EX NK DILBAG v. UOI & Ors.

SC 38 lays down that the ratio decidendi is the principle upon which the case is decided and statements which do not partake of this character are obiter dicta which do not have authoritative force.

6. The frequently quoted opinion of the House of Lords in Quinn –vs- Leathem, 1901 AC 495 : (1900-3) All ER Rep 1 is to the effect that “every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved .... The other is that a case is only an authority for what is actually decides”. These quotations have been reiterated in Goodyear India Ltd. -vs- State of Haryana, (1990) 2 SCC 71 and State of WP(C)6959/2004 & WP(C)20348/2005 Orissa -vs- Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647. In the latter case, the Court explicitly opined that “a decision on a question which has not been argued cannot be treated as a precedent”. Their Lordships, in turn, referred back to the previous opinion in Rajput Ruda Meha -vs- State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 SC 1707 in which it had similarly been stated that where an issue has neither been raised nor argued any decision by the Court, even after ’pondering over the issue in depth’, would not become a binding precedent. Similar observations have been made by the Constitution Bench in Padma Sundara Rao -vs- State of T.N., 2002(3) SCC 533, as is evident from the following extract: “Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case, said Lord Morris in Herrington v. British Railways Board, (1972) 2 WLR 537. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. WP(C)6959/2004 & WP(C)20348/2005

7. Bhavnagar University –vs- Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 cautions that – “a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision”. In Director of Settlement, A.P. –vs- M.R. Apparao, (2002) 4 Supreme Court Cases 638, a Three Judge Bench has opined that “Article 141 of the Constitution unequivocally indicates that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. The aforesaid Article empowers the Supreme Court to declare the law. It is, therefore, an essential function of the Court to interpret a legislation. The statements of the Court on matters other than law like facts may have no binding force as the facts of two cases may not be similar. But what is binding is the ratio of the decision and not any finding of facts. It is the principle found out upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. To determine whether a decision has “declared law” it cannot be said to be a law when a point is disposed of on concession and what is binding is the principle underlying a decision. A judgment of the Court has to be read in the context of questions which arose for consideration in WP(C)6959/2004 & WP(C)20348/2005 the case in which the judgment was delivered. An “obiter dictum” as distinguished from a ratio decidendi is an observation by the Court on a legal question suggested in a case before it but not arising in such manner as to require a decision. Such an obiter may not have a binding precedent as the observation was unnecessary the decision pronounced, but even though an obiter may not have a binding effect as a precedent, but it cannot be denied that it is of considerable weight. The law which will be binding under Article 141 would, therefore, extend to all observations of points raised and decided by the Court in a given case”. The Constitution Bench has also reiterated this view in Islamic Academy of Education –vs- State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 697 = 2003(6) Scale 325, viz. that the ratio decidendi of a judgment can be obtained only from a reading of its entirety. The opinion of the Apex Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. –vs- N.R. Vairamani, (2004) 8 SCC 579 is in similar vein. Their Lordships observed that – “Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid‟s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts WP(C)6959/2004 & WP(C)20348/2005 are not to be construed as statutes”. This is also the opinion of the Court in Punjab National Bank –vs- R.L.Vaid, (2004) 7 SCC 698. In State of Gujarat –vs- Akhil Gujarat Pravasi, AIR 2004 SCC 3894, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that “any observation made during the course of reasoning in a judgment should not be read divorced from the context in which they were used”. In Zee Tele Films –vs- Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 2677, the Apex Court has unequivocally declared that “a decision is not an authority for the proposition which did not fall for its consideration.” In M/s A- One Granites –vs- State of U.P., AIR 2001 SC 1203: (2001) 3 SCC 537 it had been contended that the controversy was covered on all fours by a previous decision of the Court. The contention was rejected in these words- This question was considered by the Court of Appeal in Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd., (1941) 1 KB 675, and it was laid down that when no consideration was given to the question, the decision cannot be said to be binding and precedents sub silentio and without arguments are of no moment. Following the said decision, this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi