Mr. Rajesh Yadav, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Vikas Arora and Ms. Radhika Arora, Advs v. CD PHARMA INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED

Judgment

1. The present appeal assails order dated 7 July 2025 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in OA 8/2019 in CS (COMM) 912/20181. OA 8/2019, in turn, assailed an order dated 18 December 2018, passed by a learned Joint Registrar of this Court, dismissing an application filed by the appellants, as the defendants in the suit, for condonation of delay in filing the written statement. 1 “the suit” hereinafter FAO(OS) (COMM) 129/2025 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:11.09.2025 17:58:32

2. The learned Single Judge has, by the order under challenge, upheld the decision of the learned Joint Registrar, refusing to take the written statement of the appellants on record.

3. The learned Joint Registrar and the learned Single Judge have concurrently held that the written statement was filed beyond the maximum period of 120 days provided in the proviso to Order VIII Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, as amended by the Commercial Courts Act 2015. Reliance has also been placed, by the learned Single Judge, on the judgment of the Supreme Court in SCG Contracts v K S Chamankar Infrastructure3.

Mr. Rajesh Yadav, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, fairly does not contest the position that the written statement, if it has been filed beyond the permissible period of 120 days, cannot be taken on record. His contention is, however, that the written statement must be treated as having been filed within the permissible period of 120 days as envisaged in the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC as amended by the Commercial Courts Act.

5. Summons in the suit were admittedly served on the appellants- defendants on 29 May 2018 and written statement was filed by the defendants on 27 September 2018. The learned Joint Registrar as well 2 1. on him, present a written statement of his defence: Written statement.—The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the written statement on such other day, as may be specified by the court, for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as the court deems fit, but which shall not be later than one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons and on expiry of one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record. 3 (2019) 12 SCC 210 FAO(OS) (COMM) 129/2025 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:11.09.2025 17:58:32 as the learned Single Judge in the impugned orders have concurrently held that first day for reckoning the period of 120 days would be 30 May 2018 and, thus reckoned, the 120th day would be the 26 September 2018. The written statement having been filed a day thereafter i.e. 27 September 2018, has not been permitted to be taken on record.

6. Mr. Yadav’s contention is that the 120th day would not be 26 September 2018 but 27 September 2018. He predicates his contention on Section 94 of the General Clauses Act read with Section 12(1)5 of the Limitation Act.

7. Mr. Yadav’s contention is that the use of the word “from” in conjunction with the words “the date of service of summons” in the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC, read with Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, would require the limitation period to be computed w.e.f. 30 May 2018 which would, therefore, be the terminus a quo for reckoning limitation.

8. He, thereafter, relies on Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act to submit that the day from which the period of limitation commences would have to be excluded, meaning that 30 May 2018 would have to be excluded while computing the period of 120 days under the proviso 4 9. Commencement and termination of time.—(1) In any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from”, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “to”. (2) This section applies also to all [Central Acts] made after the third day of January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887. 5 12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.—(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. FAO(OS) (COMM) 129/2025 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:11.09.2025 17:58:32 to Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC. Thus reckoned, Mr. Yadav’s contention is that the first day of the 120-day period within which the written statement could be filed under Order VIII Rule 1 would not be 30 May 2018 but 31 May 2018, from which date, if 120 days is counted, 27 September 2018 would be the 120th day.

9. Mr. Yadav has placed reliance, to support his submissions, on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Saketh India Ltd v India Securities Ltd6 and ECON Antri Ltd v ROM Industries Ltd7 as well as Haru Das Gupta v State of West Bengal8, which is cited and relied upon in ECON Antri Ltd.

10. We have considered the submissions of Mr. Yadav, and we must confess that his argument is ingenious and may appear, at first glance, to be a permissible manner of construing Section 9 of the General Clauses Act read with Section 12 of the Limitation Act.

11. Essentially, if the submissions of Mr. Yadav are to be accepted, it would result in appellants being granted not one, but the benefit of exclusion of two days while computing limitation. The first would be the day on which summons is served i.e. 29 May 2018, and the second would be the next day, i.e. 30 May 2018.

12. On a careful reading of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act and Section 12 of the Limitation Act, however, we do not feel that the