be made t o the following observations: (cid:28)13. By the next contention the learned counsel attacks the validity of the sche me on the ground that the Government is actuated by bias against the private ope rators of buses in West Godavari District, and indeed had predetermined the issu e. In the petitions it was alleged that the Government had complete control over the Road Transport Corporation that the entire administration and control over such road transport undertaking vested in the Government, that the Chief Secreta ry to the Government of Andhra Pradesh was its chairman and that, therefore, the entire scheme, from its inception to its final approval, was really the act of the Government. On this hypothesis it was contended that the Government itself w as made a judge in its own cause and that, therefore, its decision was vitiated by legal bias. That apart, it was also pleaded that a sub-committee, consisting of Ministers, Secretaries and officers of connected departments and presided ove r by the Minister in charge of transport, decided in its meeting of January 28, 1960, that under the scheme of nationalization of bus service, the State Governm ent would take over the bus services in West Godavari District and Guntur Distri ct before the end of that year and, therefore, the Minister in charge of the por tfolio of transport, he having predetermined the issue, disqualified himself to decide the dispute between the State Transport Undertaking and the petitioners. The self same questions were raised in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. State of Andh ra Pradesh, 1960-1 SCR 580 : (AIR 1959 SC 1376). There, as in this case, it was contended that the Chief Minister, who was in charge of the portfolio of transpo rt, could not be a judge in his own cause, as he was biased against the private operators. This Court pointed out the distinction between official bias of an au thority which is inherent in a statutory duty imposed on it and personal bias of the said authority in favour of, or against, one of the parties. In dealing wit h official bias this Court, after considering the relevant English decisions, ob served at p. 587 (of SCR) : (at p. 1379 of AIR), thus: (cid:28)These decisions show that in England a statutory invasion of the common law obj ection on the ground of bias is tolerated by decisions, but the invasion is conf ined strictly to the limits of the statutory exception. It is not out of place h ere to notice that in England the Parliament is supreme and therefore a statutor y law, however repugnant to the principles of natural justice, is valid; whereas in India the law made by Parliament or a State Legislature should stand the tes t of fundamental rights declared in Part III of the Constitution. (cid:29) 14. Then this Court proceeded to state that the provisions of the Act did not sa nction any dereliction of the principles of natural justice, for the Act visuali zed in case of conflict between the undertaking and the operators of private bus es that the State Government should sit in judgment and resolve the conflict. Mu ch to the same effect has been stated by Shah, J., in Petn No.2 of 1960, D/-28-4 -1990 : (AIR 1960 SC 1073), though in slightly different phraseology. The learne d Judge stated: (cid:28)It is also true that the Government on whom the duty to decide the dispute rest s, is substantially a party to the dispute but if the Government or the authorit y to whom the power is delegated acts judicially in approving or modifying the s cheme, the approval or modification is not open to challenge on a presumption of bias. The Minister or the officer of the Government who is invested with the po wer to hear objections to the scheme is acting in his official capacity and unle ss there is reliable evidence to show that he is biased, his decision will not b e liable to be called in question, merely because he is a limb of the Government . (cid:29) In the above cases the transport department of the Government was the transport undertaking, but here the State Road Transport Corporation, which is a body corp orate having a perpetual succession and common seal, is the transport authority. Though under the provisions of the Act, the State Government has some control, it cannot be said either legally or factually that the said Corporation is a dep artment of the State Government. The State Government, therefore, in deciding th e dispute between the said undertaking and the operators of private buses is onl y discharging its statutory functions. This objection, therefore, has no merits. Nor can we say that it has been established that the Minister in charge of the portfolio of transport has been actuated by personal bias. The fact that he pres ided over the sub-committee constituted to implement the scheme of nationalizati on of bus services in the West Godavari District does not in itself establish an y such bias. Indeed, in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the first respo ndent the contents and authenticity of the reports of the proceedings of the sub -committee published in the Telugu daily (cid:28)Andhra Patrica (cid:29) were not admitted. Eve n if the sub-committee came to such a decision, it is not possible to hold that it was a final and irrevocable decision in derogation of the provisions of the A ct. it was only a policy decision and in the circumstances could only mean that the sub-committee advised the State Government to implement the policy of nation alization of bus services in that particular district. The said decision could not either expressly or by necessary implication involve a predetermination of the issue: it can only mean that the policy would be impl emented subject to the provisions of the Act. It is not suggested that the Minis ter in charge of the concerned portfolio has any personal bias against the opera tors of private buses or any of them. We, therefore, hold that it has not been e stablished that the Minister in charge of the portfolio of transport had persona l bias against the operators of private buses and, therefore, disqualified himse lf from hearing the objections under Chapter IV-A of the Act. (cid:29) (ii) Control/ location of parking : The scope of the Act includes bus-stands notified by the transpo rt authority. In Hari Om Gautam -vs- District Magistrae, Mathura & Anr., (1987) 2 SCC 397, it was held that Chapter IV of the 1939 Act enabled the transport aut hority to fix the location of the bus-stand. Section 96 (2)(xxi) is in parimater ia with Section 68(2)(r) of the 1939 Act and provides for prohibiting the pickin g up or setting down of passengers at specified places. It was observed: (cid:28)5. The first question which arises for consideration is whether the area in whi ch the bus operators were asked to stop their buses is a bus-stand or a halting place. The next question is whether, if the said area is a bus-stand, the Distri ct Magistrate had the power to pass the impugned order. It is not disputed befor e us that the District Magistrate had passed the impugned order in question with the object of establishing a bus-stand in the area in question. That appears to be so from the order passed by the District Magistrate and the letter dated Oct ober 10, 1986 written by the Executive Officer of Baldev Town Area Committee. We shall proceed on the basis that the District Magistrate fixed the area as a bus -stand. Regarding the authority which had the power to notify an area as a bus-s tand, there are at least three decisions of this Court. In T.B. Ibrahim v. RTA, AIR 1953 SC 79, this Court took the view that the expression (cid:28)duly notified stan d (cid:29) in Section 68(2)(r) of the Act meant a stand duly notified by the Transport A uthority and not a stand notified by the municipality within whose jurisdiction the area was situated. This Court held that the fixing and alteration of bus-sta nds was not a purpose foreign to the (cid:28)control of transport vehicles (cid:29) which was g overned by Chapter IV of the Act and, therefore, rules could be framed by the St ate Government regarding the said subject under Section 68(2)(r) of the Act. At page 297 of the Reports this Court has observed thus: (cid:28)The expression ’duly notified stands’ is not defined in the Act, but it is reas onable to presume that a duly notified stand must be one which is notified by th e Transport Authority and by none other. (cid:29) 6. It accordingly affirmed the view of the High Court against whose judgment the said appeal had been filed that Section 76 of the Act which contained the provi sion relating to parking places and halting places had no application to a perma nent bus-stand which was a sort of radiating centre of all the bus traffic in th e town. A similar question arose for consideration in Municipal Board, Pushkar v . STA, AIR 1965 SC 458 Following the decision in T.B. Ibrahim case this Court h eld in this case that Section 76 of the Act had nothing to do with the fixation or alteration of a bus-stand and the power to issue a notification fixing a bus- stand was implied in Section 68(2)(r) of the Act. It further held that the power under Section 68(2)(r) of the Act could be exercised only by the Regional Trans port Authority having jurisdiction over the area and therefore, the order passed under that provision was open to revision under Section 64-A by the State Trans port Authority. The last case to which reference has to be made is Municipal Cou ncil, Bhopal v. Sindhi Sahiti Multipurpose Transport Co-op. Society Ltd. where t he two decisions referred to above were applied for purposes of deciding the sai d case. The facts of this case were these. The Municipal Council of Bhopal had m ade bye-laws under the provisions of Section 358(7)(f) and (m) read with Section 349(ii) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961. Bye-law 2 provided that no person in charge of a motor bus plying for hire shall for the purpose of tak ing up or setting down of passengers, park or stop his bus anywhere within the l imits of the municipality except at the municipal bus-stand. The other bye-laws provided for a levy of a fee of Re 1 for every 8 hours or part thereof in respec t of the use of the bus-stand by such buses and for the issue of a permit on suc h payment. The respondent in that case filed a writ petition in the High Court o f Madhya Pradesh challenging the said bye-laws. The High Court held that bye-law 1(c), which defined the expression (cid:28)municipal bus-stand (cid:29) and bye-law 2 were val id but held bye-laws 3 to 7 which provided for the payment of fee and the giving of permit etc., as invalid and restrained the Municipal Council from giving eff ect to those bye-laws in any manner. In that case this Court affirmed the decisi on of the High Court holding that the power to regulate or prohibit the use of m unicipal land as halting place of vehicles could not be used to compel people to use such land as a halting place. Such a power should be given specifically by the statute and that the power to compel persons in charge of motor buses to sto p only at certain places for the purpose of taking up or setting down passengers was a matter which related to motor traffic and that there was a specific provi sion in Section 68(2)(r) of the Act for that purpose. Accordingly this Court hel d that the bye-laws which compelled persons in charge of motor buses to use the municipal bus-stand could not be passed by the Municipality. In that case also t he District Magistrate had declared the Bhopal Municipal Bus-Stand as a bus-stan d. The Municipal Council contended before this Court that the District Magistrat e had been authorised by the State Government under Section 76 of the Act to pas s an order fixing the municipal bus-stand as a bus-stand for purposes of the Act . Rejecting the said contention this Court held that the District Magistrate cou ld not exercise the power of fixing a bus stand under Section 76 of the Act and that that could be done only under Section 68(2)(r) of the Act. The Court furthe r observed that while the Municipal Corporation had no power to compel persons p lying motor buses for hire to use only the municipal bus-stand for the purpose o f taking up and setting down passengers, there can be no objection to its provid ing a bus-stand for anybody who chooses to use it voluntarily and to such person being required to pay for such use. (cid:29) (iii) Reasonableness of restrictions: In State of Gujarat -vs- Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & O rs., (2005) 8 SCC 534, reiterating the earlier decision rendered by a seven-Jud ge Bench in Pathumma v. State of Kerala, (1978) 2 SCC 1, it was observed: (cid:28)39. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 a thirteen-Judge B ench decision of this Court is a turning point in the history of directive princ iples’ jurisprudence. This decision clearly mandated the need for bearing in min d the directive principles of State policy while judging the reasonableness of t he restriction imposed on fundamental rights. Several opinions were recorded in Kesavananda Bharati and quoting from them would significantly increase the lengt h of this judgment. For our purpose, it would suffice to refer to the seven-Judg e Bench decision in Pathumma v. State of Kerala, (1978) 2 SCC 1 wherein the lear ned Judges neatly summed up the ratio of Kesavananda Bharati and other decisions which are relevant for our purpose. Pathumma holds: (SCC pp. 2-3) (1) The courts interpret the constitutional provisions against the social setti ng of the country so as to show a complete consciousness and deep awareness of t he growing requirements of society, the increasing needs of the nation, the burn ing problems of the day and the complex issues facing the people, which the legi slature, in its wisdom, through beneficial legislation, seeks to solve. The judi cial approach should be dynamic rather than static, pragmatic and not pedantic a nd elastic rather than rigid. This Court while acting as a sentinel on the qui v ive to protect fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country must try to strike a just balance between the fundamental rights and the larger and broader interests of society so that when such a right clashes with a larger int erest of the country it must yield to the latter. (para 5) (2) The legislature is in the best position to understand and appreciate the nee ds of the people as enjoined in the Constitution. The Court will interfere in th is process only when the statute is clearly violative of the right conferred on a citizen under Part III or when the Act is beyond the legislative competence of the legislature. The courts have recognised that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the statutes and the onus to prove its inv alidity lies on the party which assails it. (para 6) (3) The right conferred by Article 19(1)(f) is conditioned by the various factor s mentioned in clause (5). (para 8) (4) The following tests have been laid down as guidelines to indicate in what pa rticular circumstances a restriction can be regarded as reasonable: (a) In judging the reasonableness of the restriction the court has to bear in mi nd the directive principles of State policy. & (para 8) b) The restrictions must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature so as to go beyond the requirements of the interests of the general public. The legislature must take intelligent care and deliberation in choosing the course which is dict ated by reason and good conscience so as to strike a just balance between the fr eedom in the article and the social control permitted by the restrictions under the article. (para 14) (c) No abstract or general pattern or fixed principle can be laid down so as to be of universal application. It will have to vary from case to case and having r egard to the changing conditions, values of human life, social philosophy of the Constitution, prevailing conditions and the surrounding circumstances all of wh (para ich must enter into the judicial verdict. 15) (d) The Court is to examine the nature and extent, the purport and content of t he right, the nature of the evil sought to be remedied by the statute, the ratio of harm caused to the citizen and the benefit conferred on the person or the co mmunity for whose benefit the legislation is passed. (para 18) (e) There must be a direct and proximate nexus or a reasonable connection betwee n the restriction imposed and the object which is sought to be achieved. (para 20) (f) The needs of the prevailing social values must be satisfied by the restricti ons meant to protect social welfare. (para 22) (g) The restriction has to be viewed not only from the point of view of the cit izen but the problem before the legislature and the object which is sought to be achieved by the statute. In other words, the Court must see whether the social control envisaged by Article 19(1) is being effectuated by the restrictions impo sed on the fundamental right. However important the right of a citizen or an ind ividual may be it has to yield to the larger interests of the country or the com munity. (h) The Court is entitled to take into consideration matters of common report, h istory of the times and matters of common knowledge and the circumstances existi ng at the time of the legislation for this purpose. (para 24) (underlining by us) (para 25) (cid:29) (iv) Judicial review of subordinate legislation: While considering the validity of a subordinate legislation, the Court has to consider the object and scheme of the enabling Act, the area over which the power has been delegated and whether the Rules are inconsistent with t he mandatory provisions of the statute. In State of T.N. & Anr. -vs- P. Krishnam urthy & Ors., (2006) 4 SCC 517, it was observed: (cid:28)15. There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subo rdinate legislation ad the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is invalid. It is also well recognized that a subordinate legislation can be challe nged under any of the following grounds: (a) Lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate legislation. (b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. (c) Violation of any provision of the Constitution of India. (d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the li mits of authority conferred by the enabling Act. (e) Repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment. (f) Manifest arbitrariness/ unreasonableness (to an extent where the court might well say that the legislature never intended to give authority to make such rul es). 16. The court considering the validity of a subordinate legislation, will have t o consider the nature, object and scheme of the enabling Act, and also the area over which power has been delegated under the Act and then decide whether the su bordinate legislation conforms to the parent statute. Where a rule is directly i nconsistent with a mandatory provision of the statute, then, of course, the task of the court is simple and easy. But where the contention is that the inconsist ency or non-conformity of the rule is not with reference to any specific provisi on of the enabling Act, but with the object and scheme of the parent Act, the co urt should proceed with caution before declaring invalidity. 17. In Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 S CC 641 this Court referred to several grounds on which a subordinate legislation can be challenged as follows: (SCC p. 689, para 75) (cid:28)75. A piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of immuni ty which is enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent legislature. Subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned. In addition it may also be questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the statute under which it is made. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. That is because subord inate legislation must yield to plenary legislation. It may also be questioned o n the ground that it is unreasonable, unreasonable not in the sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary. (cid:29) (emphasis supplied) 18. In Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, ((189) 4 SCC 18 7, this Court held that the validity of a subordinate legislation is open to que stion if it is ultra vires the Constitution or the governing Act or repugnant to the general principles of the laws of the land or is so arbitrary or unreasonab le that no fairminded authority could ever have made it. It was further held tha t the Rules are liable to be declared invalid if they are manifestly unjust or o ppressive or outrageous or directed to be unauthorised and/or violative of the g eneral principles of law of the land or so vague that it cannot be predicted wit h certainty as to what it prohibited or so unreasonable that they cannot be attr ibuted to the power delegated or otherwise disclose bad faith. 19. In Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 223, a Consti tution Bench of this Court reiterated: (SCC pp. 251-52, para 47) (cid:28)47. Power delegated by statute is limited by its terms and subordinate to its o bjects. The delegate must act in good faith, reasonably, intra vires the power g ranted, and on relevant consideration of material facts. All his decisions, whet her characterised as legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial, must be in harmony with the Constitution and other laws of the land. They must be ’reasona bly related to the purposes of the enabling legislation’. See Leila Mourning v. Family Publications Service, 36 L Ed 2d 318 (1973). If they are manifestly unjus t or oppressive or outrageous or directed to an unauthorised end or do not tend in some degree to the accomplishment of the objects of delegation, court might w ell say, ’Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they a re unreasonable and ultra vires’: per Lord Russel of Killowen, C.J. in Kruse v. Johnson, (1898) 2 QB 91. (cid:29) 20. In St. John’s Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, NCTE, (2003) 3 SCC 321, this Court explained the scope and purpose of delegated legislation thus: (SCC p. 331, para 10) (cid:28)10. A regulation is a rule or order prescribed by a superior for the management of some business and implies a rule for general course of action. Rules and reg ulations are all comprised in delegated legislations. The power to make subordin ate legislation is derived from the enabling Act and it is fundamental that the delegate on whom such a power is conferred has to act within the limits of autho rity conferred by the Act. Rules cannot be made to supplant the provisions of th e enabling Act but to supplement it. What is permitted is the delegation of anci llary or subordinate legislative functions, or, what is fictionally called, a po wer to fill up details. The legislature may, after laying down the legislative p olicy confer discretion on an administrative agency as to the execution of the p olicy and leave it to the agency to work out the details within the framework of policy. The need for delegated legislation is that they are framed with care an d minuteness when the statutory authority making the rule, after coming into for ce of the Act, is in a better position to adapt the Act to special circumstances . Delegated legislation permits utilisation of experience and consultation with interests affected by the practical operation of statutes. (cid:29) (emphasis supplied) 21. It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that where the power exercised do es not concern the interest of an individual, but relates to the public in gener al, or where the power exercised concerns a direction of a general character lay ing down the future course of action, it should be held to be an exercise of leg islative power and not an exercise of administrative or judicial/quasi-judicial power. It is contended that Section 4-A(3) refers to performing executive or adm inistrative acts and not to a legislative act, as it requires hearing before mak ing a premature termination of mining leases held by an individual. It is submit ted that termination of all leases/permissions relating to quarrying of sand, as a class, under Rule 38-A, is a legislative act and not an executive act and the refore, Section 4-A(3) has application. It is submitted that Rule 38-A being a d elegated legislation, legislative in character, is not open to question on the g round that it violates the principles of natural justice. (cid:29) (v) Conflict between the Rule and the Act: While considering the plea that the Rule was in conflict with th e main statute, the scope of the provision has to be seen when the Rule is alleg ed to be in conflict with another statute. If the scope of the two statutes is d ifferent and there is no operational incompatibility, irreconcilability or collu sion, the Rule cannot be held to be bad. In Vijay Kumar Sharma & Ors. -vs- State of Karnataka & Ors., (1990) 2 SCC 562, it was observed : (cid:28)32. Thus the Karnataka Act and the MV Act 1988 deal with two different subject matters. As stated earlier the Karnataka Act is enacted by the State legislature for acquisition of contract carriages under Entry 42 of the Concurrent List rea d with Article 31 of the Constitution to give effect to the provisions of Articl e 39(b) and (c) thereof. The MV Act 1988 on the other hand is enacted by the Par liament under Entry 35 of the Concurrent List to regulate the operation of the m otor vehicles. The objects and the subject matters of the two enactments are mat erially different. Hence the provisions of Article 254 do not come into play in the present case and hence there is no question of repugnancy between the two le gislations. 53. The aforesaid review of the authorities makes it clear that whenever repugna ncy between the State and Central legislation is alleged, what has to be first e xamined is whether the two legislations cover or relate to the same subject matt er. The test for determining the same is the usual one, namely, to find out the dominant intention of the two legislations. If the dominant intention, i.e. the pith and substance of the two legislations is different, they cover different su bject matters. If the subject matters covered by the legislations are thus diffe rent, then merely because the two legislations refer to some allied or cognate s ubjects they do not cover the same field. The legislation, to be on the same sub ject matter must further cover the entire field covered by the other. A provisio n in one legislation to give effect to its dominant purpose may incidentally be on the same subject as covered by the provision of the other legislation. But su ch partial coverage of the same area in a different context and to achieve a dif ferent purpose does not bring about the repugnancy which is intended to be cover ed by Article 254(2). Both the legislations must be substantially on the same su bject to attract the article. (cid:29). 14. The Rules providing for regulating parking of private vehicles a nd place of business of travel and other agents cannot be held to be beyond the scope of the statute. The provisions for fine or for licence fee are not shown to be unreasonably high so as to be held to be interfering with the right of bus iness of the petitioners. The provisions to which objection has been mainly rai sed is permit fee and restriction on parking. There is no material to hold that the provision for permit fee was in conflict with the Motor Vehicles Taxation Ac t, 1936 which provides for installments. The scope of the said Act being differe nt, there is no scope of conflict in provisions of the said Act and the impugned Rules. Except Rule 46 and 54 (e), all other Rules have already been in operatio n for more than 10 years and no specific case of hardship has been brought to ou r notice. Rule 46(C) provide for permit being given subject to payment of due ta xes. Such taxes include tax under the provisions of the Assam Motor Vehicles Tax ation Act, 1936. This Court vide interim order passed in the present proceedings has held that Rule 46C(a) will be governed by the Assam Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1936 Act. There is no conflict in the Rule and the said Act. If the said A ct provides for payment in installments, the Rule has to be read harmoniously an d payment of due taxes will include payment of such tax in installments also. Th e said provision cannot be held to be irreconcilable. 15. Rule 54(e)(ii) provides for a distance of the place of business of a private owner from the place of business of the ASTC. Such restriction cann ot be held to be unreasonable. Even if a person owns his own building, the said building can definitely be used for any other purpose. Ownership of the buildin g does not confer any unrestricted right to use the same for the business of mot or transport in the immediate vicinity of the bus-stand. The prohibition is onl y upto 300 meters at Guwahati and 100 meters in other places. Beyond such distan ce there is no restriction. Such restriction, in our view, cannot be held to be unreasonable. 16. gned Rules. 17. 18. In the light of the above, no exception can be taken to the impu We, thus, do not find any ground to interfere. The writ petition is dismissed.