✦ High Court of India · 27 Nov 2025

Mr. Prosenjeet Banerjee, Ms. Shreya Singhal, Ms. Mhasilenuo Keditsu, Ms. Kushagra, Ms. Ms. Vijayrajeshwari v. DEBARATI BHUNIA CHAKRABORTY

Case Details High Court of India · 27 Nov 2025

Judgment

1. The present Appeal, filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 19841 read with Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1 FC Act Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 1 of 28 19552, challenges the Judgment dated 28.03.20243 passed by the learned Family Court, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi4, in case being HMA No. 93/2023 (earlier numbered as Matrimonial Suit No. 410/2021), titled “Debarati Bhunia Chakraborty v. Suman Sankar Bhunia”, whereby the marriage held between the parties was dissolved on the grounds of cruelty. 2. The present appeal raises a significant question as to whether, in a petition originally instituted under Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty, a decree of divorce can be granted under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 19545. BRIEF FACTS: 3. The brief conspectus of the facts as garnered from the records is as follows:- (a) The marriage between the parties is undisputed, but the date and form of the marriage are disputed. As per the Respondent-Wife, the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 11.12.2011 according to Hindu rites and customs, whereas as per the Appellant-Husband marriage was performed on 26.09.2011 under the SMA before the Marriage Officer, Barasaat, District North 24 Pargana, West Bengal, and a social function was held on 11.12.2011 followed by a reception on 15.12.2011. (b) The factum of marriage between the parties is not in dispute. However, the actual date of marriage and the statutory provision under which it was solemnised or recognised were matters of dispute before the learned Family Court. As far as recognition 2 HMA 3 Impugned Judgment 4 Family Court/ Family Court Judge 5 SMA Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 2 of 28 of marriage is concerned, the Appellant-Husband has placed on record a Certificate of Marriage dated 26.09.2011 issued under Section 13 of the SMA. Nevertheless, the precise date of marriage is not material for the adjudication of the present Appeal, as it does not bear upon the issue under consideration. (c) It is the case of the Appellant-Husband that on 04.09.2018, the Respondent-Wife left her matrimonial home at Habra, District North 24 Parganas, West Bengal, stating she was going to her workplace. Later that evening, she sent an SMS expressing her intention to go to her parental home at Siliguri, District Darjeeling, West Bengal, and left their minor son behind. On

09.09.2018, the Respondent, along with her father and others, took away the minor child from the Appellant-Husband‟s paternal house at Habra without any order of a competent Court. (d) On the other hand, the Respondent-Wife claims that she was subjected to regular physical assault, verbal abuse, and mental harassment by the Appellant-Husband. She alleges that on the night of 03.09.2018, the Appellant-Husband accused her of having an extra-marital relationship and physically assaulted her despite her being four months pregnant. This compelled her to leave her matrimonial home on 04.09.2018, on the pretext of leaving for her workplace, for the safety of her unborn child. She further claims that on 09.09.2018, she returned to the matrimonial home with her father and relatives, accompanied by the police, to recover her minor son. She thereafter lodged an

FIR against the Appellant-Husband and his family members under Sections 498A and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 18606, 6 IPC Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 3 of 28 and provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 20057. (e) The Appellant-Husband thereafter approached the Calcutta High Court challenging such forcible removal of the child on

11.09.2018 and also filed a Guardianship Petition before the learned Additional District Judge, Darjeeling. On 21.02.2019, the Calcutta High Court, while considering Civil Revision (C.O. 4105 of 2018) on merits, directed transfer of the proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act, 18908, from Darjeeling to the Court at Barasat, noting that both parties were working in Kolkata, North 24 Parganas District, during the relevant period. (f) The Appellant-Husband alleges that the Respondent-Wife, as a counterblast to the Guardianship Proceedings initiated by him, lodged an FIR bearing no. 04/2019 dated 09.01.2019 under Section 498A and 506 IPC read with Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. (g) On 05.03.2019, Respondent-Wife instituted three cases against the Appellant-Husband at Siliguri, West Bengal, which are as follows:- i. Criminal Case being CIS No. 10911/2019 arising out of C.R. Case No. 202/2019 under Sections 406, 120B, and 34 IPC before the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Court; ii. Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 31/2019 under the DV Act before the Judicial Magistrate, 4th Court; 7 DV Act 8 GWA Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 4 of 28 iii. Maintenance Case being M.R. 939/2019 under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19739, before the Judicial Magistrate, 2nd Court. (h) On 02.01.2020, the Respondent-Wife filed Transfer Petition (Civil) Nos. 161-162 of 2020 and Transfer Petition (Criminal) Nos. 63-65 of 202010 before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court seeking transfer of Guardianship Petition and connected criminal cases to the Family Courts, Jodhpur, Rajasthan. (i) On 24.06.2021, the Respondent-Wife filed I.A. No. 70784/2021 seeking amendment of the prayer in Transfer Petition (Civil) Nos. 161-162 of 2020 to request transfer to the Family Court, Patiala House, New Delhi. (j) On 25.06.2021, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court disposed of Transfer Petitions of 2020 by a common order, directing transfer of the Guardianship Petition pending before the Ld. District Judge, Barasat, as well as the Maintenance Case bearing No. M.R. 939/2019 pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Siliguri, to the Family Courts, Patiala House, New Delhi. (k) On 08.10.2021, the Respondent-Wife filed a divorce petition, i.e., Matrimonial Suit No. 410/2021 under Section 13(1)(ia) the HMA, seeking dissolution of her marriage with the Appellant- Husband before the learned Court of the Additional District Judge (1st Court) Siliguri, District Darjeeling, West Bengal. The learned Family Court framed the issues on 16.12.2022, and the Respondent-Wife was partly cross-examined by the learned Counsel for Appellant-Husband. 9 CrPC 10 Transfer Petitions of 2020 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 5 of 28 (l) On 11.04.2022, the Appellant-Husband filed Transfer Petition (Civil) Nos. 825-826 of 2022 and Transfer Petition (Criminal) Nos. 279-280 of 202211 before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court seeking transfer of the cases pending between the parties before the Family Court, Patiala House, New Delhi, to the Court at Siliguri, District Darjeeling, which is the hometown of the Respondent-Wife. (m) However, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while disposing of Transfer Petitions of 2022 vide Order dated 07.12.2022, directed that Matrimonial Suit No. 410/2021 be transferred to the learned Family Court, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, to expedite adjudication, as certain other proceedings inter se parties were being transferred to Delhi on the plea of the Respondent-Wife. It was further directed that the matters to be heard from the stage they were transferred. (n) During the pendency of the proceedings in India, Respondent-Wife obtained employment as a Lecturer at the University of Hull, United Kingdom, and has been residing there since August 2023. (o) While hearing HMA No. 93/2023 (earlier numbered as Matrimonial Suit No. 410/2021), on 18.11.2023, the learned Family Court framed fresh issues for adjudication as well as directed Respondent-Wife to file an Evidence Affidavit. Further, an application filed by the Appellant-Husband under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 190812, on the ground the marriage between the parties was 11 Transfer Petitions of 2022 12 CPC Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 6 of 28 solemnised under the SMA, was also dismissed. The learned Family Court dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the following grounds: i. That while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, only the averments made in the petition are to be looked into. ii. That the marriage between two Hindus, even if performed under the SMA, could also be dissolved under the HMA, and no prejudice was shown to have been caused to the Respondent [Appellant herein] the petition was entertained under the HMA. (p) On 18.01.2024, the Appellant-Husband filed an Application for Judicial Notice, stating that C.M.(M) No. 2050/2023 had been filed challenging the Order dated 18.11.2023, which was allegedly contrary to the directions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court vide Order dated 07.12.2022. Pursuant to which, the learned Family Court deleted the fresh issues framed on

18.11.2023. The learned Family Court also closed the right of the Respondent-Wife to lead evidence as she failed to appear for her cross-examination. (q) On 27.02.2024, Appellant-Husband reserved his right to lead evidence, since the Respondent-Wife‟s right to lead evidence had been closed and no evidence had been adduced on her behalf. The learned Family Court closed Appellant-Husband‟s right with liberty to lead evidence, in the event the Respondent- Wife was permitted to lead evidence in the future. (r) On 28.03.2024, the learned Family Court passed the Impugned Judgment in HMA No. 93/2023. Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 7 of 28 (s) Aggrieved by the said judgment dated 28.03.2024 passed by the learned Family Court, the Appellant-Husband has preferred the present Appeal. CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT-HUSBAND: 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant-Husband would contend that the Judgment impugned herein is not maintainable, for the reason that the original petition which came to be filed under the provisions of the HMA was not applicable since the marriage itself had been solemnized and registered under Section 13(2) of the SMA. He would, thus, contend that any adjudication of the petition under the provisions of the HMA was vitiated. 5. He would, thereafter, contend that, even assuming provisions of the HMA were applicable, the conclusion of the learned Family Court with respect to there being the extension of the benefit of provisions of the SMA is not permissible. 6. The learned Counsel for the Appellant-Husband would contend that the learned Family Court, in paragraphs 57 and 58 of the Impugned Judgment, erroneously relied upon a proposed amendment which was never gazetted or notified to dissolve the marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, a ground not available to the Courts in law. This fact has been confirmed through information furnished by the Rajya Sabha, Lok Sabha, and the Ministry of Law and Justice under the Right to Information Act, 2005. 7. The learned Counsel for the Appellant-Husband would further contend that the learned Family Court, in paragraph 58 of the Impugned Judgment, erroneously held that the wife could seek dissolution of marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, on Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 8 of 28 the basis that the marriage was solemnised on 26.09.2011, prior to the proposed but unnotified amendment. The learned Family Court further referred to Section 28A of the SMA, which does not exist in the statute, to support this finding. 8. He would, thus, contend that there being a clear jurisdictional infirmity in the manner in which the Impugned Judgment has come to be passed on the basis of non-existent laws, the same cannot be sustained and deserves to be set aside. CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT-WIFE: 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent-Wife would submit that the learned Judge merely took into account the practical reality of the parties‟ marital relationship having effectively ceased to exist and, in doing so, validly exercised the jurisdiction vested with the learned Family Court to grant a decree of dissolution of marriage. 10. She would, thus, defend the Judgment by stating that laws relating to matrimony should not be permitted to get embroiled in procedural red-tapism, and for that reason, the Judgment impugned herein would require to be sustained. ANALYSIS: 11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have meticulously perused the entire record, including the record as before the learned Family Court. 12. At the very outset, we deem it necessary to record our strong disapproval of the manner in which the learned Judge, Family Court, Patiala House Courts, has been adjudicating matrimonial matters. We have repeatedly found that he has conflated provisions of distinct and self-contained statutes, each with its own specific procedures and Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 9 of 28 purposes, thereby distorting the statutory framework governing matrimonial disputes. 13. On earlier occasions as well, this Court‟s interference has been necessitated, where the provisions of the FC Act have been invoked in a manner that effectively sidesteps or supplants the substantive requirements mandated under the HMA. Some recent examples are enumerated below: (i). Upinder Kaur Malhotra vs. Capt. Teghjeet Singh Malhotra & Anr., MAT.APP.(F.C.) 136/2025 - Where the learned Judge suo motu granted a decree of divorce in separate petitions filed by the parties without examining whether the requirements under Section 13B of the HMA (divorce by mutual consent) were satisfied. He did so by relying upon the provisions of the FC Act, which provide procedural flexibilities to the Family Courts. (ii). Lovely Sharma vs. Manissh Jaisani, MAT.APP.(F.C.) 166/2025 - Where again the learned Judge granted a decree of divorce suo motu in separate petitions without assessing compliance with Section 13B of the HMA. (iii). Shweta Puri vs. Sanjay Puri & Anr., MAT.APP.(F.C.) 321/2024 - The petition was listed before the learned Family Court Judge for the Wife‟s (Respondent therein) cross- examination. However, without recording any evidence on that date, the learned Judge disposed of the petition by granting a decree of divorce under Section 13B of the HMA. (iv). Smita Jina vs. Amit Kumar Jina, MAT.APP.(F.C.) 167/2025 - In this matter as well, without the parties leading any evidence, the learned Judge granted a decree of divorce under Section Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 10 of 28 13B of the HMA, based on the separate petitions filed by the parties. (v). Shraddha Gupta vs. Sumit Jain, MAT.APP.(F.C.) 330/2023 - the learned Judge followed the same line of practice and granted the decree of divorce.

14. While we are conscious that Family Courts are heavily burdened, owing to the increasing frequency with which parties separate, often on exceedingly trivial grounds, and the general erosion of the sanctity of marriage, this cannot be treated as a licence for any Court to indulge in what can only be described as statutory re- engineering. The statutory scheme must be followed, irrespective of caseload pressures. 15. In the present case, although the divorce petition was filed under Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, the learned Family Court Judge proceeded to apply provisions of the SMA, particularly an alleged Section 28A thereof, and extended this supposed provision on the ground that doing so would “save precious judicial time and spare the parties another round of litigation”. On this basis, the learned Judge granted a decree of divorce. 16. It bears reiteration that the SMA is a complete and self- contained secular code, intentionally crafted to govern marriages between parties who elect to solemnize their union outside the fold of personal laws. The said Act meticulously sets out a detailed statutory framework regulating every stage of the matrimonial process, from the prerequisites for marriage, to the manner of its solemnization, and ultimately its dissolution. Its scheme is deliberate and precise, and the Courts are bound to adhere to it in its statutory completeness. Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 11 of 28

17. A foundational point of distinction between the HMA and the SMA lies in the very concept and mode of solemnization. Section 7 of the HMA contemplates that a Hindu marriage is rooted in religious and customary rites. Where these rites include Saptapadi, the marriage attains legal validity and becomes irrevocably binding upon the parties once the seventh step is completed. Thus, the validity of the marriage is intrinsically tied to personal law traditions. 18. Under the SMA, however, the legal act of solemnization is entirely secular and formal. A marriage attains validity only upon its registration under the statute, and such registration can occur only after strict compliance with the procedural safeguards and statutory conditions laid down in Chapter II. Unlike the HMA, no religious rite or ceremony has any bearing on the recognition of the marriage. The SMA therefore operates on a wholly different conceptual foundation. 19. Apart from this fundamental divergence in solemnization, the HMA incorporates specific provisions governing what constitutes a valid Hindu marriage and the circumstances under which such a marriage may be dissolved. Section 13 of the HMA sets out, in exhaustive detail, the grounds on which a Hindu marriage may be dissolved. These include adultery, cruelty, desertion, conversion, mental disorder, venereal disease, renunciation, and presumption of death. The statute further delineates additional, wife-specific grounds for seeking dissolution. Each of these grounds, whether general or gender-specific, have been enacted with clear legislative intent. For the sake of reference, Section 13 of HMA is reproduced hereunder: “13. Divorce. - (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party-- Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 12 of 28 [(i) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse; or (ia) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or (ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or] (ii) has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion; or [(iii) has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. Explanation.--In this clause,-- (a) the expression mental disorder means mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder or any other disorder or disability of mind and includes schizophrenia; (b) the expression psychopathic disorder means a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including in abnormally subnormality of aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the other party, and whether or not it requires or is susceptible to medical treatment; or] * * * * * intelligence) which results (v) has * * * been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form; or (vi) has renounced the world by entering any religious order; or (vii) has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of it, had that party been alive; *** * * * * * [Explanation. In this sub-section, the expression desertion means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.] [(1A) Either party to a marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of this Act, may also present a petition for the dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground (i) that there has been no resumption of cohabitation as between the parties to the marriage for a period of 8[one year] or upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial separation in a proceeding to which they were parties; or (ii) that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage for a period of 8[one year] or Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 13 of 28 upwards after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in a proceeding to which they were parties.] (2) A wife may also present a petition for the dissolution of her marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground,-- (i) in the case of any marriage solemnized before the commencement of this Act, that the husband had married again before such commencement or that any other wife of the husband married before such commencement was alive at the time of the solemnization of the marriage of the petitioner: Provided that in either case the other wife is alive at the time of the presentation of the petition; or (ii) that the husband has, since the solemnization of the marriage, been guilty of rape, sodomy or 9[bestiality; or] [(iii) that in a suit under section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (78 of 1956), or in a proceeding under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) (or under the corresponding section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), a decree or order, as the case may be, has been passed against the husband awarding maintenance to the wife notwithstanding that she was living apart and that since the passing of such decree or order, cohabitation between the parties has not been resumed for one year or upwards; (iv) that her marriage (whether consummated or not) was solemnized before she attained the age of fifteen years and she has repudiated the marriage after attaining that age but before attaining the age of eighteen years. Explanation. This clause applies whether the marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976).]”

20. In contrast, Section 27 of the SMA, although containing certain analogous grounds for divorce, is distinct in both its structure and application. A side-by-side comparison of Section 13 of the HMA and Section 27 of the SMA makes these differences amply clear, which is as under: Particulars Hindu Marriage Act, Nature 1955: Section 13 Personal law applicable to Hindus (as defined under Section 2 of the HMA) Applicability Both parties must be Hindus for the HMA to apply. Special Marriage Act, 1954: Section 27 Secular statute to marriages applicable solemnised under the SMA. No requirement; provided the marriage was solemnised under the SMA. religion Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 14 of 28 Grounds for divorce Section 13(1): A marriage may be dissolved on petition by either spouse on any of the following grounds: (i) Adultery: voluntary sexual intercourse with a person other spouse. (ia) Cruelty: conduct such that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. (ib) Desertion: desertion of the petitioner by the a continuous period of not immediately preceding the presentation of the petition (ii) Cessation of being a Hindu: the other party has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion. (iii) Unsoundness of mind / mental disorder: of such a kind/extent petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent (v) Venereal disease in communicable form (vi) Renunciation of the world: by entering any religious order. Presumption (vii) death: not heard of as alive for seven years or more. Section 27(1): A petition for divorce may be presented by either following grounds: spouse petitioner (a) Adultery: voluntary sexual intercourse with a person other than the spouse. (b) Desertion: desertion of a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition Imprisonment: (c) respondent undergoing sentence of imprisonment for seven years or more. (d) Cruelty: conduct of such a nature that the petitioner cannot expected to live with the respondent. (e) Unsoundness of mind / mental disorder: of such kind and extent petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. (f) Venereal disease communicable form (g) Suffering from leprosy, but not infected by petitioner (h) Presumption of death: not heard of as alive for seven years or more. reasonably Section specific 27(1A): Wife- grounds Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 15 of 28 dissolution of marriage (i) where husband guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality, (ii) or certain maintenance orders followed by non- resumption of cohabitation for a year or more. resumption Section 27(2): Additional grounds (i) cohabitation or; (ii) conjugal rights for a period of one year or more, judicial separation restitution 13(1A): Section Additional grounds (i) no resumption of cohabitation or; (ii) no conjugal rights for a period of one year or judicial more, separation restitution of 13(2): Wife- grounds Section specific dissolution of marriage (i) where husband had another surviving wife at marriage (solemnized before commencement of Act), (ii) where husband guilty rape, bestiality, certain (iii) orders maintenance non- followed resumption of cohabitation for a year or more she was married (iv) before 15 years of age and refused marriage after attaining 15 or before 18. sodomy accept

21. We take serious exception to the manner in which the learned Family Court Judge, in this case, has attempted to conflate two entirely distinct and independent statutes. This approach is not merely Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 16 of 28 irregular; it is contrary to the law. A Judicial Officer cannot amalgamate statutory provisions from different enactments in a manner that neither reflects the text of the law nor permits such blending. By invoking procedural flexibility available to Family Courts under the FC Act, he has effectively disregarded the mandatory statutory requirements. 22. We were, in fact, taken aback to find that the learned Judge relied upon, in the Impugned Judgement, a provision, Section 28A of the SMA, that does not exist on the statute book, and on this basis granted a decree of divorce. 23. It is incomprehensible how a Judicial Officer of the rank of a Family Court Judge could rely upon a non-existent statutory provision to grant a decree of divorce. Not only did he erroneously import the SMA into a petition filed under the HMA, but he then relied upon an entirely non-existent section of the SMA dealing purportedly with the irretrievable breakdown of marriage. 24. His justification that this would save judicial time and spare the parties further litigation is wholly untenable. We are of the firm view that administrative convenience cannot override statutory mandates. 25. Further, we take specific note of the observations of the learned Family Court Judge in Para 56 of the Impugned Judgment. For the sake of reference, we reproduce the same, which reads as under: “56. Under Hindu Law marriage is considered holy union and unbreakable for seven births but realizing the ordeal faced by parties to the marriage, legislature interfered with the concept of holy union years ago and introduced room for dissolving marriages on certain ground enumerated in Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Later on parties to the failed marriage were also given option to come together and get their marriages dissolved by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act. Marriages under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 cannot be termed as holy union as it permits marriage between persons belonging to Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 17 of 28 different religion and personal law of some of the religion recognizes marriage civil contract and not holy union.”

26. We are compelled to express our strong disapproval of these observations. The conclusion drawn by the learned Judge, that marriages solemnised under the SMA “cannot be regarded as a holy union”, is an unwarranted extrapolation based on a misconceived and selective reading of various matrimonial statutes. 27. Whether a marriage is viewed as a sacrament or as a civil contract under different personal laws has no bearing whatsoever on the sanctity, legitimacy, or legal force of a marriage solemnised under the SMA. The SMA is a secular code intended to provide a neutral and uniform legal framework for couples who choose to marry under it, and it in no manner diminishes the dignity, solemnity, or seriousness of such marriages. To characterise marriages under the SMA as not being a “holy union” is, therefore, neither appropriate nor appreciable. 28. We also fail to understand how the legislative intent to provide for dissolution of a marriage would take away from a Hindu marriage the character of a “holy union”. It would appear that the learned Judge verily believes that a marriage, in order for it to be considered “holy” would have to be characterised as an unbreakable, immutable or indissoluble “union” between two spouses, importing therein, not only the commonplace understanding of the popular phrase, “till death do us part” but extend further to transcend temporal boundaries, acquiring thereof a metaphysical character regenerating itself across seven births. 29. The law as it stands today, recognises a Hindu marriage as a sacrament and as a “Holy Union”, not as a result of the alleged Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 18 of 28 permanence of the relationship over seven births or even of a single lifetime, but, as per the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, because, it facilitates “the performance of religious duties” [Swarjya Lakshmi v. Dr. G. G. Padma Rao13], it transforms the wife “…in the household of her husband and takes a new birth”, [Anuradha Samir Vennangot v. Mohandas Samir Vennangot14], “..by such union, the wife becomes part and parcel of the husband” [Beni Bai Vs. Raghubir Prasad], “..wife becomes a part and parcel of the body of the husband. She is therefore, called ardhangani” [Raghubar Singh v. Gulab Singh15], or due to the observance of Homam, i.e., oblation to fire and saptapadi [Velamuri Venkata Sivaprasad v. Kothuri Venkateswarlu16]. 30. We also take note of the fact that the learned Family Court Judge, in addition to relying upon a non-existent statutory provision, has further proceeded to hold that the marriage stands dissolved on the ground of cruelty. For arriving at this conclusion, the learned Judge has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Rakesh Raman v. Kavita17 and concluded as follows: “45. Although petitioner could not be said to have proved any of her allegation against the respondent and her family about their alleged act of cruelty committed prior to 04.09.2018 yet in view of the above rulings it has got to be seen if marriage of the parties had reached such a stage where each parties could be said to be inflicting cruelty upon each other and continuation of such marriage would amount to sanctioning cruelty which parties are inflicting upon each other.

46. There is no dispute that various litigation began between the parties after 09.09.2018 with respondent filling Writ petition before the Hon‟ble Calcutta High Court for over action of the police in accompanying the petitioner to his house on 09.09.2018 and forcibly - getting delivered the son of the parties. He also filed two

FIR against the Appellant-Husband and his family members under Sections 498A and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 18606, 6 IPC Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 3 of 28 and provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 20057. (e) The Appellant-Husband thereafter approached the Calcutta High Court challenging such forcible removal of the child on

11.09.2018 and also filed a Guardianship Petition before the learned Additional District Judge, Darjeeling. On 21.02.2019, the Calcutta High Court, while considering Civil Revision (C.O. 4105 of 2018) on merits, directed transfer of the proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act, 18908, from Darjeeling to the Court at Barasat, noting that both parties were working in Kolkata, North 24 Parganas District, during the relevant period. (f) The Appellant-Husband alleges that the Respondent-Wife, as a counterblast to the Guardianship Proceedings initiated by him, lodged an FIR bearing no. 04/2019 dated 09.01.2019 under Section 498A and 506 IPC read with Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. (g) On 05.03.2019, Respondent-Wife instituted three cases against the Appellant-Husband at Siliguri, West Bengal, which are as follows:- i. Criminal Case being CIS No. 10911/2019 arising out of C.R. Case No. 202/2019 under Sections 406, 120B, and 34 IPC before the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Court; ii. Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 31/2019 under the DV Act before the Judicial Magistrate, 4th Court; 7 DV Act 8 GWA Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 4 of 28 iii. Maintenance Case being M.R. 939/2019 under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19739, before the Judicial Magistrate, 2nd Court. (h) On 02.01.2020, the Respondent-Wife filed Transfer Petition (Civil) Nos. 161-162 of 2020 and Transfer Petition (Criminal) Nos. 63-65 of 202010 before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court seeking transfer of Guardianship Petition and connected criminal cases to the Family Courts, Jodhpur, Rajasthan. (i) On 24.06.2021, the Respondent-Wife filed I.A. No. 70784/2021 seeking amendment of the prayer in Transfer Petition (Civil) Nos. 161-162 of 2020 to request transfer to the Family Court, Patiala House, New Delhi. (j) On 25.06.2021, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court disposed of Transfer Petitions of 2020 by a common order, directing transfer of the Guardianship Petition pending before the Ld. District Judge, Barasat, as well as the Maintenance Case bearing No. M.R. 939/2019 pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Siliguri, to the Family Courts, Patiala House, New Delhi. (k) On 08.10.2021, the Respondent-Wife filed a divorce petition, i.e., Matrimonial Suit No. 410/2021 under Section 13(1)(ia) the HMA, seeking dissolution of her marriage with the Appellant- Husband before the learned Court of the Additional District Judge (1st Court) Siliguri, District Darjeeling, West Bengal. The learned Family Court framed the issues on 16.12.2022, and the Respondent-Wife was partly cross-examined by the learned Counsel for Appellant-Husband. 9 CrPC 10 Transfer Petitions of 2020 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 5 of 28 (l) On 11.04.2022, the Appellant-Husband filed Transfer Petition (Civil) Nos. 825-826 of 2022 and Transfer Petition (Criminal) Nos. 279-280 of 202211 before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court seeking transfer of the cases pending between the parties before the Family Court, Patiala House, New Delhi, to the Court at Siliguri, District Darjeeling, which is the hometown of the Respondent-Wife. (m) However, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while disposing of Transfer Petitions of 2022 vide Order dated 07.12.2022, directed that Matrimonial Suit No. 410/2021 be transferred to the learned Family Court, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, to expedite adjudication, as certain other proceedings inter se parties were being transferred to Delhi on the plea of the Respondent-Wife. It was further directed that the matters to be heard from the stage they were transferred. (n) During the pendency of the proceedings in India, Respondent-Wife obtained employment as a Lecturer at the University of Hull, United Kingdom, and has been residing there since August 2023. (o) While hearing HMA No. 93/2023 (earlier numbered as Matrimonial Suit No. 410/2021), on 18.11.2023, the learned Family Court framed fresh issues for adjudication as well as directed Respondent-Wife to file an Evidence Affidavit. Further, an application filed by the Appellant-Husband under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 190812, on the ground the marriage between the parties was 11 Transfer Petitions of 2022 12 CPC Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 6 of 28 solemnised under the SMA, was also dismissed. The learned Family Court dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the following grounds: i. That while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, only the averments made in the petition are to be looked into. ii. That the marriage between two Hindus, even if performed under the SMA, could also be dissolved under the HMA, and no prejudice was shown to have been caused to the Respondent [Appellant herein] the petition was entertained under the HMA. (p) On 18.01.2024, the Appellant-Husband filed an Application for Judicial Notice, stating that C.M.(M) No. 2050/2023 had been filed challenging the Order dated 18.11.2023, which was allegedly contrary to the directions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court vide Order dated 07.12.2022. Pursuant to which, the learned Family Court deleted the fresh issues framed on

18.11.2023. The learned Family Court also closed the right of the Respondent-Wife to lead evidence as she failed to appear for her cross-examination. (q) On 27.02.2024, Appellant-Husband reserved his right to lead evidence, since the Respondent-Wife‟s right to lead evidence had been closed and no evidence had been adduced on her behalf. The learned Family Court closed Appellant-Husband‟s right with liberty to lead evidence, in the event the Respondent- Wife was permitted to lead evidence in the future. (r) On 28.03.2024, the learned Family Court passed the Impugned Judgment in HMA No. 93/2023. Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 7 of 28 (s) Aggrieved by the said judgment dated 28.03.2024 passed by the learned Family Court, the Appellant-Husband has preferred the present Appeal. CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT-HUSBAND: 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant-Husband would contend that the Judgment impugned herein is not maintainable, for the reason that the original petition which came to be filed under the provisions of the HMA was not applicable since the marriage itself had been solemnized and registered under Section 13(2) of the SMA. He would, thus, contend that any adjudication of the petition under the provisions of the HMA was vitiated. 5. He would, thereafter, contend that, even assuming provisions of the HMA were applicable, the conclusion of the learned Family Court with respect to there being the extension of the benefit of provisions of the SMA is not permissible. 6. The learned Counsel for the Appellant-Husband would contend that the learned Family Court, in paragraphs 57 and 58 of the Impugned Judgment, erroneously relied upon a proposed amendment which was never gazetted or notified to dissolve the marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, a ground not available to the Courts in law. This fact has been confirmed through information furnished by the Rajya Sabha, Lok Sabha, and the Ministry of Law and Justice under the Right to Information Act, 2005. 7. The learned Counsel for the Appellant-Husband would further contend that the learned Family Court, in paragraph 58 of the Impugned Judgment, erroneously held that the wife could seek dissolution of marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, on Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 8 of 28 the basis that the marriage was solemnised on 26.09.2011, prior to the proposed but unnotified amendment. The learned Family Court further referred to Section 28A of the SMA, which does not exist in the statute, to support this finding. 8. He would, thus, contend that there being a clear jurisdictional infirmity in the manner in which the Impugned Judgment has come to be passed on the basis of non-existent laws, the same cannot be sustained and deserves to be set aside. CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT-WIFE: 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent-Wife would submit that the learned Judge merely took into account the practical reality of the parties‟ marital relationship having effectively ceased to exist and, in doing so, validly exercised the jurisdiction vested with the learned Family Court to grant a decree of dissolution of marriage. 10. She would, thus, defend the Judgment by stating that laws relating to matrimony should not be permitted to get embroiled in procedural red-tapism, and for that reason, the Judgment impugned herein would require to be sustained. ANALYSIS: 11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have meticulously perused the entire record, including the record as before the learned Family Court. 12. At the very outset, we deem it necessary to record our strong disapproval of the manner in which the learned Judge, Family Court, Patiala House Courts, has been adjudicating matrimonial matters. We have repeatedly found that he has conflated provisions of distinct and self-contained statutes, each with its own specific procedures and Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 9 of 28 purposes, thereby distorting the statutory framework governing matrimonial disputes. 13. On earlier occasions as well, this Court‟s interference has been necessitated, where the provisions of the FC Act have been invoked in a manner that effectively sidesteps or supplants the substantive requirements mandated under the HMA. Some recent examples are enumerated below: (i). Upinder Kaur Malhotra vs. Capt. Teghjeet Singh Malhotra & Anr., MAT.APP.(F.C.) 136/2025 - Where the learned Judge suo motu granted a decree of divorce in separate petitions filed by the parties without examining whether the requirements under Section 13B of the HMA (divorce by mutual consent) were satisfied. He did so by relying upon the provisions of the FC Act, which provide procedural flexibilities to the Family Courts. (ii). Lovely Sharma vs. Manissh Jaisani, MAT.APP.(F.C.) 166/2025 - Where again the learned Judge granted a decree of divorce suo motu in separate petitions without assessing compliance with Section 13B of the HMA. (iii). Shweta Puri vs. Sanjay Puri & Anr., MAT.APP.(F.C.) 321/2024 - The petition was listed before the learned Family Court Judge for the Wife‟s (Respondent therein) cross- examination. However, without recording any evidence on that date, the learned Judge disposed of the petition by granting a decree of divorce under Section 13B of the HMA. (iv). Smita Jina vs. Amit Kumar Jina, MAT.APP.(F.C.) 167/2025 - In this matter as well, without the parties leading any evidence, the learned Judge granted a decree of divorce under Section Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 10 of 28 13B of the HMA, based on the separate petitions filed by the parties. (v). Shraddha Gupta vs. Sumit Jain, MAT.APP.(F.C.) 330/2023 - the learned Judge followed the same line of practice and granted the decree of divorce.

14. While we are conscious that Family Courts are heavily burdened, owing to the increasing frequency with which parties separate, often on exceedingly trivial grounds, and the general erosion of the sanctity of marriage, this cannot be treated as a licence for any Court to indulge in what can only be described as statutory re- engineering. The statutory scheme must be followed, irrespective of caseload pressures. 15. In the present case, although the divorce petition was filed under Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, the learned Family Court Judge proceeded to apply provisions of the SMA, particularly an alleged Section 28A thereof, and extended this supposed provision on the ground that doing so would “save precious judicial time and spare the parties another round of litigation”. On this basis, the learned Judge granted a decree of divorce. 16. It bears reiteration that the SMA is a complete and self- contained secular code, intentionally crafted to govern marriages between parties who elect to solemnize their union outside the fold of personal laws. The said Act meticulously sets out a detailed statutory framework regulating every stage of the matrimonial process, from the prerequisites for marriage, to the manner of its solemnization, and ultimately its dissolution. Its scheme is deliberate and precise, and the Courts are bound to adhere to it in its statutory completeness. Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 11 of 28

17. A foundational point of distinction between the HMA and the SMA lies in the very concept and mode of solemnization. Section 7 of the HMA contemplates that a Hindu marriage is rooted in religious and customary rites. Where these rites include Saptapadi, the marriage attains legal validity and becomes irrevocably binding upon the parties once the seventh step is completed. Thus, the validity of the marriage is intrinsically tied to personal law traditions. 18. Under the SMA, however, the legal act of solemnization is entirely secular and formal. A marriage attains validity only upon its registration under the statute, and such registration can occur only after strict compliance with the procedural safeguards and statutory conditions laid down in Chapter II. Unlike the HMA, no religious rite or ceremony has any bearing on the recognition of the marriage. The SMA therefore operates on a wholly different conceptual foundation. 19. Apart from this fundamental divergence in solemnization, the HMA incorporates specific provisions governing what constitutes a valid Hindu marriage and the circumstances under which such a marriage may be dissolved. Section 13 of the HMA sets out, in exhaustive detail, the grounds on which a Hindu marriage may be dissolved. These include adultery, cruelty, desertion, conversion, mental disorder, venereal disease, renunciation, and presumption of death. The statute further delineates additional, wife-specific grounds for seeking dissolution. Each of these grounds, whether general or gender-specific, have been enacted with clear legislative intent. For the sake of reference, Section 13 of HMA is reproduced hereunder: “13. Divorce. - (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party-- Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 12 of 28 [(i) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse; or (ia) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or (ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or] (ii) has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion; or [(iii) has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. Explanation.--In this clause,-- (a) the expression mental disorder means mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder or any other disorder or disability of mind and includes schizophrenia; (b) the expression psychopathic disorder means a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including in abnormally subnormality of aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the other party, and whether or not it requires or is susceptible to medical treatment; or] * * * * * intelligence) which results (v) has * * * been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form; or (vi) has renounced the world by entering any religious order; or (vii) has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of it, had that party been alive; *** * * * * * [Explanation. In this sub-section, the expression desertion means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.] [(1A) Either party to a marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of this Act, may also present a petition for the dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground (i) that there has been no resumption of cohabitation as between the parties to the marriage for a period of 8[one year] or upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial separation in a proceeding to which they were parties; or (ii) that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage for a period of 8[one year] or Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 13 of 28 upwards after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in a proceeding to which they were parties.] (2) A wife may also present a petition for the dissolution of her marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground,-- (i) in the case of any marriage solemnized before the commencement of this Act, that the husband had married again before such commencement or that any other wife of the husband married before such commencement was alive at the time of the solemnization of the marriage of the petitioner: Provided that in either case the other wife is alive at the time of the presentation of the petition; or (ii) that the husband has, since the solemnization of the marriage, been guilty of rape, sodomy or 9[bestiality; or] [(iii) that in a suit under section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (78 of 1956), or in a proceeding under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) (or under the corresponding section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), a decree or order, as the case may be, has been passed against the husband awarding maintenance to the wife notwithstanding that she was living apart and that since the passing of such decree or order, cohabitation between the parties has not been resumed for one year or upwards; (iv) that her marriage (whether consummated or not) was solemnized before she attained the age of fifteen years and she has repudiated the marriage after attaining that age but before attaining the age of eighteen years. Explanation. This clause applies whether the marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976).]”

20. In contrast, Section 27 of the SMA, although containing certain analogous grounds for divorce, is distinct in both its structure and application. A side-by-side comparison of Section 13 of the HMA and Section 27 of the SMA makes these differences amply clear, which is as under: Particulars Hindu Marriage Act, Nature 1955: Section 13 Personal law applicable to Hindus (as defined under Section 2 of the HMA) Applicability Both parties must be Hindus for the HMA to apply. Special Marriage Act, 1954: Section 27 Secular statute to marriages applicable solemnised under the SMA. No requirement; provided the marriage was solemnised under the SMA. religion Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 14 of 28 Grounds for divorce Section 13(1): A marriage may be dissolved on petition by either spouse on any of the following grounds: (i) Adultery: voluntary sexual intercourse with a person other spouse. (ia) Cruelty: conduct such that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. (ib) Desertion: desertion of the petitioner by the a continuous period of not immediately preceding the presentation of the petition (ii) Cessation of being a Hindu: the other party has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion. (iii) Unsoundness of mind / mental disorder: of such a kind/extent petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent (v) Venereal disease in communicable form (vi) Renunciation of the world: by entering any religious order. Presumption (vii) death: not heard of as alive for seven years or more. Section 27(1): A petition for divorce may be presented by either following grounds: spouse petitioner (a) Adultery: voluntary sexual intercourse with a person other than the spouse. (b) Desertion: desertion of a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition Imprisonment: (c) respondent undergoing sentence of imprisonment for seven years or more. (d) Cruelty: conduct of such a nature that the petitioner cannot expected to live with the respondent. (e) Unsoundness of mind / mental disorder: of such kind and extent petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. (f) Venereal disease communicable form (g) Suffering from leprosy, but not infected by petitioner (h) Presumption of death: not heard of as alive for seven years or more. reasonably Section specific 27(1A): Wife- grounds Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 15 of 28 dissolution of marriage (i) where husband guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality, (ii) or certain maintenance orders followed by non- resumption of cohabitation for a year or more. resumption Section 27(2): Additional grounds (i) cohabitation or; (ii) conjugal rights for a period of one year or more, judicial separation restitution 13(1A): Section Additional grounds (i) no resumption of cohabitation or; (ii) no conjugal rights for a period of one year or judicial more, separation restitution of 13(2): Wife- grounds Section specific dissolution of marriage (i) where husband had another surviving wife at marriage (solemnized before commencement of Act), (ii) where husband guilty rape, bestiality, certain (iii) orders maintenance non- followed resumption of cohabitation for a year or more she was married (iv) before 15 years of age and refused marriage after attaining 15 or before 18. sodomy accept

21. We take serious exception to the manner in which the learned Family Court Judge, in this case, has attempted to conflate two entirely distinct and independent statutes. This approach is not merely Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 16 of 28 irregular; it is contrary to the law. A Judicial Officer cannot amalgamate statutory provisions from different enactments in a manner that neither reflects the text of the law nor permits such blending. By invoking procedural flexibility available to Family Courts under the FC Act, he has effectively disregarded the mandatory statutory requirements. 22. We were, in fact, taken aback to find that the learned Judge relied upon, in the Impugned Judgement, a provision, Section 28A of the SMA, that does not exist on the statute book, and on this basis granted a decree of divorce. 23. It is incomprehensible how a Judicial Officer of the rank of a Family Court Judge could rely upon a non-existent statutory provision to grant a decree of divorce. Not only did he erroneously import the SMA into a petition filed under the HMA, but he then relied upon an entirely non-existent section of the SMA dealing purportedly with the irretrievable breakdown of marriage. 24. His justification that this would save judicial time and spare the parties further litigation is wholly untenable. We are of the firm view that administrative convenience cannot override statutory mandates. 25. Further, we take specific note of the observations of the learned Family Court Judge in Para 56 of the Impugned Judgment. For the sake of reference, we reproduce the same, which reads as under: “56. Under Hindu Law marriage is considered holy union and unbreakable for seven births but realizing the ordeal faced by parties to the marriage, legislature interfered with the concept of holy union years ago and introduced room for dissolving marriages on certain ground enumerated in Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Later on parties to the failed marriage were also given option to come together and get their marriages dissolved by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act. Marriages under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 cannot be termed as holy union as it permits marriage between persons belonging to Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 17 of 28 different religion and personal law of some of the religion recognizes marriage civil contract and not holy union.”

26. We are compelled to express our strong disapproval of these observations. The conclusion drawn by the learned Judge, that marriages solemnised under the SMA “cannot be regarded as a holy union”, is an unwarranted extrapolation based on a misconceived and selective reading of various matrimonial statutes. 27. Whether a marriage is viewed as a sacrament or as a civil contract under different personal laws has no bearing whatsoever on the sanctity, legitimacy, or legal force of a marriage solemnised under the SMA. The SMA is a secular code intended to provide a neutral and uniform legal framework for couples who choose to marry under it, and it in no manner diminishes the dignity, solemnity, or seriousness of such marriages. To characterise marriages under the SMA as not being a “holy union” is, therefore, neither appropriate nor appreciable. 28. We also fail to understand how the legislative intent to provide for dissolution of a marriage would take away from a Hindu marriage the character of a “holy union”. It would appear that the learned Judge verily believes that a marriage, in order for it to be considered “holy” would have to be characterised as an unbreakable, immutable or indissoluble “union” between two spouses, importing therein, not only the commonplace understanding of the popular phrase, “till death do us part” but extend further to transcend temporal boundaries, acquiring thereof a metaphysical character regenerating itself across seven births. 29. The law as it stands today, recognises a Hindu marriage as a sacrament and as a “Holy Union”, not as a result of the alleged Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:29.11.2025 13:11:32 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 115/2024 Page 18 of 28 permanence of the relationship over seven births or even of a single lifetime, but, as per the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, because, it facilitates “the performance of religious duties” [Swarjya Lakshmi v. Dr. G. G. Padma Rao13], it transforms the wife “…in the household of her husband and takes a new birth”, [Anuradha Samir Vennangot v. Mohandas Samir Vennangot14], “..by such union, the wife becomes part and parcel of the husband” [Beni Bai Vs. Raghubir Prasad], “..wife becomes a part and parcel of the body of the husband. She is therefore, called ardhangani” [Raghubar Singh v. Gulab Singh15], or due to the observance of Homam, i.e., oblation to fire and saptapadi [Velamuri Venkata Sivaprasad v. Kothuri Venkateswarlu16]. 30. We also take note of the fact that the learned Family Court Judge, in addition to relying upon a non-existent statutory provision, has further proceeded to hold that the marriage stands dissolved on the ground of cruelty. For arriving at this conclusion, the learned Judge has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Rakesh Raman v. Kavita17 and concluded as follows: “45. Although petitioner could not be said to have proved any of her allegation against the respondent and her family about their alleged act of cruelty committed prior to 04.09.2018 yet in view of the above rulings it has got to be seen if marriage of the parties had reached such a stage where each parties could be said to be inflicting cruelty upon each other and continuation of such marriage would amount to sanctioning cruelty which parties are inflicting upon each other.

46. There is no dispute that various litigation began between the parties after 09.09.2018 with respondent filling Writ petition before the Hon‟ble Calcutta High Court for over action of the police in accompanying the petitioner to his house on 09.09.2018 and forcibly - getting delivered the son of the parties. He also filed two

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