Dr. L.S Chaudhary with Dr. Ajay Chaudhary, Mr. Bharat Chaudhary, Ms. Vinita, Monika, Mr v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND ANR

Judgment

1. This writ petition assails the constitutional validity of Regulation 2(o)(c) of the Punjab National Bank (Employees) Pension Regulations, 19951, “so far as it restricts the benefit of family pension to a deceased employee’s daughter, on completing the age of 25 years”. The provision reads thus: “2. Definitions: 1 “the Pension Regulations”, hereinafter Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 11178/2023 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:21.07.2025 12:51:58 In these regulations, unless the context otherwise requires :- ***** (o) “family” in relation to an employee means :- ***** c) son or daughter including widow or divorced daughter till he or she attains the age of twenty five years or up to his or her marriage or re-marriage, whichever is earlier including such son or daughter adopted legally.

2. Regulation 2(o)(c) is only a definition clause. It merely defines expressions used in the Pension Regulations. While, classically, a definition clause has no independent substantive operational existence, and becomes meaningful only when it is employed to understand the expression as it occurs in one or the other provision as contained in that statutory, or quasi-statutory instrument, nonetheless, if the definition of an expression, as contained in the definition clause, is itself invidiously discriminatory in nature, so as to violate Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India, it renders itself vulnerable to challenge.

3. The grievance of the petitioner stems from the exclusion, in Regulation 2(o)(c) of the Pension Regulations, of unmarried daughters above the age of 25 from the definition of “family” for the purposes of applicability of the Regulations. Thus, the consequence of the impugned clause is that, while an unmarried daughter of a deceased employee of the Bank would be entitled to the benefit of the Pension Regulations and, consequently, to family pension thereunder, she becomes disentitled to family pension if she is over the age of 25, Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 11178/2023 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:21.07.2025 12:51:58 even if she is unmarried and otherwise satisfies the criteria stipulated for entitlement to family pension. Age, and age alone, excludes her. This, according to the petitioner, is completely unconstitutional, and cannot be allowed to remain on the statute book.

4. In its counter affidavit, the Bank, while otherwise seeking to support the validity of the impugned Regulation 2(o)(c), also refers to Regulation 40(1)(b) of the Pension Regulations, which, to the extent it is relevant, reads as under: “40. Period of payment of family pension The period for which family pension is payable 1) shall be, – ***** this in the case of a son or daughter b) (including widowed/divorced) till she attains the age of twenty-five years or up to the age of his/her marriage/remarriage, whichever is earlier: Provided the family pension payable to sons/daughters (including widowed/divorced) shall be discontinued/not admissible when the eligible son/daughter starts earning a sum in excess of ₹ 2550/– Government/private sector/self-employment etc: per month employment Provided further that if the son or daughter of an employee is suffering from any disorder or disability of mind or is physically crippled or disabled so as to render him or her unable to earn a living even after attaining the age of 25 years, the family pension shall be payable to such son or daughter for life subject to the following conditions, namely, (i) If such son or daughter is one among 2 or more children of the employee, the family pension shall initially be payable to Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 11178/2023 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:21.07.2025 12:51:58 the minor children in the order set out in clause (e) of sub- regulation (1) until the last minor child attains the age of 25 years and thereafter the family pension shall be resumed in favour of the son or daughter suffering from disorder or disability of mind or who is physically crippled or disabled and shall be payable to him or her for life; If there are more (ii) than 1 such children suffering from disorder or disability of mind or who are physically crippled or disabled, the family pension shall be paid in the order of their birth and the younger of them will get the family pension only after the elder above him or her ceases to be eligible: that where Provided the family pension is payable to such twin children it shall be paid in the manner set out in clause (f) of sub- regulation (1); …”

5. The nub of the controversy, quite simply, therefore, is whether the exclusion of unmarried daughters from entitlement to family pension, consequent on the death of her father, as envisaged by Regulation 40(1)(b), as well as Regulation 2(o)(c) of the Pension Regulations, is constitutionally sustainable.

6. We, therefore, have examined this aspect of constitutionality both in respect of Regulation 2(o)(c), as well as Regulation 40(1)(b), of the Pension Regulations. We have not restricted our determination to Regulation 2(o)(c), as Regulation 40(1)(b) is the substantive avatar of Regulation 2(o)(c), and is being cited as a defence to the challenge to the validity of Regulation 2(o)(c). Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 11178/2023 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:21.07.2025 12:51:58 Rival Submissions and Analysis

7. We have heard Mr. L.S. Chaudhary for the petitioner and Mr. Rajat Arora for the Bank, at length.

8. Reliance by the Bank on the second proviso to Regulation 40(1)(b)

8.1 The Bank, in its counter-affidavit, has sought to emphasise the fact that the proscription on grant of family pension is not absolute, but stands relaxed, by the second proviso to Regulation 40(1)(b), in a case in which the unmarried daughter suffers from any disorder or disability of mind, or is physically crippled or disabled so as to render her unable to earn a living. In such cases, submits the Bank, the unmarried daughter, even after attaining the age of 25, would be eligible for family pension subject to satisfaction of the conditions envisaged in the proviso.

8.2 The argument is obviously unsustainable. The relaxation granted to unmarried daughters suffering from the conditions envisaged by the second proviso to Regulation 40(1)(b) cannot, quite obviously, be cited as a defence to the challenge, by the petitioner, to the exclusion of unmarried daughters above the age of 25 from family pension, except where they suffer from the conditions envisaged in the proviso.

8.3 Family pension, like pension itself, is not a charity. It is a Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 11178/2023 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:21.07.2025 12:51:58 recognition for years of service rendered by the employee. It is, additionally, a means for the family of the deceased employee to tide over the financial distress in which it finds itself. If the employee, otherwise entitled to pension, dies, leaving his family in the lurch, family pension is intended to extend, to the surviving family of the employee, the pensionary benefits to which the employee would have been entitled, had he been alive. The entitlement of the family of the employee to family pension, therefore, does not stand on a pedestal lower than the entitlement of the employee himself to pension.

8.4 As such, the mere relaxation, envisaged in the second proviso to Regulation 40(1)(b) of the Pension Regulations, to the rigour of the main Regulation 40(1)(b), is no defence to the challenge to the validity of Regulation 40(1)(b) itself.

8.5 The reliance, by Mr. Arora, on the second proviso to Regulation 40(1)(b) is, therefore, obviously misguided.

9. On merits

9.1 It is practically fossilised in the law that a challenge to the constitutional validity of statutory or quasi-statutory enactment, predicated on Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India, has to be tested by ascertaining whether the provision results in an invidious discrimination between persons or classes of persons between or among whom there is no intelligible differentia or, if there is an intelligible differentia, the differentia has no rational nexus with the Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 11178/2023 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:21.07.2025 12:51:58 object of the concerned statutory or quasi-statutory instrument.

10. Clearly, the impugned Regulation 40(1)(b) of the PNB Regulations creates a distinction between unmarried daughters of deceased employees of the Bank who are below the age of 25 years and unmarried daughters of the employees of the Bank who are above the age of 25 years. It results in the cleavage of an otherwise homogenous class of unmarried daughters of a deceased Bank employee into two categories – daughters below 25 and daughters above 25.

11. The Court has, therefore, to examine whether this distinction constitutes an intelligible differentia, which has a rational nexus to the object of the provision.

12. As Mr. Rajat Arora, learned Counsel for the respondent, correctly submits, the object of family pension is to provide succour to the survivors of a deceased employee – in the present case, of the Bank.

13. We have queried of Mr. Arora as to how, if that is the object of family pension, there can be a distinction between unmarried daughters who are below the age of 25 years and unmarried daughters who are above the age of 25 years. Is it that unmarried daughters below the age of 25 years are in need of succour whereas unmarried daughters above the age of 25 years are not? Or is one category more in need of succour than the other? Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 11178/2023 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:21.07.2025 12:51:58

14. Mr. Arora’s submission is that there is a general belief that, by the time an unmarried daughter reaches the age of 25 years, she would have started earning her own livelihood or would have the capacity to stand on her own legs and attain self-sufficiency. He also submits that family pension is intended for persons who are not dependent on others and that this is also a governing consideration which has weighed with the framers of the Regulations in fixing the age of 25 years.

15. Let us examine the contention.

16. J.S. Rukmani v. Govt of Tamil Nadu

16.1 A bench of three learned Judges of the Supreme Court, in J.S. Rukmani v Government of Tamil Nadu2, was seized with the issue of whether family pension would be denied to the petitioner J.S. Rukmani3 before the Supreme Court on the ground that her late husband was, at the time of his retirement, serving in Cannanore, which did not form part of the state of Tamil Nadu at the time of grant of family pension to her. Rukmani, being a lady without means, directly petitioned the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court issued notices to the States of Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Both states were represented. While the entitlement of Rukmani to family pension was not disputed, the states joined issue on the state on which the liability to pay the said pension would fall. 2 1984 Supp SCC 650 3 "Rukmani" hereinafter Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 11178/2023 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:21.07.2025 12:51:58

16.2 The Supreme Court observed that, as the Kerala Pension Rules applied only to government servants who retired on or after 1 April 1964, Rukmani could not claim family pension from the state of Kerala. The contention of the state of Tamil Nadu that the liability to pay family pension to Rukmani could not devolve on it as, by the time she became entitled to family pension, Cannanore, by virtue of the States Reorganisation Act which was enacted in the interregnum, was no longer in the state of Tamil Nadu, was found unsustainable in law. Though this is not the precise issue which arises for consideration before us, the following observations of the Supreme Court, as contained in para 9 of the report, are of relevance: “… Only ground on which the State of Tamil Nadu sought to exclude the petitioners from the benefit of the family pension was that their respective husbands served at the time of their superannuation at places which as a result of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 were no more in the State of Tamil Nadu but became parts of other successor States. We do not think any such limitation can be read in the notification dated May 26, 1979. It is true that by reason of the subsequent government order dated March 18, 1982 issued by the State of Tamil Nadu clarifying the notification dated May 26, 1979 the petitioners would be excluded from the benefit of the family pension since the places where their respective husbands were serving at the time of superannuation became part of States other than the State of Tamil Nadu. But the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of the government order dated March 18, 1982 and contended that the place where a government servant was serving at the time of superannuation has no rational nexus with the object of granting family pennon under the notification dated May 26, 1979 and that the government order dated March 18, 1982 is therefore discriminatory and void. This contention is, in our opinion, well founded and must be accepted. The object of granting family pension under the notification dated May 26, 1979 is obviously to alleviate the economic distress of widows and other members of the family of government servants who retired after faithfully serving the State of Madras as also the successor State of Tamil Nadu and who subsequently died leaving widows and other Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 11178/2023 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:21.07.2025 12:51:58 members of the family. Now admittedly the widow of a government servant who was in employment of the former State of Madras and who retired before the reorganisation of the States would be entitled to family pension under the notification dated May 26, 1979 if the place where her husband was serving at the time of superannuation was situate in the territories of the successor, State of Tamil Nadu. If that be so, then it is difficult to see how the widow of a government servant who served the former State of Madras in the same manner and who retired before the reorganisation of the States should not be entitled to family pension under the notification dated May 26, 1979 merely because the place where her husband was serving at the date of superannuation subsequently came to form part of the territories of a State other than the State of Tamil Nadu as a result of the reorganisation of the States. The object of the notification dated May 26, 1979 does not warrant any such distinction to be made between the widows of one class of government servants and the widows of another class merely on the basis of the place where the government servant last served at the time of superannuation, although in both cases the government servant served the same State, namely, the former State of Madras and superannuated before the reorganisation of the States. We are therefore of the view that the restrictive limitation imposed by the government order dated March 18, 1982 confining the benefit of family pension to the members of the family of only those government servants who last served at a place falling within the territories of the successor State of Tamil Nadu must be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and hence unconstitutional and void.” (Emphasis supplied)

17. D.S. Nakara v. UOI

17.1 The linking of the entitlement of pension to a particular date immediately brings to mind the classic judgment of the Supreme Court, rendered by a Constitution Bench, in D.S. Nakara v UOI4. In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned with executive instructions which made entitlement to pension dependent on whether the concerned government servant retired on or after 1 April 1979. 4 (1983) 1 SCC 305 Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 11178/2023 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:21.07.2025 12:51:58 The instructions restricted the entitlement to pension to government servants who retired on or after the said date. The constitutionality of the provision was challenged before the Supreme Court. The following passages, from the judgment of the Supreme Court, are illuminating: “2. Do pensioners entitled to receive superannuation or retiring pension under Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 (“1972 Rules”, for short) form a class as a whole? Is the date of retirement a relevant consideration for eligibility when a revised formula for computation of pension is ushered in and made effective from a specified date? Would differential treatment to pensioners related to the date of retirement qua the revised formula for computation of pension attract Article 14 of the Constitution and the element of discrimination liable to be declared unconstitutional as being violative of Article 14? These and the related questions debated in this group of petitions call for an answer in the backdrop of a welfare State and bearing in mind that pension is a socio-economic justice measure providing relief when advancing age gradually but irrevocably impairs capacity to stand on one’s own feet. *****

8. Primary contention is that the pensioners of the Central Government form a class for purpose of pensionary benefits and there could not be mini-classification within the class designated as pensioners. The expression “pensioner” is generally understood in contradistinction to the one in service. Government servants in service, in other words, those who have not retired, are entitled to salary and other allowances. Those who retire and are designated as “pensioners” are entitled to receive pension under the relevant rules. Therefore, this would clearly indicate that those who render service and retire on superannuation or any other mode of retirement and are in receipt of pension are comprehended in the expression “pensioners”. Is this class of pensioners further divisible for the purpose 9. of “entitlement” and “payment” of pension into those who retired by certain date and those who retired after that date? If date of retirement can be accepted as a valid criterion for classification, on retirement each individual government servant would form a class by himself because the date of retirement of each is Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 11178/2023 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:21.07.2025 12:51:58 correlated to his birth date and on attaining a certain age he had to retire. It is only after the recommendations of the Third Central Pay Commission were accepted by the Government of India that the retirement dates have been specified to be 12 in number being last day of each month in which the birth date of the individual fall. In other words, all government servant happens government servants who retire correlated to birth date on attaining the age of superannuation in a given month shall not retire on that date but shall retire on the last day of the month. Now, if date of retirement is a valid criterion for classification, those who retire at the end of every month shall form a class by themselves. This is too microscopic a classification to be upheld for any valid purpose. Is it permissible or is it violative of Article 14?

10. The scope, content and meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution has been the subject-matter of intensive examination by this Court in a catena of decisions. It would, therefore, be merely adding to the length of this judgment to recapitulate all those decisions and it is better to avoid that exercise save and except referring to the latest decision on the subject in Maneka Gandhi v Union of India5 from which the following observation may be extracted: “[W]hat is the content and reach of the great equalising principle enunciated in this article? There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith of the Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits.... Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence....” The decisions clearly lay down that though Article 14 11. forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled viz. (i) 5 (1978) 1 SCC 248 Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 11178/2023 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:21.07.2025 12:51:58 that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group; and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the statute in question (see Ram Krishna Dalmia v Justice S.R. Tendolkar6). The classification may be founded on differential basis according to objects sought to be achieved but what is implicit in it is that there ought to be a nexus i.e. causal connection between the basis of classification and object of the statute under consideration. It is equally well settled by the decisions of this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.

12. After an exhaustive review of almost all decisions bearing on the question of Article 14, this Court speaking through Chandrachud, C.J. in In re Special Courts Bill, 19787 restated the settled propositions which emerged from the judgments of this Court undoubtedly insofar as they were relevant to the decision on the points arising for consideration in that matter. Four of them are apt and relevant for the present purpose and may be extracted. They are: “* * * The constitutional command to the State to afford (3) equal protection of its laws sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application of a precise formula. Therefore, classification need not be constituted by an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusion of persons or things. The courts should not insist on delusive exactness or apply doctrinaire the validity of for determining classification in any given case. Classification is justified if it is not palpably arbitrary. (4) The principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 is not that the same rules of law should be applicable to all persons within the Indian territory or that the same remedies should be made available to them irrespective of differences of circumstances. It only means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation, and there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is substantially the same.