LT. COL. PANDAPPA KOTAGI v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS

h) the writ petition, stay the operation and further effect of the impugned promotion result dated 27.03.2026 insofar as it affects the Petitioner and similarly situated SCO 2007 batch officers, and further restrain the Respondents from creating irreversible equities adverse to the Petitioner. Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 5992/2026 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:11.05.2026 15:05:14 Pass any other or further order(s) as this Hon’ble in the facts and i) Court may deem fit and proper circumstances of the case.”

#2. It is clear that prayers (b) to (h) are amenable to the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces Tribunal1 under Section 142 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 20073 read with Section 2(o) of the AFT Act.

#3. We have heard Mr. Malik, learned Counsel for the petitioner.

#4. To our mind, the inclusion of prayer (a) in this writ petition is merely a strained effort at seeking to bypass the jurisdiction of the AFT and perforce invoke the jurisdiction of this Court.

#5. This is clearly impermissible in view of the law laid down by 1 “AFT”, hereinafter 2 14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority in service matters.— (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority, exercisable immediately before that day by all courts (except the Supreme Court or a High Court exercising jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to all service matters. (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person aggrieved by an order pertaining to any service matter may make an application to the Tribunal in such form and accompanied by such documents or other evidence and on payment of such fee as may be prescribed. On receipt of an application relating to service matters, the Tribunal shall, if satisfied after (3) due inquiry, as it may deem necessary, that it is fit for adjudication by it, admit such application; but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may dismiss the application after recording its reasons in writing. For the purpose of adjudicating an application, the Tribunal shall have the same powers (4) as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely— summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on (a) oath; requiring the discovery and production of documents; (b) receiving evidence on affidavits; (c) (d) subject to the provisions of sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), requisitioning any public record or document or copy of such record or document from any office; (e) (f) (g) (h) passed by it ex parte; and (i) The Tribunal shall decide both questions of law and facts that may be raised before it. issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; reviewing its decisions; dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex parte; setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order any other matter which may be prescribed by the Central Government. (5) 3 “AFT Act”, hereinafter Signature Not Verified W.P.(C) 5992/2026 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:11.05.2026 15:05:14 the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI4 and UOI v. Parashotam Dass5 read with the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Squadron Leader Neelam Chahar v. UOI6.

#6. Mr. Malik’s contention is that, where violation of fundamental rights is involved, the matter has to be decided by the High Court and not by the AFT.

#7. The submission has merely to be stated to be rejected. Every service matter involves violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, which are fundamental rights. To a query from the Court as to whether it is Mr. Malik’s contention that the AFT is incompetent to decide matters involving violation of fundamental rights, his contention is that certain cases of violation of fundamental rights involving “systemic, cumulative and continuing discrimination” should be decided by the High Court.

#8. We are unaware of any such principle in law. There cannot be any distinction, so far as the jurisdiction of the AFT is concerned, between cases involving discrimination per se and “systemic, cumulative and continuing discrimination”.

#9. We do not see why the petitioner cannot approach the AFT, even if it is his case that there is “systemic, cumulative and continuing discrimination”.