Mr. Himanshu Pathak, SPC with Mr. Amit Singh, Adv v. EX HAV BIRENDRA KUMAR SINGH

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA % JUDGMENT (ORAL) 16.09.2025 C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

1. This petition assails order dated 30 May 2024 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal1 in OA 1153/2023 wh ereby th e respondent’s application for grant of disability pension on the ground that he suffers from Primary Hypertension with 30% has been allowed by the AFT.

2. The issue is covered by a recent decision rendered by us in UOI v Ex Sub Gawas Anil Madso2.

3. Nonetheless, we have heard Mr. Himanshu Pathak, learned SPC for the petitioners, and have perused the record. 1 “th e AFT”, h erei nafter 2 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2018 W.P.(C) 13219/2025

4. The respondent was released in Low Medical Category on his being found to be suffering from Primary Hypertension. From the 3, the record, including the proceedings of the Release Medical Board following facts emerged: (i) The respondent had served in the Indian Army for over 24 years before he was diagnosed as suffering from Primary Hypertension. (ii) The respondent, in his self-declaration, specifically declared that he had not been suffering from Primary Hypertension prior to joining the Indian Army. The declaration reads thus: Did the disability exist before entering service? (Y/N Could be) NO The correctness of this declaration is not doubted either by the RMB or by the petitioner before the AFT or before this Court. (iii) The reason regarding the Primary Hypertension suffered by the respondent has not been attributable to military service, as entered by the RMB reads thus: “Primary Hypertension: Onset during Nov 2017 at Zuluk (Sikkim), (HAA) during induction (1st stage). Before that Indl was serving in Kolkata (Peace). Hence NANA vide para 43 Chapter VI of GMO 2002 as amended 2008.” (iv) We have already held, in our judgment in Gawas Anil 3 “RMB”, h erei nafter W.P.(C) 13219/2025 Madso, that where the applicant was not suffering from the ailment at the time of entry into service, the RMB is required to positively identify the cause for the ailment, to justify a finding that it is not attributable to military service. The Commanding Offi cer’s certi fi cate speci fi cally states th at th e respondent was not responsible, owing to any act or omission of his, for the ailment from which he was suffering. The entry in that regard reads as under: (a) Was the disability attributable to the i ndi vi dual’s own negligence or misconduct? If Yes, in what wa NO (v) Regarding para 43 of the Chapter VI of the GMO 2008, we have, in our judgment in UOI v WO Binod Kumar Sah (Retd4), observed thus: “12. Para 43 of the Chapter VI of the GMO 2008, vivisected into its individual components, specifies that, while dealing with hypertension, (i) the hypertension is primary or secondary, the RMB is required to determine whether (ii) if the hypertension is secondary, entitlement consideration should be directed to the underlying disease process, (iii) where disablement for essential hypertension appears to have arisen to, or become worse in, service, it has to be considered whether service compulsion caused aggravation, (iv) in cases where the disease has been reported after Field/HAA/Active Operational Areas, the case could be explained by variable response exhibited by frequent service spells 4 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2355 W.P.(C) 13219/2025 different individuals to stressful situations and (v) primary hypertension would be considered aggravated if it occurred while the officer was serving in field areas, HAA, CIOPS areas or prolonged afloat servi ce.” (vi) The RMB has certified the respondent as suffering from 30% disability on account of Primary Hypertension, lifelong.

5. In such circumstances, we have held in our decision in Ex Sub Gawas Anil Madso that the respondent would be entitled to disability pension.

6. We do not deem it necessary to reproduce our findings in the said decision, so as not to burden this judgment.

7. We have also been conscious of the fact that we are exercising certiorari jurisdiction over the decision of the AFT and are not sitting in appeal over the said decision.

8. The parameters of certiorari jurisdiction are delineated in the following passages of Syed Yakoob v K.S. Radhakrishnan5: The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High “7. Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a . A writ of certiorari can be issued 5 AIR 1964 SC 477 W.P.(C) 13219/2025 This limitation question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v Syed Ahmad Ishaque6, Nagandra Nath Bora v Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam7 and Kaushalya Devi v Bachittar Singh8.

8. It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; hut it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so