Mr. Manish Sangwan, Adv. along with Mr. Anshul Kumar, Mr. Manish Mishra and Ms v. CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE FORCE

Judgment

1. The petitioner assails order dated 17 July 2025 whereby he has been transferred from Group Centre, Noida to 87th Battalion, located at Manipur.

2. The writ petition candidly states that the petitioner has no inherent objection to being posted at Manipur. However, it is sought to be contended that the order of transfer is vitiated by malice and is in Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:04.09.2025 12:51:59 W.P.(C) 13427/2025 the nature of retaliation against the petitioner who is an internal whistleblower.

3. There can be no doubt about the fact that, if an order of transfer is by way of retaliation against an employee, the order would be vitiated. However, it would be for the concerned employee in that case to make out a clear case in that regard.

4. This position is manifest even from the judgment in Somesh

Tiwari v Union of India1, on which Mr. Manish Sangwan, learned Counsel for the petitioner places reliance.

5. We may reproduce para 16 of the said decision which was specifically cited by Mr. Sangwan, thus: “16. Indisputably an order of transfer is an administrative order. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that transfer, which is ordinarily an incident of service should not be interfered with, save in cases where inter alia mala fide on the part of the authority is proved. Mala fide is of two kinds - one malice in fact and the second malice in law. The order in question would attract the principle of malice in law as it was not based on any factor germane for passing an order of transfer and based on an irrelevant ground i.e. on the allegations made against the appellant in the anonymous complaint. It is one thing to say that the employer is entitled to pass an order of transfer in administrative exigencies but it is another thing to say that the order of transfer is passed by way of or in lieu of punishment. When an order of transfer is passed in lieu of punishment, the same is liable to be set aside being wholly illegal.

6. The Supreme Court has clearly held in para 16 that, where malafides on the part of the authority are proved in issuing the transfer Signature Not Verified 1 (2009) 2 SCC 592 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:04.09.2025 12:51:59 W.P.(C) 13427/2025 order, the Court would be justified in interfering with the transfer order.

7. In the present case, we are constrained to observe that, much less any proof of mala fides in issuing of the impugned transfer order, there is nothing to indicate any link between the alleged whistle- blowing activities of the petitioner and the transfer.

8. Mr. Sangwan has addressed us at length on the various whistle- blowing activities in which the petitioner has engaged himself. We do not deem it necessary to enter into all these allegations, in the absence of anything to connect the impugned transfer order therewith. Mr. Sangwan also sought to contend that owing to the whistle-blowing activities of the petitioner, he was repeatedly targeted, inter alia by issuing, to him, a baseless chargesheet and denying him transport allowance, among other things.

9. No challenge, in the present case, has been laid to any such act of the respondents.

10. The challenge in the present writ petition is specifically to the order of transfer. We reiterate that, in the absence of any connection being made out, even prima facie, between the transfer order and the alleged whistle-blowing activities and consequent victimization of the petitioner, the said submissions are completely tangential to the issue in controversy. Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:04.09.2025 12:51:59 W.P.(C) 13427/2025

11. Qua his above submissions, Mr. Sangwan sought to rely on para 16 of Somesh Tiwari, reproduced supra. A reading of the said paragraph clearly indicates that the said case cannot in any way be compared with the facts before us.

12. In fact, in the said case, the Supreme Court has clearly held that it is open to the respondents to transfer an employee in administrative exigencies. In the present case, the impugned order of transfer specifically states that the transfer is for administrative reasons.

13. The Supreme Court was concerned, in Somesh Tiwari, with a case in which the transfer was punitive, on the basis of allegations against the appellant in that case, contained in an anonymous complaint. The Supreme Court clearly held that, while it was open to the respondents to transfer an employee in administrative exigencies, it was “another thing to say that the order of transfer is passed by way of or in lieu of punishment.” It is clarified, in the same paragraph, that where the order of transfer is passed in lieu of punishment, the transfer order is liable to be set aside being wholly illegal.

14. In the present case, it is not even the petitioner’s argument that the order of transfer is by way of punishment, save and except to state that it is retaliatory in nature.

15. Mr. Sangwan has not been able to draw our attention to a scintilla of material as would even enable us to arrive even at a prima facie conclusion that the transfer order is vitiated by mala fides or was Signature Not Verified by way of retaliation against the alleged whistle-blowing activities of Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:04.09.2025 12:51:59 W.P.(C) 13427/2025 the petitioner.

16. Accepting Mr. Sangwan’s submissions, in such circumstances, would amount to holding that, by leveling allegations against the officials of the department or engaging in whistle-blowing activities, whether rightly or wrongly, an employee insulates himself forever from transfer. This, quite obviously, can never be the position in law.

17. Transfer is an incidence of service. The situations in which an order of transfer can be legally challenged are well settled in law. We may reproduce the relevant paragraphs from Pubi Lombi v State of Arunachal Pradesh2: In the case of Union of India v S.L. Abbas3, it is clearly “9. observed by this Court that the scope of judicial review is only available when there is a clear violation of statutory provision or the transfer is persuaded by malafide, non-observation of executive instructions does not confer a legally enforceable right to an employee holding a transferable post. The relevant paragraph reads as under: “7. Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject……..”

10. Further, following the footsteps of S.L. Abbas (supra) this Court in the case of Union of India v N.P. Thomas4, held that the interference by the Court in an order of transfer on the instance of an employee holding a transferrable post without any violation of statutory provision is not permissible. This Court further curtailed the scope of judicial review in 11. the case of N.K. Singh v Union of India5, holding that the person