XX v. UNION OF INDIA ORS

Judgment

1. Petitioner challenges order dated 12.11.2024 whereby she has been terminated from service. She seeks issuance of appropriate writ directing her employer to reinstate her to the post of Assistant Director (Administration & Finance)-Legal, with all consequential benefits. 2. Petitioner has withheld her identity and has masked her name in the present writ petition. This seems to have been done for the reason that W.P.(C) 9931/2025 1 of 38 during the course of her employment in question, she had filed a complaint under Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. Though, the aforesaid complaint (being referred as POSH Complaint) has already been adjudicated, in the present matter, she would be referred to either as “petitioner” or as “XX”. 3. 4. Let me narrate factual matrix, in brief. Petitioner is admittedly a law graduate and got herself enrolled as advocate on 23.10.2011. 5. Bureau of Indian Standards (respondent no. 2 herein) is a statutory body, working under the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, Government of India. Needless to emphasize, Bureau of Indian Standards (in short „BIS‟) is a National Standard Body of India established under BIS Act 2016 engaged in harmonious development of activities of standardization and system certification. 6. BIS came up with an advertisement on 05.09.2020 for various posts falling under Group-A, Group-B & Group-C. 7. One such position was Assistant Director (Administration & Finance)-Legal and the prescribed educational and other qualifications required for the aforesaid post were described as under in the advertisement: - “For Assistant Director (Administration) for legal i) Degree in law from a recognized university/Bachelor of law; i ) Th ree years’ experi ence i n th e relevant fi eld i n Central/ State/ Union Territory Government of Statutory/ Autonomous Body/ Public Sector undertaking/ reputed Government agency. W.P.(C) 9931/2025 2 of 38 i

8. The applicant/petitioner applied for the aforesaid post and was, eventually, called for interview. 9. After rigorous selection process and subjecting her candidature to thorough verification with respect to her eligibility and experience credentials, BIS, after satisfying itself about the same, offered her appointment vide appointment letter dated 29.07.2021. 10. Such offer was accepted by her and she, eventually, joined BIS on

01.09.2021. 11. According to petitioner, her performance as per Annual Performance Appraisal Report (APAR) was, always, ranked very highly and her integrity also remained beyond doubt. She even submitted her candidature for being considered as Director (Legal) within the same organization. 12. Fact remains, she was served with show cause notice on

13.04.2022 for concealment of facts and was asked to furnish details regarding her fulfilling the mandatory criteria of work-experience for Assistant Director (Administration & Finance)-Legal. 13. She submitted a comprehensive reply on 25.05.2022. 14. Her grievance is that despite the fact that BIS had, even, sought a specific clarification from Ministry of Consumer Affairs about her meeting the requisite criteria and that the Secretary, Ministry of Consumer Affairs had, in no uncertain terms, clarified that she met the requisite criteria as per the advertisement, BIS has terminated her services during her probation period holding that she was not meeting the W.P.(C) 9931/2025 3 of 38 requisite work-experience and that she had furnished false information for securing appointment. 15. Such order is under challenge. 16. Before touching the factual aspects in some detail and taking up the rival contentions, it will be appropriate to mention here that the petitioner had earlier filed a writ petition before the Hon‟ble Rajasthan High Court, inter alia, challenging the aforesaid Termination Memorandum dated 12.11.2024. 17. Her such petition was numbered as S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17730/2024. 18. When the aforesaid writ petition was taken up by the Hon‟ble High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench on 20.11.2024, while issuing notice, the operation of the impugned Termination Memorandum dated 12.11.2024 was stayed with the direction that she would continue to serve as Assistant Director (Administration & Finance)-Legal. 19. However, in view of objection taken by learned Additional Solicitor General of India with respect to lack of territorial jurisdiction, the aforesaid writ petition was permitted to be withdrawn on 27.05.2025, liberty to file fresh writ petition before this Court and, simultaneously, the interim order dated 20.11.2024 was directed to remain in operation for a period of another eight weeks. 20.

It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed before this Court. W.P.(C) 9931/2025 4 of 38

21. Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior Counsel contends that the impugned order is bad in eyes of law and is also against the Principle of Natural Justice and violative of fundamental rights of the petitioner. According to him, there is apparent arbitrariness and malafide in the impugned order. It is contended that petitioner was meeting the prescribed eligibility criteria and work-experience and submitted requisite documents in order to substantiate and corroborate the same when she applied for the aforesaid position and there was never any case of misrepresentation and, therefore, her termination on the ground that she had given false information is clearly unsustainable. She had been working on the post in question for more than three years and once selected and appointed as per merit-list and there being no misrepresentation or malafide on her part, her service could not have been terminated, more so, when aspect of her meeting the eligibility criteria was comprehensively dealt with, before offering her aforesaid position. According to Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Jatan Singh, learned Senior Counsel for petitioner, she seems to have been harassed for submitting POSH complaint and the action of the employer is on account of sheer vengeance. It is also argued that relief sought by the petitioner is in consonance with the principle of public policy, public interest and public good and the impugned order is contrary to the basic tenets of rule of law and is liable to be quashed. 22. The prime contentions coming from the side of the petitioner can be enumerated as under: - W.P.(C) 9931/2025 5 of 38 (i) Petitioner was meeting the requisite eligibility criteria. Such aspect was thoroughly scrutinized immediately after she had applied for the aforesaid position and after according its due satisfaction, BIS had called her for interview and, eventually, offered her employment. Not only the above, but the clarification was also sought from the Secretary of Ministry of Consumer Affairs and once the Secretary had given a very specific clarification and had opined that she was meeting the requisite eligibility criteria and work-experience, the decision, being binding and conclusive on BIS, could not have been re-opened. (ii) Petitioner was on probation and termination is stigmatic in nature and, therefore, needs to be recalled. (iii) The order is untenable also because of the fact that there is violation of principles of natural justice as she was never granted any opportunity of being heard, before the impugned order dated

12.11.2024. (iv) The action of the Executive Committee smacks of malafide and, therefore, termination order, which is, primarily, based on the decision taken by the Executive Committee, is liable to be set aside being actuated by malice. (v) The termination is at the instance of Dy. Director General (Administration) BIS and the POSH complaint filed by petitioner herein was also directed against him and thus, clearly, the entire action taken by the BIS smacks of malafide. W.P.(C) 9931/2025 6 of 38

23. Petitioner has also placed reliance upon (i) Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College vs. Lakshmi Narain : (1976) 2 SCC 58, (ii) Varinder Hans vs. Union of India: 2019 SCC OnLine P&H 1343, (iii) M. S Mudhol (Dr.) vs. S D Halegkar:(1993) 3 SCC 591, (iv) Sarabjeet Kaur Dhaliwal vs. Punjab Agriculture Unversity:2003 SCC OnLine P&H 1722, (v) Nina Lath Gupta vs Union of India:2023 SCC OnLine Del 2518, (vi) Union of India vs Nina Lath Gupta:2024 SCC OnLine Del 3169, (vii) Dave Vaishali Narhariprasad vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn.: 2024 SCC OnLine Guj 3809, (viii) Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University vs. Monika: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3540, (ix) Birendra Singh Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others: 2024 SCC OnLine MP 7541, (x) Distt. Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi: (1990) 3 SCC 655, (xi) Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation.: (1990) 1 SCC 361, (xii) Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences: (1999) 3 SCC 60 (xiii) A.P. State Federation of Coop. Spg. Mills Ltd. v. P.V. Swaminathan: (2001) 10 SCC 83, (xiv) Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary v. Indira Gandhi Institute of Medical Science: (2015) 15 SCC 151, (xv) Sandeep Kumar v. GB Pant Institute of Engineering & Technology Ghurdauri: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 541 and (xvi) Uma Shankar Sharma v. Union of India: (1980) 3 SCC 202. 24. Mr. S.D. Sanjay, learned Addl. Solicitor General of India has refuted all the aforesaid contentions and argues that the entire claim of W.P.(C) 9931/2025 7 of 38 the petitioner is based on falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of material facts and, therefore, the present petition is liable to be dismissed. It is submitted that it is a false narrative that the termination was a retaliatory measure for her having filed a POSH complaint. It is argued that when writ petition was filed before the Hon‟ble Rajasthan High Court, no such ground was ever taken by her and, therefore, for the reasons best known to her, she has given a different colour to the present writ petition which is essentially a service matter concerning her recruitment eligibility and once the department came to a specific conclusion that she was not eligible to apply for the position in question, the termination was the only plausible outcome since she, even otherwise, was on probation. 25. The contentions of the respondents can be summarized as under: - (i) Petitioner was on probation which was extended from time to time and termination order is without any stigma as she has been merely terminated for her not meeting the requisite eligibility conditions. (ii) Being on probation, she has no vested or crystallized rights to continue in service, particularly when she was not eligible to apply for the aforesaid post. (iii) The offer of appointment was subject to her meeting the eligibility criteria and even if the aforesaid aspect was earlier gone into and even if there was some opinion given by the Secretary, Department of Consumer Affairs, the decision taken by the Central W.P.(C) 9931/2025 8 of 38 Government, based on the recommendations of Executive Committee is well-reasoned and cannot be interfered. (iv) There was no violation of any principle of natural justice as, admittedly, pursuant to show cause notice, she had submitted her detailed reply to such show cause notice and she had even been given a personal hearing.

26. Respondent has cited following judgments to buttress its case: - (i) (ii) State of Haryana Vs. Suman Dutta: (2000) 10 SCC 311 Samsher Singh Vs. Union of India and Others: 2021 SCC OnLine Del 3651 (iii) CDR. A. Swapna Vs. Union of India and Others: 2021 SCC OnLine Del 3787 (iv) Rakesh Kumar Singh Vs. Committee of Management, Rae Bareili: