High Court
Case Details
RSA 19/2001 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE N. CHAUDHURY Whether the plaintiffs who have been dispossessed
Legal Reasoning
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL) (N. Chaudhury, J) 1. This Second Appeal has been preferred by the plaintiffs against the conc urrent findings of facts arrived at by the two learned Courts below. Appeal was admitted on 02.03.2001 on the following substantial questions of law: (i) from the suit land during pendency of the Title Suit No. 30/82 filed by the defendants are entitled to recovery of khas possession if it is established on evidence in record that they have acquired title by adverse po ssession? (ii) ex-tinguished because of dis-possession of the plaintiffs from the suit land on 03.04.1989, during pendency of T.S. No. 30 of 1982? (iii) deciding adversely the question of acquisition of title by adverse possession by Whether title acquired by adverse possession stood
Legal Reasoning
Whether learned counsel below fell in error in non-consideration of relevant evidence, either oral or documentary? and Any other substantial question of law that may (iv) arise during the course of hearing? 2. Before going to decide the substantial questions of law framed in this c Subsequently, on 23.05.2013 in course of hearing of this appeal, another additional substantial question of law was framed and the same is quoted below: Whether a suit for declaration of title on the basis of the clai m of adverse possession is maintainable in view of the provision of Section 27 o f the Limitation Act, 1963? 3. Heard Ms. B. Choudhury, learned counsel, assisted by Mr. S. Sahu, learne d counsel for plaintiffs. Also heard Mr. T. C. Khatri, learned Senior Counsel, a ssisted by Mr. P. Mahanta, learned counsel for respondents. 4. ase, it is necessary to record the minimum factual summary of the case. 5. Three sons, namely, Binode Das, Gopal Das and Ganesh Das and their siste r Smt. Maheswari Devi being the legal heirs of Late Pandu Badyakar, filed Title Suit No.66/ 1989 in the court of learned Munsiff in Tezpur, against the responde nts as plaintiffs, praying for declaration of their right, title and interest by way of adverse possession, and for recovery of possession and also for injuncti on restraining the defendants and others, who may attempt to enter into the suit land after such recovery of possession. The case of the plaintiffs was that the ir predecessor, namely, Pandu Badyakar possessed the suit land in the year 1916- 17 to the knowledge of the original owner and was residing there by constructin g house. Pandu Badyakar and his wife Bina Das enjoyed possession over the land f or a period of 66 years without any obstruction from anybody and in the process they claimed that their predecessor (Pandu Badyakar) had acquired title by way of adverse possession and correspondingly the same of the original owner got ex tinguished . But on 07.02.1982 when Pandu Badyakar died, Arun Patangia (the pred ecessor of the defendant’s No. 1 to 5) forcefully occupied the land ousting the legal heirs of Pandu Badyakar from the suit land and demolishing their houses. T he legal heirs of Pandu Badyakar lodged a complaint before the court of Judicial Magistrate at Tezpur on 8.02.1982 and CR case No. 105 of 1982 was registered un der Sections 427/ 448/ 352/ 506 IPC and the accused, Arun Patangia, ( predecesso r of the defendant Nos. 1 to 5) was arrested. At that time the plaintiff No.1 an d his mother Bina Das claimed to have reconstructed the house, but the same was again demolished by the predecessor of the defendant Nos. 1 to 5. She could not re-enter the suit land any more as police restrained both the sides in view of a proceeding before the Executive Magistrate at the instance of the predecessor o f the defendants. However, the defendants did not have any right, title and int erest thereto although Arun Patangia sent a notice to the mother of the present plaintiffs on 26.2.1982 asking her to vacate the suit land on the ground that s he had failed to pay rent. By giving reply notice, the claim of the notice giver was refuted but Arun Patangia, the predecessor of the defendants, as plaintiff, instituted Title Suit No. 30 of 1982 in the court of learned Sadar Munsiffat Te zpur on 21.4.1982 praying for decree against the mother of the plaintiffs for ev iction and recovery of possession and also for injunction restraining her from m aking any construction on the suit land wherein an order for temporary injunctio n was granted. Defendant, Smt. Bina Das submitted a written statement and contes ted the suit but the suit was dismissed for not taking any steps on 29.03.1986 w hich was subsequently restored to file vide MC No. 284 of 1986. During pendency of the said suit, namely, T.S. No. 30/82, Arun Patangia died. But prior to his death , he had sold the suit land to defendant No.7 on 21.08.1987. It appears th at the said sale was made when the suit had been dismissed for default and the r estoration order was yet to be passed. According to the plaintiffs, possession o f Bina Das was admitted by the defendants in their own plaint in T.S. No. 30 of 1982 and as such the defendants or their predecessor did not have any legal righ t to evict the plaintiffs or their mother without following the legal process. A ccording to the plaintiffs, during pendency of the Title Suit No. 30 of 1982, Bi na Das died on 13.9.88 and this is how the present plaintiffs stepped into her s hoes. But as the present plaintiffs, namely Shri Binode Das, Shri Madhav Bora, S ri Ganesh Das and Smt. Maheswari Devi, the legal heirs of Bina Das were not brou ght on record the suit came to an end on 27.04.1989. With the aforesaid factual statements, the plaintiffs have prayed for declaration of title over their suit land by virtue of adverse possession and also for recovery of Khas possession e victing the defendants along with cost etc. as stated above. 6. The defendants submitted a joint written statement in the suit denying the claims of the plaintiffs. According to the defendants, late Pandu Badyakar became a tenant under the predecessor in interest of the defendants as would be evident from the Bandobastinama dated 31.12.1972 and Panchayatnama dated 19.06.1 978 agreeing to pay rent. It is the further statement of the defendants that sai d Bina Badyakar left the premises at her own accord surrendering the possession in favour of the defendants during the pendency of the suit and as such whatever right or interest they had, came to an end thereby. The defendants denied the s tory of demolition of house on the suit land. Defendants also denied that they f orcefully got the land vacated. With these pleadings the defendants prayed that the suit be dismissed with cost. 7. framed as many as five issues as follows: i) Is there any cause of again for the suit? ii) Have the plaintiffs acquired right, title and interest in the suit land by a dverse possession? iii) Whether the plaintiffs had been dispossessed from the suit land by legal ma nner by the defendants? iv) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get a decree of eviction as prayed fo r? v) But what other relief/ reliefs the parties are entitled? On the basis of the aforesaid rival contentions the learned trial court 8. The plaintiffs’ side exa mined as many as four witnesses while the defendants also examined witnesses and exhibited documents including the records of the Title Suit No. 30/1982. On the basis of the materials available on record and after hearing the parties the le arned trial court passed the judgment and decree dated 15.09.1993, dismissing th e suit of the plaintiffs. While deciding the issue No.2 i.e., right, title and i nterest of the plaintiffs over the suit land, the learned trial Court observed t hat P.W.1 himself stated in course of his evidence that he did not have possessi on over the suit land at the time of institution of the suit in view of the disp ossession on 03.04.1989, P.W.3 stated that the mother of the plaintiffs died in Rangapara and not in the suit land. While P.W.2 stated that mother of the plaint iffs died in other place than the suit land. P.W.3 further stated that even in 1 977 plaintiff Binade Das stayed in Rangapara where his mother also stayed with h im. It is the finding of the learned Trial Court that plaintiff Binade Das was a n employee of railways since 1977 at Rangapara. On the aforesaid statements vis- à-vis, the revenue receipts and two papers written by Gaonburah in the nature of possession certificate on prior period, adverse possession cannot be claimed u nless the plaintiffs could prove their continuous uninterrupted possession over the suit land for a period of more than 12 years prior to the date of institutio n of the suit. Observing that the plaintiffs were not in possession within a per iod of 12 years from the date of filing of the suit, the learned trial court hel d that the plaintiffs did not have any right whatsoever on the basis of the adve rse possession. While deciding issue No.3 in regard to plea of dispossession of the plaintiffs, it is the finding of fact by the learned trial court that the pl aintiffs could not prove their story of dispossession. The learned Trail Court f ound that P.W.2 & 3 have admitted that after the death of Pandu Badyakar, the pl aintiffs had left the suit premises for Rangapara, where the mother of the plain tiff died. Taking note of the fact that plaintiff Binade Das was residing at Ran gapara since 1977 in course of his employment, issue No.3 was decided against th e plaintiffs. Accordingly, other issues were also decided against the plaintiffs and consequently suit was dismissed. 9. The plaintiffs preferred title appeal No. 33/1993 in the court of learne d Civil Judge, Senior Division, Tezpur. The learned first appellate court after hearing the parties and on perusal of the materials on record, proceeded to cons ider the issues afresh and did not frame any point for decision as contemplated under Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since issue Nos. 2 & 3 a re the cardinal issues in this case, it is necessary to look into the correspond ing findings of the learned first appellate court as against the said issues. Th e learned first appellate court discussed the recital made in the plaint and the depositions made by the P.Ws and D.Ws. Learned first appellate court noticed th at the P.W.3 Akon Bora deposed about staying of plaintiff Binade Das at Rangapar a because of his employment under Indian Railways, that P.W.2, Pitamohan Saikia, deposed that after the death of Pandu Badyakar his legal heirs stayed on the su it land for some time but thereafter were driven out and since then they were n ot in the suit land and that Bina Badyakar, widow of Pandu Badyakar, died somewh ere else and not in the suit land. The first appellate Court came to the finding that after 1982, the plaintiffs were not in the possession of the suit land and so when in 1989 they filed this suit for a declaration of the right, title and interest on the basis of the adverse possession they admittedly did not have any possession at all not to speak of adverse possession. The learned first appella te court also considered the evidence led by the defendants particularly in rega rd to Exhibit-6, the records of the earlier suit, namely, title suit No.30 of 1982, the learned first appellate court observed that in Paragraph -22 of the wr itten statement submitted in title suit No.30 of 1982 the present plaintiffs cla imed that Pandu Badyakar had purchased the suit land at Rs. 120 from Arun Patang ia by an unregistered sale deed. With the aforesaid observations on fact, learne d first appellate court dismissed the appeal upholding the findings of the learn ed trial court and hence this second appeal. Learned Counsel Ms. B. Choudhury, arguing for the appellants submitted t 10. hat Pandu Badyakar had been in possession of the suit land since 1916-1917 and l ived there at least for 63/70 years and in the year 1982 when Pandu Badyakar die d, Arun Patangia forcibly entered and thus he had acquired right of adverse poss ession over the suit land for such a long and uninterrupted possession. Accordin g to her they have been evicted from the land but such dispossession would not h ave any adverse effect on the title already acquired by their predecessor on the basis of adverse possession and as such the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree of declaration as well as khas possession. When the attention of the learned co unsel was drawn to the substantial question No.(ii) framed on 02.03.2001 as to w hether title by way of adverse possession, if any acquired by the plaintiffs, ha d come to an end after the plaintiffs were admittedly dispossessed and did not a dversely possess the land continuously for a period of 12 years prior to institu tion of the suit, the learned counsel submitted that title once acquired is fina l and the same cannot be extinguished by subsequent dispossession. 12. Before the trial court, the records of the earlier suit between the par ties, namely, Title Suit No. 30/1982 have been proved as Exhibit 6. From paragra ph 22 of the written statement filed by the mother of the present plaintiffs in Exhibit 6, it appears that the predecessor of the plaintiffs did not take the pl ea of adverse possession at that time but took the plea of acquisition of title by purchase from the predecessor of the defendants vide one unregistered sale de ed while the consideration was admittedly shown at Rs.120/-. In view of the prov isions of section 17 read with section 49 of the Registration Act, 1909 the said plea is/was unacceptable. On the face of the aforesaid submissions of the learn ed counsel for the appellants, a question necessarily arises as whether a plea o f adverse possession is merely a defence or a title is created by fiction withou t there being any known incident of conveyance or transfer of title. This questi on shall be considered and answered in the later part of this judgment. Pausing here for a moment it strikes one’s mind that had the predecessor of the plaintif fs himself believed that he had acquired title by adverse possession there would have been no occasion on his part to go for acquiring title by purchase from th e original owners and as such it necessarily follows that his possession was not adverse. Viewed from different angle, as the plea of adverse possession was no t taken in 1982 while filing written statement in the earlier suit, presumption must be taken that the possession was not adverse at that time and as such no p lea of adverse possession can be taken in 1989 when on the face of the evidence of the plaintiffs themselves, the plaintiffs did not or could not enter the suit land after 1982. The irresistible conclusion under such factual premises is tha t the plaintiffs could not set up a case of adverse possession at all. In this v iew of the matter, the concurrent findings of courts arrived at by the learned c ourts below that the plaintiffs have failed to establish plea of adverse possess ion cannot be said to be unsustainable or perverse and consequently, the first a nd third substantial questions of law are decided against the appellants. Learned counsel has relied on the following judgments in support of her 13. contention; AIR 1968 SC 1165, 1994 (6) SCC 155, 2009 (14) SCC 224 and (1986)1 GL R 108. These judgments speak of maturing of title of adverse possession once the same is established. But none of these judgments take care of the exigency when the person having such right arising from adverse possession is dispossessed by the original owner. These decisions, therefore, do not apply to the case in han d. 14. Substantial question No.(ii), as to whether adverse possession gets exti nguished by interruption of possession, does not appear to be res integra any more . It appears that in the case of Karan Singh vs. W. Ali Khan 9 IA, 1999, th e judicial committee of the Privy Council held that after the claim of the adver se possession was interrupted, the right accrued thereby also comes to an end. The said view of the judicial committee of the Privy Council was referred in the case of P.C. Mukherjee vs. S.K. Mukerjee reported in 1971 (3) SCC 607. In that case also right by way of adverse possession was snapped by requisition of the l and by the Deputy Commissioner. The High Court of Calcutta decided the case agai nst the claimant of adverse possession. The appeal was dismissed in the case of P.C. Mukherjee vs. S.K. Mukerjee (Supra) and thus by implication the law laid d own by the judicial council of the Privy Council in Karan Singh vs. W.Ali Khan (Supra) appears to be accepted by the Supreme Court of India. Apart from the sai d possession, the concept of adverse possession starts with a right based on pos session. So the basic substratum on which the right was founded being physical p ossession, if the substatum goes the claim cannot exist. This is why once a righ t by way of adverse possession has been acquired, the same is a special right ba sed on possession alone and as such after being dispossessed of the said right, the only remedy open to the person dispossessed would be under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and not otherwise. 15. In the case in hand the plaintiffs did not proceed to get their possessi on back taking recourse of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. While the court s below have concurrently held that the plaintiffs are no longer in possession a fter 1982, the plaintiffs staked their claim of possession till 03.04.1989 by th e technical ground that a suit filed in 1982 demanding for the possession from t hem had been in existence till then. 16. Thus in view of above and particularly, on the perusal of the law laid d own by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of PC. Mukerjee vs. S.K. Mukerjee (Supr a) and the judgment of the judicial committee of the Privy Counsel in the case o f Karan Singh vs. W.A Khan, (Supra) it appears that title acquired by way of adv erse possession stands extinguished once the possession is snapped. The substant ial question No.(ii) therefore, is decided in affirmative against the appellants . 17. Coming to additional substantial question of law, Section 27 of the Limi tation Act, 1963 speaks of extinguishment of title of a person at the determinat ion of a period limited to him for instituting a suit for possession of any prop erty. Statute has prescribed this period to be 12 years vide Article 65 of the F irst Division of the Schedule under the said Act. But a bare perusal of the said article shows that it is 12 years with effect from the date when possession of defendant becomes hostile to the plaintiff. The necessary corollary that may ari se from joint reading of the said article as well as section 27 of the Limitatio n Act is that the plea of adverse possession fits in the mouth of the defendant and not in the mouth of the plaintiff. What is prescribed is the extinguishment of title of a person but it does never provide for corresponding acquisition of title by the defendant. The person losing the title is really barred from stakin g any claim anymore and thus this bar of limitation is merely an incident of est oppel for such person i.e., the rightful owner without having any element of con veyance of title by operation of law. 18. The mode of acquisition of title to property is prescribed under the Tra nsfer of Property Act such as sale, gift, exchange etc. Mr T.C.Khatri, the learn ed senior counsel has also pressed into service the provisions of section 6 of t he Assam Land and Revenue Regulation to show other modes of conveyance of title. Section 10 of the Assam Land and revenue Regulation provides for relinquishment of tile. But no where it is prescribed that title can be acquired by any means other than conveyance associated with and followed by registration if the value of the conveyed property is more than Rs.100/-. Even in a case where a party acq uires exclusive title to a property by amicable arrangement made in course of pr oceeding of a suit and a decree is passed accordingly in terms of such settlemen t, unless such a decree of court is registered like any other deed of conveyanc e, the beneficiary of the decree may not acquire title provided the whole of the property was subject matter of that suit. So, while a person may forfeit his ti tle by dint of section 27 of the Limitation Act there shall not be a correspondi ng acquisition of title by any one. The defendant, however, shall be entitled to be in possession vis a vis the rightful owner by default only. This takes us to the next and the additional substantial question of law as to whether a suit fo r declaration of title can be claimed on the basis of adverse possession. It is reiterated here that article 65 of the Limitation Act has prescribed computatio n of limitation as a bar from the time when possession of defendant becomes adve rse. So, to contest a suit for recovery of possession it is a tool for defence g iven to the defendant by the legislature. The legislature in its wisdom has chos en not to give this right to a defendant only and this is why there is an oft qu oted maxim that claim of adverse possession is a shield but not a sword. 19. In this view of the matter, it becomes difficult to accept as to whether a suit for a declaration of title at all can be based on the claim of the adver se possession and this takes us to the additional substantial question of law fr amed in this second appeal. It appears such a question came up for consideratio n in the case of Bhim Singh vs Zile Singh (AIR 2006 P&H 195) and it has been hel d that such suit shall not be maintainable. Same was the view expressed by the H on’ble Delhi Court in the case Premnath Wadhwan vs. Inder Rai Wadhwan. The case of Bhim Singh vs Zile Singh has received consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme C ourt in the case of State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar reported in (2011) 10 SCC 4 04. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not expressed any opinion as to the c orrectness of the judgment. Be that as it may in view of what has been sated abo ve conclusion, therefore, has to drawn that a suit for declaration on the basis of adverse possession is not maintainable. The last substantial question of law is thus decided in the negative and against the plaintiffs/appellants. 20. Before parting, it is noticed that in the case of State of Haryana v. M ukesh Kumar reported in (2011) 10 SCC 404, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has traced the history of the concept of adverse possession in England as far back as 1275 AD as a claim of seisin although legal recognition of the concept originally t ook birth on 1623 when the statute of limitation was put into place which allowe d a person to be in possession for 20 years or more to acquire title to that pro perty. It has also been discussed therein that this law was then adopted in the United States to procure drawing of principle of title and the American version which is illustrated by most states adopting 20 years of adverse possession of c laims. Although Mukesh Kumar (supra), shows that the concept of extinguishment o f title by law of limitation came to be introduced in the west as far back as 12 75 A.D. but the same was in vogue in India much before the birth of the Christ. Because, Manusmrit bears testimony to existence of such law which goes as below : (cid:28)Pranas.taswamikang Riktang Raja Tryavdat Nidhapayet. Arvak Tryavdaddharaet Swami Paren. Nripatirharet. (cid:29) (-Manusmiriti Chap. VIII, verse No. 30) (If the real owner abandons his property for a continuous period of 3 years th e King shall protect the same against occupation by others for a period of 3 yea rs but if the real owner does not return to take over after 3 years, the king sh all have it.) This concept of forfeiture of private property if the real owner abandons it, ha s received constitutional recognition in Article 296. Article 296 of the Constit ution mandates that if the owner abandons the property the same accrues to His M ajesty or as the case may be to the ruler of the Indian states state by escheat or as Bona vacantia to the Union or the State as the case may be depending on th e fact as to where the property is situate. So, corresponding to extinguishment of title of the real owner there may be vesting of the property to the state or Union by bona Vacantia there cannot be a corresponding or deemed vesting of titl e to third party. 21. 22. Consequently the second appeal is dismissed. However, no order as to cost.