Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. M/s. D.C.M. Ltd.
Case at a glance
Provisions considered
Key paragraphs
- Para 44. Aggrieved from the above order, the assesseepreferredan appealbefore fte Income-tax AppellateTribunal, Delhi Bench, which vide avery, detailedorderacceptedthe appealof the assesseeby holding as under "We have no doubt in our mind that in ordei- to decide taxabilityof an asset we haw to po by thetactualpositionas…
- Para 77. Tlie above provisionswere insertedby the Finance Act, 1993 and made effective from 1.4.1994. We ai-e dealing with the relevant assessmentyearfor 1993-94. On the barereadingof the aboveprovision, it is deal- that urban land would not includea land, on which constraction of abuildingis not permissibleunder any…
- Para 1010. We accordingly uphold claim of the assessee company. Firstly, on the ground that premisesunderreferencecaiinotbe said to be land and, tlierefore, were not in the natiire of ''Urban Land" chargeable to wealth-tax. Fiu'tlier, as per tlie Explanationto sub-section(ea) of section2 of the land in question…
Judgment
Whetherreportersoflocalpapermay be allowed to see the judgment? To berefeiTedto the reporteror not? Yes Whetherthe judgmentshouldbe refeired in the Digest? SWATANTERKUMAM, J. A According to the appellant, in this appeal, under Section27A ' of the WealthTax Act (hereinafterrefen-edto as the Act), the questionof law as to tlie scope and meaningof the expression"land and urban land chargeable to wealth tax in relation to assets of the assessee for the Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:AMULYA Certify that the digital file and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. \J V assessmentyear 1993-94Bnderthe amendedprovisionsof the Act arises for considemtionin the presentappeal.
2, It is well settledprincipleof law that aquestion which has eitherbeen answeredby the judgmentof the Courtor on plainreadingof the provisionsof the relevantsection, ttte interpretationis so clearas not to inviteany legalcontroversy, there the questionof law would not arise as contemplatedundersection27A of the Act. The provisionsofsection 27A of tlte Act at« pari materiato section260A of the Income-taxAct. Thecourtshouldbe satisfiedthat the casein appealinvolvesasubstantial question of law. ADivisionBench of this Court, after applyingthe principleenunciatedby the SupremeCourtin differentcasesheld that m both the abovesaidcitcumstances, the case would not mvolvesubstantial questionoflaw. Referencein this regardcanbe madeto thejudgmentby aDivisionBench of this Courtin Cnmrnissionerof Income-taxVs. S.R, PragriFincesLtd. 270 ITR 560. Thus, now we have to consider whether the controveniy 3. involved in the present case and particularly as formulated by tlie Departmentin the proposedquestionoflaw is answered by judgmentor provisionsofthe Act. Beforediscussingftis on the plainreadingof WTA inms pg.2of 11 V aspect of the case in some elucidation, it v/oiild be necessaiy for us to refer to the facts giving rise to the present appeal. The assesseefiled a return of wealth of Rs.95,36,700/-for the assessmentyeaj- 1993-94. Tlie Assessing Officer issued a notice under section 17 of the Act to the assessee on the gi'ound tliat during the course of assessment for the assessmentyear 1994-95 it .was noticed that assessee has not disclosed urban land worth crores of mpees held by the assessee as stock-in-trade which were liable to wealth tax for the relevant year of 1993-94. To this A- notice, the assesseesubmittedtlie reply statingthat tlie urban land owned by the assesseecould not be includedin tlie net wealtliof the assessee, as such the land and tlie building thereupon was constiiicted without approvalof the relevantautliorities, were convertedinto stock-in-tra.deon
1.9.1992. The AssessingOfficerwhile rejectingthe contentionraised on behalf of the assessee, held that no exemption was available to the assessee in case of conversion of urban land into stock-in-trade till the assessmentyear 1993-94. Accordingto the AssessingOfficer, tlie land was acquu-ed in 1980, possession is taken as on 1.4.1981, tluis the assesseeis not covered.underexceptioninsertedw.e.f. 1.4.1994. Thus, the AssessingOfficeradded the value of the land towards the net wealth of the assessee. Aggrieved, from the order of the Assessing Officer dated 30.3.2001, an appeal was prefen-ed by the assessee before the WVAlf2G03 pg.3ofU V Commissioner, WealthTax (Appeals),who vide his order dated 2.2.2001, held tliat Supreme Court vide his order 1.5.1991 had pennitted the re developmentof the mill area to flattedfactoiycomplexand grouphousing complex and ordered the existing building to be demolished, thus the remainingbuildingcould not be remained to be standing there witli the approvalof the appropriateauthority. While dismissingthe appealof the assessee, by a detailedorder, the First AppellateAutliority, interalia, held as under •v' I "Tlie assessee in its contention fi'om Nos. 1 to 26 relating to this 6'^ ground of appeal has not been able to refute the decision of the AO that urban land held by it as stock in trade is not exempt in A.Y. 1993-94. In order that there is no ambiguity left while not allowing exemption to the assesseecompany, the amendmentby Finance Act 1992 in WT Act was also discussed on page 2 of tlie assessment order. It has been discussed that • clause 2(ea) to Section 2 v,'as inserted to the WT Act w.e.f. 1/4/1993 and the inserted provision provided for exemption of any unused land held by the assessee company for industrialpurposes for a period of 2 years from the date of its acquisition by it. As discussed further in the , assessment order tlie assessee converted its land into stock in tcade in 1/9/1992 which coiTesponds to A.Y. 1993-94. It is obvious that tlie assessee should not have claimed the exemption because in A.Y. 1993-94 no exemption is available. The exemption in such cases is available from A.Y. 1994-95 and not in 1993-94."
24.0From the above it becomes clear that the AR is admittingthat it is only on the basis of the amendment brought about by tlie Finance Act WTA 7/2003 pg.4ofll 1993 applicable fi'om A.Y. 1994-95 flial exemption is being claimed by tlie Inspite of it being cleaily and unambiguousy st^ngft Slonedmat th! amendmenton of which tlieexemptionis beingclaimedby appellant would be applicable on y w.eX trying to claim flie 1/4/1994, tlie AR is exemption in the year under consiteation unambipraus against provisionsofWT Acthad tlieamendmentl»en applicable to A.Y. under consideration, certainly the same would ^ In view of the specitic the- amendment. mention of the date of '/4/1994 mentioned in the amendment, the AR's contention ra exemptionshould be allowed in view of (he amendmentbrought about by, lie 1993 in the A.Y. underconsiaerationis cle^ly •misplaced, the same cannotbe acceptedand is accordinglyrejected. 75 0 In view of the foregoingdiscussionthe AO's action in including in tiie appellants net factor7 Remises and wealth the value of residentialcolonyis held to be justiiied.
Aggrieved from the above order, the assesseepreferredan appealbefore fte Income-tax AppellateTribunal, Delhi Bench, which vide avery, detailedorderacceptedthe appealof the assesseeby holding as under "We have no doubt in our mind that in ordei- to decide taxabilityof an asset we haw to po by thetactualpositionas on thevaluationdate^ l is no. permitted under law to f, hypotheticalsituation which never ^ are fully convinced with the factual position as WTA 7/2003 .5 of It P« . In view of these factual circumstances explainedby the counselfor the assesseecompany that as on tlie valuation date old factory premises as well as residential colony were existing, except for a small portion which has been demolished. As per the conditions imposed by the Municipal Corporationof Delhi, completedemolitionhad to be done before any activityfor constractioncould be commenced. Approval for consti'uctionnad been granted much later by flie Municipal Corporation of Delhi and that too only for one phase for the factory complex.
Above approval had also been withdrawn by way of work stoppage notice. Thei^fore, even as on date of permission Residential for construction does not exist. premiseshad been occupiedby the ex-employees of the assesseecompany as on the valuation date. Legal disputes have been going on before the Courts. premises in question cannot be said to be land. Tlierefore, weare agreeable to the contentionsof the learned counsel for the assessee that said premises cannot be said to be urban land for the purposeofsection2(ea) of W.T. Act. On die basis of above factual position itself, claim of the company deserve to succeed. We find trom the orders of lower authorities that the factual position as submitted by the assessee company has not been considered and appreciatedby tliem. Tlie AO, in fact did not even consider it necessary to give any weightageto the factual position and he justconcludedthat whateverargumentshave been put forth it is urban land taxed under WT Act.
Further, he has said that under no ch-cumstances the u3-ban land is exempt CWT (A) tliougli considered and recorded factual position in his order, he disregarded the same by taking into account a a hypotheticalsituationfor each claim, Supreme Court permitted thougli, redevelopmentof area in principlebut case of the assesseecompany for gmnting approval etc. was to be considered by MCD. DDA, etc. with referenceto relevant regulationsand bye-laws. It WTA 7/2003 pg.6ofll V cannotbe said that approvalof maps etc. was only a routine matter.
We accordingly uphold claim of the assessee company. Firstly, on the ground that premisesunderreferencecaiinotbe said to be land and, tlierefore, were not in the natiire of ''Urban Land" chargeable to wealth-tax. Fiu'tlier, as per tlie Explanationto sub-section(ea) of section2 of the land in question is not W.T. Act also, " chai'geablealso for the reason
As is clear from the above two orders, different reasons have been given by the autlioritiesfor acceptingand/orinjectingtlie case of tlie assessee. Basically, tv/o gi'ounds appeared to have influenced the authorities in coming to then- respectiveconclusions. Fustly, that the assesseehimselfhad treated the land and buildingas stock-in-trade and thus did not discloseit in the wealth tax returnfor the yeai-1993-94. This by itselfwould an admission on tlie part of the assesseethat the said land is an asset chaigeable to wealth tax in terms of the statutory provisions. Secondly, on the interpretationof the relevantprovisions, the First AppellateAuthorityhad found that the "stock-in-trade"would not deprive tlie respondentof the benefitavailableto it under the Act, in so fat- as it was exempted specificallyfrom being an asset of land for the purposeofits chai-gabilit}-'underthe WealthTax Act. WTA 7./2003 pg.7 of 11 P tlie Act Section 3 of the chai-ging section which 6. contemplates that subject to the provisions of.the Act, there shall be chai-gefor every assessmentyear commencingfrom the specifieddate, a tax in respect of the net wealth as specified in ScheduleI of the Act.
Section 2(e) defines the expression"assets" which includes property of every descriptionmoveable or immovablebut does not include what is specifically included in that definition. Section 2(ea) again defines ^assets'in relationto the assessmentyear commencingon the first day of April, 1993 and/or in subsequentassessmentyeai'; whereinurban land is stated to be inclusivein tiie definitionof the assets. Sub-clause(b) of explanationto section2(ea)explainsthe "urbanland" as well as illusti-ates what exemptionis peimissiblefor landed propertynot to be includedas net wealth/assetof the assessee. The saidprovisionreads as undei 't-A (b) "urbanland" means land siUiate-- (i)in any area which is comprised within the jurisdictionof a municipality(whetherknown as a municipality', municipal coiporation, notified area committee,'townarea committee, town committee or by any other name) or acantonmentboai'd and whichhas apopulationof not less tlian ten thousand accordingto the last precedingcensus of which the relevant figui-es have been published before the valuation date; or ai)in any area witliin such distance, not being more than eight kilometei^ from, the local limits of any municipality'or cantonmentboard refeiredto in sub- clause (i), as the Central governmentmay, having V/TA 7/2003 ps.
Sofll u regard to the extent of, and scope for, ubranisation specify in this behalfby notificationin the Official Gazette, considerations, and other relevant but does not include land land on which constiuction of a buildingis not permissibleunder any law for the time being in force in tlie area in which such land is situated or the land occupiedby any building which has been constracted with the approval of the appropriateauthorityor any unusedland held by tlie assesseefor industrial purposes for a period of two years from tlie date of its acquisitionby him *[or any lartd held by the assesseeas stock-in-tradefor a period of three years from the date of its acquisition by him];"
Tlie above provisionswere insertedby the Finance Act, 1993 and made effective from 1.4.1994. We ai-e dealing with the relevant assessmentyearfor 1993-94. On the barereadingof the aboveprovision, it is deal- that urban land would not includea land, on which constraction of abuildingis not permissibleunder any law for die time being in force in the area where land is situated or the land occupiedby any building which has been constnictedwith the approvalof the appropriateautliority or in any unusedland held by the assesseefor an industiialpuiT30sefor a periodof two yearsfrom the date of its acquisition. It is an admittedcase beforeus that the assesseedoes not claimbenefitof the third clause of the categoiyspecifiedin the provisions. The assesseewould obviouslyhave WTA 7/2003 pg.9of 11 advantage of the land being not included as an urban land because no constractionat the relevanttime was permissibleon tlie land in question.
In alternative. Hie buildingwhich has been constructed, if at all, with the approval of the appropriateauthorities. The Maxim, Generaliaveiba sunt generaliterintelligenda- would be afair perceptto inteipietationof tlie provisions as tlie words used being of general nature should be understoodgenerally and despite the fact that they relate to the law of revenue, the general consti-uction Hiereof would further the cause of legislation. The intentionof the legislativeappears to be that land which falls within the exceptionafore-refenedwould have to be excludedfiom the ambit and scope of the expression"urbanland". Once the land or any buildingthereuponmakingit acombinationof land and buildingis not an urban land, then it couldnot be an assetas definedunder section2(EA) of the Act. The rcsuit thereofwouldbe not to ti-eat the same as net-wealth of an assesseefor the purposes of the provisionsof the Wealth Tax Act.
The Firet AppellateAutlioritj'had proceededon the assumptionthat now orders of Supreme Court dated L5.1991 qua re-developmenthad been permittedof the mill aiea to flatted factory complex and group housing complex. Leavewas also grantedto demolishthe existingbuilding. It is not in dispute before us that till date no pennission/approvalhas been grantedby the appi'opriateauthorityto the assessee to raise tlie building WA 7/2003 pg.lOofll 11 in-consonance with tlie plans and as such the old structure existing is not in-confirmity with law and had not been raised with the leave of any autliority. In other words, on the land in question, no constraction was permitted and tlie authorities concerned have not granted its approval so fat" for raising constraction on that land. In either of these cases, tlie land would stand excluded from the definition of '\irban land" chargeable to wealth tax. In relation to one phase, the permission was granted much subsequent to the relevant yeai- of assessment, which as stated on record before us, had also been witlidrawn and work was stopped.
In tlie facts and circumstances afore noted, we are of the considered view that no substantial question of law arises consideration of the Court in the present appeal, as such the appeal is dismissed leaving the parties to beai' tlieir own costs. r-'- Febniary 03,2005 NTER KUMAR JUDGE ^tjADArTB. LGKUR .TUDGE
Questions this judgment answers
Which statutory provisions did this judgment involve?
Finance Act, 1992; ScheduleI of the Act; Finance Act, 1993; Wealth Tax Act.
Which court decided this case, and when?
Delhi High Court, on 03 Feb 2005. The bench was MADAN B LOKUR, SWATANTERKUMAM.
Precedent status how later indexed judgments have treated this case
No known negative treatment found in the Courts & Cases corpus.
This is a result about the indexed corpus, not a finding that the judgment remains good law. Coverage may be incomplete.