Ms. Charu Ambwani, Advocate v. THE PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT NEW DELHI AND

Judgment

1. This writ action, brought under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner assails the Labour Court Award dated 25.04.2018, whereby the Reference as regards termination of his services was decided against him. On service of notice, respondent no.2 management entered appearance through counsel to oppose the petition. However, subsequently counsel for respondent no.2 stopped appearing. I heard learned counsel for petitioner and examined the records.

2. Succinctly stated, circumstances leading to the present petition are as follows. W.P.(C) 11509/2018 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RAHUL YADAV Signing Date:23.01.2025 17:57:12 Page 1 of 17 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA

DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF DELHI, ou=DELHI HIGH COURT, 2.5.4.20=8401dd889b27a77b2f65ffffe4afec45569af3962c6fb4835d435f97626cacca, postalCode=110003, st=DELHI, serialNumber=D3E86796451EC45C07B5D15570996B40F80CBD2EEE60402C487965FF801E26FA, cn=GIRISH KATHPALIA

2.1 The Joint Labour Commissioner, Labour Department, North District, Government of NCT of Delhi, sent a Reference to the Labour Court as to whether services of the petitioner were terminated illegally and/or unjustifiably by the management, and if so, to what relief the petitioner was entitled.

2.2 Upon notice of the Reference, the petitioner appeared before the Labour Court and filed a Statement of Claim, thereby pleading that he had been working with respondent no.2 management since 04.11.1978 as a General Worker at the last drawn salary of Rs. 8554/- per month, but he was not issued any salary slip, nor granted leave or any other facility; that when he agitated for grant of legal facilities, the management paid him only Rs. 1500/- in the month of June 2013 for expenditure; that on 07.04.2014, in response to his pressure to pay entire earned wages, Sh. S.P. Garg, the partner/proprietor of respondent no.2 terminated his services; that when despite repeated requests, he was not allowed to join back duty, he lodged a complaint dated 26.08.2015 through Union to the Labour Office, on which the Labour Inspector called the management with entire record on

26.08.2015; that on 10.09.2015, Sh. Garg appeared in the Labour Office but thereafter, neither called him back nor paid his dues, so he sent demand letter which was ignored by the management; that on 09.11.2015 he filed his claim before the Conciliation Officer but the management did not respond; W.P.(C) 11509/2018 Page 2 of 17 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF DELHI, ou=DELHI HIGH COURT, 2.5.4.20=8401dd889b27a77b2f65ffffe4afec45569af3962c6fb4835d435f97626cacca, postalCode=110003, st=DELHI, serialNumber=D3E86796451EC45C07B5D15570996B40F80CBD2EEE60402C487965FF801E26FA, cn=GIRISH KATHPALIA Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RAHUL YADAV Signing Date:23.01.2025 17:57:12 and that termination of his services was bad in law and ever since then he remains unemployed.

2.3 The respondent no.2 management filed their written statement before the Labour Court, denying the relationship of employer and employee between them and the petitioner. In the written statement, the management respondent no.2 pleaded that the petitioner is a freelance worker and was working as a helper in the entire area; and that the claim has been filed only to extort money from respondent no.2.

2.4 The petitioner filed a rejoinder, denying the pleadings of respondent no.2 management and reaffirmed his claim contents.

2.5 On the basis of rival pleadings, the learned Labour Court framed the following issues: “1. Whether the claimant is a workman as defined under Industrial Disputes Act? 2. Whether there exists any relationship of employer and employee between the management and workman? 3. Whether the services of the workman were terminated illegally on 07.04.2014 by the management? 4. Relief.”

2.6 During trial, both sides examined one witness each in support of their respective pleadings. In his testimony as WW1, the petitioner deposed on oath the above mentioned contents of his claim statement and placed on record copy of his appointment letter dated 04.11.1978 as Ex.WW1/1, W.P.(C) 11509/2018 Page 3 of 17 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF DELHI, ou=DELHI HIGH COURT, 2.5.4.20=8401dd889b27a77b2f65ffffe4afec45569af3962c6fb4835d435f97626cacca, postalCode=110003, st=DELHI, serialNumber=D3E86796451EC45C07B5D15570996B40F80CBD2EEE60402C487965FF801E26FA, cn=GIRISH KATHPALIA Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RAHUL YADAV Signing Date:23.01.2025 17:57:12 registration application for GDA house as Ex.WW1/2, allotment of GDA as Ex.WW1/3, photocopies of cheqbook requisition slips issued to him by respondent no.2 as Ex.WW1/4 & 5, complaint dated 26.08.2015 as Ex.WW1/6, copy of demand letter dated 21.10.2015 and its postal receipt as Ex.WW1/7 & 8, Statement of Claim as Ex.WW1/9 and copy of letter dated

25.11.1976 of respondent no.2 as Ex.WW1/10. On the other hand, respondent no.2 management examined Sh. S.P. Garg, who deposed that the petitioner was never employed with respondent no.2 management at any point of time and that the claim of the petitioner is fabricated; and in his cross examination, Sh. Garg denied the signatures on Ex.WW1/1, the alleged appointment letter.

2.7 After analysing the evidence on record, the learned Labour Court arrived at the findings that the signatures on the appointment letter Ex.WW1/1 alleged to be of Sh. Garg are completely different from his signatures and that no request was made by the petitioner workman for forensic comparison of the same. After detailed discussion of entire evidence, the learned Labour Court held that the petitioner workman had failed to prove his relationship of employment with respondent no.2.

2.8 In view of the above findings qua absence of proof of relationship of employment, the learned Labour Court found it not necessary to analyze the remaining issues and held that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. W.P.(C) 11509/2018 Page 4 of 17 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF DELHI, ou=DELHI HIGH COURT, 2.5.4.20=8401dd889b27a77b2f65ffffe4afec45569af3962c6fb4835d435f97626cacca, postalCode=110003, st=DELHI, serialNumber=D3E86796451EC45C07B5D15570996B40F80CBD2EEE60402C487965FF801E26FA, cn=GIRISH KATHPALIA Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RAHUL YADAV Signing Date:23.01.2025 17:57:12

2.9 Hence, the present petition was filed by petitioner workman.

2.10 It would also be significant to note that during pendency of these proceedings, the petitioner passed away and vide order dated 17.01.2020, he was substituted with his legal representatives.

3. During arguments, learned counsel for petitioner took me through the above record and contended that the impugned award is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Learned counsel for petitioner contended that the signatures on the appointment letter Ex.WW1/1 were not of Sh. S.P. Garg but his father and that the former had taken over the management of respondent no.2 in the year 2000 after death of the latter, therefore, the comparison of signatures was wrongly done by the learned Labour Court. It was further argued by learned counsel for petitioner that respondent no.2 ought to have produced salary receipts, which was not done.

4. As mentioned above, none appeared on behalf of respondent no.2 to address arguments.

5. To begin with, it would be apposite to briefly traverse through the scope of interference by this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India while dealing with disputes of the present nature. The jurisdiction available to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not in the nature of appellate or revisional jurisdiction. It is an extraordinary W.P.(C) 11509/2018 Page 5 of 17 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF DELHI, ou=DELHI HIGH COURT, 2.5.4.20=8401dd889b27a77b2f65ffffe4afec45569af3962c6fb4835d435f97626cacca, postalCode=110003, st=DELHI, serialNumber=D3E86796451EC45C07B5D15570996B40F80CBD2EEE60402C487965FF801E26FA, cn=GIRISH KATHPALIA Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RAHUL YADAV Signing Date:23.01.2025 17:57:12 jurisdiction in which the discretion can be exercised within the limited parameters, delineated by the Supreme Court.

5.1 In the case of Sangram Singh vs Election Tribunal, Kotah & Anr., 1955 SCC OnLine SC 21, the Supreme Court examined the jurisdiction under Articles 226 and Article 136 of the Constitution of India thus: “13. The jurisdiction which Articles 226 and 136 confer entitles the High Courts and this Court to examine the decisions of all Tribunals to see whether they have acted illegally. That jurisdiction cannot be taken away by a legislative device that purports to confer power on a tribunal to act illegally by enacting a statute that its illegal acts shall become legal the moment the tribunal chooses to say they are legal. The legality of an act or conclusion is something that exists outside and apart from the decision of an inferior tribunal. It is a part of the law of the land which cannot be finally determined or altered by any tribunal of limited jurisdiction. The High Courts and the Supreme Court alone can determine what the law of the land is vis a vis all other courts and tribunals and they alone can pronounce with authority and finality on what is legal and what is not. All that an inferior tribunal can do is to reach a tentative conclusion which is subject to review under Articles 226 and 136. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 with that of the Supreme Court above them remains to its fullest extent despite Section 105. 14. That, however, is not to say that the jurisdiction will be exercised whenever there is an error of law. The High Courts do not and should not, act as Courts of appeal under Article 226. Their powers are purely discretionary and though no limits can be placed upon that discretion it must be exercised along recognised lines and not arbitrarily; and one of the limitations imposed by the Courts on themselves is that they will not exercise jurisdiction in this class of case unless substantial injustice has ensued, or is likely to ensure. They will not allow themselves to be turned into Courts of appeal or revision to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice in a broad and general sense, for, though no W.P.(C) 11509/2018 Page 6 of 17 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF DELHI, ou=DELHI HIGH COURT, 2.5.4.20=8401dd889b27a77b2f65ffffe4afec45569af3962c6fb4835d435f97626cacca, postalCode=110003, st=DELHI, serialNumber=D3E86796451EC45C07B5D15570996B40F80CBD2EEE60402C487965FF801 E26FA, cn=GIRISH KATHPALIA Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RAHUL YADAV Signing Date:23.01.2025 17:57:12 legislature can impose limitations on these constitutional powers it is a sound exercise of discretion to bear in mind the policy of the legislature to have disputes about these special rights decided as speedily as may be. Therefore, writ petitions should not lightly entertained in this class of case.” (emphasis supplied)

5.2 In the case of Indian Overseas Bank vs. IOB Staff Canteen Workers Union and Anr., AIR 2000 SC 1508, the Supreme Court held thus: liberally reappreciating “The learned single Judge seems to have undertaken an exercise, impermissible for him in exercising writ jurisdiction, the evidence and drawing conclusions of his own on pure questions of fact, unmindful, though aware fully, that he is not exercising any appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by a Tribunal, presided over by a Judicial Officer. The findings of fact recorded by a fact-finding authority duly constituted for the purpose and which ordinarily should be considered to have become final, cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having been based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of the writ Court to warrant those findings at any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose or even on the ground that there is yet another view which can be reasonably and possibly one taken. The Division Bench was not only justified but well merited in its criticism of the order of the learned single Judge and in ordering restoration of the Award of the Tribunal. On being taken through the findings of the Industrial Tribunal as well as the order of the learned single Judge and the judgment of the Division Bench, we are of the view that the Industrial Tribunal had overwhelming materials which constituted ample and sufficient basis for recording its findings, as it did, and the manner of consideration undertaken, the objectivity of approach adopted and reasonableness of findings recorded seem to be unexceptionable. The only course, therefore, open to the writ Judge was the relevant criteria laid down by this Court, before sustaining the claim of the canteen workmen, on the facts found and recorded by the fact-finding authority and not embark upon an exercise of re-assessing the evidence and arriving at findings of ones own, altogether W.P.(C) 11509/2018 Page 7 of 17 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF DELHI, ou=DELHI HIGH COURT, 2.5.4.20=8401dd889b27a77b2f65ffffe4afec45569af3962c6fb4835d435f97626cacca, postalCode=110003, st=DELHI, serialNumber=D3E86796451EC45C07B5D15570996B40F80CBD2EEE60402C487965FF801E26FA, cn=GIRISH KATHPALIA Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RAHUL YADAV Signing Date:23.01.2025 17:57:12 giving a complete go-bye even to the facts specifically found by the Tribunal below.” (emphasis supplied)

5.3 Most recently in the case of State of Rajasthan & Ors. vs. Bhupendra Singh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1908, the Supreme Court recapitulated the legal position on the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India thus: “23. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’) in a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a 3-Judge Bench stated: ‘7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the W.P.(C) 11509/2018 Page 8 of 17 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF DELHI, ou=DELHI HIGH COURT, 2.5.4.20=8401dd889b27a77b2f65ffffe4afec45569af3962c6fb4835d435f97626cacca, postalCode=110003, st=DELHI, serialNumber=D3E86796451EC45C07B5D15570996B40F80CBD2EEE60402C487965FF801E26FA, cn=GIRISH KATHPALIA Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RAHUL YADAV Signing Date:23.01.2025 17:57:12 departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.’ (emphasis supplied)