✦ High Court of India · 07 Dec 2006

T**" December v. UOI & Anr.

Case Details High Court of India · 07 Dec 2006
Court
High Court of India
Decided
07 Dec 2006
Length
7,787 words

Cited in this judgment

through Mr. SanjayPoddar, Advocate. # t Jai Singh & Ors. VS AND ....Respondents through: S/sh.D.V.Khatri, S.S. Gulia, P.C. Sharma, Sanjeev Kumar and Mr. Roop Chand, Advocates. # Bhoop Singh LAAPP No. 281/2006 & CM 5117/2006 ....Appellants through:S/sh.D.V.Khatri, S.S. Gulia,P.C. Sharma,Sanjeev LAAPPNo.l89-91/2006&conn.matters r~) Versus $ A Union of India and Another. Kumar and Mr. Roop Chand, Advocates. ....Respondents through:Mr.SanjayPoddar forUOI. Mr. Gaurav Sarin for DDA. Union of India # Bhoop Singh AND T,AAFP NO. Simm & CM 17950/2005 Appellants throughMr. SanjayPoddar, Advocate. VS. ....Respondent through:S/sh.D.V.Khatri,S.S. Gulia,P.O. Sharma,Sanjeev Kumairand Mr. Roop Chand, Advocates. AND TAAPPNO. 568/2005 Ranbir Singh Versus Union of India and Another. # ! $ A ....Appellant through: S/sh.D.V.Khatri, S.S. Gulia, P.C. Sharma, Sanjeev Kumar and Mr. Roop Chand, Advocates, ....Respondents through: Mr. Sanjay Poddar forUOI. IVfr. Gaurav Sarin for DDA. AND LAAPP No.l89-91/2006&conn.matters Union of India # Ranbir Singh T.A APP NO. 7S2/2()05& CM 17517/2005 Appellant throughMr. SanjayPoddar, Advocate. VS ....Respondent through:S/sh.D.V.Khatri,S.S. Gulia,P.C. Sharma,Sanjeev Kumar and Mr. Roop Chand, Advocates. AND TAAPPNO. 648/2005 # Raghbir Versus $ Union of India and Another. ....Appellant through;S/sh.D,V.Khatri,S.S. Gulia,P.C. Sharma, Sanjeev Kumar and Mr. Roop Chand, Advocates. ....Respondents through: Mr. Sanjay Poddar forUOI. Mr. Gaurav Sarin for DDA. AND LAAPP NO. 326/2006 T- # Bhoop Singh ....Appellant through: S/sh.D.V.Khatri, S.S. Gulia, P.Ci Sharma, Sanjeev Kumar and Mr. Roop Chand, Advocates. 'sJ LAAPP No.l89-91/2006&conn.matters r? Versus $ UnionofIndia and Another. ....Respondents through;Mr. SanjayPoddar forUOI. Mr. Gaurav Sarin for DDA. Union of India # Bhoop Singh AND T.A APP NO. 835/m'^ & CM 17977/2005 Appellants throughMr. SanjayPoddar, Advocate. VS AND ....Respondent through:S/sLd.V.Khatri,S.S. Gulia,P.C. Sharma,Sanjeev Kumar and Mr. Roop Chand, Advocates. Raghbir Singh # ! LAAPP No. 609/2005 ....Appellant through:S/sh.D.V.Khatri,S.S. Gulia,P.C. Sharma, Sanjeev Kumar and Mr. Roop Chand, Advocates. Versus $ Union of India and Another. ....Respondents through: Mr. Sanjay Poddar forUOL Mr. Gaurav Sarin for DDA. AND LAAPP NO. 864/2005 & CM 18104/2005 V LAAPP No.l89-91/2006&conn.matters Page4 of 32 Union of India RaghbirSingh c # j throughMr. SanjayPoddar, Advocate. ....Respondent through:S/sh.D.V.Khatri,S.S. Gulia,P.C. Sharma,Sanjeev Kumar and Mr. Roop Chand, Advocates. VS AND TAAPP Nos. 183/2006.1S4/2006.845/2005 &CMs. 18016/2005&5629/2006, 319-21/2006.779-80/2005.783/2005.802/2005&CM 17867/2005,813/2005& CM 17909/2005.834/2005 & CM 17973/2005.841/2005 & cm 17997/2005, 843/2005 & CM 18009/2005.847/2005 & CM 18084/2005.859/2005 & CM 18079/2005. 860/2005 & CM 18087/2005. 861/2005 & cm 18092/2005, 863/2005 & CM 18100/2005.865/2005 & cm 18108/2005.336-37/2007& CM 6664/2006. 858/2005 & CM 18074/2005. 836/2005 17981/2005. 595/2005. 596/2005. 604/2005. 605/2005. 606/2005. 607/2005. .608/2005. ^7/ #005. 620/2005. ^21/2005. 647/2005. 649/200& 650/2005,Vd85/200i 1)05 & cm 15900/95W3/200^ 718/2005 & CM 16906/2005.720/2005 & 17191/2005.777/2005 & an 17304/2005. 778/2005 & CM 17308/2005.781/2005 & cm 17408/2005. 792/2005 & CM 17813/2005. 797/2005 & CM 17835/2005. 798/2005 & CM 17841/2005, 799/2005 & cm 17845/2005. 793/2005 & CM 17817/2005. 794/2005 & 17823/2005.801/2005 & 17866/2005.803/2005 & CM 1786.3/2005.804/2005 & CM 17874/2005.806/2005 & CM 17877/2005.807/2005 & CM 17885/2005, ^ 808/2005 & CM 17889/2005.^809/2005& cm 17893/2005.810/2005 & CM 17897/2005. 811/2005 & CM 17900/2005. 814/2005 & cm 17913/2005, 815/2005 & CM 17917/2005. 816/2005 .& CM 17922/2005. 818/2005 & cm 17930/2005.819/2005 & CM 17934/2005.820/2005 & cm 17938/2005.821/2005 & CM 17942/2005. 827/2005 & CM 17946/2005. 829/2005 & CM 17954/2005. 830/2005 & CM 17958/2005. 831/2005-& CM 17962/2005. 832/2005 & CM 17966/2005. 833/2005 & CM 17970/2005. 837/2005 & CM 17985/2005. 838/2005 & CM 18001/2005. 840/2005 & CM 17993/2005. 842/2005 & CM 18005/2005. 846/2005 & CM 18020/2005. 848/2005 & CM 18031/2005. 849/2005 & CM 18030/2005. 850/2005 & CM 852/2005 & CM 18050/2005, 18045/2005. 851/2005 & CM 18042/2005. 844/2005 & CM 18013/2005. -\J LAAPPNo.l89-91/2006&conn,matters

8.^3/2005 & CM 18054/2005,854/2005 & CM 18058/2005.855/2005 & CM & cm 18065/2005. 857/2005 & CM 18070/2005, 862/2005&CM 18096/2005. 58/2006&CM 1068/2006.59/2006&Cms.1154- ^1155/2006. 279/2006 & Cms. 5108-5110/2006. 280/2006 & Cms. 5111- 5113/2006. 594/2005. 817/2005 & CM 17926/2005. 822-26/2005. 574/2005. 575/2005.576/2005:577/2005.592/2005 CORAM: HON'RT.K MR. TUSTTCE SWATANTER KUMAR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. L. BHAYANA

1. Whetherreportersof localpapermay be allowedto see the judgment?

2. Tobereferredto thereporteror not? .

3. Whetherthe judgmentshouldbereferredin the Digest? . SWATANTER KUMAR. .T. All the above 111 Land AcquisitionAppealshave been preferredeitherby. the claimantsor by the Union of India against the judgmentsof the Reference ^ Court wherebyit partiallyallowed the referenceand grantedcompensationto the claimants @Rs.1,08,000/- per bigha with other statutory benefits and interest payablein termsofprovisionsofSection23 (1-A)ofthe Land AcquisitionAct. It is not necessaryfor us to refer to the facts of each appeal as the learned counselappearingfor the appellantsin all these appealsarguedand referredto the pleadingsand recordof thefollowingappeals (a) Bhoop Singh Vs. Union of India& Others(LAAPPNo. 281/2006) (b) Union of India Vs. Bhoop Singh (LAAPP No. 828/2005) A.; LAAPPNo,189-91/2006&conn.matters Page 6 of32 (c) Jai Singhand OthersVs. Unionof India&Othes(LAAPP 189-91/06) .p (d) \ Unionof IndiaVs. Jai Singhand Others(LAAPPNo.812/2005) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) RanbirSinghVs. Unionof India&Another(LAAPPNo. 568/2005) Unionof IndiaVs. RanbirSingh(LAAPPNo. 782/2005) RaghbirVs. UnionofIndia&Another(LAAPPNO. 649/2005) Bhoop SinghVs. UnionofIndia&Ors (LAAPPNO. 326/2006) UnionofIndiaVs. BhoopSingh (LAAPP.No.835/2005) RaghbirSinghVs. Unionof India&Another(LAAPP.No. 609/2005) (k) UnionofIndiaVs. RaghbirSingh(LAAPP.No.864/2005) These cases were also taken as lead cases by the ReferenceCourt and the judgmentspassed in these cases were relied upon in disposingof otherreferences as well. Thus, we would be referringprimarilyto the facts and evidenceledin the above mentionedcases as it would help in bringingthe correctfacts and evidence on record and would also help in determinationof questions involved in the presentappeals. We would disposeof allthese appealsby thiscommonjudgment. All the claimantsare bhumidaror owners of agriculturalland fallen in the revenue estate of Village Bakarwala. This land was acquiredfor public purpose namely "Water Treatment Plant for Dwarka Project" vide notificationdated 15th October, 1993, issued under Section 4 of the Land AcquisitionAct (hereinafter referredto as the Act). Declarationunder Section6 was issued on Tlth October,

1994. The appropriate Government invoked the emergency provisions under LAAPPNo.189-91/2006&conn.matters Page7of32 Section17(1)of the Act for dispensingwith the complianceof Section5A of the Act. After following the prescribedprocedure,the Land AcquisitionCollector vide award No.12/95-96had assessed the market value of the acquiredland at Rs.4.65lakhs per acre (Rs.96,875/-perbigha). This compensationwas computed by the Collectorwith referenceto the policy of the Governmentof Delhi, which came into effect from 27th April, 1990 fixing the minimum price of the agriculturalland atRs.4.65lakhsper acre. The claimantsbeing dissatisfiedwith the award of the Collectorpreferred referencesunder Section 18 of the Act, which in turn were referredto the learned DistrictJudge,Delhi. The partiesled evidence.The claimants,while relyingupon the sale instances,award, allotmentletters issued by the DDA to various public institutions, had claimed compensation @Rs.2000/- per square yards. The ReferenceCourt, keeping in view the pleadingsof the parties,had framed all or any of thefollowingissues

1. What is the effect of the Delhi Land Reforms Act on the market value of the land?

2. Whetherthe Delhi Land Reforms Act is applicableto the land in dispute and if so, to what effect?

3. Whetherthe Delhi Jal Board is not a necessaryparty to the presentproceedings as claimed by it?

4. What was the market value of the acquiredland on the date of notificationunder Section 4 of the LA Act?

5. To what enhancement,if any, the claimantsare entitledto? 'V LAAPPNo.l89-91/2006&conn.matters Page 8of 32

6. Whetherthe claimantsare entitledto the specialdamagesas claimedfor? ^ 7. Relief. The claimantshad producedfour sale deeds in the case of Jai Singh Vs. Union of India, LAC No. 77/04, which as recorded by the trial Court in its judgmentswere exhibitedas Exh.P-1 to Exh. P-4 with the consentof counselfor the parties. Therespondentshad producedthe GovernmentPolicydated 3rdMay, 1990, which was exhibitedas Exh.R-2 and two sale deeds in relationto sale of land in VillageMundaka,which were exhibitedas Exh.R-3 and Exh.R-4. In this case, the parties had not led any oral evidence. However,in the case of Raghbir Singh Vs. Union of India (LAC No. 208/2004) and Ranbir Singh Vs. Union of India (LAC No. 239/2004),the parties had also led oral evidence.The claimant had examinedPW-1 Khem Singh, UDC from DDA in LAC No. 104/99,who had broughtthe summonedrecord and copy of letterof allotmentto institutiondated 8th November, 1999, Exh. PW-l/A. PW-2 Parkash Chand again a UDC from L&DO, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi, had produced and proved on record Exh.PW-2/Aand Exh.PW2/B,first was the letterdated 3rd M^ch, 1993 regarding fixationof prices of Govt. land for allotmentof various social,cultural,charitable and other organisationswhile the other was regardingschedule of market rates. PW-3 Rajeev Kumar, Halka Patwari had proved on record Exh. PW3/A being certifiedphotocopyof ak sajraof VillageBakarwalaand he had also statedthat it was surroundedby VillageMundakain North,Baprola,Dichao Kala and Tilanpur LAAPP No.189-91/2006&conn.matters Kotla in South, Village Ranhola in East and Village Zafar pur Hiran Kudna in West. He particularlystatedthattheboundaryofVillageMundakaandBakarwala jy are adjoining. PW-4 Anar Singh stillanotherUDC from DDA, LAB Residential, Vikas Sadan, New Delhi had proved Exh.PW4/A and Exh.PW4/B being photocopiesof the letterswhere rates were given but they were excessiveand in the lease deed they were corrected. Copy of the leasedeed executedbetweenone VirenderSinghand DDA beingExh.PW4/Cwas also provedon record. In LAC No. 111/99 before the Reference Court, one Surender Singh Patwariwas also examinedas PW-1, who had broughtthe DDA file to show that letter dated 8th September, 1993 was addressed to Delhi Water Supply and SewageDisposalUndertakingby the AdditionalCommissionerofDDA pertaining to physicalpossessionof the landmeasuringabout20 bighas 10 biswasin Village Najafgarh,which was taken from DDA on 25th October,1994. PW-2 S.P, Dagar, Record Clerk from Sub RegistrarOffice of Janakpurihad proved the sale deed Exh.PW2/l dated 23rd April, 1993. PW-4 Khem Singh, UDC from DDA was examined to prove the record of Institutionalletter dated 8th November, 1993, which was exhibitedas Exh.PW4/A. PW-3 Amar Singh was examinedto prove allotment of auction plot at Pitampura. PW-5 Prakash Chand, UDC, L&DO, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi had again proved the letter dated 3rd March, 1993 regardingfixation of prices of Govt. land for allotmentof various social cultural and charitableand other organisationsand copy of letter regarding schedule of AJ LAAPPNo.l89-91/2006&conn.matters I marketrate, which were exhibitedas Exh.PW5/Aand Exh.PW5/B. PW-6 Rajiv ^ Kumar,Halka Patwariwas also examinedin this case. PW-7 Anar Smgh, UDC, DDA, L&B Residential,Vikas Sadan,New Delhiwas also examined,who proved the Exh.PW7/A and Exh.PW7/B in relation to allotment of plot in Pitampura @Rs.286.50per square meter. All thesewitnesseswere also examinedin LAC No. 70/99 titledas Dharam Singh Vs. Union of India. Above is the entiredocumentaryand oral evidenceled by the partiesin all these cases. Vide different judgments, the learned Reference Court granted uniform compensationto the claimants in all these cases. The claimants were ^ awarded compensation@Rs.1,08,000/-per bigha in addition to other statutory benefitsand interestpayableundertheprovisionsofthe Act. TheReferenceCourt while solely relying upon Exh.R-4,which was asale deed dated 4th March, 1994 in relationto 1bighaof agriculturalland in the revenueestateof VillageMundaka for considerationof Rs.l lakh and by adding the stamp value of Rs.8,000/-,had granted the compensation @Rs.1,08,000/- per bigha to the claimants. The claimantsbeing dissatisfiedfrom the judgmentof the ReferenceCourt have filed 38 appeals before this Court praying for further enhancement of awarded compensationwhilethe Unionof Indiahas preferred73 appealson the groundthat compensationawarded by the Reference Court is excessive, unreasonableand without any evidence and pray that the award of the Collector awarding -V LAAPPNo.l89-91/2006&conn.matters . Page 11 of 32 \ /• compensation@Rs.Rs.4.65lakhsperacre(Rs.96,875/-perbigha)be restored. ^ Beforereferringto themeritsofthe contentionsraisedby learnedCounsel appearingfor the partiesin all theseappeals,it willbe appropriateto have aglance of the various sale deeds, which were produced and proved by the parties on record in these cases. Sr.No Detailsofsale deeds Village Date of execution Valueper Tikri Kalan 23.4.1993 Rs.3,02,400/-

4. Rs.3,02,400/-for land measuring 1 bigha (Exh. P-l)(LACNo.77/2004) Rs.9,07,200/-for land measuring 3 bigha (Exh. P-2) (LAC No.77/2004) Rs.3,02,400/-for land measuring 1 bigha • (Exh.P-3)(LACNo.77/2004) Rs.4,50,000/-for land measuring 1 bigha (Exh.P-4)(LACNo.77/2004) Tikri Kalan 23.4.1993 Rs.3,02,400/- Tikri Kalan 23.4.1993 Rs.3,02,400/- Tikri Kalan 28.2.1996 Rs.4,50,000/- Sr.No Detailsof sale deeds

2. Rs.l,25,000/-for land measuring 1 bigha (Exh. P-l/P-3)(LAC No. 111/99) Rs.l,83,000/-for land measuring 1 bigha2-1/4biswas (Exh. P-3) (LAC No. 111/99) Village Date of execution Value per Mundaka

27.2.1990 Rs.1,25,000/- Mundalca

24.1.1992 Rs.1,64,494/- LAAPP No.l89-91/2006&conn.inatters Sr.No Detailsofsale deeds

1. 2 Rs.50,000/-for land measuring2 bigha7 biswas (Exh.R-3XLACNo.77/2004) Rs.1,00,000/-for land measuring 1 bigha (Exh. R-4)(LACNo.77/2004) Village Date of execution Valueper Mundaka

11.3.1994 Rs.21,276/- Mundaka

4.3.1994 Rs.1,00,000/- On the basis of above sale deeds and other documentaryand oral evidence produced by claimants, learned counsel appearing for claimants/appellantsarguedthat the compensationawardedto the claimantsought to be enhancedby this Court,inter-alia,on the followinggrounds (i)the learned Reference Court has fallen in error of law and appreciationof evidenceby discardingExh.P-3, which is the sale deed dated 27th February, 1990 for sale of one bigha of land wherein the vendor had sold one bigha of land in the revenue estate of Village Mundakafor a sum of Rs.1,25,000/-and solely relied upon a post notificationsale deed in relationto the same Village while awardingthe compensation(Exh.R-4). (ii)on the basis of Exh.P-3, the claimantswould be entitledto get compensation @Rs.1,35,000/-(Rs.1,25,000/-being sale consideration+Rs.10,000/- towards stampduty) with furtherincrease@15% per annum from the year 1990 to 1993, the date of issuance of notification under Section 4, which comes to Rs.2,08,406/-. (iii)tiie Reference Court while relying upon Exh.P-2 should have awarded compensation@Rs.3,02,400/-per bigha whereby the land measuring about 3 bigha in the revenue estate of Village Tikri Kalan was sold for a sum of Rs.9,07,200 on 23rd April, 1993 just few months prior to the issuance of Notificationunder Section 4 of the Act. Thus, this was the best piece of evidence before the Reference Court for determining tiie fair and reasonable market'value of the land. LAAPP No.l89-91/2006&conn.matters • (iv)theReferenceCourt has ignoredExhP-l,the saledeed in relationto the land situatedin the VillageGhewra. • (v)intermsof GovernmentPolicyExh.R-1.the claimants ^ @12% compoundingper year on the valuefixed under the Pohcy. In terms of this policy, as of 1993, the claimants would be entitled to compensation @Rs.l,72,000/-perbighain any case. \(h (vi)whileheavily relying upon Exh.PWl/A,the letter issued by the Delhi Water Supply and SewageDisposalUndertaking,it was argued that the DDA, without any further developmentand in fact in the conditionsin which the land was acquired, had allotted land to the undertaking @Rs.4,00/-per squareyard. Even after making the deduction@25%, the marketv^ue of me land ought to have been determinedat Rs.3,00/-per squareyard i.e. 3,02,40U/- perbigha. (vii)anancillaryargumentto the aboveis thatby applyingthe GoldenMean Rule to all the above computation,the claimantsin any case would be entitledto compensation@Rs.226/-per squareyardi.e. 2,28,848/-perbigha. On the other hand, the learnedcounselappearingfor the respondent/Union of India contendedthat it is not permissiblein law to apply the principleof 15% increaseas thereis no rule even permittinguniversalincrease@12% annually and for this purposehe placedrelianceupon the judgmentof this Court in the case of Bedi Ram Vs. Union of India and Another 93 (2001)DLT 150 (DB) and Amar Singh Vs. Union of India (RFA No. 494/88 decidedon 7th February,2003). He also contended that the land at the time of acquisition was simplicitor an agricultural land and the rates of the developed land whether applicable to institutionalor commercial colonies cannot be taken as a guiding factor for determining the market value of the acquired land. While -relying upon the LAAPPNo.l89-91/2006&conn.matters judgment of Supreme Court in the case Kiran Tandon Vs. Allahabad, ^DevelopmentAuthority&Another (2004)10SCC745,it was also contended ^ that even if any sale deeds are to be taken into consideration,the Court should apply at least 33% deduction for determining the fair market value of the agriculturalland. On this premise,it is argued that firstly the sale deeds have not been proved in accordancewith law by the claimantsand even if they are to be taken into consideration,the reflectedvalue would have to be, reducedin terms of this principleof law. It is lastly submittedthat the value of Exh.R-4shouldhave been reducedkeeping in view the fact that the sale deed was much subsequentto the date of issuanceof notificationand the compensationawardedby the Collector would be fair. Firstly we would deal with the contentsof Exh.PWl/A. This documentis heavily relied upon by the claimantsand they claimed compensation@Rs.300/- per square yards after making certain deductions on account of development charges. This is a letter issued by the DDA to Delhi Water Supply & Sewerage Disposal Undertakingvide which land measuring4.27 acre Site No.A-2, 4, 583 acres Site No.A-3 was allotted @Rs.l5.60 lakhs per acre. This rate was subsequentlyenhancedto Rs,20 lakhs per acre + 24% ground rent per annum. A bear readingof the lettershows that it relatedto allotmentof developedplot in the area of NazafgarhTownship. The land was given for the purposeof construction of Mini Sewage Treatment Plant and Sewage Pumping Station for Nazafgarh LAAPPNo.l89-91/2006&conn.matters Township and adjoining areas. It has been held in different cases that tlie ^ allotment by the authorities of developed areas cannot be good guide for determiningthe fair marketvalue of the agriculturalland, which is acquiredand more particularlywhen the instances of sale of agriculturalland of the same village are available on record. Reference in this regard can be made to a judgmentof the SupremeCourtin the case of BhimSinghand OthersVs. State nf Hnrvana and Another AIR 2003 SC 4382. The burden of proving that the claimants are entitled to the same compensation @ Exh. PWl/A even after reasonabledeductionwas entirelyupon the claimants. It was for them to show that acquiredland had the same locationand potentialas the land coveredunder Exh. PWl/A. As far as this document itself is concerned, it does not reflect specificallythat from which part of Delhi the land was allotted,muchless giving ^ the revenue estate of relevant Village. The NajafgarhTownship area is a very vast area and thus, it is not possible for the Court to adopt this document as a relevantcomparablepiece of evidencefor adjudicatingthe controversyin issue. For this reason, we are unable to accept the contentionof the claimantsthat they are entitledto get compensationon the strengthof Exh.PWl/A. Exh.P-1 to P-4 ( in LAC 77/2004) are the sale instances of agriculturalland relating to. the land situated in the revenue estate of Village Tikri Kalan. Of course all these sale instancesare prior to notificationissued under Section4 of the Act exceptExh.P- 4, which is in fact nearly 2 years post notificationand as sucli.is not relevantfor •V LAAPP No.l89-91/2006&conn.matters any purpose. As far as Exh.Plto P3 are concernedtheyrelateto revenueestateof anotherVillage.Exh.P-3 (in LAC No. 111/99) is asale instanceof agricultural landrelatingto the land situatedin the revenueestateofVillageGhewra. As taras Exh.P-2in LAC No. 77/2004is concerned,it is asalein favourof apubliclimited company where the vendorhad sold nearly3bighaof agriculturalland from the revenue estate of VillageTikri Kalan for a total considerationof Rs.9,07,200/-. This sale at the face of it was more for acommercialpurposeand relatedto sale of landin anothervillage.PW6Rajiv Kumar,HalkaPatwariin his statementno where statedthat boundariesof VillageTikri Kalan and VillageGhewrawere adjacentto that of Village Bakarwalaand the nature, user and potentialof the land of these villages were similar, if not identical. In the absence of any such specific ^ evidence, the Court would not take into considerationExh.Pl to P4 in LAC No.77/2004and Exh.P-3 in LAC No. 111/99 in determiningthe fair market value of the land in question. As far as R-3 in LAC No. 77/2004is concerned,it is asale deed producedby the respondentvide which land measuringabout 2bigha and 7 biswas in Village Mundaka was sold for a sum of Rs.50,000/-on 11th March, 1994 i.e. subsequentto the date of notificationin the presentcase. As per Exh.R- 3, the value of the land wouldbeRs.21,276/-per bighawhile the Collectorhimself has awardeda sum of Rs.96,875/-per bigha. Thus, Exh. R-3 is also an irrelevant documentfor determiningthemarketvalue of the land in question. Having discardedthe above documentaryevidence now we are left with V LAAPPNo.l89-91/2006&conn.matters- Pagel7of32 Exh.R-1, Exh.R-4 and Exh.P-3 and the oral evidence led by the parties to substantiatetheir respectiveclaims. Exh.R-4relatesto sale of 1bighaof land in the revenueestateof VillageMundaka,which was sold for atotal considerationof Rs.l lakh as on 4th March, 1994. This sale instanceis nearly6 monthssubsequent to the date of notificationissued by the authoritiesunder Section 4 of the Act. Exh.P3 in LAC NO. 111/99relatesto the sale ofone bigha of land in the revenue estateof Village Mundakafor aconsiderationof Rs.l,25,000/-on 27th February, 1990 i.e. nearly 2-1/2 years priorto issuanceof notificationin question. Exh.R-2 is the Governmentpolicy dated 3rd May, 1990 vide which the Governmenthad fixed the minimum price of agriculturalland in the Union Territory of Delhi @Rs.4.65lakhs per acre in additionto otherbenefits. Learned Reference Court has noticed the Government policy Exh.R-2 fixingthe minimumpriceof all the agriculturalland by the Governmentat Rs.4.65 lakhs per acre but has declinedto considerthe same for awardingcompensationto the claimantsby stating"An increaseat 12% per annum featingthe base value at Rs.4.65lacs per acre on 27.4.90as per policyEx.R2 cannotbe grantedas specific evidence as to the prevailingprice as per Ex.R4 is available on record which pertainsto sale of agriculturalland in the vicinity." While making the above observations,the learnedReferenceCourt granted compensation@Rs.1,08,000/-per bigha on the basis of Exh.R-4. However, the ReferenceCourtrejectedand treatedExh.P-3 as not agenuinetransaction. Exh.P3 LAAPPNo.l89-91/2006&conn.matters is asaleinstancerelatingto saleofland in the revenueestateof VillageMundaka. There does not appear to be any plausible reason, much less a logical differentiationin the reasoningfor rejectingP-3 and entirelyrelyingupon Ex.R-4. In relation to Ex.P3, it has been stated that respondents have challengedthe correctnessof Exh.P3 as no evidencehas been led by the petitionersto show that the land in VillageBakarwalahad the same potentialas that of the plot of land sold as per Exh.Pl/P3 in Village Mundaka. Exh.Pl to P3 were tendered in evidenceand were duly acceptedby the Court in presenceof the counselfor the • parties.As is clearfrom the orderof the referenceCourtdated 13thMay, 2004,the documents were filed, they were taken on record and then were tendered in evidenceon behalf of the claimantsand as there was no objectionto exhibitthe documentsand read them in evidencein accordancewith law, they were exhibited r by asubsequentorderpassedon the same date. Once the respondentshave waived objection,if any, in regard to exhibitionand admissibilityof the documentthen they could not even be heard to question the correctnessof the said document particularlywhen they themselvesled no oral evidenceand only tenderedExh.R-1 to R4 in evidencein terms of order of the ReferenceCourtdated 20th April, 2005. The partiesopted to only tenderthe documentin evidenceand arguedthe cases on the strengthof such document. It may also be noticedthat certifiedcopies of the sale instances have been filed in some cases while photocopies of the sale instanceswere filed still in some other cases. The copies of both Exh.Pl and R4, r I V LAAPPNo.l89-91/2006&conn.matters thus were admitted in evidence and treated as relevant evidence by the Court. >^Rejectionofone andacceptanceofotheratasubsequentstage,cannotbe saidto be just and proper. We must also notice at this stage that the parties had participatedin the entiretrial of differentcases withoutraisingany objectionwith regardto exhibitionand admissibilityof these documents. Objectionin regardto exhibitionand admissibilityin evidenceof an documentis a waivableobjection and a party by expression or conduct can waive such an objection. Having participatedin the entiretrial, none of them can be heard to objectto exhibition and admissibilityof the same documents. Equally without merit is the other reason given by the learned reference It has been recordedby the Reference Court that the Court for rejectingP-3. petitionershave failed to lead any evidenceto show that land situatedin Village Mundakahas the same potentialas thatof VillageBakarwala. Firstly,this finding is not supportedfrom the record. As per the statementof PW-6, the land of Village Mundaka was adjacent to Village Bakarwala towards north. He also provedon recordExh.PW6/A,which showsthatboundaryof both thesevillagesis If this reasonis to adjacent. Even the claimantshave so statedbeforethe Court. be taken as correct,in that event, the ReferenceCourt could not have reliedupon Exh.R-4 as such in arrivingat the conclusionin the judgmentunder appeal. The respondenthad admittedlyled no oral evidence and has only placed on record Exh.R-1 to R-4. None of these documentsshows that potentialof the land of both LAAPPNo.l89-91/2006&conn.matters Page20 of 32 villages are identicalor similar. On the same analogy,learned ReferenceCourt ^shouldhaverejectedExh.R-4. Thereis apparentanomalyin the reasoninggiven by the learnedReferenceCourt. Learnedcounselappearingfor the claimantsalso reliedupon the judgment of this Court in the case of Smt Omwati Vs.Union of Tndia and Another (L.A.APPL.No.94/2006 decided on 27th April, 2006) and argued that the same compensationcould be awardedto the claimantswith such reasonablededuction as may be permissiblein law. For this purpose,he againreliedupon the statement of PW-6 Rajiv Kumar, Halka Patwari to say that there is a boundaryof village Ranhola in the east of the acquired land. It is also contendedon behalfof the claimantsthat while assessingthe market value of the acquiredland, it must be taken into considerationthat what use the land is capableofbeing put to in future and the Court should consider the possibilitiesof the land and not its realized possibilities while determiningsuch matters. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the judgment of the Privy Council the case of Vyricherla Naravana Gaiapatiraiu Vs. Revenup- DivisionalOfficer.VizagapatnamAIR 1939 Privy Council 98. It is true that this Court had consideredat some length these aspects of acquisitionproceedingswith particularreferenceto the land in the revenueestaet . of VillageRanhola. Not only the potential/futurepotentialof the land but also the value of the land is to be determinedwith referenceto the minimumprice of land LAAPP No.l89-91/2006&conn.matters Page 21 of32 mentionedby the Governmentin its own letterwas consideredand the Court held as under I "15 They are documentspreparedby the governmentafter due verificationand surveys,but ^e documentsitselfdoes not refer to any distinct piece of evidence which was considered by the government for determining the minimum price payable for acquisition of agricultural land. At the same time, this policy decisionof the governmentcannot be treated to be either entirely inadmissible or irrelevant for the purpose of determining the controversyin issue. This reflects the conscious decision of the appropriategovernmentnot to allow registrationof the sale deeds, whereinthe agriculturallands anywhereinDelhi are proposedto be sold below the specified rate i.e. Rs.4.65 lacs per acre (i.e. Rs. 1,11,778.84per bigha). This value was fixed in the year 1990. We do not intendto say that the governmentis bound by this price and the claimantsmust get this price, but with such,variationsthat are permissiblein law, this would be some kind of a guidelinefor the court to arrive at just and fair market value of the land at the relevant time. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent. Union of India, whilerelyingon thejudgmentof the SupremeCourt in the case of VirenderSinsh (supra) argued that small pieces of landcannotat allbe lookedinto bythe courtswhile determiningthe compensation payable to the claimants for acquisition of vast stretchesof lands. Firstly,this is, in our view not a correctreading of the judgmentof the Supreme Court and secondly, the facts of that case were entirely different. Their Lordshipsof the Supreme Court held that "small bit of transaction would not be determinative factor for deciding the market value of vast stretch of land" where the land was acquiredto the extent of 5,484-bighas and only one bigha vide Ex.Al was made the basis for awarding the compensationby the court, and the same was not acceptedby the SupremeCourt. In the presentcase, the acquisitionis only of 971 bighas but the sale instancesplaced on record by the claimants as well as the respondentswere of land measuring1 bigha to 4 bighas, as such these sale deeds cannotbe treated at parity with Ex.Al (in the case of Ramuhool and Anr. V5'. Union of India: 1998 V AD (Delhi)433). It willbe impractkable to imaginethat the claimants or even respondents are expected to tender evidence of sale transactionswhere hundredsof bighas have been purchasedor sold in acquisitionproceedingsor even sale of few hundreds of bighas. LAAPPNo.l89-91/2006&conn.matters No individualperson and for that matter, even a corporate body would sell or buy the lands in hundreds of bighas in a place like Union Territoryof Delhi, where yards of lands cost thousands of rupees. To require parties to lead such evidence is an illusory submissionrather than a pragmatic view. We may also refer to a judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Baldev Sinsh v.y. State of Harvana 1999 (3) PLR 141 where the courtdiscussedthis aspectas well as the aspectof the notifiedlands being surroundedby the boundariesof the revenueestatesof other villagesand its impacton thefixationof the compensationpayable. The court after detailed discussion held as under:- "'14. One can hardly trace any element of disparity between the case of Harpal Singh and the present appeals. In both the cases, the lands were acquired by the same notificationdated 26.5.1981. Lands were acquired by a common notification in the revenue estates of all the three villages i.e. Patti Mehar, Jandli and Sounda. It is also an admitted case and is equally reflected by the site plans The boundaries of the three Ex.P.lO and Ex.P.ll. revenue estates of these villages is common. In other words, the lands of each of these villages are adjacent to other while part of the land of Patti Mehar prior to the present acquisition was in MunicipalLimits. This has been so reflected in the cases of Pala Singh and Sudesh Kumar (Ex,P.9). The lands acquired are at a distancefrom the grain market while conmiercialised and developed when the lands in those areas were acquired. Thus, I find it difficultto plainly follow the said criteria for awarding the compensationin the present case. The necessary corollary thereto would be to make a reasonable deduction/cut from such amounts and to implement the rule of uniform compensation as afore-indicated to award the compensationwhich has been awarded in other connected cases for such similar lands. The lands in other cases are comparable or even somewhatsimilar. They havebeen acquiredfor one and the same purposeand, thus, differenceof part of the land from the other land acquired would not be places were LAAPPNo.l89-91/2006&conn.matters Page23 of 32 \ / of great significance. and enhance the For the reasons afore-stated I allow these 15. appeals compensation for acquisition of the lands of the land owners to Rs.2,91,800/-per acre. The land owners claimants would be entitled to statutory benefits under Sections 23 (1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Act in accordance with law. However, in the. facts and circumstancesof the case, there would be no orders as to costs. The appeals are, accordingly,allowed, limited to the above extent." Even inthe case of RavinderNgrain v.y. Union ofIndiaAIR 2003

16. SC1987, the Court held as under:- It cannot, however, be laid down as an absolute propositionthat the rates fixed for the small plots cannot be the basis for fixationof the rate. For example,where there is no other materialit may in appropriatecases be open to the adjudicatingCourt to make comparisonof the pricespaid for small plots of land. However, in such cases necess^ deductions/adjustmentshave to be made while determining the prices.

8. In the case of Suresh Kumar v. Town Improvement Trust,Bhopal(1989 (1) SVLR (C) 399) in acase under the Madhya PradeshTown ImprovementAct, 1960 this Court held that the rates paid for small parcels of land do not provide a useful guide for determining die market value of the land acquired. While determining the market value of the land acquired it has to be correctly determinedand paid so that there is neither unjustenrichmenton the part of the acquirernor undue deprivationon the part of the owner. It is an accepted principle as laid down in the case of Vyricheria Narayana Gajapatirajuv. Revenue DivisionalOfficer, Vizagapatnam, compensationmust be determinedby referenceto the pricewhich awillingvendormightreasonablyexpectto receivefrom the willingpurchaser." (AIR 1939 PC 98) 17, Furtherin the case of Union ofIndia vs. Bal Ram and another LAAPP No.l89-91/2006&conn.matters •I u \ / AIR 2004 SC3981, the Courtheld as under:- "The ground urged before us is that in view of the decisionin Kunwar Singh v. Union of India, 1998 (8) see 136 contiguityof villages could not by itself be sufficientto draw an inferenceof similarityin character of the lands in awarding the compensation and, therefore,the reasoningof the ffigh Courtis not correct. The High Courtindeeddid not rely upon the contiguity of the lands alone but if found that the nature/qualityof the lands is by and large similar to those lands consideredin Satpal'scase. If that is the finding of the High Court, we do not think there would be any justification to make any distinction between lands which had been lying in Palam and Shahbad Mohamadpur. Therefore,the view taken by the High Court cannot be faulted with. The High Court also found that it would be unfair to discriminate between the land owners to pay more to some and less to others when the purpose of acquisitionis same and lands are identicaland similar,though lying in differentvillages, we find the judgmentOf the High Court to be fair and reasonableand no interferenceis called for. Therefore, the appealsstandsdismissed."

18. It may also be noticed that certain principlesrelating to this aspectwere also enunciatedby the SupremeCourtin the case of The Land Acaumtion Officer. Revenue Divisional Officer. Nalsonda (A.P.) v,y. MnrisettvSatvanaravana& Ors. 2002 (1) All India Land Acquisitionand CompensationCases L Amongstothersit was held that normally, the court would not consider post notificationsale instancesand an order based upon such instancesmay be held to be erroneous. Where the court basis its findings on sale instances relating to small pieces of lands belonging to different persons, deductionis requiredto be made. But whereverthere is an increase in the market price of the land during the relevant years, then applyingthe developmentdeductionon these grounds would not be necessary. Theseprinciplesare to be kept by the courtin mind while determiningthe compensationpayableto the claimants.

19. We have akeady held that Ex. A4 (P4) and A3 cannot be looked into and the court cannot record its findings on the basis of LAAPP No.l89-91/2006&conn.matters such evidence. Thus, the court would be left with exhibits Rl, R2, R3, A1 and A2. Ex.Al relatesto the revenueestateof VillageTekri Kalan where 3 bighas of land was sold for Rs. 9,07,200/-. Vide Ex.A2, 1 bigha of land was sold for a sum of Rs. 1,25,000/-in the year 1990. There is no evidenceon record to show that the land in the revenue estate of Village Tekri Kalan is adjacentto the land in question and both the lands have same potentialand are capable of fetching the same price. PW2 in his affidavit Ex.PW2/A had specifically stated that Village Mundka is nearby and there are industries in those areas so the land acquired is fit for industrial development. Furthermore,even PWl in his statementhad stated that on the north of the revenue estate of Village Ranhola, Village Mundkais situated. Thus, the lands located in Village Mundka were statedto be little better than the acquiredland but both the lands were stated to be near each other and were having great potential,both industrial as well as residential. The acquired land has all the facilities and necessitiesof day-to-day life. Thus, exhibit A2 can easily be looked into for determiningthe fair market value of the acquiredland. For a sale instanceor other piece of evidence to be relevantit'must be 'a documentwhich is admissiblepiece of evidence and is a comparableinstance'. Of course, it is not necessarythat it should be an absolutelyidenticalpiece of land in comparisonto the acquiredlands. This is an indicationin regardto the price ofthe land surroundingthe acquired land. Vide Ex.A2 land has been sold in Village Mundka which as per the evidence on record is a more potential area having higher value and is to some extent even developed. This is the own admissionof the claimantsas such the claimants cannot be entitled to the same value as reflected in Ex.A2. Some amount of deduction would have to be made to balance the higher potential of Ex.A2 by lowering the extent of compensation payableto the claimants. In the facts and circumstancesof the case and the judgmentsreliedabove in the cases of BaldevSinsh (supra); RavinderNarain (supra)and Union ofIndia vs. Bal Ram andAnr. (supra),it will be appropriateto reducethe valueofthe acquiredland by 25% to balance the higher potentialof the developed areas and comparativelysmallerpieces of land in comparisonto the acquired land, locationetc., thus making thevalue @Rs.l lakh perbigha.

20. The respondentshave mainly relied upon Ex.R2 which again is a sale deed of small pieces of land. Ex.R2 is the document on which the thrust of the entire argumentof the respondentis based. This is a sale deed executedin the year 1994 for a land measuring LAAPP No.l89-91/2006&conn.matters about1bighain VillageSaffiPur Ranholafor asum of Rs.97,000/-. The notificationunderSection4was issuedon 6.1.1995whichwould be the relevantdate for determiningthe fair marketvalue of the land in question. Ex.R3 is still anothersale deed dated 30.4.96 i.e. post- notificationand vide this sale deed 4 bighas 16 biswas of land was sold in Village Saffi Pur Ranhola,Delhi. As per this sale deed the pricewouldbe nearlyRs.1,10,000/-perbighathoughthis saledeed is post-notificationbut stillit reflectsthe two very pertinentfacts which wouldthrow lighton determiningthe extentof compensationpayable to the claimants:- (a) That in Ex.R2, it has been recordedthat it was convertedinto a farmhouse and plans for that were sanctioned as back as on 4.12.1987. (b) Thatthereis increasingtrendin the pricesof the property.

21. As per Ex.R2, one bigha was sold for Rs.97,000/-in the year 1994, while the land was sold @Rs.1,10,000/-per bighain the year 1996 vide Ex.R3. Both these materialpieces of evidencehave not been advertedto by the learnedReferenceCourt. Even if this court treats Ex.R2 as the material piece of evidence as argued by the respondentsfor determiningthe fair marketvalue of the land at the time of acquisitionstill there is a gap of nearly 6 months in the date of sale of Ex.R2 and issuance of notification under Section 4 acquiringthe land in question. The claimantsin any case would be entitled to increase in the price again on various counts i.e. developmentof the surroundingareas,increasein valueof the land as well as other determining factors as contemplated under the provisionsof Section 23 of the Act. From the evidenceled by the appellants as well as the respondents there is hardly any major difference in the amount which can be determined as fair market valueofthe land at the time ofacquisition. On the basis ofEx. A2 as well as Ex.R2,the compensationpayablewouldapproximatelybe the same particularlykeepingin view the two basicingredientswhichwe have afore-noticedandas areclearfrom Ex. R3. The respondentsare boundby both theseexhibitsand mustbear the consequencesthereof. let us

22. Now, revert back to one basic document and consequencethereof,which completelyand discernlywould have to be consideredby the court. The policy of the governmentafore- noticed,had for reasons mentionedtherein, clearly directedthat the LAAPPNo.l89-91/2006&conn.matters Page27 of 32 \ / ^ ( ^ minimumprice of any agriculturalland anywherein Delhi wouldbe Rs.4.65 lacs per acre. This value was effectivefrom 27.4.1990. In other words, the minimumvalue of the agriculturalland, exceptthe river bed in Delhi, in the year 1995 would be much more than what has been indicatedin the policyof the government. The objectofthe policy is to ensure that people do not evade stamp duty and other liabilities,but at the same time it is a documentwhich is relevant. It may not be strictly binding on the State and cannot be enforced against the State as it is a documentprimarilypreparedto prevent evasionof revenueand tax. This documentagain is a fair indication of the market value prevalent in Delhi in the year 1990 which accordingto the Governmentshouldbe determinedas the 'minimum price'. There is apparentdistinctionbetween 'minhnumprice' and 'fair market value' of the land as contemplatedunder Section 23 of the Act. The expression'minimum' is capableofbeing understood and given different meanings in different contexts. But its basic understandingin commonparlancecan hardlybe altered. According to Century Dictionary,the word 'minimum' means smallestamount or degree and it is smallestand next to nothing(minimumest nihilo proximum). Even in contextto 'minimumwages'itindicates'thebare subsistenceminimum wages'. The Black'sLaw Dictionaryexplains the expression 'minimum as 'of, relating to, or constitutingthe smallest acceptableor possiblequantity in a given case, minimum chargeto acustomerof apublicutility'.

23. The clear consequenceof this expressionis that a 'fairmarket value' has to be read and construedin contradistinctionto 'minimum price' and cannot be treated synonymousto that expression. In all normal circumstances,'fair market value' should be higher than the 'minimumprice'. The determinationof the amountofcompensation to be awardedhas to take in its ambit the marketvalue of the landon the date of publicationof notificationand also such amounts which may become payable to the claimants in reference to second and sixth clausesto Section23 of the Act. Thus, marketvalue of theland is a basic criteria which the court has to essentially take into considerationfor determiningthe final amountof compensationto be awardedto the ownersof theland. It cannotbe the 'minimumprice' of the land. The concept of payment of compensationhas much wider connotationthan the 'minimumprice of the land'. In the case of Union of India and Ors. Pramod Guvta (D) by LRs and Ors. JT 2005 (8) SC 203, while elucidatingthe varioysprinciplesrelating ' to acquisitionproceedingsunder the provisionsofthe Act, the Court LAAPP No.l89-91/2006&conn.matters also observedthat the 'marketvalue'is the ordinarypricethe property may fetch in open market if sold by a willing seller in effect by special needs of aparticularpurchase. The court could consider othersale instancesin absenceof sales of similarlands and also such other evidencethat may be considered. The court emphasizedthat "The amount of compensation cannot be ascertained with mathematicalaccuracy. Acomparableinstancehas to be identified havingregardto the proximityfrom time angle as well as proximity from situationangle. For determiningthe market value of the land under acquisition,suitableadjustmenthas to be made havmg reg^d to various positive and negative factors vis-a-vis the land under acquisitionby placingthe two in juxtaposition. On properanalysisof the factualmatrixof the case, evidence 24. on record and the principlesof law afore-referredit is clear that in . terms of Ex.A2, sale deed relatingto October'1994,the land in the adjacentvillageof Mundkawas sold @Rs.1,25,000/-per bigha and by reducingthe amountfor betterdevelopedareas and locationetc., it will be just and fair to assess the compensationpayable to the claimants@ Rs.l lacs per bigha. Statement of PW-6 read in conjunction with Exh.PW6/A shows that acquiredland is surroundedby differentvillagesparticularlyVillagesRanholaand Mundaka. In regardto theseVillages,recentjudgmentsof this Courtis available and practicallyin all cases compensationawarded by the ReferenceCourt was enhancedor where the Court had declinedto increaseany amount,the amountof compensationwas reasonablyenhanced. The claimantshave also claimedenhancementon the price indicatedin the sale instancesor even in the policyofthe Governmentas they are quitepriorto the issuanceof the Notificationunder Section4of the Act. They claim 12% increase per annumon the considerationreferredto in thesedocumentsfor determiningthe LAAPPNo.l89-91/2006&conn.matters Page29 of 32 fair market value of the acquiredland.. To support their claim of 12% increase ^annually,they have relied upon aDivisionBench judgmentof this Court mthe case of Pameshwar Sd^nki & Another Vs. Union of India & Another 57 (1995)DLT 410 (DB). Exh.R-2is the policydeclaredby the Governmenton 30th April, 1990 fixing the minimumprice for acquisitionof agriculturalland. This priceis uniformallyapplicableto the entireDelhi withoutexception. Needlessto note thatit is the minimumpriceand not the fair marketvalueof the acquiredland as contemplatedunder Section23 of the Act. If claimantsare to be given some increase may be 12% per annum then the claimantswould be entitledto nearly Rs.1,59,284/-per bigha as the interveningperiodbetweenthe date of notification and the policyof the Governmentis more than 3years. It has not been disputed that this policywas subsequentlyamendedand the minimumprice of agricultural landhas been fixed at Rs.lOlakhsper acre with effectfrom 1st April, 1997,which has already been noticed in arecent judgmentof this Court in the case of SIl Mahender Singh V.. TTnion of India & Others (L.A. Appl. No. 866/2005 decided on 11th May, 2006). The amount stated in this policy only indicates generalprevalentpriceof agriculturallandin the opinionof the Governmentbut it necessarilyneed not be enforced against the Governmentbecause it is for the partiesto leadevidencein supportoftheirclaimsand whentheyledevidence,they have to abideby the resultthereof. Sale deeds relatingto the acquiredland or of the same Villageis the best LAAPPNo.l89-91/2006&conn.matters /' piece of evidence where a willing buyer and a willing seller enters into a sale -^^transaction,which otherwiseis genuineand is of areasonabletime priorto the acquisition can safely be lodestar for analyzation of the complex issue of determinationof fair market value of the land. Besides the judgmentreferred above,even in the caseofSpecialTehsildar.Land Acquisition.Vishakapatnam Vs. Smt A. Mangala Gowri AIR 1992 SC 666 the SupremeCourt indicatedthat the sale transaction,of acquiredland within a reasonabletime would be the best piece of evidence. It is also settledprincipleof law that relianceupon awards, judgmentsand even the policy of the Governmentwould be made by the Court only in absence of such best evidence. The first and primary method for computationof fair marketvalue of land is relatableto the saleinstancesof land in the same village. It is also the settledprinciplethat 1/3 market value should be deductedfor developmentsof the land. Even in the cases ofA. ManglaGauri and RameshwarSolanki (supra) relied upon by the claimants,1/3 deductionwas held to be just and fair. Exh.P-3 in our opinion could not have been ignored by the learnedReferenceCourt. Golden Rule of Averagescould have been safelyapplied by the ReferenceCourtfor determiningthe fair marketvalueofthe land. Exh.R-4 indicates the value of the agriculturalland in Village Mundaka @Rs,l lakh per bigha. This sale deed was executed on 14th March, 1994 i.e. nearly 6 months subsequent to the date of notificationdated 15th October, 1993 issued under Section4 of the Act while Exh.P-3 was executedon 27th February, 1990 whereby -N' LAAPPNo.l89-91/2006&conn.matters Page31 of 32 the land in Village Mundaka kas sold for Rs.1,25,000/-per bigha. Giving a ^ Reasonableincreaseon the valuereflectedin Exh.P-3for the interveningperiodof 3years, the amount would corne to nearly Rs.1,70,000/-per bigha while reducing the amount of R-4 at the same rate for the interveningperiod of 6 months, the amount would come to Rs.94,C00/-per bigha and averageof both of them would give marketvalueofRs.1,32,0C01- per bigha. In view of the above discussion,we are of the consideredview that the appealsof the claimantsare liebleto be acceptedpartiallywhile the appealsfiled by the Unionof Indiaare liabldto be dismissed. Thus, the appealsof the claimants are partiallyallowed. The claimantswould be entitledto get compensationfor acquisitionof their land @Rs,1,32,000/-per bigha along with interestand other statutory benefits as available I under Section 23 (1-A) of the Act in accordance with law. However,in the fac|ts and circumstancesof the case, we left the parties to bear their own costs, i (SWATANJER-KUMAR) 5GE (S.L. BHAYANA) JUDGE. May 25, 2006 I LAAPP No.l89-91/2006&conn.matters I .

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