Mr. Alok Kumar, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Soumya Bhowmik, Mr. Amanullah, Mr. Amit Kr v. ARCHNA CHUGH & ANR

Judgment

1. The respondents in these appeals were suspended by the Chairman of the appellant-School1. Prior approval of the Director of Education2, under Rule 8(4) of the Delhi School Education Rules, 19733 was not obtained. A learned Single Judge of this Court has set aside the suspension orders on this sole ground. The School is in appeal.

2. The issue is squarely covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v Director of Education4.

3. As this is the only issue in dispute, and the fact stand sufficiently captured in the judgment of the learned Single Judge, we need not burden this judgment with a reiteration thereof.

4. Before proceeding further, we may straightaway address the contention, of the appellant in the present appeals, that the judgment in Raj Kumar would not apply as it deals with Section 8(2)5, and not

Section 8(4), of the DSE Act. The contention has merely to be urged to be rejected. Section 8(2), like Section 8(4), requires prior approval 1 “the School” hereinafter 2 “the Director” hereinafter 3 “the DSE Rules” hereinafter 4 (2016) 6 SCC 541 5 8. Terms and conditions of service of employees of recognised private schools- ***** Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no employee of a recognised private school (2) shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the Director. LPA 107/2025 & LPA 108/2025 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:04.03.2025 15:00:44 of the Director to be obtained before dismissing, removing, or reducing, in rank, any employee of a recognized private school. That the appellant is a recognized private School is not disputed. The only difference between Section 8(2) and 8(4) is that Section 8(4) is hedged in by two provisos, which permit the School to suspend an employee in emergent circumstances, where the School is satisfied that the employee was guilty of gross misconduct. Even in such cases, however, the second proviso to Section 8(4) requires the approval of the Director to be obtained within 15 days, failing which the suspension ipso facto comes to an end. Admittedly, no such approval, of the Director, was obtained within 15 days of the suspension of the respondents. The learned Single Judge has dealt with this issue thus, in the impugned judgment, and we agree with her: “22. Coming to the present writ petitions, it is an undisputed fact that both the Petitioners were suspended without prior approval of DoE. Assuming in favour of the School, albeit that is not the case set up, that there was an immediate necessity of suspending the Petitioners, the School was not helpless and as observed by the Full Bench of this Court in Delhi Public School 6, it was open to the Managing Committee to suspend the Petitioners without prior approval and then seek approval from the Director within the period specified in the first Proviso to Section 8(4) of DSEAR. In the eventuality that the Director did not grant approval within the period prescribed under the Statute, then the suspension would have automatically lapsed at the end of 15th day reckoned from the date of suspension, but if the approval was granted within 15 days, the suspension would have been valid. Even where the Director did not take a decision, if approval was sought within the prescribed period, an option was available to the Managing Committee of the School to either insist that the decision be taken, though belatedly and thereafter pass a fresh order of suspension or if the Director took a decision and refused to accord approval, to challenge the said decision on well-established grounds of judicial review, but it was certainly not open to the School to charter a course different from any of the legally permissible ones. Admittedly, suspension 6 Delhi Public School v Director of Education, 100 (2002) DLT 530 (FB) LPA 107/2025 & LPA 108/2025 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:04.03.2025 15:00:44 orders were passed without prior approval of the Director and even post passing of the orders there is no approval with the prescribed period of 15 days and hence it has to be held that the suspension orders lapsed on the expiry of the 15th day from the dates of issuance of the said orders. Read simply, the object of Section 8(4) of DSEAR is to protect and safeguard the employees and at the same time counter balance the right of the School to suspend a delinquent employee and it is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that words of the Statute must be understood construction leads to an absurdity or runs contrary to the object of the Statute.” their natural and ordinary sense unless

5. The plea that Raj Kumar does not apply for this reason, (Emphasis supplied) therefore, fails.

6. We turn, now, to Raj Kumar.

7. Raj Kumar was a driver, employed with the DAV Public School7. His services were terminated by the DAVPS. He instituted an industrial dispute, contending that his termination amounted to “retrenchment” within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and had been effected in breach of Section 25-F of the said Act. That issue does not consider us. However, Issue (iii), as thus framed by the Supreme Court as arising before it for consideration, is relevant: “(iii) Whether the provision of Section 8(2) of the DSE Act is applicable to the facts of the instant case?”

8. The following paragraphs from the judgment in Raj Kumar, which address this issue, merit reproduction : Signature Not Verified LPA 107/2025 & LPA 108/2025 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:04.03.2025 15:00:44

40. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the respondent School is a recognised private school and the appellant is an “employee” in terms of Section 2(h) of the DSE Act. Chapter IV of the DSE Act provides for the terms and conditions of services of an employee of a recognised private school. Section 8(2) of the DSE Act contemplates that no employee of a recognised private school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall their services be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the Director of Education, Delhi. In the instant case, the respondent Managing Committee, before terminating the services of the appellant did not comply with the said mandatory provision of Section 8(2) of the DSE Act. The learned counsel for the appellant further contends that the notice regarding termination of service was served on the appellant on 7-1-2003, and as on that date, the aforesaid statutory provision was valid and binding.

41. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that Section 8(2) of the DSE Act is a substantive right provided for safeguarding the conditions of services of an employee. The termination of services of the appellant without obtaining prior permission of the Director, renders the action of the respondent School as void. The learned counsel contends that when statutory provisions provide a procedure to do an act in a particular manner, it should be done in that very manner or not at all. Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in Babu Verghese v.Bar Council of Kerala8. . It is the basic principle of law long settled that if “31 the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v Taylor9 which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v King Emperor10 who stated as under : ‘… where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all.’

32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v State of Vindhya Pradesh11and in Deep Chand v State