✦ High Court of India · 25 Mar 2025

Mr.Harpreet Singh, Adv v. UNION OF INDIA ORS

Case Details High Court of India · 25 Mar 2025

counsels for the parties.

9. In K.Meghachandra Singh (supra), the Supreme Court held as under:

37. When we carefully read judgment in N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 711] , it appears to us that the referred OMs (dated 7-2-1986 and 3-7-1986) were not properly construed in the judgment. Contrary to the eventual finding, the said two OMs had made it clear that seniority of the direct recruits be declared only from the date of appointment and not from the date of initiation of recruitment process. But surprisingly, the judgment while referring to the illustration given in the OM in fact overlooks the effect of the said illustration. According to us, the illustration extracted in N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340: (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 711] itself, makes it clear that the vacancies which were direct intended recruitment in a particular year (1986) which were filled in the next year (1987) could be taken into consideration only in the subsequent year's seniority list but not in the seniority list of 1986. In fact, this was indicated in the two OMs dated 7-2-1986 and 3-7-1986 and that is why the Government issued the subsequent OM on 3-3-2008 by way of clarification Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 6694/2024 Digitally Signed By:RENUKA NEGI Signing Date:29.03.2025 13:32:31 Such observation the date when cannot be blamed of the two earlier OMs. 38. At this stage, we must also emphasise that the Court in N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340: (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 711] need not have observed that the selected candidate administrative delay and the gap between initiation of process and appointment. fallacious inasmuch as none can be identified as being a selected candidate the process of recruitment had commenced. On that day, a body of persons aspiring to be appointed to the vacancy intended for direct recruits was not in existence. The persons who might respond to an advertisement cannot have any service- related rights, not to talk of right to have their seniority counted from the date of the advertisement. In other words, only on completion of selected applicant morphs candidate and, therefore, unnecessary observation was made in N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 711] to the effect that the selected candidate cannot be blamed for the administrative delay. In the same context, we may usefully refer to the ratio in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India [Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 800], where it was held that even upon empanelment, an appointee does not acquire any right. 39. The judgment in N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 711] the Central Government relating in our opinion, employees cannot the process, into a Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 6694/2024 Digitally Signed By:RENUKA NEGI Signing Date:29.03.2025 13:32:31 711] automatically apply to the Manipur State Police Officers, governed by the MPS Rules, 1965. We also feel that N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 : (2013) 3 SCC incorrectly (L&S) distinguished the long-standing seniority determination principles propounded in, inter alia, Jagdish Ch. Patnaik [Jagdish Ch. Patnaik v. State of Orissa, (1998) 4 SCC 456 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1156] , Suraj Parkash Gupta v. State of J&K [Suraj Parkash Gupta v. State of J&K, (2000) 7 SCC 561 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 977] and Pawan Pratap Singh v. Reevan Singh [Pawan Pratap Singh v. Reevan Singh, (2011) 3 SCC 267 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 481] . These three judgments and several others with like enunciation on the law for determination of seniority makes it abundantly clear that under service jurisprudence, seniority cannot be claimed incumbent is yet to be borne in the cadre. In our considered opinion, the law on the issue is correctly declared in Jagdish Ch. Patnaik [Jagdish Ch. Patnaik v. State of Orissa, (1998) 4 SCC 456 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1156] and consequently we disapprove the norms on assessment of inter se seniority, suggested in N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 711]. in N.R. Accordingly, Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 711] is overruled. However, it is made clear that this decision will not affect the inter se seniority already based on N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 : from a date when the decision Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 6694/2024 Digitally Signed By:RENUKA NEGI Signing Date:29.03.2025 13:32:31 (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 711] and the same is protected. This decision will apply prospectively except where seniority is to be fixed under the relevant rules from the date of vacancy/the date of advertisement.”

10. From a reading of the above, it would be apparent that the Supreme Court has clarified that it is only upon completion of the selection process, that the person so selected can claim seniority and that such seniority cannot be claimed from the date when the incumbent is yet to be born in the Cadre.

11. It is further clarified that though the decision in Union of India v. N.R.Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340, has been overruled, however, the decision will not affect the inter se seniority already based on N.R.Parmar (supra) and the same is protected. The decision in K.Meghachandra Singh (supra) was therefore, held to be applicable prospectively.

12. In the present case, the impugned seniority list, has been issued by the respondents on 19.04.2023. The same therefore, has to be governed by the decision of the Supreme Court K.Meghachandra Singh (supra).

13. Applying the above principle, retrospective seniority even before the personnel is born in the Cadre, cannot be granted. The impugned seniority list insofar as it determined seniority in violation of the said principal, is liable to be quashed.

14. As far as the prayer of the learned counsel for the respondents Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 6694/2024 Digitally Signed By:RENUKA NEGI Signing Date:29.03.2025 13:32:31 that as the judgment in K.Meghachandra Singh (supra) has been referred to a Larger Bench, this Court should adjourn the present petition sine die is concerned, it is settled law that merely because the Supreme Court has referred a judgment to the Larger Bench, it would not prohibit or restrain the High Court from following the judgment that is presently holding forth.

15. In this regard, we may make a reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union Territory of Ladakh & Ors. v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference & Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1140, wherein this principle has been explained as under : “32. The Court would categorically emphasize that no litigant should have even an iota of doubt or an impression (rather, a misimpression) that just because of systemic delay or the matter not being taken up by the Courts resulting in efflux of time the cause would be defeated, and the Court would be rendered helpless to ensure justice to the party concerned. It would not be out of place to mention that this Court can even turn the clock back, if the situation warrants such dire measures. The powers of this Court, if need be, to even restore status quo ante are not in the realm of any doubt. The relief(s) granted in the lead opinion by Hon. Khehar, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was), concurred with by the other 4 learned Judges, in Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2016) 8 SCC 1 is enough on this aspect. We know full well that a 5-Judge Bench in Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 6694/2024 Digitally Signed By:RENUKA NEGI Signing Date:29.03.2025 13:32:31 is settled Subhash Desai v Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 607 has referred Nabam Rebia (supra) to a Larger Bench. However, the questions referred to the Larger Bench do not detract from the power to bring back status quo ante. That apart, that mere reference to a larger Bench does not unsettle declared law. In Harbhajan Singh v State of Punjab, (2009) 13 SCC 608, a 2-Judge Bench said: “15. Even if what is contended by the learned counsel is correct, it is not for us to go into the said question at this stage; herein cross-examination witnesses had taken place. The Court materials available to it for the purpose of arriving at a satisfaction that a case for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Code was made out. Only because the correctness of a portion of the judgment in Mohd. Shafi [(2007) 14 SCC 544 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 889 : (2007) 4 SCR 1023 : (2007) 5 Scale 611] has been doubted by another Bench, the same would not mean that we should wait for the decision of the larger Bench, particularly when the same instead of assisting the appellants runs counter to their contention.” consideration (emphasis supplied)

16. However, keeping in view that the reference is pending before the Larger Bench, we direct that the seniority list, which shall be redrawn by the respondents pursuant to our judgment, shall be subject to the outcome of the reference. Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 6694/2024 Digitally Signed By:RENUKA NEGI Signing Date:29.03.2025 13:32:31

17. The respondents shall rework the Seniority List and publish the revised list after considering objections, if any, filed to a draft seniority list, within six months from today. 18. The petition is disposed of in the above terms. NAVIN CHAWLA, J RENU BHATNAGAR, J MARCH 25, 2025 RN/DG Click here to check corrigendum, if any Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 6694/2024 Digitally Signed By:RENUKA NEGI Signing Date:29.03.2025 13:32:31

counsels for the parties.

9. In K.Meghachandra Singh (supra), the Supreme Court held as under:

37. When we carefully read judgment in N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 711] , it appears to us that the referred OMs (dated 7-2-1986 and 3-7-1986) were not properly construed in the judgment. Contrary to the eventual finding, the said two OMs had made it clear that seniority of the direct recruits be declared only from the date of appointment and not from the date of initiation of recruitment process. But surprisingly, the judgment while referring to the illustration given in the OM in fact overlooks the effect of the said illustration. According to us, the illustration extracted in N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340: (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 711] itself, makes it clear that the vacancies which were direct intended recruitment in a particular year (1986) which were filled in the next year (1987) could be taken into consideration only in the subsequent year's seniority list but not in the seniority list of 1986. In fact, this was indicated in the two OMs dated 7-2-1986 and 3-7-1986 and that is why the Government issued the subsequent OM on 3-3-2008 by way of clarification Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 6694/2024 Digitally Signed By:RENUKA NEGI Signing Date:29.03.2025 13:32:31 Such observation the date when cannot be blamed of the two earlier OMs. 38. At this stage, we must also emphasise that the Court in N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340: (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 711] need not have observed that the selected candidate administrative delay and the gap between initiation of process and appointment. fallacious inasmuch as none can be identified as being a selected candidate the process of recruitment had commenced. On that day, a body of persons aspiring to be appointed to the vacancy intended for direct recruits was not in existence. The persons who might respond to an advertisement cannot have any service- related rights, not to talk of right to have their seniority counted from the date of the advertisement. In other words, only on completion of selected applicant morphs candidate and, therefore, unnecessary observation was made in N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 711] to the effect that the selected candidate cannot be blamed for the administrative delay. In the same context, we may usefully refer to the ratio in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India [Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 800], where it was held that even upon empanelment, an appointee does not acquire any right. 39. The judgment in N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 711] the Central Government relating in our opinion, employees cannot the process, into a Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 6694/2024 Digitally Signed By:RENUKA NEGI Signing Date:29.03.2025 13:32:31 711] automatically apply to the Manipur State Police Officers, governed by the MPS Rules, 1965. We also feel that N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 : (2013) 3 SCC incorrectly (L&S) distinguished the long-standing seniority determination principles propounded in, inter alia, Jagdish Ch. Patnaik [Jagdish Ch. Patnaik v. State of Orissa, (1998) 4 SCC 456 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1156] , Suraj Parkash Gupta v. State of J&K [Suraj Parkash Gupta v. State of J&K, (2000) 7 SCC 561 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 977] and Pawan Pratap Singh v. Reevan Singh [Pawan Pratap Singh v. Reevan Singh, (2011) 3 SCC 267 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 481] . These three judgments and several others with like enunciation on the law for determination of seniority makes it abundantly clear that under service jurisprudence, seniority cannot be claimed incumbent is yet to be borne in the cadre. In our considered opinion, the law on the issue is correctly declared in Jagdish Ch. Patnaik [Jagdish Ch. Patnaik v. State of Orissa, (1998) 4 SCC 456 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1156] and consequently we disapprove the norms on assessment of inter se seniority, suggested in N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 711]. in N.R. Accordingly, Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 711] is overruled. However, it is made clear that this decision will not affect the inter se seniority already based on N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 : from a date when the decision Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 6694/2024 Digitally Signed By:RENUKA NEGI Signing Date:29.03.2025 13:32:31 (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 711] and the same is protected. This decision will apply prospectively except where seniority is to be fixed under the relevant rules from the date of vacancy/the date of advertisement.”

10. From a reading of the above, it would be apparent that the Supreme Court has clarified that it is only upon completion of the selection process, that the person so selected can claim seniority and that such seniority cannot be claimed from the date when the incumbent is yet to be born in the Cadre.

11. It is further clarified that though the decision in Union of India v. N.R.Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340, has been overruled, however, the decision will not affect the inter se seniority already based on N.R.Parmar (supra) and the same is protected. The decision in K.Meghachandra Singh (supra) was therefore, held to be applicable prospectively.

12. In the present case, the impugned seniority list, has been issued by the respondents on 19.04.2023. The same therefore, has to be governed by the decision of the Supreme Court K.Meghachandra Singh (supra).

13. Applying the above principle, retrospective seniority even before the personnel is born in the Cadre, cannot be granted. The impugned seniority list insofar as it determined seniority in violation of the said principal, is liable to be quashed.

14. As far as the prayer of the learned counsel for the respondents Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 6694/2024 Digitally Signed By:RENUKA NEGI Signing Date:29.03.2025 13:32:31 that as the judgment in K.Meghachandra Singh (supra) has been referred to a Larger Bench, this Court should adjourn the present petition sine die is concerned, it is settled law that merely because the Supreme Court has referred a judgment to the Larger Bench, it would not prohibit or restrain the High Court from following the judgment that is presently holding forth.

15. In this regard, we may make a reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union Territory of Ladakh & Ors. v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference & Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1140, wherein this principle has been explained as under : “32. The Court would categorically emphasize that no litigant should have even an iota of doubt or an impression (rather, a misimpression) that just because of systemic delay or the matter not being taken up by the Courts resulting in efflux of time the cause would be defeated, and the Court would be rendered helpless to ensure justice to the party concerned. It would not be out of place to mention that this Court can even turn the clock back, if the situation warrants such dire measures. The powers of this Court, if need be, to even restore status quo ante are not in the realm of any doubt. The relief(s) granted in the lead opinion by Hon. Khehar, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was), concurred with by the other 4 learned Judges, in Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2016) 8 SCC 1 is enough on this aspect. We know full well that a 5-Judge Bench in Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 6694/2024 Digitally Signed By:RENUKA NEGI Signing Date:29.03.2025 13:32:31 is settled Subhash Desai v Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 607 has referred Nabam Rebia (supra) to a Larger Bench. However, the questions referred to the Larger Bench do not detract from the power to bring back status quo ante. That apart, that mere reference to a larger Bench does not unsettle declared law. In Harbhajan Singh v State of Punjab, (2009) 13 SCC 608, a 2-Judge Bench said: “15. Even if what is contended by the learned counsel is correct, it is not for us to go into the said question at this stage; herein cross-examination witnesses had taken place. The Court materials available to it for the purpose of arriving at a satisfaction that a case for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Code was made out. Only because the correctness of a portion of the judgment in Mohd. Shafi [(2007) 14 SCC 544 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 889 : (2007) 4 SCR 1023 : (2007) 5 Scale 611] has been doubted by another Bench, the same would not mean that we should wait for the decision of the larger Bench, particularly when the same instead of assisting the appellants runs counter to their contention.” consideration (emphasis supplied)

16. However, keeping in view that the reference is pending before the Larger Bench, we direct that the seniority list, which shall be redrawn by the respondents pursuant to our judgment, shall be subject to the outcome of the reference. Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 6694/2024 Digitally Signed By:RENUKA NEGI Signing Date:29.03.2025 13:32:31

17. The respondents shall rework the Seniority List and publish the revised list after considering objections, if any, filed to a draft seniority list, within six months from today. 18. The petition is disposed of in the above terms. NAVIN CHAWLA, J RENU BHATNAGAR, J MARCH 25, 2025 RN/DG Click here to check corrigendum, if any Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 6694/2024 Digitally Signed By:RENUKA NEGI Signing Date:29.03.2025 13:32:31

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