LAKSH VIR SINGH YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS

Judgment

#1. The present batch of petitions raises a question that stands at the intersection of constitutional law and the digital age, viz. whether an individual whose name appears in judicial records that are accessible through internet search engines is entitled, by virtue of the right to informational privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, to seek de-indexing of those records from name-based search results and masking of personal identifiers (including names) from publicly accessible digital versions of those records.

#2. The petitioners range, inter alia, from persons who have been acquitted of criminal charges, to parties to matrimonial disputes, to persons whose names appear incidentally in judicial records of proceedings to which they were not parties. The petitioners share a common grievance that the continued availability and name-based searchability of judicial records bearing their names in the digital public domain causes disproportionate and continuing harm to their reputations, dignity, and life prospects, excessive to any legitimate public interest served by such continued accessibility.

#3. The present petitions have been filed by the petitioners invoking the “right to be forgotten”. The relief sought is anchored in the fundamental

right to life and liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, which has been judicially recognised to encompass the right to privacy and dignity of the individual. These petitions, while emanating from diverse factual backgrounds, share certain overlapping features and converge upon the invocation of the “right to be forgotten”. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters A. FACTUAL MATRIX

#4. The factual matrix set forth by the petitioners in the present batch of petitions is as follows:

#5. The petitioner in W.P(C) 1021/ 2016 seeks de-linking of the order dated 13.10.2015 passed by the Special Judge, NDPS, South District, Saket, in CR No.1/15. It is submitted that the petitioner’s name appears therein only incidentally, as the husband of respondent no.1, and that he had no role in the criminal proceedings. The petitioner contends that since the Trial Court is not a court of record, de-linking the concerned page from search results will not affect public interest. The petitioner further contends that inclusion of the URL in search results associated with his name is prejudicial, creating a false impression of involvement in criminality and thereby infringing his right to life and personal liberty.

#6. In W.P(C) 3918/2021, the petitioner, stated to be an American citizen of Indian origin, seeks removal of case details/judgment/URL pertaining to the judgment dated 29.01.2013 passed by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 14/2013 from the respondent platforms/ Google search engine and Indian Kanoon. It is submitted that although the petitioner has been acquitted in the said matter, the continued appearance of the said judgment upon a name-based search has led to irreparable prejudice, with acquaintances and professional contacts perceiving him as a criminal. The petitioner submits that his social life, marriage prospects and career have been adversely affected, notwithstanding his acquittal affirmed by concurrent findings of two courts. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters

#7. In W.P(C) 6790/ 2021, the petitioner, who claims to be a public figure, is aggrieved by the continued availability of posts, videos and articles depicting incidents of drunken behaviour said to have occurred more than a decade ago. The petitioner seeks removal of such content, contending that it has no relevance in the present time and continues to tarnish his reputation.

#8. In W.P.(C) 8209/2021, the petitioner, a medical doctor, seeks removal of the judgment dated 08.04.2019 passed by the SCJ-cum-RC (South), Saket Courts, New Delhi in CS SCJ 1194/18. It is submitted that the petitioner in 2010 sought to change his name, which was duly published in the UP Gazette. Subsequently, while applying for the United States Medical Licensing Examination, the petitioner was advised to rectify discrepancies arising on account of change in name through a court decree. Acting upon such advice, the petitioner obtained a declaratory decree dated

08.04.2019. The petitioner contends that publication and continued availability of the said judgment, containing his personal details, infringes his right to privacy.

#9. In W.P (C) 8557/ 2021, the petitioners are aggrieved by the uploading of the orders dated 24.12.2016 and 08.08.2017 passed by the CMM and the Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, (respectively), as also the related articles, on respondent platforms including Google and Times of India. The petitioners submit that despite acquittal, the continued availability of the said materials has adversely affected their professional prospects and subjected the petitioners to social stigma, particularly due to misinformed and factually incorrect reportage suggesting W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters involvement in smuggling or illegal activities. The petitioners seek removal of the concerned orders and articles in exercise of their right to privacy.

#10. In W.P(C) 12620/ 2021, the petitioner seeks removal of URLs, articles, blogs and photographs pertaining to his conviction dated

19.02.2015 for the offence of ‘one count of blackmail and fifteen counts of fraud’ by the Leicester Crown Court, United Kingdom. The petitioner was convicted in a jury trial and sentenced to imprisonment for 9 years. After the petitioner served his sentence, he was released on 15.03.2021. It is submitted that mass reporting of the conviction has caused continuing loss of reputation, business, mental stress and social stigma to the petitioner and his family.

#11. In W.P(C) 11553/ 2021, the petitioner seeks removal of the judgment/ order dated 07.10.2017 passed by the Special Judge-03 (PC Act) (CBI), Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, in CC No. 13/2015, whereby, the petitioner was acquitted of all charges in RC No. 21A/2015/ CBI/ACB/ND. It is submitted that the acquittal has attained finality upon dismissal of CRL.L.P. 565/2018 on 26.05.2025. The petitioner further seeks removal of the aforesaid judgment dated 07.10.2017 and judgment dated 22.09.2021 passed by the Special Judge (PC Act), CBI-17, Rouse Avenue Courts, New Delhi in CC No. 01/2021, whereby a closure report qua the proceedings against the petitioner was accepted.

#12. The petitioner submits that despite acquittal and closure of proceedings, the inclusion of these orders in search results linked to his name and that of his children is prejudicial, particularly as the order dated

22.09.2021 contains personal details including educational qualifications, W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters employment particulars and family information. The petitioner seeks removal of the concerned judgments and related reportage in exercise of his right to be forgotten under Article 21.

#13. In W.P.(C) 14360/2021, the petitioner seeks removal of news pertaining to FIR No. 2172017A0008 dated 23.05.2017. It is submitted that in the week following registration of the FIR, derogatory news articles were published without awaiting the outcome of investigation, resulting in severe damage to reputation. Pursuant to investigation, the CBI filed a closure report stating that no case was made out against the petitioner. The same was accepted by the Special Judge (PC Act), CBI-13, Rouse Avenue Courts, New Delhi by order dated 25.11.2019. The petitioner further seeks that the respondents be directed to publish/ broadcast news regarding the said judgment dated 25.11.2019.

#14. In W.P (C) 1671/2022, the petitioner herein had filed an application before the Mahila Court, Dwarka, New Delhi seeking monetary relief and relief of residence. Vide order dated 01.05.2018, monetary relief was granted to the petitioner. The same was assailed by the husband of the petitioner, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 09.08.2018. The petitioner seeks removal of the said order dated 09.08.2018 passed by the Special Judge (PC Act), CBI-03, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi from respondent platforms, including Indian Kanoon and Google. It is submitted that the order contains personal details of the petitioner, and its continued availability in the public domain violates the petitioner’s right to privacy. The petitioner asserts that disclosure of such personal information causes grave injury to the petitioner's right to privacy. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters

#15. In W.P.(C) 8658/2022, the petitioner seeks the removal/un-publishing of the articles, search links and other content pertaining to the demise of the petitioner’s wife, as also directions restraining respondents from further dissemination. It is submitted that information regarding the death of the petitioner’s wife in 2015 holds no public interest value, being purely private in nature or serving only to instigate gossip. Continued publication is said to impede the petitioner’s personal and professional life, thereby infringing his fundamental right to privacy under Article 21.

#16. The petitioner in W.P.(C) 11372/2022 seeks removal of posts, tweets, videos and articles linking him to the Bike Bot Scam, Project Grand Venice and Mist Avenue and his arrest in context thereof. It is submitted that after detailed investigation by the concerned authorities, it was revealed that one of the investor’s funds were channeled in the Petitioner’s project. It is submitted that due to the same, the petitioner got roped into the said scam and was subject to judicial custody for seven months, but was subsequently granted bail by the Allahabad High Court. It is submitted that multiple online platforms have disseminated inaccurate and misconceived information suggesting his involvement and arrest, accompanied by sensational headlines and images. The petitioner contends that such material creates a false impression of established criminality, violates the rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India and causes irreparable harm to the petitioner’s livelihood, trade and reputation. The petitioner asserts that he is subjected to speculation in the eyes of the media and public at large, and seeks removal of the impugned content in exercise of his right to privacy and dignity. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters

#17. The petitioner in W.P. (C) 12567/2022, an Associate Professor at the Institute of Liver and Biliary Sciences, seeks removal of the judgment dated

19.04.2022 passed by ASJ-02, South District, Saket Courts, New Delhi, in CR No. 140/2020, whereby, the SHO PS Malviya Nagar was directed to register an FIR on the petitioner’s complaint. It is submitted that the said order contains sensitive details of incidents where the petitioner was allegedly falsely accused of being the biological father of a child born to a former colleague, who also extorted money from the petitioner. The petitioner contends that availability of the order in the public domain causes grave and irreparable damage to his professional reputation and social life, and infringes his right to privacy by exposing private information to unrestricted access.

#18. The petitioner in W.P.(C) 2134/2023, removal of news items and articles pertaining to his arrest on 23.04.1999 in connection with an FIR alleging, inter alia, illegal procurement of medicines from abroad and mishandling of HIV patients. The petitioner, a practicing doctor, stated to be an internationally recognized figure in the fight against HIV-AIDS, submits that the material is no longer relevant, as he was discharged by judgment dated 04.08.2009 passed by the Ad Hoc Additional Sessions Judge, City Sessions Court, Sewree, Bombay. The petitioner further submits that on account of continued circulation of the said articles, grave prejudice is being caused to the dignity and reputation of the petitioner.

#19. In W.P. (C) 2353/2023, the petitioner seeks removal of posts, videos and articles associating his name with Crime No. 420/20, his arrest and consequential judicial proceedings. It is submitted that the petitioner was W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters acquitted in the said proceedings vide order dated 17.09.2021, thereby the said information is rendered irrelevant in the present times and causes grave injury to his dignity and reputation. It is his case that in the digital age, the right to privacy must extend to information available on the internet.

#20. The petitioner in W.P. (C) 4094/ 2023 seeks removal of the judgment dated 21.10.2010 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-I (East), Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in SC No. 28/2009, whereby the petitioner was acquitted of offences under Sections 498A, 306 and 34 IPC. It is submitted that the said judgment contains personal details and its availability upon a name-based search violates the petitioner’s right to privacy, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner contends that continued accessibility is prejudicial to his reputation and adversely affects his personal, professional and social life. It is further submitted that since the Trial Court is not a court of record, de-linking will not affect public interest.

#21. In W.P.(C) 5400/2023, the petitioner seeks removal of the judgment dated 04.07.2018 passed by the ASJ, Rohini Courts, Delhi, and directions to the Registrar General, Delhi High Court to grant only limited access to the said judgment on the e-courts portal. It is submitted that by way of the aforesaid judgment, the petitioner was acquitted of the charges of rape and criminal intimidation. It is the case of the petitioner that despite acquittal, the continued availability of the judgment upon a name-based search is gravely prejudicial, causing loss of reputation and humiliation. The petitioner urges that the identity of persons accused of sexual offences ought to be concealed upon acquittal, to prevent stigma and societal prejudice. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters

#22. The petitioner in W.P.(C) 9824/2023, seeks removal of the judgment dated 04.12.2019 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate (NI Act), East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in CC No. 58734/2016, as also the order sheets, from the website of the Delhi District Courts and Indian Kanoon. It is submitted that the petitioner was convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and sentenced on 06.12.2019 to simple imprisonment of four months and a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, with a direction to pay Rs. 9,70,000/- to the complainant therein. During pendency of appeal, however, the parties arrived at a settlement before the Mediation Centre, recorded vide order dated 15.09.2022 by the ASJ-02, East District, Karkardooma Courts. The petitioner contends that continued availability of the conviction judgment, despite compounding of the offence in light of settlement, is adverse to his reputation and infringes his right to be forgotten.

#23. In W.P.(C) 5608/2023, the petitioner seeks removal of articles pertaining to FIR No. 293/2021 and his arrest pursuant thereto, which appear in search results linked to the petitioner’s name. It is submitted that the matter was settled between the petitioner and the complainant vide MOU dated 29.09.2021, recorded by order dated 02.06.2022 in CRL.M.C. 1207/2022, and the FIR was quashed. The petitioner asserts that continued circulation of the articles is prejudicial to his reputation and causes irreparable loss, warranting removal in exercise of the right to be forgotten.

#24. In W.P.(C)13461/2023, the petitioner seeks removal of URLs pertaining to FIR No. 29/2022 alleging offences under Sections 354, 376 and 511 IPC. Upon investigation, the Investigating Officer filed a closure report, noting no case was made out. The Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters House Courts, dismissed the protest petition on 23.12.2022, and the revision petition against that order was dismissed on 09.02.2023 in CRL.REV.P. 129/2023. The petitioner submits that despite closure, search engines continue to display news articles and videos reporting allegations of rape and sexual assault, which are stigmatic and defamatory, maligning his credibility and goodwill. The petitioner seeks removal of such content to protect his dignity and reputation.

#25. In W.P.(C) 16447/ 2023, the petitioner seeks removal of web pages and links pertaining to Suo Moto Application No. 262/2015 before the National Green Tribunal. It is submitted that consequent to a news report dated 03.07.2015, alleging that a report was sent by the then Chief Conservator of Forests to the U.P Government, claiming that the petitioner had unauthorizedly cut 8000 trees in Babarpur and 4000 trees in and around the 500-metre radius of the Taj Mahal, an eco-sensitive zone, the National Green Tribunal took suo moto cognizance. The matter was disposed of on

13.07.2018, with the Tribunal noting the affidavit of the Division Forest Officer, Agra, recording that the Supreme Court and the Central Empowered Committee had found no unauthorized tree felling. The petitioner contends that continued publication of reports linking his name to the allegations, despite closure of proceedings, blemishes his image and character, and seeks removal of such content.

#26. In W.P.(C) 16476/2023, the petitioner seeks the masking of party names in the judgments/orders as listed in paragraph –8 of the present petition. The petitioner also seeks that the judgments rendered by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 6827/2015; Criminal Appeal No. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters 487/2015; and SLP (C) 25871/2013, be removed from the website of the Supreme Court of India. Further, the petitioner seeks that the links to the legal material/orders/judgments pertaining to the matrimonial dispute between the petitioner and her ex-husband be removed from the public domain.

#27. It is submitted that proceedings in the said matters attained finality on

03.09.2015 when the Supreme Court, with the consent of the parties vide Civil Appeal No. 6827/2015 granted a decree of divorce and all the pending criminal proceedings between the parties, were quashed and all the pending civil proceedings were deemed to have been disposed of. It is the case of the petitioner that availability of the aforementioned orders/judgments, with the name of the petitioner in title thereof, has caused social stigma, humiliation and constant hampering of the petitioner’s personal and professional life, and is therefore, violative of her right to privacy as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

#28. In W.P.(C) 13192/2024, the petitioner, inter alia, seeks removal of content/ URLs pertaining to the news articles/ content drawing a linkage between the petitioner and the incident/s in context of which FIR No. 486/2021 was registered. It is submitted that the petitioner is in no way related to the said incidents; he is neither an accused, neither the complainant, nor a witness in the said matter.

#29. The petitioner further seeks that the respondent/ Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY) be directed to take action as regards the complaints dated 19.07.2021, 05.08.2022 and 12.09.2023, addressed by the petitioner, raising grievance against the aforesaid news W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters articles/ content. It is submitted that the concerned publishers, in featuring the said news articles, have been remiss in ensuring genuineness and correctness of the information so published and have failed in abiding by the Norms of Journalistic Conduct, 2022 published by the Press Council of India and Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDA), 2023.

#30. In W.P.(C) 6695/2024, the petitioner, stated to be an Overseas Citizen of India, seeks the content/details/URLs/judgments etc. pertaining to the matrimonial disputes involving the petitioner, available on the platforms of the respondents herein, be removed from the search engines and internet platforms, or the petitioner’s identity be masked therein. It is submitted that the said disputes now finally stand concluded in terms of the order dated

03.09.2015 passed in SLP (Civil) No. 19646/ 2014.

#31. It is submitted that the personal details and identity of the petitioner and his former wife also form part of the judgments/ orders passed in the proceedings of matrimonial nature between the petitioner and his erstwhile wife, and the content/articles pertaining thereto, reveal the details of allegations raised by both the parties against each other and also reveal the petitioner’s private information, thereby, violating the petitioner’s fundamental right to privacy.

#32. The petitioner in W.P(C) 2887/2025 seeks the removal of the URLs/web-links pertaining to the petitioner in context of the FIR No. 227/2019, registered at P.S. Hauz Khas. The petitioner further seeks directions to respondent/ Google LLC to block access to the aforesaid. The petitioner also seeks that the respondents, Registrar General, Delhi High Court and Indian Kanoon, be directed to mask the petitioner’s identity and W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters personal details from the judgment dated 30.05.2024 passed by this Court in Crl Rev 745/2023, whereby, the order on charge and framing of charge was set aside by the Court and the petitioner was discharged. It is pointed out that SLP (Criminal) Diary No. 41864/2024 filed against the aforesaid judgment dated 30.05.2024 was dismissed by the Supreme Court vide order dated 15.10.2024.

#33. It is the case of the petitioner that despite being discharged, due to the continuation of appearance of petitioner’s name in association with the criminal matter, in the context of which the judgment dated 30.05.2024 was passed; grave prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. It is submitted that the said judgment dated 30.05.2024 contains the petitioner’s name and personal details, thereby revealing his identity, therefore, the availability of the said judgment in public domain is violative of the petitioner’s right to privacy.

#34. In W.P (C) 3687/2024, the petitioners seek that in recognition of their right to privacy enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, the respondents (except respondent no.5 therein) be directed to remove the following judgments/ orders from their platforms; and that respondent no.5/ Registrar General, Delhi High Court be directed to grant limited access thereto : - order dated 18.03.2017 passed by ASJ (Special Fast Track Court-01), West, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi; - judgment dated 06.08.2018 passed by ASJ (Special Fast Track Court-01), West, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in Sessions Case No. 12/17; - judgment/ order dated 12.09.2017 passed by this Court in CRL.REV.P. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters 504/2017; - orders dated 04.02.2019 and 18.02.2019 passed by this Court in W.P. (CRL) 354/2019; - orders dated 22.04.2016, 04.08.2016, 01.09.2016 passed by this Court in BAIL APPLN. 811/2016.

#35. It is the case of the petitioners that the aforesaid judgments/ orders were passed in proceedings pertaining to allegations of sexual offences (u/s 376 and 506, IPC), of which the petitioners have been acquitted; therefore, their availability in public domain, is prejudicial, humiliating and violative of the petitioners’ right to privacy.

#36. The petitioners in W.P(C) 6047/2024 seek that their name/s and address/es be masked/ removed from the judgment dated 02.04.2024 and orders passed in MAT. APP. (F.C.) 321/2018. The petitioners further seek that the respondents be directed to remove/delete the content pertaining to the matrimonial/ private details of the petitioners.

#37. It is submitted that the aforesaid judgment dated 02.04.2024 contains details of private incidents/events of petitioner no.1 and her former husband, who is a public figure (renowned chef). Availability of the said judgment in public domain is violative of her fundamental right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

#38. The petitioner in W.P(C) 7763/2024 seeks the removal of the judgment/ order dated 30.05.2023 passed in MAT.APP.(F.C) 49/2023, from the search engines/ platforms of the respondents. It is submitted that the said order/judgment contains personal and private information/ details of the petitioner and her former husband, including the details of the petitioner’s W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters matrimonial relationship with her former husband, details of the matrimonial dispute between them, litigation in context thereof, the settlement arrived at, list of assets etc. It is further submitted that the said judgment appears upon a search of the petitioner’s name on the respondent platform/s.

#39. It is the case of the petitioner that dissemination of the aforesaid judgment/ order in public domain when it contains sensitive and private details of the petitioner and is of no concern to the public, is violative of the petitioner’s fundamental right to privacy.

#40. In W.P (C) 9940/2024, the petitioner, who is stated to be a public figure, seeks removal of the content, including articles/ news reports, pertaining to the FIR No.0418/2022, from the platforms/ search engines of the respondents. Further, the petitioner seeks that the concerned respondent/s be directed to ensure removal of inaccurate/ misleading/outdated personal data as per the request/representation furnished by the petitioner in terms of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.

#41. It is submitted that pursuant to the registration of the aforesaid FIR alleging offences under sections 376 and 506 of the IPC, the petitioner approached this Court by way of CRL. MC. No. 5294/2022. Subsequently, the petitioner and the complainant entered into a settlement dated

09.11.2023. Vide order dated 06.02.2024 passed in CRL.MC. No. 5294/2022, this Court while recording the submission of the complainant (respondent no.4 therein) in paragraph –4 of the said order, quashed the aforesaid FIR and all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom against the petitioner, subject to the deposit of cost of Rs.1,00,000/-. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters

#42. It is submitted that despite the said order dated 06.02.2024, several articles and news reports, containing defamatory content pertaining to the aforesaid, continue to be available on the internet platforms/ in public domain, adversely affecting the petitioner’s reputation, privacy and career prospects, thereby being in violation of the petitioner’s fundamental right to privacy.

#43. In W.P(C) 12179/2024, the petitioner seeks the removal of the details/ judgment/ URLs pertaining to the judgment dated 06.04.2013 passed by Civil Judge-02, South District, Saket Courts, Delhi, in Civil Suit No. 380/12, the platform of respondent/ iKanoon Software Development Private Limited.

#44. It is submitted that upon a search of the petitioner’s name on the respondent’s platform/search engine, the said judgment dated 06.04.2013 appears in the search results. It is further submitted that the said judgment, which was passed in context of a private family dispute gives an adverse impression about the petitioner’s conduct towards his now deceased father and the petitioner’s relationship with his wife, and that the same adversely affects the petitioner’s reputation.

#45. In W.P(C) 30/2025, the petitioner, stated to be an Overseas Citizen of India, holding a British Passport, seeks the removal of the orders/ judgments (including order dated 22.08.2024 passed by this Court) passed in context of the FIR No. 303/2024 registered at Police Station Pahar Ganj, available on the respondent platforms. It is submitted that pursuant to the registration of the said FIR, the petitioner filed an application for anticipatory bail, however, vide order dated 03.07.2024, the said application was dismissed by W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters the Additional Sessions Judge (FTC)-01, Central Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi. Thereafter, the petitioner approached this Court and the petitioner’s application seeking anticipatory bail was allowed vide order dated

22.08.2024.

#46. It is further submitted that in the meantime, in terms of the mutual agreement arrived at between the complainant and the accused (petitioner herein), the dispute which primarily arose in the backdrop of a business transaction, was settled and a closure report was filed. In this conspectus, the proceedings were taken to their logical conclusion vide order dated

07.11.2024 passed by the Reliever JMFC (Central) in Cr. Case 13895/2024.

#47. It is the case of the petitioner that upon a search of the petitioner’s name on the respondent search engine/ Google LLC, the appearance of the aforesaid order dated 22.08.2024, as available on the platform of the respondent/ iKanoon Software Development Pvt. Ltd., creates a misleading impression of the petitioner’s involvement in a criminal matter. The petitioner asserts that such continued availability of the aforesaid order adversely affects his personal and professional reputation.

#48. The petitioner in W.P(C) 1567/2025, inter alia, seeks removal of the content, including articles, posts and orders pertaining to the investigation/ proceedings instituted by the CBI. It is submitted that in 2010, certain proceedings were instituted by the Central Bureau of Investigation, inter alia, against the petitioner, viz. Special (CBI) Case Nos. 9 / 2011, 65 / 2011, 66 / 2011, 71 / 2011 and 72 / 2011. Upon investigation, a chargesheet was filed. However, vide orders dated 17.06.2015 and 22.06.2015 passed by the Special Judge, the petitioner was discharged. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters

#49. It is the case of the petitioner that there are several articles, posts, orders and other content pertaining to the aforesaid proceedings instituted by the CBI, are available on the internet/ respondent platforms, which though were relevant at a certain point in time, hold no relevance in the present especially in light of the aforesaid orders dated 17.06.2015 and 22.06.2015.

#50. In W.P(C) 9929/2025, the petitioner, inter alia, seeks the removal of the judgments/ orders passed by the concerned courts in proceedings arising out of FIR No. 50/2022, registered at Women’s Police Station, Srinagar, wherein, the petitioner accused Mr. Nadeem Ahmad Ganai @ Nadeem Nadu of committing offences punishable under sections 376, 384 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

#51. It is the case of the petitioner that during the course of proceedings in context, certain orders/judgments, containing personal details/identity of the petitioner have been uploaded on the respondent platform/ Indian Kanoon without redaction or making of her name/identity. It submitted that despite multiple representations, seeking masking/redaction, the respondents have been remiss in taking any action.

#52. It is further submitted that the continued availability of the aforesaid orders/judgments revealing the petitioner’s identity in public domain, particularly upon conducting an internet search of her name, has subjected the petitioner to social stigma, loss of dignity, psychological trauma, harassment and defamation. It is asserted that in view of her status as a victim of sexual offences, such disclosure constitutes a violation of her fundamental right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters

#53. In W.P (C) 11714/2025, the petitioner, inter alia, seeks the removal/ delisting of the judgment dated 13.11.2024 passed by the ASJ (FTSC)(RC)- 02/West/Tis Hazari Courts, in SC No. 534/23 and related content, including in the form of articles, posts, news, videos, URLs, websites, web-links etc, available on the platforms of the respondents. It is submitted that FIR No. 167/2021 was registered against the petitioner and certain other individuals, accusing them of committing offences punishable under sections 328/342/376/34 of the Indian Penal Code,1860. Subsequently, vide order dated 02.08.2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, the accused, except the petitioner, were discharged and charges were framed against the petitioner.

#54. Ultimately, vide judgment dated 13.11.2024, passed by the ASJ (FTSC)(RC)-02/West/Tis Hazari Courts, in SC No. 534/23, the petitioner herein was acquitted of the charges framed against him. It is further submitted that during the pendency of trial, certain content, pertaining to said ongoing trial of the petitioner were published on the respondent platforms.

#55. It is the case of the petitioner that despite acquittal, the content published on the respondent platforms, in the name of the petitioner, during the pendency of the trial, is still available in the public domain, and such content while also being stigmatic, has an adverse impact on the petitioner’s personal life, career and future prospects, causing irreparable prejudice.

#56. The petitioner in W.P(C) 11862/2025 seeks the removal of the content in the name of the petitioner, viz. certain proceedings of matrimonial nature, available on the respondent platforms, including in the form of W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters articles, news, journals. Further the petitioner seeks that the respondent/ Registrar General, Delhi High Court be directed to redact/mask/delete the name of the petitioner from publicly accessible digital records, including those pertaining to: - MAT.APP (F.C.) NO. 297/2024; - W.P (CRL.) NO. 1206/2024; - CRL.MC.236/2024; - MAT.APP. (F.C.) NO. 148/2025; - CONT.CAS (CIVIL) 313/2025; - W.P (CRL.) 1844/2024; - W.P (CIVIL) 17733/2024; - CM (MAIN) 4113/2024; - CM (MAIN) 1930/2023.

#57. It is submitted that the publication/ continued availability of the aforesaid contents in public domain is bringing upon the petitioner, social stigma and loss of privacy. It is also submitted that publication of her personal information is now redundant and serves no purpose.

#58. In W.P (C) 14696/2025, the petitioner seeks removal/de-indexind of the URLs/web-links pertaining to the FIR No. 67/2006, registered at PS Lajpat Nagar, from the platform of the respondent/ Indian Kanoon. The petitioner also seeks for its name and personal information to be masked from the aforesaid content.

#59. It is submitted that the petitioner was arrayed as an accused in the FIR No. 67/2006. The said FIR was, however, quashed in terms of the order dated 04.05.2023, passed by this Court in CRL.M.C. 1460/2023. Despite the W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters quashing of the said FIR, respondent platforms continue to publicly display judicial records associated with the said FIR, including the petitioner’s name and other personal details, causing grave prejudice to his privacy and business interests, posing a serious threat to the petitioner’s professional credibility and social standing. It is further submitted that the aforesaid details lack present-day legal relevance and serve no public interest.

#60. The petitioner in W.P(C) 18962/2025, is stated to be a company engaged in the power transmission sector. It is submitted that in the year 2022, several digital news platforms published reports pertaining to the petitioner and its directors, alleging, inter alia, large scale financial fraud and criminal conspiracy. The said reports were premised on certain FIRs arising out of internal disputes among the shareholders of the petitioner. It is further submitted that the said reports, published on the respondent platforms, created a false narrative that portrayed the petitioner as being involved in serious criminal wrongdoings. Subsequently, all disputes between the concerned shareholders/ directors were amicably resolved. In view of the settlement, the parties jointly approached the High Court of Allahabad, seeking quashing of the FIRs registered in relation to these disputes. Thereafter, vide order dated 29.07.2024, passed by the High Court of Allahabad, in view of the said settlement deed, quashed the concerned FIRs. The National Company Law Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, vide order dated 27.02.2025 passed in IA No. 09/2025, in view of the said settlement deed, disposed of the Company Petition being CP NO.32/ALD/2021.

#61. It is the case of the petitioner that despite the conclusion of concerned judicial proceedings, the availability of the content pertaining thereto, on the W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters respondent platforms, upon a search of the petitioner’s name, has materially affected the petitioner’s business reputation and social standing and violates its fundamental right to privacy and dignity under Article 21. In the above conspectus, the petitioner seeks that the respondents be directed to remove/de-index the aforesaid news reports pertaining to the petitioner.

#62. In W.P (Crl.) 1861/2022, the petitioner seeks the removal of the order dated 21.10.2019 passed by this Court in BAIL APPLN. 1393/2019 & CRL.M.A. 35670/2019, pertaining to his deceased son-in-law, from the platforms of the respondents. Further, the petitioner seeks de-linking of the name and other information regarding his deceased son-in-law in the context of the said anticipatory bail order; and masking/redaction of the deceased’s identity from the aforesaid order as available on the respondent platforms.

#63. It is submitted that FIR No. 105/2019 was registered accusing the petitioner’s son-in-law offences punishable sections 376/323/506/509/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Consequent thereto, the son-in-law approached this Court seeking anticipatory bail and he was granted interim protection. However, vide aforesaid order dated 21.10.2019, the said interim protection was revoked and the Bail Application (BAIL APPLN. 1393/2019) was dismissed. Thereafter, the now deceased son-in- law surrendered and moved a regular bail application being in BAIL APPLN. 591/2020, wherein, vide order dated 22.05.2020 passed by this Court, he was released on interim bail. The said interim bail was extended by subsequent orders dated 13.07.2020, 24.07.2020 and 24.08.2020 passed in W.P. 3037/2020. On 15.11.2021, the petitioner’s son-in-law suffered a W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters cardiac arrest and passed away, rendering the criminal trial (Case No. SC/515/2019) abated.

#64. The petitioner contends that upon conducting a search based on the name of his son-in-law, on respondent search engines, the order dated

21.10.2019, which elaborately sets out the allegations levelled against the deceased, appears prominently within the first few search results. It is submitted that such continued availability causes social stigma, grave prejudice, and loss of future prospects to the family of the deceased, including his wife and children. The publication of the aforesaid order on respondent platforms is violative of the right to privacy of the petitioner’s family.

#65. In W.P (C) 15523/2023, the petitioners seek the removal of all the content (including in the form of articles and social media posts) pertaining to the arrest of the petitioners in the context of FIR No. 187/2021 registered at PS EOW, Mandir Marg, New Delhi, available/ published on the respondent platforms. It is submitted that the aforesaid content, published on the respondent platforms creates an impression of the petitioners being guilty of the allegations in terms of the aforesaid FIR and omit the fact that the petitioners were granted interim bail vide order dated 29.08.2022 passed by the CMM, Saket District Court.

#66. Further, it is submitted that vide order dated 14.09.2023, passed by this Court in CRL. M.C No. 1274/2023 the said FIR No. 187/2021 has been quashed. Despite the said order dated 14.09.2023, the aforesaid content pertaining, inter alia, to the petitioners’ arrest continues to be available on W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters the respondent platforms, thereby being prejudicial to the petitioners’ reputation and also violating their right to privacy. B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

#67. Learned counsel for the petitioners, relying upon the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, submitted that once any information is made public and shared on the internet, it remains accessible across the world without any expiry date. The radically unrestricted spread of personal data across the web deprives individuals of control over how, by whom, and in what context their personal data is viewed. The apparent immortality of information on the internet has compelled the petitioners to assert their “Right to be forgotten”.

#68. Relying upon K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), wherein privacy was recognized as an intrinsic facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, it was further submitted that privacy assures dignity, and dignity is the core which unites fundamental rights. Informational privacy, as part of this right, reflects an individual’s interest in preventing dissemination of personal information. Learned counsel emphasized that privacy also includes the right to protect reputation not only against falsehoods but also against certain truths, since individuals have a right to control how their image is portrayed to the world.

#69. To further substantiate the above contentions, learned counsel referred to the European Union Regulation of 2016, which expressly recognized the W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Right to be forgotten to effectuate an individual’s right to control his existence on the internet. In terms of the said 2016 regulations, this right means that an individual, who no longer wishes his data to be processed or stored, should be able to remove it from the digital domain.

#70. It was contended the extensive availability of personal information in the public domain possesses limited inherent value; however, its unrestricted accessibility may engender severe adverse consequences, including the frustration of employment opportunities, impairment of creditworthiness, diminution of professional and social standing, or erosion of personal dignity.

#71. Individuals should not be indefinitely reminded of past mistakes, even where information was lawfully in the public domain or shared with consent. The law already recognizes this principle in relation to “spent convictions,” and the same rationale ought to apply in the digital environment.

#72. Reference was made to Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Mario Costeja González [C-131/12], where the Court of Justice of the European Union permitted de-indexing of articles that were “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant.” Following this decision, the European Union enacted the General Data Protection Regulation, codifying the Right to be forgotten. Learned counsel also referred to Justice Kaul’s concurring opinion in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), wherein the contours of the Right to be forgotten, were articulated as a facet of privacy. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters

#73. Further, it was contended that the deletion, de-indexing, masking, and redaction of personal information, including one’s name and identity, in exercise of the ‘Right to be forgotten,’ is indispensable, as it facilitates the effective realization of the right to reputation. In support of this contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the following judgments to assert that the right to reputation has long been recognized as enforceable under Article 21 of the Constitution of India : Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P.,(2013) 10 SCC 591 State of Bihar v. Lal Krishna Advani, (2003) 8 SCC 361 Vinod Kumar Bindal v. CIC, (2025) 2 HCC (Del) 459 DejoKappan v. Deccan Herald, 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6494

#74. The petitioners’ rights to privacy, reputation, and presumption of innocence under Article 21 must be balanced against the respondents’ right to freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a). Reliance was placed on Sahara India Real Estate Corpn. Ltd. v. SEBI (2012) 10 SCC 603, where the Supreme Court held that Article 21 protection is a valid restriction on free speech.

#75. It was emphasized that the Right to be forgotten is not antithetical to the freedom of information, but rather a balancing mechanism between privacy and freedom of expression. Courts must adopt a two-pronged approach: first, treating ‘Right to be forgotten’ as the default and second, carving out a narrow public interest exception, with clear standards for removal when information is no longer necessary, excessive, or irrelevant. Where personal data storage is no longer necessary or relevant for the W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters original purposes of processing, the removal of such links does not tantamount to deletion of content.

#76. Relying upon the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, (2020) 5 SCC 48, it was submitted that the measures sought in the present proceedings, i.e. removal, masking, and de-indexing of prejudicial content, are narrowly tailored to protect the petitioners’ rights without unduly infringing upon the freedom of speech and the right to know. Continued availability of such content serves no public purpose, and mere curiosity or amusement cannot justify invasion of privacy.

#77. Reliance is placed upon Kaushal Kishore v. Sate of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2023) 4 SCC 1, to contend that rights under Article 21 can be enforced against non-State actors such as search engines, and that the present writ petitions are maintainable on account of the absence of effective alternative remedies. C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS GOOGLE INC/GOOGLE LLC and GOOGLE INDIA PRIVATE LTD.

#78. A preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the petitions has been made by the respondent. It is contended Google is a private entity and does not fall within the definition of “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution. Being neither a public authority nor discharging any public function, it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. Any petition alleging violation of Article 21 cannot be maintained against a private entity. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters

#79. It is submitted that ‘Google Search’ merely operates as an automated search engine which indexes webpages available on third-party websites through automated crawlers, performing a passive and neutral function akin to a library index. Search results are generated dynamically through algorithms, and the search engine does not create, publish, modify, or control the underlying content. Google is neither the creator, nor the uploader, nor publisher of the impugned content and has no prior knowledge of its existence. The impugned material has been authored and published by an independent third parties. It is submitted that the directions for removal of online content ought to be issued against the original publishers or uploaders, since removal at the source automatically results in de-indexing from search engines.

#80. It is further submitted that the impugned material pertaining to judicial orders, criminal proceedings, FIRs, arrests and related reporting, forms part of public records and therefore cannot be suppressed. Reliance, in this regard, is placed upon R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632, wherein it was held that where information forms part of public records, the right to privacy no longer subsists. This principle has been affirmed in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), which recognized privacy under Article 21 but clarified that it is not absolute and must be balanced with competing rights.

#81. It is submitted that publication or reporting of judicial proceedings and court orders is lawful and forms part of the principle of open justice. Truthful reporting of court proceedings is statutorily protected under the Fourth Exception to Section 499 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). Freedom of W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, freedom of the press, and the public’s right to know are integral constitutional values. Permitting removal or delinking of search results relating to court orders or public records would undermine the principle of open justice.

#82. The respondent submits that under Indian law, it is necessary to first establish through judicial determination that a particular publication violates the right to privacy before any direction restraining its publication or dissemination can be issued and in the absence of such adjudication, the accessibility of such material through search results cannot be restricted.

#83. The respondent submits that there exists no enforceable “right to be forgotten” under the present framework of Indian law and courts have consistently held that such a right cannot be invoked in relation to judicial records in the absence of statutory backing. The respondent further submits that even the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 does not recognise any statutory right to be forgotten and in fact provides exemptions for processing of personal data for judicial functions and legal proceedings.

#84. The respondent submits that foreign jurisprudence including the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Google Spain v. Mario Costeja (supra) cannot be imported into Indian law as the doctrine of the right to be forgotten in Europe is based upon statutory frameworks such as the European Union Data Protection Directive and the GDPR which have no equivalent statute under Indian law. The respondent further submits that even under European law, the right to be forgotten is subject to several exceptions including freedom of expression, legal obligations and matters of public interest. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters

#85. The respondent further submits that Indian law recognizes masking or anonymity of parties judicial records only limited statutory circumstances such as protection of victims of sexual offences under Section 228A IPC, the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. UNION OF INDIA / MINISTRY OF ELECTRONICS & INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (MEITY)

#86. Learned counsel for the UOI submits that the right to privacy has been recognized as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution by the Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), and that the doctrine of the “right to be forgotten” is an evolving concept. Its applicability has been acknowledged by the Indian Judiciary in Subhranshu Rout v. State of Odisha, 2020 SCC OnLine Ori 878,Vasunathan v. Registrar General, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 424, Jorawer Singh Mundy v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 2306, P. Nithish Vs. Union of India and Ors [WP (MD) No. 17228 of 2022], Zulfiqar Ahman Khan v. Quintillion Business Media (P) Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8494.

#87. It is further submitted that judicial orders/ judgments form part of public records and judicial documents within the common law system, therefore, cannot ordinarily be treated as confidential information merely because they contain personal details relating to individuals. In this regard the respondent relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in R.Rajagopal (supra), which was affirmed by the Constitution Bench in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), wherein it was held that once information forms part of W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters public records including court records, the right to privacy no longer subsists in respect of such information and such records become legitimate subjects of publication and comment.

#88. It is pointed out that courts have also emphasized the principle of open justice and public access to judicial proceedings and judgments as an important component of transparency in the administration of justice, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India, (2018) 10 SCC 639.

#89. The respondent submits that the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 defines statutory concepts such as “data”, “data principal”, “data fiduciary”, “data processor” and “processing” and that digital court records containing identifiable information may constitute personal data capable of protection under the statutory framework. The respondent further submits that in the context of digitized judicial records, the individual concerned may be regarded as the data principal, the court system hosting the order may function as the data fiduciary and platforms that capture or index such information may operate as processors of that personal data. The respondent also submits that search engines which locate, index, store and display information relating to identifiable individuals perform activities that amount to processing of personal data and therefore play a significant role in the dissemination of such information on the internet.

#90. The respondent submits that under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, (hereinafter, IT Act, 2000) the Central Government is empowered to direct blocking of information accessible through computer resources only on limited statutory grounds such as sovereignty, and W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters defense of the country, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order or prevention of incitement to the commission of cognizable offences, and therefore issues relating to the doctrine of the right to be forgotten do not fall within the statutory scope of Section 69A of the IT Act, 2000.

#91. The respondent further submits that the framework governing intermediary liability is provided under Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000, read with the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, (hereinafter, IT Rules, 2021) which prescribe due diligence obligations and grievance redressal mechanisms relating to unlawful information hosted on intermediary platforms. Under Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, 2000, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1, intermediaries are required to remove or disable access to information only upon receiving actual knowledge through an order of a Court of competent jurisdiction or notification by the appropriate Government.

#92. The respondent submits that the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY) is the custodian of the IT Act, 2000 and administers Part II of the IT Rules, 2021 which relates to the due diligence obligations of intermediaries and the grievance redressal framework applicable to them. The respondent further submits that Part III of the said Rules is administered by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and establishes a regulatory framework for publishers of news and current affairs content on digital media and publishers of online curated content platforms including adherence to a Code of Ethics and a three-tier grievance redressal W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters mechanism consisting of complaints at the publisher level, review by a self- regulating body of publishers and oversight by the Ministry through an Inter-Departmental Committee.

#93. The respondent submits that since the relief sought by the petitioner pertains to removal, masking, delisting or restriction of access to information available through intermediary platforms or search engines, any directions, if required, may appropriately be issued directly to the concerned intermediary platforms or search engine operators. It is further submitted that the respondent does not directly host, publish or control such content and therefore is neither a necessary nor a proper party to the present proceedings. THE MEDIA HOUSES

#94. The respondents, relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in R. Rajagopal (supra), submitted that once information forms part of public records or relates to events occurring in the public domain, the right to privacy cannot ordinarily be invoked to restrain publication or reporting of such information. It is submitted that reporting based on judicial proceedings or public records therefore, cannot be restrained merely because the information is adverse to the petitioner or affects his reputation.

#95. The respondents further submit that the press performs an essential role as a public watchdog in a democratic society and dissemination of truthful information relating to judicial proceedings and matters of public concern is necessary to maintain transparency and accountability in public life. The respondents further submit that the principle of open justice permits W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters fair and accurate reporting of court proceedings and judicial decisions and that any direction restraining publication of judicial proceedings or judicial records would undermine the principle of open courts and adversely affect the public’s right to know.

#96. The respondents submit that the petitioner cannot seek erasure of accurate facts of the past, relating to his conviction merely to avoid reputational consequences arising from his own acts. The respondents further submit that reputational harm, if any, arises from the petitioner’s own conduct rather than from the fair reporting of such conduct by the media, and that recognition of an unrestricted right to be forgotten enabling selective erasure of unfavourable information would distort public memory and undermine the principles of transparency, accountability and freedom of the press essential to a democratic society.

#97. It is further submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable against private media entities as they do not perform any public function or public duty and therefore a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot ordinarily lie against them. iKANOON SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PRIVATE LIMITED

#98. The respondent submits that reliance on foreign jurisprudence relating to the doctrine of the “right to be forgotten” is misconceived as such principles arise from statutory frameworks such as the EU Data Protection Directive and cannot be applied in India in the absence of corresponding legislation. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters

#99. The respondent further submits that directing removal or de-linking of information relating to an individual from search indices would amount to permitting private censorship of public documents and would therefore be violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

#100. The respondent further submits that the legal framework governing blocking or removal of online information is already provided under Section 69A of the IT Act, 2000 and the allied blocking rules and therefore additional removal mechanisms cannot be created through writ jurisdiction.

#101. It is submitted that the respondent functions merely as an intermediary providing searchable access to publicly available statutes and judicial decisions and does not author, control or modify the underlying content. Intermediaries cannot be required to adjudicate competing claims between privacy and freedom of expression as such determinations must be undertaken by the competent judicial forum that authored the underlying record.

#102. The respondent further submits that information forming part of judicial records cannot be claimed as private information against which a right to privacy or a right to be forgotten may be asserted.

#103. The right to information forms an integral part of the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) as recognised by the Supreme Court in Assn. for Democratic Reforms (Electoral Bond Scheme) v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 1.

#104. The respondent further submits that restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression can only be imposed through legislation enacted by the State and cannot be judicially created beyond those enumerated in W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Article 19(2) of the Constitution, as observed in Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2023) 4 SCC 1 and K.S. Puttaswamy (supra). The right to information under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution extends to access to information necessary for participatory democracy and democratic transparency as recognised in Assn. for Democratic Reforms (Electoral Bond Scheme) (supra). X CORP. (formerly known as Twitter)

#105. The respondent submits that the present writ petition is not maintainable against the answering respondent as it is a private entity incorporated under the laws of the United States of America and does not fall within the definition of ‘State’ or ‘other authority’ under Article 12 of the Constitution, and therefore a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot ordinarily be issued against it. The respondent further submits that the grant of a writ of mandamus requires the existence of a legally enforceable right in favour of the petitioner and a corresponding statutory duty imposed upon the respondent, and petitioners have failed to demonstrate the existence of any such statutory duty requiring the respondent to remove or disable access to the impugned content.

#106. The respondent further submits that disputes involving alleged reputational harm, mental distress or defamatory publication necessarily involve adjudication of disputed questions of fact, including determination of the truthfulness or defamatory nature of the content complained of and such questions cannot appropriately be determined within writ jurisdiction under Article 226. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters

#107. The respondent further submits the statutory framework governing intermediary liability has overriding effect by virtue of Section 81 of the IT Act, 2000, thereby limiting the circumstances in which intermediaries may be held liable for third party content hosted on their platforms. The respondent submits that requiring intermediaries independently adjudicate complaints relating to allegedly offensive, defamatory or unlawful content would effectively impose a judicial function upon private entities, which would be inconsistent with the legislative framework governing intermediary liability and contrary to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal (supra).

#108. It is submitted that the doctrine of the “right to be forgotten” is not presently recognised as an enforceable constitutional or statutory right under Indian law, notwithstanding observations made by the Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), recognising the broader right to privacy. Even assuming the existence of such a right, it cannot be invoked to restrict access to information forming part of public records, including judicial records relating to criminal convictions or matters of public interest.

#109. Further, it is submitted that the respondent is neither a necessary nor a proper party to the present proceedings as the petitioners have failed to establish any enforceable legal duty requiring the respondent to remove the impugned content, and that any grievance relating to allegedly defamatory or unlawful content must be pursued against the actual originators or publishers of such content. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters MICROSOFT CORPORATION INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED

#110. The respondent submits that any alleged reputational harm suffered by the petitioner arises, if at all, from statements published by third party authors or media outlets and liability for such content lies exclusively with the original publishers rather than with a search engine intermediary that merely indexes publicly available information.

#111. The respondent submits that the determination of whether any particular content is defamatory requires detailed factual and legal analysis which can only be undertaken by a competent Court of law and therefore an intermediary cannot be required to unilaterally adjudicate upon the legality or defamatory character of third party content. The respondent further submits that the petitioner cannot circumvent the statutory remedies available under defamation law, including civil proceedings against the authors or publishers of the impugned articles, by invoking writ jurisdiction against intermediaries who have no role in the creation or publication of the disputed content.

#112. It is further submitted that even where de-indexing is undertaken pursuant to lawful directions, if the underlying source websites continue to host the content, similar links may reappear in search results through subsequent automated crawling and indexing processes. The respondent therefore submits that effective relief in respect of the petitioners’ grievance would require directions against the original publishers or source websites hosting the content, including removal or masking of the petitioners’ identity, as only such measures would prevent the continued availability and re-indexing of the impugned material. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters

#113. The respondent submits that intermediaries are entitled to statutory safe harbour protection under Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000, which protects intermediaries from liability for third party information made available through their platforms, where they do not initiate the transmission, select the receiver of the transmission or modify the information contained therein.

#114. The respondent further submits that an intermediary is required to act against allegedly unlawful content only upon receiving actual knowledge of its illegality, which under Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, 2000 and the IT Rules, 2021, arises only upon receipt of an order from a competent Court or notification by the appropriate government or its authorized agency. THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT

#115. Learned counsel appearing for the Registrar General submits that the right to privacy is an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. Reliance is placed upon K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), wherein the Supreme Court declared privacy to be a fundamental right and acknowledged that such right would include facets such as the “right to be forgotten.”

#116. Reference is made to Vysakh K.G. v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 7337, wherein the Kerala High Court affirmed the open court principle but acknowledged statutory exceptions protecting privacy in sensitive matters such as family law, matrimonial disputes, child custody, and adoption. Further reference is made to Karthick Theodore v. Registrar General, Madras High Court (W.A.(MD) No. 1901 of 2021), wherein, the W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Madras High Court ordered removal of a judgment from an online legal database on the basis of the “right to be forgotten.” However, the Supreme Court has stayed the operation of that judgment in iKanoon Software Development Pvt. Ltd. v. Karthick Theodore (SLP(C) No. 15311 of 2024), which remains pending final adjudication.

#117. It is submitted that consistent with this reasoning, this Court has directed redaction or removal of records in sensitive matters, including those under matrimonial laws, the Juvenile Justice Act, and the POCSO Act, where privacy is expressly or implicitly recognised. The Delhi High Court Information Technology Committee (DHCITC) has played a central role in overseeing compliance. Minutes of meetings dated 07.12.2016, 18.03.2021 and 06.07.2022, document instances where the Registry acted in compliance with judicial orders.

#118. It is further submitted that pursuant to directions dated 29.07.2021 in Crl. M.C.1655/2021 &Crl. M.C. 1657/2021, the DHCITC considered mechanisms to detect and address cases requiring identity protection from inception. In its meeting on 30.05.2023, the Committee approved development of a software module enabling masking of names when ordered by the Court. The module was demonstrated and approved on

04.10.2023 after a security audit, and has since been made operational.

#119. It is submitted that the masking software allows advocates and parties-in-person, at the time of e-filing, to select an option requesting identity protection. This tool has been integrated into the Court’s Online E-Filing System, ensuring sensitive cases can be masked at the threshold. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters D. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION I. MAINTAINABILITY

#120. Several respondents have raised a preliminary objection that a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot lie against private entities that do not perform any public function or discharge any public duty and that these proceedings are therefore not maintainable against Google, iKanoon Software Development Private Limited (“Indian Kanoon”), Media Houses, X Corp. (formerly known as Twitter) and Microsoft. In this regard, reference has been made to Radhey Shyam & Anr. v Chabbi Nath & Ors. (2015) 5 SCC 423, wherein the Court has observed as under: “27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view [Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2009) 5 SCC 616] of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226.”

#121. This objection is required to be dealt with at the threshold. The general principle that a writ of mandamus lies only against a body performing a public function or discharging a public duty is well established. This principle has been reiterated vide judgment dated

23.07.2024 passed by this Court in Sanchit Gupta v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5880, in the context of a writ petition filed against a social media entity (X Corp, formerly known as Twitter). In the facts of the case, and considering the nature of grievance of the petitioner therein, it was observed that “ In the Court's opinion, Petitioner's legal recourse appears more appropriate for a claim breach of contract rather than a constitutional W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters violation. The proper venue for addressing such a breach would be the civil courts, where contractual disputes are adjudicated. If the Petitioner believes that his rights under the policy of X Corp have been violated, pursuing this claim through civil litigation is advised, as the remedy for breach of contract lies therein. Thus, the writ petition challenging such actions on constitutional grounds is not maintainable.” The Court held as under: its significant role “11. In conclusion, despite in public discourse and the potential impact on public opinion and democratic engagement, ‘X’ does not perform a ‘public function’ in the strict legal sense intended under Article 226 of the Constitution. The platform operates as a private entity under private law and does not carry out any governmental duties or obligations. Therefore, it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 as currently interpreted by jurisprudence on this issue.”

#122. However, the present proceedings are directed at enforcing the fundamental rights of the petitioners, originating from Article 21 of the Constitution, the rights that the Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, expressly recognized as operating against both State and non-State actors: “328. Informational privacy is a facet of the right to privacy. The dangers to privacy in an age of information can originate not only from the State but from non-State actors as well…… XXX XXX XXX

#367. Claims for protection of privacy interests can arise against the State and its instrumentalities and against non-State entities, such as, individuals acting in their private capacity and bodies corporate or unincorporated associations, etc., without any element of State participation. Apart from academic literature, different claims based on different asserted privacy interests have also found judicial support. Cases arose in various jurisdictions in the context of law; (ii) statutory privacy recognition; and (iii) constitutionally protected claims of the right to privacy. interests based on (i) common W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters XXX XXX XXX

#644. The right to privacy is a fundamental right. It is a right which protects the inner sphere of the individual from interference from both State and non-State actors and allows the individuals to make autonomous life choices .”

#123. In exercise of its powers under Article 226, this Court can issue directions to the respondents, including private parties, since fundamental rights are enforceable even against persons other than the State or its instrumentalities. The Kerala High Court in Dejo Kappan v. Deccan Herald & Ors. 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6494, referring to the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P., (2023) 4 SCC 1, has held as under: “20. In Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P.7, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered, inter alia, three issues in the context of the right to free speech guaranteed under the Constitution. They are: (i) whether the grounds specified in Article 19(2) in relation to which reasonable restrictions on the right to free speech can be imposed by law, were exhaustive in nature or whether restrictions on the right to free speech could be imposed on grounds not found in Article 19(2) by invoking other fundamental rights? (ii) whether the fundamental right under Article 19 or Article 21 of the Constitution can be claimed against and (iii) persons other than the State or its instrumentalities? whether the State is under a duty to affirmatively protect the rights of a person under Article 21 of the Constitution even against a threat to the liberty of a person by the acts or omissions of another person or private agency?

#21. …Issue (ii) was answered by considering the development of law in other countries and India and holding that a fundamental right under Articles 19 and 21 can be enforced even against persons other than the State or its instrumentalities . ….”

#124. If the right to privacy, including informational privacy, operates against non-State actors, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 to W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters enforce the said right cannot be ousted merely because the entity whose conduct causes the violation is a private entity. The violation of informational privacy by private commercial entities, operating at such extensive scale, is as real and as constitutionally significant as any violation by a State actor. To hold otherwise, would render the fundamental right to informational privacy illusory in precisely the domain where it is most acutely threatened, i.e. the digital domain.

#125. Additionally, Google and Indian Kanoon as intermediaries, are subject to specific statutory obligations under Rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (hereinafter “IT Rules, 2021”) which , upon receiving an order from a Court of competent jurisdiction, obliges intermediaries to not host, store or publish the information concerned. The scope of the present proceedings subsumes the issue as to whether such orders are required to be passed in the peculiar factual matrix. The same provides an independent and additional basis for the exercise of this Court's writ jurisdiction.

#126. On the specific objection raised by the Media Houses, it may be noted that the primary relief being considered in these proceedings, is not a blanket restraint on publication or journalistic activities. What falls for consideration is whether any specific and narrowly tailored relief can be granted, inter alia, relating to the de-indexing of content that has become disproportionate and constitutionally unjustifiable in light of the legal outcomes of the underlying proceedings. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters

#127. Further, reference in this regard may be placed on ABC v. Commissioner of Police, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 449, wherein it was observed as under: “48. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the view, that the press and the media perform a public function and discharge a public duty of: disseminating news, views & information; initiating and responding to debates; dealing with matters of current interest in the society in all fields such as politics, morality, law, crime, arts, sports, entertainment, science, philosophy, religion, etc. There is not an aspect related to human rights and human existence which is not dealt with by the press and the media. Considering the immense impact that the press and media has over the polity, in my view, it cannot be said that they do not perform a public function or discharge a public duty, inter alia, when they perform the act of reporting news. Their functions touch the lives of practically everyone. Their reach is very deep and pervasive. Infact, the audio- visual media creates an even greater impact in today's time with deeper & wider penetration all across the State. They command immense power of making, moulding, sustaining or even changing public opinion. The functions performed by the press & media are recognised by the State which, consequently, accords various rights & privileges to them.

#49. The controversy in the present case, as aforementioned, relates to the alleged disclosure of the identity of the petitioner's daughter, who had reported a case of alleged child sexual abuse against her own father, by the respondents herein. The duty of the respondents herein to maintain utmost secrecy and confidence in the matter of identity of the petitioner's daughter has not been disputed. Such a duty of the press & media stems from the need to prevent social obliteration and humiliation of the victim. The potential of the press and media to cause such harm is immense because the press and the media enjoy a position of trust in the society and also because of Any function/activity, alleged to be in violation of such their reach. duty, would fall within the ambit of scrutiny of this court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, especially when the same is alleged to have infringed the fundamental rights of the victim. Therefore, the respondent nos. 2 and 3 are subject to the writ jurisdiction of this court in respect of the public function and public duty performed by them. ”

#128. The preliminary objection is accordingly rejected. W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters II. ON MERITS

#129. In view of the rival submissions placed before this Court, the central issue that is required to be addressed at the outset is whether, and to what extent, the “right to be forgotten” finds recognition within the constitutional and legal framework, and whether it stands embedded within the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. It is, therefore, apposite to first revisit the jurisprudence on the contours of the right to privacy. The Right to Privacy and Informational Privacy under Article 21

#130. The jurisprudence on privacy finds its early articulation in R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632, popularly called the “Auto Shankar case.” This judgment of the Supreme Court laid down foundational principles that continue to inform the discourse on privacy: “9. The right to privacy as an independent and distinctive concept originated in the field of Tort law, under which a new cause of action for damages resulting from unlawful invasion of privacy was recognised. This right has two aspects which are but two faces of the same coin — (1) the general law of privacy which affords a tort action for damages resulting from an unlawful invasion of privacy and (2) the constitutional recognition given to the right to privacy which protects personal privacy against unlawful governmental invasion. The first aspect of this right must be said to have been violated where, for example, a person's name or likeness is used, without his consent, for advertising — or non- advertising — purposes or for that matter, his life story is written — whether laudatory or otherwise — and published without his consent as explained hereinafter. In recent times, however, this right has acquired a constitutional status..... XXX XXX XXX W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters

#26. We may now summarise the broad principles flowing from the above discussion: (1) The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a “right to be let alone”. A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent — whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. Position may, however, be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy. (2) The rule aforesaid is subject to the exception, that any publication concerning the aforesaid aspects becomes unobjectionable if such publication is based upon public records including court records. This is for the reason that once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for comment by press and media among others. We are, however, of the opinion that in the interests of decency [Article 19(2)] an exception must be carved out to this rule, viz., a female who is the victim of a sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence should not further be subjected to the indignity of her name and the incident being publicised in press/media. ….”

#131. The recognition of privacy, being implicit in Article 21, was further elaborated by the judgment rendered in PUCL v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301. The Apex Court, examining the legality of telephone tapping and surveillance, affirmed privacy as integral to the dignity and liberty of the individual. The Court observed as under: “16. In R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N. [(1994) 6 SCC 632] Jeevan Reddy, J. speaking for the Court observed that in recent times right to privacy has acquired constitutional status. The learned Judge referred to Kharak Singh case [(1964) 1 SCR 332 : AIR 1963 SC 1295] , Gobind case [(1975) 2 SCC 148 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 468] and considered a large number of American and English cases and finally came to the conclusion that “the right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a ‘right to be let alone’.” A citizen has a right “to safeguard the privacy of W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education among other matters”.

#17. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that right to privacy is a part of the right to “life” and “personal liberty” enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. Once the facts in a given case constitute a right to privacy, Article 21 is attracted. The said right cannot be curtailed “except according to procedure established by law”.

#18. The right to privacy — by itself — has not been identified under the Constitution. As a concept it may be too broad and moralistic to define it judicially. Whether right to privacy can be claimed or has been infringed in a given case would depend on the facts of the said case.... XXX XXX XXX

#20. India is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. Article 17 of the said covenant is as under: “Article 17 1. No one shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, human or correspondence, nor to lawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 is almost in similar terms.”

#132. The contours of privacy were further delineated in Mr. ‘X’ v. Hospital ‘Z’, (1998) 8 SCC 296, where the Supreme Court considered the delicate balance between individual privacy and public interest and held that the right to privacy is not an absolute right and may be restricted. The relevant portion reads as under: “26. As one of the basic Human Rights, the right of privacy is not treated as absolute and is subject to such action as may be lawfully taken for the prevention of crime or disorder or protection of health or morals or protection of rights and freedoms of others.

#27. Right of privacy may, apart from contract, also arise out of a particular specific relationship which may be commercial, matrimonial, or even political. As already discussed above, doctor-patient W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters relationship, though basically commercial, is, professionally, a matter of confidence and, therefore, doctors are morally and ethically bound to maintain confidentiality. In such a situation, public disclosure of even true private facts may amount to an invasion of the right of privacy which may sometimes lead to the clash of one person's “right to be let alone” with another person's right to be informed. 28. Disclosure of even true private facts has the tendency to disturb a person's tranquillity. It may generate many complexes in him and may even lead to psychological problems. He may, thereafter, have a disturbed life all through. In the face of these potentialities, and as already held by this Court in its various decisions referred to above, the right of privacy is an essential component of the right to life envisaged by Article 21. The right, however, is not absolute and may be lawfully restricted for the prevention of crime, disorder or protection of health or morals or protection of rights and freedom of others. XXX XXX XXX where there is a clash of two Fundamental Rights, as in the 44. ..... instant case, namely, the appellant's right to privacy as part of right to life and Ms ‘Y’s right to lead a healthy life which is her Fundamental Right under Article 21, the right which would advance the public morality or public interest, would alone be enforced through the process of court, for the reason that moral considerations cannot be kept at bay and the Judges are not expected to sit as mute structures of clay in the hall known as the courtroom, but have to be sensitive, “in the sense that they must keep their fingers firmly upon the pulse of the accepted morality of the day”. (See: Allen: Legal Duties).”

#133. In Sharda v. Dharmpal, (2003) 4 SCC 493, the Supreme Court, referring to R. Rajagopal(supra), PUCL (supra) and Gobind v. State of M.P. (1975) 2 SCC 148, observed as under: “56. With the expansive interpretation of the phrase “personal liberty”, this right has been read into Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. (See R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N. [(1994) 6 SCC 632 : AIR 1995 SC 264] and People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India [(1997) 1 SCC 301] .) In some cases the right has been held to amalgam of various rights.