Mr. Gaurav Bhardwaj and Ms. Garima Bhardwaj, Advs v. M/S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PRINTERS PVT LTD

Through: Mr. Arvind Nigam, Sr. Adv. (Amicus Curiae) CORAM: JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL JUDGMENT Prathiba M. Singh J.,

2. This hearing has been done through hybrid mode. The present Reference arises out of 12 eviction petitions filed by various landlords under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter, the ‘DRC, 1958’) inter alia seeking O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 eviction of the tenants from the tenanted premises. Vide orders passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (hereinafter, the ‘ARC’) the said eviction petitions were allowed and the landlords in each of the petitions were permitted to obtain possession of the respective tenanted premises.

3. Assailing the orders passed by the ARC, the tenants filed revision petitions under Section 25B (8) of the DRC Act, 1958. It is these revision petitions which are the basis for the reference dated 22nd December, 2017.

4. Vide order dated 22nd December, 2017 in R.C. REV. 18/2016 the ld. Single Judge referred the following questions for consideration: “(i) Where the landlord is a company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution and the premises are required for the use of employees of such landlord, whether such landlord has a choice, whether to invoke Section 14(1)(e) or Section 22 of the Act. (ii) Whether the Chairman, Directors, Trustees, members of the governing body and office bearers, of a company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution qualify as „employees‟, within the meaning of Section 22 of the Act and if not whether such landlord for requirement of such persons is entitled to invoke Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. (iii) Whether the tenant of such a landlord can be construed as having acted in contravention of the terms under which he was authorized to occupy the premises or be construed as in unauthorized occupation of the premises, within the meaning of Section 22(b) and (c) of the Act, on continuing in occupation after determination of his tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act, 1882. (iv) Whether the commercial or industrial or other requirement of a landlord, which / who is a company or O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution, of premises, by allowing its employees to work or carry on its activities therein is within the ambit of Section 22 of the Act and if not, whether for such requirement such a landlord can invoke Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. (v) Whether a public charitable trust carrying on public activities qualifies as a public institution. (vi) Whether a deity in a temple owning properties or a trust or a society managing a place of worship qualifies as a public institution. (vii) Whether the choice if any with such a landlord, to invoke either Section 14(1)(e) or Section 22 of the Act, is to the detriment of the tenant and if so to what effect.” Facts:

5. The revision petitions are filed by the tenants, under Section 25B (8) of the DRC, 1958 inter alia assailing the orders passed by the ARC, vide which the tenants have been evicted from the tenanted premises.

6. In the present petitions, the landlords belong to a diverse class, including body corporates, juristic entities, public trusts, etc. The details of the petitions are as under: Petition No. Name & Status of the Landlord Name Tenant Particulars petitions REV. RC. M/s International Security Printers Pvt. Ltd. K.S. Bhandari (Private Limited Company) Landlord sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e), DRC, 1958, invoking the summary procedure under Section 25B, DRC, 1958. Rent Controller directed eviction vide order dated 30th September, 2015. Revision petition filed by the tenant challenging the eviction. S. No 1 O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 2 RC.REV. M/s Superior Exim Pvt. Ltd. (Private Limited Company) 3 RC.REV. M/s Superior Exim Pvt. Ltd. (Private Limited Company) 4 REV. RC. M/s Superior Exim Pvt. Ltd. (Private Limited Company) 5 REV. RC. M/s Superior Exim Pvt. Ltd. M/s Frontier Sales Landlord sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e), DRC, 1958, invoking the summary procedure under Section 25B, DRC, 1958. Rent Controller directed eviction vide order dated 29th November, 2016. Revision petition filed by the tenant challenging the eviction. M/s Frontier Sales Landlord sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e), DRC, 1958, invoking the summary procedure under Section 25B, DRC, 1958. Rent Controller directed eviction vide order dated 29th November, 2016. Revision petition filed by the tenant challenging the eviction. M/s Frontier Sales Landlord sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e), DRC, 1958, invoking the summary procedure under Section 25B, DRC, 1958. Rent Controller directed eviction vide order dated 29th November, 2016. Revision petition filed by the tenant challenging the eviction. M/s Frontier Sales Landlord sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e), DRC, 1958, invoking the summary procedure under O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 (Private Limited Company) 6 REV. RC. Lala Joti Pershad Shiv Mandir Trust Jai Rani and Sanjay Kapoor (Public Trust) 7 REV. RC. Shri Digambar Jain Panchayat Samaj (Regd.) Shanti Devi (Registered Society) 8 REV. RC. Panchayat Badi Vaish Bise Aggarwal (Regd.) Sunil Gupta (Registered Society) Section 25B, DRC, 1958. Rent Controller directed eviction vide order dated 29th November, 2016. Revision petition filed by the tenant challenging the eviction. Landlord sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e), DRC, 1958, invoking the summary procedure under Section 25B, DRC, 1958. Rent Controller directed eviction vide order dated 06th April, 2017. Revision petition filed by the tenant challenging the eviction. Landlord sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e), DRC, 1958, invoking the summary procedure under Section 25B, DRC, 1958. Rent Controller directed eviction vide order dated 25th February, 2017. Revision petition filed by the tenant challenging the eviction. Landlord sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e), DRC, 1958, invoking the summary procedure under Section 25B, DRC, 1958. Rent Controller directed eviction vide order dated 19th July, 2017. O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 9 REV. RC. Panchayat Badi Vaish Bise Aggarwal (Regd.) (Registered Society) Revision petition filed by the tenant challenging the eviction. Jai Prakash Goel Landlord sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e), DRC, 1958, invoking the summary procedure under Section 25B, DRC, 1958. Rent Controller directed eviction vide order dated 19th July, 2017. Revision petition filed by the tenant challenging the eviction. 10 RC. REV. Anoop Charitable Trust Singh Surender Kaur and Prabjot Singh Gulati (Charitable Public Trust) 11 RC. REV. Anoop Charitable Trust Singh Surender Kaur and Prabjot Singh Gulati (Charitable Public Trust) Landlord sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e), DRC, 1958, invoking the summary procedure under Section 25B, DRC, 1958. Rent Controller directed eviction vide order dated 19th May, 2017. Revision petition filed by the tenant challenging the eviction. Landlord sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e), DRC, 1958, invoking the summary procedure under Section 25B, DRC, 1958. Rent Controller directed eviction vide order dated 19th May, 2017. Revision petition filed by the tenant challenging the eviction. O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50

7. Further, RC. REV. 208/2017 titled M/s Frontier Sales v. M/s Superior Exim Pvt. Ltd. has been withdrawn. Submissions:

8. Mr. Gaurav Bhardwaj, Mr. Anuragh Bindal, Mr. M. Tarique Siddiqui, Mr. Abhishek Kumar Tanwar, ld. Counsels appearing on behalf of the tenants have made the following submissions: i. Section 14 of the DRC, 1958 is a prohibitory provision as it falls within Chapter III of the Act. The said chapter deals with control of eviction of tenants. The object of the DRC, 1958 is to protect tenants. Thus, in case of any ambiguity in the interpretation of a provision, benefit has to be given to the tenant. ii. The question that arises is as to when can a landlord seek eviction under Section 14 of the DRC, 1958. Section 14(1)(e) of the Act is the only provision under Section 14 of the DRC, 1958 where the landlord can seek eviction and take possession on the basis of bona fide need. All other sub sections under Section 14 of the DRC, 1958 deal with other situations where there have been defaults by the tenant or the condition of the premises is no longer satisfactory for human occupation. Thus, the provision itself deals with three categories: a) Where there are violations or infractions by the tenant. b) Where the premises is in a dilapidated condition. c) Where the landlord requires the premises only under sub section (e). O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 No other sub section of 14 of the DRC, 1958 would enable a landlord to use the summary procedure under Section 25 (b) of the Act. iii. Use of the words ‘he’ or ‘himself’ in Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958 along with the words, ‘bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself’ would be a controlling part of the provision. Even though it would mean to include even the female gender, it however, would not mean that a juristic entity or any other entity such as a firm, company, etc. can be included in the ambit of a landlord. iv. Two amendments have been carried out in the DRC, 1958. The first, in 1976, introduced Chapter III-A, providing for summary trials. The second amendment, in 1988, inserted a special procedure under Section 25B of the Act. A joint reading of Section 25B along with Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958 leads only to the conclusion that summary procedure is prescribed for landlords who are natural persons and not for any other class of landlords. Thus, for the purpose of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958, the landlord has to be a natural person. v. Though all landlords can seek eviction of tenants under the DRC, 1958, the summary procedure under Section 25B of the Act can only be used for the benefit of the landlords who come under the ambit of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti, 1980 1 SCC 290 to argue that the Section 25B of the DRC, 1958 is a procedure which is confined essentially to Section O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 14A and Section 14 (1)(e) of the DRC, 1958. Thus, unless the landlord needs the premises for personal occupation, the special procedure under Section 25B of the Act cannot be triggered. vi. On a query from the Court as to what would be the position in cases where a sole proprietary concern or an unregistered partnership firm, seeks eviction of the tenants, it was submitted that insofar as the unregistered partnership firm is concerned, since the sole proprietor would be a natural person, and a sole proprietary firm not being a juristic entity, Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958 would be available in such a case. vii. In respect of those landlords for whom Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 applies, they should not be permitted to invoke section 14(1)(e) of the Act as Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 carves a subset from Section 14(1)(e)/14 of the Act. viii. The purpose of juristic entities, such as, companies, trusts, body corporates, etc. is to maximize profits, and therefore, they ought not be given benefit of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. Under Section 25B of the Act, only some individual landlords are given the benefit. The bona fide requirement of the individual landlord has to be satisfied for the purpose of invoking the summary procedure under Section 25B of the DRC act. ix. Both Sections 14 and 22 of the DRC, 1958 are non-obstante provisions. Section 14 of the DRC, 1958 has the expression “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract…”, and Section 22 of the Act contains the expression “notwithstanding anything in contained in Section 14 or O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 any other law”. In view of these non-obstante clauses, harmonious construction needs to be done, which would show that it is only Section 22 of the Act which could apply, in respect of, companies, body corporates, local authorities, public institutions, etc. Further, if such an interpretation is not given and all landlords are construed to be included under Section 14 of the Act, then there would be several overlaps between categories of cases falling in Section 14(1)(e) and Section 22 of the DRC, 1958. This would render Section 22 of the Act otiose. An interpretation by the Court should not render any provision superfluous or otiose and therefore, the provisions have to be applied in the manner in which they are framed or enacted. x. The judgment in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs v. Union of India & Anr. [(2008) 5 SCC 287] has made it clear that Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958 could apply even to commercial premises. A harmonious construction of both the provisions, therefore, should be that only those landlords for whom Section 22 of the Act applies cannot invoke section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958. xi. The application of CPC would be relevant in all proceedings under Section 22 of the DRC, 1958. Those entities covered by Section 22 of the Act are not governed by procedure under Section 25B of the DRC, 1958 because under Section 25B, an appeal or a second appeal does not lie against an order directing the recovery of premises by the Comptroller. Thus, usually only revision petitions under Section 115 CPC are filed when orders are passed under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the DRC, 1958. O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 However, no such embargo exists in respect of orders passed under Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 qua which, appeals are maintainable before the Tribunal under Section 38 of the Act. It is thus submitted that the provisions under Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 are carved out especially for the purpose of statutory authorities, companies, juristic entities, body corporates, local authorities, public institutions, etc. The only class of institutions not be covered by Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 would therefore be private trusts. xii. A private trust is not covered under Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 in terms of the decision in National Distributor Company v. Sant Lal Godha & Sons Charity Trust [(2012) SCC OnLine Del 237]. In view, thereof a private trust can invoke Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958.

9. Mr. Sudhanshu Batra, ld. Senior Advocate, Mr. Gurmeet Bindra, ld. Counsel and Mr. Hitendra Kumar, ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of the landlords/Respondents made the following submissions: i. The simple question is whether a company can invoke Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958 and whether the chairman, directors, etc. are employees of the company. ii. The definition of landlord under Section 2(e) of the DRC, 1958 shows that it includes any person which need not be a natural person; iii. Under Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, a person includes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. Thus, the submission is that a company is fully covered under the definition of landlord under the DRC, 1958. O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 iv. On a reading of Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 it is found that the said provision has carved out companies and other body corporates, etc., to seek eviction in case where employees need the premises. Further, the directors would not be employees under Section 22 of the Act. However, the language of Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 would show that the company is included in the Act as a landlord. v. Section 14 of the DRC, 1958, in general and Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958 in particular would still continue to apply to companies. The option is with the company whether to invoke Section 22 of the Act as it is an additional remedy provided to a company for the sake of its employees. Reliance is placed upon the following decisions: a) b) Canara Bank v. T.T. Ltd., 214 [(2014) DLT 526] Chuni Lal v. University of Delhi, [1970 LawSuit (Del) 292: 1970 RCR (Rent) 742] c) Madan Mohan Lal Sri Ram Pvt. Ltd. v. P. Tandon, [(1981) SCC OnLine Del 303], d) Satnam Kaur & Ors. v. Ashlar Stores P. Ltd. [158 (2009) DLT 62] vi. The Act thus cannot exclude remedies for landlords in a selective manner and companies which are juristic entities are entitled to invoke Section 14 of the DRC, 1958 in general and Section 22 of the Act in particular. vii. Whenever the landlord needs the premises for residential purposes, Section 14 of the DRC, 1958 could be invoked by the landlord. However, a landlord who requires the premises for commercial reasons cannot file an eviction petition under Section 14 of the Act O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 and can only invoke Section 22 of the DRC, 1958. This position has changed after the decision in Chunilal v. University of Delhi (supra), where a ld. Single Judge of this Court held that Section 14 & Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 would go hand in hand. There is no conflict between the said two provisions. The Court recognizes in the said decision that a corporate body or a public institution could be similar to natural person under certain circumstances and there is no reason to exclude corporate persons from invoking Section 14 of the Act. viii. In the decision of Madan Mohan Lal v. P. Tandon, (supra), the ld. Single Judge of this Court expanded the purport of Section 14 of the DRC, 1958 and held that if a company required the premises, for example, for residential purposes of the Company Chairman, Section 14(1)(e) could be invoked. Thus, even as per Madan Mohan Lal (supra) both Sections 14(1)(e) & 22 of the DRC, 1958 were available to juristic entities. ix. This principle of law was followed by the decision in Canara Bank v. T.T Ltd. (supra) where again on the basis of the decision in Madan Mohan Lal (supra), a ld. Single Judge held that the contention of the tenant, that Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958 could not be invoked by the landlord/company deserves to be rejected. x. When a landlord is a registered society and is a private institution, Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 cannot be invoked. The landlord has, therefore, filed the eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the DRC, 1958. No registration of the said O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 society has been placed on record and in any case if there is such an order dismissing the eviction or granting leave to defend, the appeal would not lie.

10. The Court also considered the submissions made by ld. Senior Counsel Mr. Arvind Nigam who has been appointed as the ld. Amicus Curaie to assist the Court. Mr. Nigam made the following submissions: i. The definition of ‘landlord’ is person agnostic under Section 2(e) of the DRC, 1958. The purpose of the Act was to protect tenants in the wake of Partition of the country and to give some succour to tenants using it for residential purposes in the 1950s. This philosophy underwent a change after 45 years when the decision in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRS v. Union of India & Anr. (supra) was rendered by the Supreme Court wherein the Court held that the distinction in Section 14(1)(e) DRC, 1958 between residential and non-residential premises would render the said provision discriminatory to the extent that it confined relief only to residential premises. In view thereof, the same was struck down, to that extent. Since Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRS v. Union of India & Anr. (supra), Section 14(1)(e) of the Act is available to tenants using the same even for non-residential use. Even at that stage, in the said judgment, the status of the landlord was not gone into – as to whether it was a natural person or a juristic person. ii. The manner in which the purpose of ‘use’ has been held to be discriminatory in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRS v. Union of India & Anr. (supra) would also apply if the provision is confined only to natural persons and would fall foul of Article 14 of the O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 Constitution. The natural sequitur of the said judgment is that Section 14 of the DRC, 1958 would be owner neutral. There are competing equalities in the Rent Control legislation in the form of three factors: - a) the nature of tenant; b) the nature of property; c) the nature of landlord. While at the time of enactment, distinctions were made, over the years these inequalities have been removed and the legislation has to be interpreted in a manner when it is neutral to all three factors. iii. It is further submitted that by reading the reference order and the discussion in respect of Northern India Caterers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab (AIR 1967 SC 1581) and Madan Mohan Lal v. P. Tandon, (supra) the view of Justice Bachawat has been accepted. A tenant cannot claim a right on procedure but only on the aspect of the remedy. For example, if an Appellate remedy is being curtailed, violation of rights can be argued by the tenant. iv. Here the question is whether a summary procedure can be made available to all the landlords or not. The right of the landlord under Section 14 or under Section 22 is a separate and distinct right. Reference is made to the judgment in Chunni Lal v. University of Delhi (supra) wherein it is held categorically that both these provisions apply to all landlords. The inconsistency which is attributed to the judgment in Canara Bank (supra) is merely incidental and, in fact, did not exist. Illustratively, Mr. Nigam, ld. Amicus refers to any monetary instrument over which both a normal suit and a summary suit would be maintainable, if the conditions are satisfied. Thus, it is argued that Section 14 is in addition to the O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 remedy under Section 22. The submission is that procedural elements cannot dominate substantive rights. There is nothing wrong if Section 14(1)(e) is available to all landlords post Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRS v. Union of India & Anr. (supra) v. The explanation in Section 22 DRC, 1958 is then referred to argue that the same is not an exhaustive definition as it uses the terms ‘includes’, ‘in contrast with ‘means’ or ‘means and includes’. The Explanation is, therefore, broad and would also include institutions set up by private trusts as well. vi. Coming to the questions raised in the reference dated 22nd December, 2017, the following was submitted by the ld. Amicus Curiae- a. Question 50 (i), the answer would be ‘Yes, the choice would exist for the landlord’. b. Question 50(ii) the question whether Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 would apply to such individuals who were not employees would have to be seen on a case to case basis. For such cases Section 14(1)(e) would always be applicable but if the employer-employee relationship exists then Section 22 can also be invoked. c. Question 50(iii) applicability of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Reference is made to Section 2(l) of the said Act to argue that under Section 2(l)(ii), if the termination is by way of a notice under section 106, the termination may still be valid but the tenant can still be protected under the DRC, 1958 and O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 not an unauthorised occupant. d. Question 50(iv)- The distinction has been removed between the nature of the premises post the judgment in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRS v. Union of India & Anr. (supra). e. Question 50(v)- A public charitable trust would qualify to be a public institution under Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 though the exclusion is if set up by a private trust. f. Question 50(vi) - A deity could qualify as a public institution depending on the facts. g. Question 50(vii) - The choice available to the landlord cannot be considered as being detrimental to the tenant as it is only a question of procedure and the landlord is dominus litis.

11. The Court has heard the matter at length. The submissions made by the ld. Counsels have been considered and the judgments placed on record have been perused. Observations:

12. The ld. Single Judge vide a detailed and copiously written judgment in RC.REV. 18/2016 dated 22nd December, 2017 referred to the Division Bench, the following questions for consideration: “(i) Where the landlord is a company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution and the premises are required for the use of employees of such landlord, whether such landlord has a choice, whether to invoke Section 14(1)(e) or Section 22 of the Act. the Chairman, Directors, Trustees, (ii) Whether members of the governing body and office bearers, of a company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution qualify as „employees‟, within O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 the meaning of Section 22 of the Act and if not whether such landlord for requirement of such persons is entitled to invoke Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. (iii) Whether the tenant of such a landlord can be construed as having acted in contravention of the terms under which he was authorized to occupy the premises or be construed as in unauthorized occupation of the premises, within the meaning of Section 22(b) and (c) of the Act, on continuing in occupation after determination of his tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act, 1882. (iv) Whether the commercial or industrial or other requirement of a landlord, which / who is a company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution, of premises, by allowing its employees to work or carry on its activities therein is within the ambit of Section 22 of the Act and if not, whether for such requirement such a landlord can invoke Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. (v) Whether a public charitable trust carrying on public activities qualifies as a public institution. (vi) Whether a deity in a temple owning properties or a trust or a society managing a place of worship qualifies as a public institution. (vii) Whether the choice if any with such a landlord, to invoke either Section 14(1)(e) or Section 22 of the Act, is to the detriment of the tenant and if so to what effect.”

13. Before proceeding to answer the above questions and discussing the case laws involved, this Court deems it appropriate to discuss the scheme of the DRC, 1958. Scheme of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:

14. The Delhi Rent Control Act was enacted by the legislature in 1958 and is a law which is meant to control rents and evictions in the jurisdiction of Delhi. Under Section 2 of the Act, the terms ‘Landlord’ and ‘Tenant’ are O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 defined. Section 2(e) of the DRC, 1958 defines a landlord as under: “(e) “landlord” means a person who, for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant;”

15. A perusal of the definition of landlord as provided under the Act would show that the same is inclusive. It is an exhaustive definition but it includes within its ambit any person: • Who is receiving rent; • Who is entitled to receive rent. (Such person need not be receiving rent on his own account. It could be on behalf of a trustee, a guardian or receiver for any other person who is entitled to receive rent); • Who is receiving rent for the benefit of a trustee or guardian or receiver for any other person who is entitled to receive rent.

16. Thus, the definition of landlord is quite broad and the intention is to ensure that no one is excluded from the definition, so long as the premises is a tenanted premises and the person has some legitimate right or authority to receive rent from the tenant.

17. Insofar as the definition of tenant is concerned, the same is provided under Section 2(l) of the DRC, 1958. It is a means and includes definition. It provides that a tenant is any person by whom or on behalf of whom, the rent of any premises would be payable. It includes: • A sub-tenant, • A person who is in possession of the premises despite termination of tenancy; O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 • The tenant’s family members or others who have been ordinarily living in the premises as per order of succession prescribed under Explanation I and II of Section 2(l) of the Act.

18. The relevant portion of Section 2(l) of the DRC, 1958 is extracted hereunder for ready reference: “xxx xxx xxx 1 [(1) “tenant” means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is, or, but for a special contract, would be, payable, and includes— (i) a sub-tenant; (ii) any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy; and (iii) in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified, respectively, in Explanation I and Explanation II to this clause, such of the aforesaid person’s— (a) spouse, (b) son or daughter, or, where there are both son and daughter, both of them, (c) parents, (d) daughter-in-law, being the widow of his pre- deceased son, as had been ordinarily living in the premises with such person as a member or members of his family up to the date of his death, but does not include,— (A) any person against whom an order or decree for eviction has been made, except where such decree or order for eviction is liable to be re-opened under the proviso to section 3 of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976 (18 of 1976); (B) any person to whom a licence, as defined by section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), has been granted. Explanation I-............ Explanation II - ……………. O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 Explanation III …….”

19. From a perusal of both the above mentioned provisions, it can be seen that the DRC, 1958 has in fact struck a balance while defining the terms ‘Landlord’ and ‘Tenant’. It has not restricted the said definitions to any specific parties but has in fact expanded it. The definition of the term ‘landlord’ is an expansive one and includes persons who may have authority to collect rent, even if not the landlord, from persons, who are in occupation of property, even if not the tenant.

20. The intention is therefore to ensure creation of relationship of a landlord and tenant even where, there may not be a direct landlord-tenant relationship, tenancy agreement or a lease agreement. The core of the landlord-tenant relationship thus, is the tenanted premises and not the party individual.

21. Section 3 of the DRC, 1958 clarifies in respect of which premises the Act would not apply. The exclusions provided therein are in respect of: i) Premises belonging to the government or requisitioned by the government; ii) Any premises, where the rent is more than Rs.3,500/-; iii) Any premises constructed after 1988 for a period of ten years from the date of completion of construction. The last two Clauses were added in 1988.

22. A perusal of Section 3 of DRC, 1958 would also show that the focus of the Act is on the premises and not on the nature of the landlord or the tenant. Insofar as premises belonging to the government are concerned, the same being public premises is also governed by the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter, the ‘PP Act’).

23. Sections 4 to 13 of the DRC, 1958 deal with various aspects of fixation O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 of rent, standard rent, increase in rent, refund of rent, etc. and are not relevant for the present purposes.

24. Section 14 of the DRC, 1958 falls under Chapter III of the Act, which is titled, Control of Eviction of Tenants. Section 14(1) of the Act provides that a decree for recovery of possession of any premises cannot be made in favour of a landlord so long as certain conditions as specified in Section 14 (1) proviso of the DRC, 1958 are satisfied. The said conditions are relevant and are set out hereunder: • 14(1)(a) – Non payment of rent by the tenant within two months after service of notice in the manner provided under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. • 14(1)(b) – Sub-letting or parting with possession of any part of the tenanted premises without obtaining consent in writing from the landlord; • 14(1)(c) – Change of user of the rented premises other than for the purpose for which it was let out, without consent of the landlord. • 14(1)(d) –In the case of a premises let out for use as a residence, if the tenant or any member of the tenant’s family has not resided in the said premises for six months prior to the filing of eviction petition; • 14(1)(e) – If the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent upon him; • 14(1)(f) – If the premises is unfit for human inhabitation and the landlord wishes to carry out repairs which is not possible without evicting the tenant; O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 • 14(1)(g) – That the premises are needed by the landlord bona fide for the purpose of building, re-building or causing alterations to the premises, which cannot be done without evicting the tenant; • 14(1)(h) – If the tenant has obtained a residence; • 14(1)(hh) – If the tenant has built a residence after 1988 and ten years have elapsed; • 14(1)(i) – If the tenant was an employee of the landlord and such employment has ceased; • 14(1)(j) – That the tenant has caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the premises, directly or indirectly; • 14(1)(k) – If the tenant has violated any conditions imposed on the landlord by the authority which has given the premises on lease such as the Government, Delhi Development Authority, Municipal Corporation, etc. • 14(1)(l) – If the premises is needed by the landlord for complying with any condition imposed by the Government, Delhi Development Authority, Municipal Corporation, etc.

25. In respect of each of the sub-Sections of Section 14(1) of the Act provided above, the further conditions that apply are set out in Sections 14(2) to 14(11) of the DRC, 1958.

26. For the purpose of the present reference, the relevant provisions would be Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 14(7) of the DRC, 1958. The same read as under: “(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation; (7) Where an order for the recovery of possession of any premises is made on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1), the landlord shall not be entitled to obtain possession thereof before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the order.”

27. The question with respect to Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC, 1958 raised by the ld. Single Judge vide order dated 22nd December, 2017 is whether in the said provision, the word ‘himself’ or ‘his family dependent on him” would restrict the application of Section 14(1)(e) of the said Act to only a natural person and not to a juristic entity, body corporate or a trust, etc. Before answering this question, it is imperative to delve into the scope of DRC, 1958 even further and discuss some more key provisions. Amendments in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958

28. Substantial amendments have been undertaken in the DRC, 1958. However, two sets of amendments i.e., in the years 1975 and in 1988 are relevant for the discussion herein.

29. The Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1975 introduced Section 14A of the DRC, 1958 which empowered the landlord with the right to recover immediate possession of premises, in respect of persons who may be occupying premises allotted to them by the government or such authorities.

30. The Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, inserted Section 14B and 14C of the DRC, 1958. These provisions inter alia, vest the right to recover immediate possession of those premises relating to the members of O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 armed forces, employees of Central Government, Delhi Administration employees, as also widows. Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:

31. Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 which existed in the Act since 1958 and is relevant for the discussion, is set out below: “22. Special provision for recovery of possession in certain cases.—Where the landlord in respect of any premises is any company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution and the premises are required for the use of employees of such landlord or in the case of a public institution, for the furtherance of its activities, then, notwithstanding anything contained in section 14 or any other law, the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by such landlord, place the landlord in vacant possession of such premises by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation thereof, if the Controller is satisfied— (a) that the tenant to whom such premises were let for use as a residence at a time when he was in the service or employment of the landlord, has ceased to be in such service or employment; or (b) that the tenant has acted in contravention of the terms, express or implied, under which he was authorised to occupy such premises; or (c) that any other person is in unauthorised occupation of such premises; or (d) that the premises are required bona fide by the public institution for the furtherance of its activities. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “public institution” institution, includes any educational library, hospital and charitable dispensary 1 [but does not include any such institution set up by any private trust].” O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50

32. Thus, Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 has three ingredients as clarified in the judgment of Shri Rishi Walia v. Shri Sanatan Dharam Mandir Trust Regd Through its President (2022:DHC:2535). • Firstly, the landlord is a company or other body corporate or local authority or public institution. • Secondly, the premises are required for use of the employees of such landlord or in the case of a public institution, for furtherance of its activities. • Thirdly, in the case of public institutions, the premises ought to be required bona fide by the public institution for the furtherance of its activities.

33. However, Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 has been subjected to varying interpretations. Unlike in the initial provisions of the Act where focus was on the premises, in the case of Sections 14A, 14B, 14C, 14D and 22 of the DRC, 1958 the focus is on the status of the landlord.

34. In the case of Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 the landlords who are included are: a) a company b) a body corporate c) any local authority d) any public institution which may require the premises for use of its employees or for furtherance of activities of the public institution.

35. The grounds for eviction are provided under Section 22 of the Act, in case of such landlords. The Explanation further clarifies that public institutions would include educational institutions, libraries, hospitals and charitable dispensaries. However, if such institutions are set up by private O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 trusts, they would not be included in the ambit of public institutions. Thus, for public institutions, to be covered under the ambit of Section 22 of the Act, they have to have a public colour, meaning thereby, some public purpose and ought not to be established by a private trust. Public institutions hence, would be those institutions which are set up by the State or other institutions which are directly or indirectly controlled by Government or have a public character.

36. The provision, however, is confusing to say the least, as a company could be a private company, a body corporate could be a private body corporate, a local authority would be a governmental authority or an authority under the State. However, a public institution would not include those established by a private trust. Thus, the intention of the provision though appears to have been to exclude private bodies, but the same is not clear from the language. Chapter IIIA of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:

37. Chapter IIIA of the DRC, 1958 provides for summary trial in case of certain applications. The legislative intent behind this Chapter can best be understood by referring to the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Bill, 1984 (hereinafter, the ‘Bill, 1984’). The discussion held in the Rajya Sabha during the consideration of the Bill, 1984 is particularly relevant for capturing the legislative intent behind granting landlords the benefit of a summary procedure in specific cases. While referring to the need for expeditious disposal of appeals, it is stated that those house owners who are in genuine need, have to knock at the doors of the Courts for eviction of tenants or for seeking possession of their houses for personal necessity. The relevant portion O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 of the discussion in Rajya Sabha1 pertaining to this Bill is extracted hereunder for ready reference: “……. The various rent control legislations are aimed at regulating the relationship between landlord and tenant by providing inter alia the control of rent eviction of tenant, etc. While in consonance with the concept of any welfare legislation the object of the Rent Act is to protect the tenant against the avarice, I would say, of a feudalistic landlord, at the same time, it is the concern of any rent legislation to safeguard the interests and genuine rights of a house-owner. That is the distinction I draw between a feudalistic landlord and a house- owner. For the attainment of these aims, it is in fact very essential that any dispute that arise between a landlord and a tenant must be decided in the shortest possible time. In this context, this particular piece of legislation, the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Bill, is a welcome As we are presently referring 7 P.M. to the need of expeditious disposal of appeals, I will make only one move submission before I conclude and that refers to the genuine need of those small house-owners who often have to, knock at the doors of the courts for eviction of the tenants; and possession of their houses for personal necessity. ' My suggestion is 'that, in that event a provision should be made that the trial of the case should be a summary trial, and the case should be disposed of in any case within a period of six months as has been provided in various other legislations including the Hindu Marriage Act...”

38. Chapter IIIA of the DRC, 1958 consisting of Sections 25A, 25B and 25C of the Act was inserted in the year 1975. It provides for summary trial of 1 Shri Pawan Kumar Bansal (Punjab), Member of Parliament O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 certain applications.

39. For the purpose of the present reference, Section 25B of the DRC, 1958 is particularly relevant. Section 25B of the said Act is a special procedure for the disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement. It is in the nature of a special provision, however, the same applies only under limited circumstances. Eviction can be sought under Section 25B of the DRC, 1958 only if the circumstances as mentioned in Clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14, Sections 14A, 14B, 14C and 14D of the Act are satisfied and not otherwise.

40. Thus, Section 25B provides for summary procedure for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement only in respect of the following cases: a) Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958 b) Section 14A of the DRC, 1958 c) Section 14B of the DRC, 1958 d) Section 14D of the DRC, 1958 e) Section 14E of the DRC, 1958

41. The special procedure provided under Section 25B of the DRC, 1958 has no application to Section 22 of the said Act.

42. The conflict that has been placed before the Court in this Reference is as to whether Section 14(1)(e) would apply to all landlords or would restrict its application only to a natural person and not to a juristic entity, body corporate or a trust, etc. Analysis:

43. An analysis of the scheme of the DRC, 1958 would reveal that in the initial Statute as was enacted in 1958, the focus was on the nature of the premises. However, thereafter, post the 1975 and 1988 amendments, the focus O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 shifted to the status of the landlords. The object and reasoning behind this can also be deciphered from the Rajya Sabha debate over the Delhi Rent Control Amendment Bill, 1988, wherein the need to strike a balance between rights of house-owners and tenants is highlighted. The said statement was made in the backdrop of escalation of litigation and issues concerning landlords, as also the delays in adjudication of eviction petitions. The Legislature was conscious of various factors – eg., even poor house-owners had to litigate for several years in order to seek eviction, landlords were insecure and hesitant to conduct house repairs as the tenancy rights enabled tenants to maintain possession of the premises. Therefore, the Legislature deemed it necessary to strike a balance between the rights and interests of landlords and tenants. The relevant portion of one of the statements made by the Minister2 introducing the Delhi Rent Control Amendment Bill, 1988 in the Rajya Sabha is extracted hereunder: “We have to maintain a balance between house-owners and tenants. Now, to give a boost to house building activity and maintaining the existing houses in a reasonable state of repair: we have to face the reality of what the present situation is. Nobody wants to do house repair because the house-owner is insecure; the tenancy rights enable the tenant to sit tight and not vacate the house. We have a backlog of court cases which are pending, outstanding and choking the courts. Lok Adalats must be brought in to help expedite disposal of tenancy disputes in a much easier manner. A man sweats life long and takes a loan and builds a house and rents it out because his is a transferable job. And when at the end of his service he comes back, goes into litigation and dies without ever getting his house back. Where does this leave us?” 2 Smt. Renuka Chowdhury (Andhra Pradesh), Member of Parliament O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50

44. Though the intention initially was to protect all tenants except in some cases, the intent later on was clearly for creating more and more landlord related exceptions, such as, in the case of army personnel, widows, government employees, etc.

45. The only ground on which it is argued that the provision encompasses within itself only a natural person, is the use of the word ‘himself’ or ‘his family’.

46. The word ‘he’ and ‘himself’ cannot be construed as a masculine gender and under Section 13 of the General Clauses Act would include females. The said Section reads as under: “13. Gender and number.—In all 2 [Central Acts] and Regulations, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,— (1) words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females; and (2) words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa.”

47. Since masculine gender includes females, it is an inclusive meaning and would therefore also include all persons.

48. Further, a perusal of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958 read with the definition of landlord under the Act would show why the definition uses the word ‘person’ several times. The masculine gender is used in the language of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958 because of the manner in which the term ‘landlord’ is defined under the Act. However, on a careful reading of the same, it can be clearly seen that the definition of landlord provided under Section 2(e) of the Act is quite wide and takes within its ambit even an non-natural person. The indication of the same is clear from the following: O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 a) Use of the word ‘person’ at least three times; b) Use of non-gender based terminology such as guardian or receiver; c) Use of the word ‘trustee’ which could include non-natural persons.

49. Therefore, mere use of the terminology containing masculine gender in Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958 cannot in the opinion of this Court dilute the definition of landlord as, Section 14(1)(e) of the Act uses the expression ‘required bona fide by the landlord’. This expression clarifies that the provision focuses on the landlord’s genuine need for property and not on the status of the landlords i.e., whether they are male or female or juristic entities or other non-natural persons such as companies, firms, Trusts, authorities etc., The term ‘landlord’ hence encompasses all landlords. Thus, landlords who require premises for their bona fide requirements are all fully covered under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958.

50. Further, Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958 also uses the word ‘person’ in case of those landlords on whose behalf an eviction petition can be filed. So, use of the word ‘landlord’ and/or ‘person’ in Section 14(1)(e) of the said Act, both in the main provision and in the Explanation, if replaced with the definition of landlord would make it quite clear that it applies to even non- natural persons.

51. The provision Section 2(e) of the DRC, 1958 has to therefore be construed harmoniously with Section 14(1)(e) of the said Act and cannot be read as excluding all non-natural persons. This interpretation of the Statute is further in consonance with the law laid down in the judgment Sultana Begum v Prem Chand Jain [(1997) 1 SCC 373] wherein while applying the rule of construction, ex visceribus actus, the Court inter alia observed that it is the duty of the Courts to avoid a clash between two provisions of an Act and O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 construe them in a manner so as to harmonise them. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereunder: “15. On a conspectus of the case-law indicated above, the following principles are clearly discernible: (1) It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the Act and to construe the provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other in such a manner as to harmonise them. (2) The provisions of one section of a statute cannot be used to defeat the other provisions unless the court, in spite of its efforts, finds it impossible to effect reconciliation between them. (3) It has to be borne in mind by all the courts all the time that when there are two conflicting provisions in an Act, which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is the essence of the rule of “harmonious construction”. (4) The courts have also to keep in mind that an interpretation which reduces one of the provisions as a “dead letter” or “useless lumber” is not harmonious construction. (5) To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it otiose.”

52. The argument that Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 applies to non-natural persons and therefore such persons should be excluded from Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, might at first blush appear to be an appealing argument but on a deeper scrutiny, it would be revealed that Section 22 of the said Act applies to a limited category of persons and not to all persons who are non-natural persons. Section 22 applies to: a) Private limited companies; b) Body corporates such as registered partnership firms, registered societies, registered LLP and not to any other unregistered bodies who O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 are non-natural persons; c) Local authorities; d) Public institutions which are not set up by private trusts.

53. Thus, there is a whole gamut of non-natural persons who are excluded from the ambit of Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 and to whom the said provision would not be applicable. Such persons cannot be left remediless under any statute. Therefore Section 14 of the DRC, 1958 in general would apply to all such landlords including landlords who come within the ambit of Section 22 of the Act.

54. Moreover, remedies which are provided under the DRC, 1958 are not singular in nature. Certain types of non-natural persons have in fact been provided with multiple remedies under the Act. For example - a local authority could avail of remedies under: (i) The PP Act; (ii) Section 14 (1) (e) & Section 14A of the DRC, 1958 (iii) Section 22 of the DRC, 1958

55. The availability of multiple remedies does not mean that one remedy is excluded in favour of another. This principle of law is further upheld by the Supreme Court in the judgment Bank of India v. Lekhimoni Das [(2000) 3 SCC 640] wherein it was inter alia held that where two remedies are available, one of them should not be taken as operating in derogation of the other. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereunder: “8. As a general principle where two remedies are available under law one of them should not be taken as operating in derogation of the other. A regular suit will not be barred by a summary and a concurrent remedy being also provided therefor, but if a party has O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 elected to pursue one remedy he is bound by it and cannot on his failing therein proceed under another provision. A regular suit for compensation is not barred by the omission to proceed under the summary procedure provided under Section 95 CPC, but if an application is made and disposed of, such disposal would operate as a bar to a regular suit, whatever may be the result of the application. There is, however, a difference between conditions necessary maintainability of an application under Section 95 CPC and those necessary to maintain a suit. The regular suit is based on tort for abusing the process of court. Under the law of torts in a suit for compensation for the tort the plaintiff must not only prove want of a reasonable or probable cause of obtaining injunction but also that the defendant was attracted by malice which is an improper motive.’

56. Therefore, the remedy provided under Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 is an additional remedy provided to landlords, in addition to the remedies provided under Section 14 of the Act. Applying this principle to the above stated example, in the case of local authority, the choice, vests with the landlord i.e., the local authority to avail of whichever remedy it deems fit.

57. Further, the manner in which Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 is enacted, itself seems to suggest that the Controller can place the landlord in possession of the premises mentioned therein based solely on the 'satisfaction,' of the Controller. A trial in such cases is not even needed. Even the procedure for summary trial provided under Section 25B of the DRC, 1958 may not be required in cases covered under Section 22 of the Act.

58. In fact, a reading of Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 makes it clear that it applies in such cases where the tenant would be, in effect, estopped from challenging the title of the landlord. The situations which come under the O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 ambit of Section 22 of the DRC, 1958 are: (i) Under Section 22(a) of the Act where the tenant was in employment of the landlord and had obtained the premises as an employee but the employment has ceased, or; (ii) Under Section 22(b) of the Act where the tenant has violated the terms of the tenancy, or; (iii) Under Section 22 (c) of the Act where some person has come into unauthorised occupation of the premises, or; (iv) Under Section 22 (d) of the Act where the premises are needed bona fide by a public institution.

59. In respect of other non-natural persons i.e., a company or a body corporate or a local authority, Section 22(d) of the Act may apply only to public institutions. Thus, under Section 22 of the DRC, 1958, satisfaction of the Rent Controller is sufficient to place the landlord in possession of the premises, in case of the non-natural persons to whom the said provision is applicable, if the conditions under clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 22 are fulfilled. In addition, in respect of public institutions, bona fide requirement of the public institution for the furtherance of its activities is also covered.

60. Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958 has been enacted with the intention of recognizing bona fide needs of the landlord. Such need could be either in respect of the premises rented out for residential or non-residential purposes, as held by the Supreme Court in the judgment of Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs v. Union of India & Anr. (supra). Thus, the statute has been extended in its application for summary procedures and shortened procedures under various circumstances. The intention has been to enable eviction of tenants under multifarious circumstances. The growth of case law and precedents in O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50 this regard also demonstrate this position.

61. In Satyawati (supra), the Supreme Court partially struck down Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC, 1958 to the extent that it restricted the requirement of the landlord only to a residential accommodation. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under: “41. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non- residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only. 42. However, the aforesaid declaration should not be misunderstood as total striking down of Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the parties nor the learned counsel argued that Section 14(1)(e) is unconstitutional in its entirety and we feel that ends of justice will be met by striking down the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e) so that the remaining part thereof may read as under:

14. (1)(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such suitable person has no other accommodation; * reasonably * * While adopting this course, we have kept in view well-recognised rule that if the offending portion of a statute can be severed without doing violence to O.REF. 1/2025 & connected Signature Not Verified Signed By:RAHUL Signing Date:16.05.2025 19:12:50