Ms v. EMAAR MGF LTD. ORS

Judgment

1. The present appeal, filed under Section 96 read with Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 1 and Section 13 of the Commercial Act, 20152, impugns the Judgment dated 18.05.20243 passed by the learned District Judge, Commercial Court-06, South- East District, Saket Courts, New Delhi 4 , in CS (COMM) No. 194/2021 titled „Roopinder Singh vs. Emaar MGF Ltd. and Ors’. 2. By the Impugned Judgment, the learned Commercial Court 1 CPC 2 CC Act 3 Impugned Judgement 4 Commercial Court Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 1 of 24 dismissed the Appellant‟s application filed under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 19635, seeking exclusion of the period spent in bona fide prosecution of the matter before the courts lacking jurisdiction. Consequently, the learned Court rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, holding the same to be barred by limitation. BRIEF FACTS:

3. The Appellant had booked a commercial unit in the project titled “The Palm Square”, situated at Gurgaon, Haryana, being developed by the Respondents, in the year 2007, upon payment of a booking amount of Rs. 15,50,000/- through a cheque dated

25.10.2007. 4. Subsequently, by a letter dated 05.02.2008, the Appellant requested cancellation of the said booking, citing personal reasons. 5. The Appellant was issued a receipt dated 29.02.2008 and an acknowledgement letter dated 24.03.2008 by the Respondents. Further, by letter dated 10.03.2008, the Respondents issued an allotment letter in favour of the Appellant for Unit No. 1008 on the 10th floor of the said project. 6. Despite repeated requests made by the Appellant, Respondents failed to refund the booking amount. By email dated

28.01.2009, the Respondents expressly refused to process the refund, stating that entertaining such requests would adversely affect the completion of the project. 7. Thereafter, a legal notice dated 22.07.2009 was issued by the Appellant to the Respondents, calling upon them to refund the booking amount. The Respondents replied to the same on 05.10.2009. 5 Limitation Act Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 2 of 24

8. In December 2009, the Appellant filed a Complaint Case No. 1515/2008 before the learned District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Chandigarh 6 , which was allowed vide order dated

06.10.2010, directing the Respondents to refund the deposited amount along with interest and litigation costs. 9.

In July 2011, the Respondents challenged the said order before State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chandigarh 7 . Vide order dated 11.07.2011, the learned SCDRC allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the learned District Consumer Forum, holding that the Appellant was not a “consumer” within the meaning of the Consumer Protection Act, 19868. 10. Aggrieved by the order of the learned SCDRC, the Appellant preferred a Revision Petition before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Circuit Bench at UT Chandigarh9. Vide order dated 28.11.2014, after hearing the matter for some time, the Appellant was permitted to withdraw the petition with liberty to pursue appropriate remedies before a competent forum. 11. Pursuant to the said liberty, in February 2015, the Appellant instituted Civil Suit No. 279/2015 before the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Chandigarh10, seeking recovery of Rs. 15,50,000/- along with interest. However, the said plaint was returned vide order dated 24.09.2019 for want of territorial jurisdiction. 12. Thereafter, in November 2019, the Appellant initiated pre- institution mediation proceedings under the CC Act before the District 6 District Consumer Forum 7 SCDRC 8 CP Act 9 NCDRC 10 District Court at Chandigarh Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 3 of 24 Legal Services Authority, Saket Courts, New Delhi. However, the proceedings failed as the parties did not appear for mediation. 13. In March 2021, the Appellant instituted CS (COMM) No. 194/2021 before the learned Commercial Court, Saket, Delhi, seeking recovery of the booking amount along with interest. 14. Upon the Respondents raising an objection regarding the limitation, the Appellant filed an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, seeking exclusion of the period spent in bona fide prosecution of the matter before courts lacking jurisdiction. 15. After considering the response filed by the Respondents and hearing both sides, the learned Commercial Court, by the Impugned Judgment, dismissed the Appellant‟s application under Section 14, holding that the Appellant had not prosecuted the earlier proceedings with due diligence and good faith as required under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, and therefore, the Court rejected the plaint as barred by limitation under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC. 16. Aggrieved by the Impugned Judgment, the Appellant has preferred the present appeal before us. SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT:

17. Learned Counsel for the Appellant would submit that the learned Commercial Court has erred in dismissing the Appellant‟s application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, as the Appellant had continuously and diligently pursued the remedies available in law, first before the Consumer Forums and thereafter before the learned District Court at Chandigarh, and all such proceedings were initiated within the prescribed period of limitation. 18. Learned Counsel for the Appellant would further submit that Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 4 of 24 the learned Commercial Court has erred in holding that the petition filed by the Appellant before the learned SCDRC was not pursued with due diligence and in good faith. It would be further submitted that it was the Respondents who had challenged the order passed in favour of the Appellant by the learned District Consumer Forum, and the Appellant, being aggrieved by the reversal of that order, had exercised his legal remedy on bona fide legal advice and in continuation of earlier proceedings, and therefore, the period spent therein ought to have been excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. 19. It would further be submitted by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the institution of the civil suit before the learned District Court at Chandigarh was based on a reasonable and bona fide belief, founded on legal advice, that part of the cause of action had arisen at Chandigarh, and since both the booking application and the payment of Rs. 15,50,000/- were effected there, a plausible territorial nexus under Section 20(c) of the CPC existed, and hence, the Appellant cannot be faulted for having pursued the said remedy. 20. Learned Counsel for the Appellant would also contend that the learned Commercial Court failed to appreciate the settled position of law with respect to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, as it overlooked the Appellant‟s bona fide and diligent pursuit of earlier proceedings, and thereby erroneously rejected the claim of the Appellant. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS:

21. Per contra, learned Counsel for the Respondents would contend that the Appellant‟s suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, having been filed well beyond the prescribed three-year period from the Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 5 of 24 accrual of cause of action in January 2009, and would argue that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, has no application to the present case, as the said provision contemplates exclusion of time only for proceedings instituted before a civil court lacking jurisdiction, whereas the consumer fora before which the Appellant had pursued his earlier remedies do not fall within that definition, and hence, the Appellant would not be entitled to claim exclusion of the time spent before such fora. 22. It would further be submitted by the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the Appellant cannot be said to have acted either with due diligence or in good faith, as the issue of maintainability under the CP Act, had been raised from the very inception, yet the Appellant continued to prosecute the proceedings before the learned District Consumer Forum, the learned SCDRC, and thereafter before the learned NCDRC, and the revision petition was ultimately withdrawn after more than three years. 23. Learned Counsel for the Respondents would further submit that despite a specific objection to territorial jurisdiction being taken before the learned District Court at Chandigarh, the Appellant persisted with the suit until the plaint was returned, and such conduct, it would be urged, clearly indicates absence of bona fides and due diligence in prosecuting the earlier proceedings, thereby disentitling the Appellant from claiming exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. 24. Learned Counsel for the Respondents would, in support of their contentions, place reliance upon the decisions in Madhavrao Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 6 of 24 Narayanrao Patwardhan v. Ram Krishna Govind Bhanu11, U.P. Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd. v. C.G. Power & Industrial Solution Ltd.12, and K.G. Khosla & Co. v. Trustees of The Port of Bombay13, and would contend that the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be extended to proceedings not prosecuted before a court of competent civil jurisdiction, nor to those pursued without due diligence and good faith. 25. Learned Counsel for the Respondents would also contend that such conduct on the part of the Appellant would clearly evidence a lack of bona fides and diligence, and would therefore submit that the learned Commercial Court has rightly held that the Appellant failed to establish good faith and due diligence as contemplated under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, and that the Impugned Judgment is well- reasoned and warrants no interference. ANALYSIS:

26. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and, with their able assistance, carefully perused the Impugned Judgment, the documents, and the pleadings on record. 27. At the outset, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the analysis and findings of the learned Commercial Court in the Impugned Judgment. The relevant extract of the Impugned Judgment is set out below: “16. I have considered the arguments of Ld. Counsel for the parties and I have perused the record. Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1963 empowers the court to exclude the time for which the plaintiff might be proceeding bonafidely in a court without jurisdiction. To take the benefit of this provision, the plaintiff has 11 1958 SCC OnLine SC 152 12 2023 SCC OnLine Del 7916 13 1970 SCC OnLine Del 63 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 7 of 24 to show that he has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of a appeal or revision, against the defendant. The plaintiff also needs to show that he was prosecuting the matter before the wrong forum in good faith.

17. The order of the District Consumer Forum was in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, it may be accepted that he was under the wrong impression that he was covered under the definition of "Consumer". However, the filing of revision against the order dated 11.07.2011 of SCDRC cannot be said to be an action taken with due diligence and in good faith. Despite knowing that he was not a consumer under the Consumer Protection Act, he filed the revision before NCDRC. Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the revision was filed on 07.10.2011 and it was withdrawn on 28.11.2014. This shows that the revision remained pending before NCDRC for more than three years.

18. Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the civil suit at Chandigarh was filed on 11.02.2015. The defendant took the objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction. The defendant did not concede and ultimately the issue was decided against him vide judgment dated 24.09.2019. The proceedings remained pending before the Chandigarh Court for more than four years.

19. In paragraph 28 of the judgment by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Ashwani Sharma Vs. Kanta Sharma & Ors 2017 SCC OnLine Del 6623 it was held thus:- "28. it has been held in Ravindra Nath Samuel Dawson Vs. Sivakasi (1973) 3 SCC 381, that continuing to prosecute the suit in a court unable to entertain it from defect of jurisdiction inspite of objection by the defendant negates good faith. Recently in M.P. Steel Corpn. Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (2015) 7 SCC 58, it has been held that the party who invokes Section 14 should not be guilty of negligence, lapse or inaction and there should be no pretended mistake intentionally made with the view to delaying the proceeding or harassing the opposite party."

20. Section 2 (h) of the Limitation Act 1963 provides that nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention.

21. In Messrs K.G. Khosla & Co. Vs. The Trustees of Port of Bombay 92 DLT 1972, Hon'ble Delhi High Court held thus: - "13. The appellant took the objection to the local jurisdiction of the Bombay Civil Court immediately after the suit was filed at Bombay. The respondent refused to concede the validity of the objection and went on Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 8 of 24 perversely litigating in Bombay Court. This was utter negligence on part of the respondent. It cannot be said therefore, that the prosecution of the suit at Bombay by the respondents was made with 'due diligence'."

22. Filing of the revision by the plaintiff against the order of SCDRC cannot be said to be a decision taken with due diligence and in good faith. Therefore, the period from 07.10.2011 to 28.11.2014 for which the revision filed by the plaintiff remained pending before NCDRC, cannot be condoned under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. 23. The defendant promptly took the objection before the court of Civil Judge, Chandigarh regarding the territorial jurisdiction. Despite the objection taken by the defendant, the plaintiff pursued the matter for more than four years. This is also not an act of due diligence and good faith. Therefore, this period can also not be condoned under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. 24. If the periods mentioned above are not condoned, the suit is clearly barred by limitation. The application of the plaintiff under Section 14 of the Limitation Act is dismissed and the plaint is rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (d) CPC being barred by limitation. Parties to bear their own cost. File be consigned to Record Room.”

28. In the present Appeal, the limited issue that arises for consideration is the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, to the facts and circumstances of this case. Section 14 reads as under: “14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.—(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 9 of 24 permission granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, - (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding; (c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.” (emphasis supplied)

29. Section 14 of the Limitation Act seeks to protect a litigant who, in good faith, has pursued a remedy before a court that ultimately lacks jurisdiction or competence to decide the matter. In essence, it ensures that the time spent bona fide litigating before an incompetent forum is excluded while calculating the period of limitation for filing the same claim before a competent forum. This protection extends not only to suits but also to applications filed before courts of first instance, appellate, or revisional jurisdiction. 30. However, to invoke the benefit of this section, inter alia, two essential conditions must be satisfied, namely, the litigant must have acted with due diligence, meaning that all reasonable steps were taken without unnecessary delay; and the proceeding must have been pursued in good faith. 31. The Explanation to Section 14 further clarifies that both the day on which the earlier proceeding was instituted and the day it concluded shall be included while computing the exclusion period. It also provides that a party resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding and that even misjoinder of parties or causes Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 10 of 24 of action constitutes a defect of a like nature. 32. To claim the benefit of this provision, the litigant must establish good faith as defined under Section 2(h) of the Limitation Act, which states as follows: “(h) “good faith” - nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention”

33. On a plain reading, it is evident that the essence of good faith lies not in the outcome of the proceedings but in the honesty and reasonableness with which the litigant pursued them. Therefore, as long as a party‟s choice of forum was guided by a bona fide belief, exercised with due care and without negligence, the protection under Section 14 of the Limitation Act would apply. 34. The true intent and scope of Section 14 have been clearly elucidated by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt.14, wherein it was observed that the legislative intent behind this provision is to safeguard litigants who, despite acting bona fide and diligently, are precluded from pursuing their remedies on the merits due to a jurisdictional or procedural defect. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under: “21. Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction. On analysis of the said section, it becomes evident that the following conditions must be satisfied before Section 14 can be pressed into service: (1) Both proceedings prosecuted by the same party; the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil (2) The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith; (3) The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature; 14 (2008) 7 SCC 169 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 11 of 24 (4) The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue and; (5) Both the proceedings are in a court.

22. The policy of the section is to afford protection to a litigant against the bar of limitation when he institutes a proceeding which by reason of some technical defect cannot be decided on merits and is dismissed. While considering the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, proper approach will have to be adopted and the provisions will have to be interpreted so as to advance the cause of justice rather than abort the proceedings. It will be well to bear in mind that an element of mistake is inherent in the invocation of Section 14. In fact, the section is intended to provide relief against the bar of limitation in cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum. On reading Section 14 of the Act it becomes clear that the legislature has enacted the said section to exempt a certain period covered by a bona fide litigious activity. Upon the words used in the section, it is not possible to sustain the interpretation that the principle underlying the said section, namely, that the bar of limitation should not affect a person honestly doing his best to get his case tried on merits but failing because the court is unable to give him such a trial, would not be applicable to an application filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. The principle is clearly applicable not only to a case in which a litigant brings his application in the court, that is, a court having no jurisdiction to entertain it but also where he brings the suit or the application in the wrong court in consequence of bona fide mistake or (sic of) law or defect of procedure. Having regard to the intention of the legislature this Court is of the firm opinion that the equity underlying Section 14 should be applied to its fullest extent and time taken diligently pursuing a remedy, in a wrong court, should be excluded. *****

31. To attract the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, five conditions enumerated in the earlier part of this judgment have to co-exist [Ed.: See para 21, above.] . There is no manner of doubt that the section deserves to be construed liberally. Due diligence and caution are essential prerequisites for attracting Section 14. Due diligence cannot be measured by any absolute standards. Due diligence is a measure of prudence or activity expected from and ordinarily exercised by a reasonable and prudent person under the particular circumstances. The time during which a court holds up a case while it is discovering that it ought to have been presented in another court, must be excluded, as the delay of the court cannot affect the due diligence of the party. Section 14 requires that the prior proceeding should have been prosecuted in good faith and with due diligence. The definition of good faith as found in Section Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 12 of 24 2(h) of the Limitation Act would indicate that nothing shall be deemed to be in good faith which is not done with due care and attention. It is true that Section 14 will not help a party who is guilty of negligence, lapse or inaction. However, there can be no hard-and-fast rule as to what amounts to good faith. It is a matter to be decided on the facts of each case. It will, in almost every case be more or less a question of degree. The mere filing of an application in wrong court would not prima facie show want of good faith. There must be no pretended mistake intentionally made with a view to delaying the proceedings or harassing the opposite party. In the light of these principles, the question will have to be considered whether the appellant had prosecuted the matter in other courts with due diligence and in good faith.” (emphasis supplied)

35. Upon careful consideration of the above and the findings in the Impugned Judgment, it is evident that the learned Commercial Court concluded that the Appellant had not acted with due diligence or in good faith while pursuing the matter before the learned NCDRC. However, on examining the scope and intent of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, we are of the considered view that such a conclusion is unsustainable. 36. The said conclusion is premised on two counts: (a) The preferring of revision proceedings before the learned NCDRC against the order passed by the learned SCDRC; and (b) The filing of a suit before the learned District Court at Chandigarh, despite the Respondent‟s preliminary objection that the said Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the matter.

37. It is evident from the record that the initial decision of the learned District Consumer Forum was in favour of the Appellant. It was the Respondents who challenged that decision before the learned SCDRC, and upon reversal, the Appellant approached the learned NCDRC by availing the statutory remedy provided under the CP Act. Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 13 of 24 The learned NCDRC permitted withdrawal of the revision petition after hearing both sides and expressly granted liberty to seek relief before the appropriate forum. Had there been any mala fides on the Appellant‟s part, such liberty would not have been granted. 38. Section 14 of the Limitation Act explicitly allows exclusion of time spent in appellate or revisional proceedings. Therefore, the mere fact of the Appellant having availed the revisional remedy cannot lead to an inference of lack of bona fides. Moreover, none of the consumer fora recorded any findings of negligence or want of good faith against the Appellant. If the conclusion of the learned Commercial Court were to be accepted, it would mean that a litigant would have to simply accept the Judgment as rendered against him and forgo the statutory right to challenge the same, as it would not be a bona fide act on the part of the litigant. We also take note of the fact that, the Appellant herein had succeeded in the first round before the learned District Forum, meaning thereby that the Appellant had genuine cause to harbour a bona fide belief that the matter could be prosecuted before the Consumer Fora. 39. Similarly, when the Appellant filed the civil suit before the learned District Court at Chandigarh, he was pursuing a legitimate remedy in accordance with legal advice. It is an admitted fact that the Appellant herein is neither a lawyer nor a person with a legal background. The Appellant, having pursued an available statutory remedy, albeit on possibly erroneous advice as rendered to him, cannot lead to a conclusion that the proceedings lacked bona fides. 40. We also take note of the fact that the learned State Consumer Commission, which had rendered a judgment in favour of the Respondent herein, had categorically dismissed the objection that the Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 14 of 24 learned District Forum lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the original Complaint. 41. We are of the opinion that the learned Commercial Court failed to appreciate the continuity and consistency in the Appellant‟s pursuit of his remedies. The Appellant did not abandon or delay his claim at any stage. The sequence of proceedings clearly demonstrates a consistent and bona fide effort to seek redress through proper legal channels by the Appellant. 42. It is also not the Respondents‟ case that the Appellant derived any undue advantage or benefit by pursuing proceedings before the learned Consumer Forums or the learned District Court at Chandigarh. Nor is there any material to suggest that the Appellant‟s actions were absolutely vexatious or intended to harass the Respondents. It is also apparent that delay in adjudication would in fact, be more prejudicial to the interests of the Appellant. 43. Au contraire, we are of the firm belief that the Appellant genuinely and bona fide pursued various legal remedies before ultimately filing the foundational proceedings in which the Judgment impugned herein has been rendered. 44. In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the Appellant‟s conduct, viewed holistically, reflects a continuous, bona fide, and diligent effort to pursue his claim before fora that were later found to lack jurisdiction. The learned Commercial Court, in holding otherwise, has misapplied Section 14 of the Limitation Act. 45. The contention of the learned counsel for the Respondents that the proceedings before the Consumer Forums do not fall within the ambit of “civil proceedings” for the purposes of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, in our considered opinion, is misplaced. Such an Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 15 of 24 interpretation would be inconsistent with both the object and the spirit of the Limitation Act. 46. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in P. Sarathy v. SBI 15 has categorically held that any authority or tribunal having the trappings of a court is covered under the expression “court” appearing in Section 14 of the Limitation Act, and it need not be confined merely to civil courts. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under: “12. It will be noticed that Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not speak of a “civil court” but speaks only of a “court”. It is not necessary that the court spoken of in Section 14 should be a “civil court”. Any authority or tribunal having the trappings of a court would be a “court” within the meaning of this section.

13. In Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Coop. Bank Ltd. [AIR 1967 SC 1494 : 1967 Cri LJ 1380] this Court, while considering the question under the Contempt of Courts Act, held that the Registrar under the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act was a court. It was held that the Registrar had not merely the trappings of a court but in many respects he was given the same powers as was given to an ordinary civil court by the Code of Civil Procedure including the powers to summon and examine witnesses on oath, the power to order inspection of documents and to hear the parties. The Court referred to the earlier decisions in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees [1950 SCC 470 : AIR 1950 SC 188 : 1950 SCR 459] ; Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay [(1953) 1 SCC 736 : AIR 1953 SC 325 : 1953 SCR 730] and Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain [AIR 1956 SC 66 : (1955) 2 SCR 955] . The Court approved the rule laid down in these cases that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.

14. In Pritam Kaur v. Sher Singh [AIR 1983 P&H 363] the proceedings before the Collector under the Redemption of Mortgages (Punjab) Act (2 of 1913) were held to be civil proceedings. It was held that the “court”, contemplated under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, does not necessarily mean the “civil court” under the Code of Civil Procedure. It was further held that any tribunal or authority, deciding the rights of parties, will be 15 (2000) 5 SCC 355 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 16 of 24 treated to be a “court”. Consequently, benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act was allowed in that case. This decision was in Bansi followed by Ram v. Khazana [AIR 1993 HP 20] . the Himachal Pradesh High Court

15. Applying the above principles in the instant case, we are of the opinion that the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals), which was an authority constituted under Section 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 to hear and decide appeals, was a “court” within the meaning of Section 14 of the Limitation the proceedings pending before him were civil Act and proceedings. It is not disputed that the appellant could file an appeal before the Local Board of the Bank, which was purely a departmental appeal. In this view of the matter, the entire period of time from the date of institution of the departmental appeal as also the period from the date of institution of the appeal under Section 41(2) before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals) till it was dismissed will, therefore, have to be excluded for computing the period of limitation for filing the suit in question. If the entire period is excluded, the suit, it is not disputed, would be within time.” (emphasis supplied)

47. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise16, exhaustively examined the scope and applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, while considering earlier precedents including P. Sarathy (supra). The Apex Court, after analyzing the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act, particularly Sections 13, 14, and 21, inter alia, held that the Limitation Act applies strictly to suits, appeals, and applications filed before courts established under the Constitution of India. However, the Apex Court further clarified that even where the Limitation Act does not, in terms, apply to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, the underlying principles embodied in the Limitation Act, including Section 14, would nevertheless govern their proceedings. The relevant extract from M.P. Steel Corporation (supra) is reproduced hereunder: 16 (2015) 7 SCC 58 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 17 of 24 “38. We have already held that the Limitation Act including Section 14 would not apply to appeals filed before a quasi-judicial tribunal such as the Collector (Appeals) mentioned in Section 128 of the Customs Act. However, this does not conclude the issue. There is authority for the proposition that even where Section 14 may not apply, the principles on which Section 14 is based, being principles which advance the cause of justice, would nevertheless apply. We must never forget, as stated in Bhudan Singh v. Nabi Bux [(1969) 2 SCC 481] that justice and reason is at the heart of all legislation by Parliament. This was put in very felicitous terms by Hegde, J. as follows: (SCC p. 485, para 9) entire legislative process

9. “Before considering the meaning of the word „held‟ in Section 9, it is necessary to mention that it is proper to assume that the lawmakers who are the representatives of the people enact laws which the society considers as honest, fair and equitable. The object of every legislation is to advance public welfare. In other words as observed by Crawford in his book on „Statutory Constructions‟ that influenced by considerations of justice and reason. Justice and reason constitute the great general legislative intent in every piece suggested construction operates harshly, ridiculously or in any other manner contrary to prevailing conceptions of justice and reason, in most instances, it would seem that the apparent or suggested meaning of the statute, was not the one intended by the lawmakers. In the absence of some other indication that the harsh or ridiculous effect was actually intended by the legislature, there is little reason to believe that it represents the legislative intent.” legislation. Consequently where

39. This is why the principles of Section 14 were applied in J. Kumaradasan Nair v. Iric Sohan (2009) 12 SCC 175, to a revision application filed before the High Court of Kerala. The Court held: (SCC pp. 180-81, paras 16-18)

16. “The provisions contained in Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act are meant for grant of relief where a person has committed some mistake. The provisions of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act alike should, thus, be applied in a broadbased manner. When sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act per se is not applicable, the same would not mean that the principles akin thereto would not be applied. Otherwise, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the same would be applicable to a case of this nature. 17. There cannot furthermore be any doubt whatsoever that having regard to the definition of „suit‟ as contained in Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:04.11.2025 17:27:09 RFA(COMM) 389/2024 Page 18 of 24 Section 2(l) of the Limitation Act, a revision application will not answer the said description. But, although the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act per se are not applicable, in our opinion, the principles thereof would be applicable for the purpose of condonation of delay in filing an appeal or a revision application in terms of Section 5 thereof. 18. It is also now a well-settled principle of law that mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of any provision of law would, by itself, be not sufficient to take away the jurisdiction of a court if it is otherwise vested in it in law. While exercising its power, the court will merely consider whether it has the source to exercise such power or not. The court will not apply the beneficent provisions like Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act in a pedantic manner. When the provisions are meant to apply and in fact found to be applicable to the facts and circumstances of a case, in our opinion, there is no reason as to why the court will refuse to apply the same only because a wrong provision has been mentioned. In a case of this nature, sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act per se may not be applicable, but, as indicated hereinbefore, the principles thereof would be applicable for the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 thereof.”