Ms. Madhura M. N., Mr. Abhishek Tongar and Ms. Vanshika Mittal, Advs.) v. MARUTI SUZUKI INDIA LIMITED THROUGH ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR& CEO, HAVING ITS REGD

Judgment

1. The present application has been filed by defendant no.1/applicant under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter Signature Not Verified Signed By:AMIT KUMAR SHARMA Signing Date:04.07.2025 15:20:55 2 Signature Not Verified Signed By:PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV referred to as “CPC”), seeking rejection of the plaint on the grounds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action and that the suit is barred by law. The application relies on the „contractual nature‟ of the relationship between the parties and the express „termination clause‟ contained in the appointment letter dated 06.02.2006, which is stated to have governed the plaintiff/non- applicant‟s employment with the defendant no.1/applicant company, i.e.,Maruti Suzuki India Limited. Factual Background

The facts of the present case would evince that the plaintiff/non- applicant, who was employed in a „managerial capacity‟ with defendant no.1/applicant, has instituted the present civil suit alleging that his termination from service, effected through the termination letter dated

13.02.2023, was unlawful. Consequently, he seeks a declaration to that effect, along with a prayer for reinstatement to service and compensation amounting to a sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- on account of loss of income, harassment, and undue hardship purportedly resulting from the said termination.

3. It remains undisputed that the employment of the plaintiff/non- applicant was governed by the terms of the appointment letter dated

06.02.2006,which unequivocally permits either party to terminate the contract upon giving three months‟ prior notice or by payment in lieu thereof. Notably, the plaintiff/non-applicant himself places reliance on the said document and does not dispute having received his contractual dues pursuant to the said termination. In view of this admitted „contractual Signature Not Verified Signed By:AMIT KUMAR SHARMA Signing Date:04.07.2025 15:20:55 3 Signature Not Verified Signed By:PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV framework‟, defendant no.1/applicant contends that no triable cause of action arises from the plaint and that the reliefs sought therein are ex facie barred by law.

4. It is in this backdrop that the defendant no.1/applicant has moved the present application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, seeking rejection of the plaint in limine. Submissions

5. Mr. Sanjeev Sindhwani, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of defendant no.1/applicant has submitted as follows:

5.1 As a preliminary submission, learned senior counsel for defendant no.1/applicant submitted that the present suit is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC, as it discloses no cause of action as well as is barred by law. It was further contended that the relationship between the plaintiff/non-applicant and defendant no.1/applicant is purely contractual in nature, governed exclusively by the terms of the appointment letter dated

06.02.2006, which permits termination by either party upon giving three months‟ notice or salary in lieu thereof. The plaintiff/non-applicant has neither pleaded any breach of these terms by the defendant no.1/applicant nor denied having received his contractual dues. Therefore, in the absence of any actionable breach, it was submitted that the plaint is fundamentally devoid of any cause of action and, accordingly, deserves to be rejected at the threshold.

5.2 Learned senior counsel further contended that, although not necessary Signature Not Verified Signed By:AMIT KUMAR SHARMA Signing Date:04.07.2025 15:20:55 4 Signature Not Verified Signed By:PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV in light of the „contractual termination clause‟, the termination in the present case was occasioned by repeated breaches of the employment contract and the Employee Governing Policy by the plaintiff/non-applicant. It was submitted that the plaintiff/non-applicant was afforded due opportunity to respond to and defend against the allegations levelled against him. However, after due consideration, defendant no.1/applicant concluded that termination was the appropriate course of action. It was emphasised that, even de hors such violations, the defendant No.1/applicant was legally entitled to terminate the employment, as the contract in question permits „termination simpliciter‟ without assigning cause, upon compliance with the prescribed notice requirements.

5.3 Proceeding further, he submitted that the reliefs sought by the plaintiff/non-applicant, including a declaration of illegal termination, and reinstatement to service are ex facie barred under Section 14(d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “SRA, 1963”). According to him, the plaintiff/non-applicant seeks specific performance of a „determinable contract‟ and a „contract of personal service‟, both of which are statutorily prohibited.

5.4 In addition, it was submitted that the plaintiff/non-applicant‟s claim for a decree of Rs. 2 Crores is not only excessive and unsubstantiated, but also contrary to the terms of the appointment letter, which limits the defendant no.1/applicant‟s liability to three months‟ notice pay. It was his submission that even in the event of alleged „wrongful termination‟, no claim exceeding the contractual entitlement can be sustained in law. Signature Not Verified Signed By:AMIT KUMAR SHARMA Signing Date:04.07.2025 15:20:55 5 Signature Not Verified Signed By:PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV

5.5 Mr. Sindhwani submitted that the plaintiff/non-applicant‟s claim for distress and emotional hardship, as articulated under prayer (ii) of the plaint, is barred by limitation under Article 79 of Part VII of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “Limitation Act”). As per the averments made in the plaint, the alleged distress commenced in December 2022, with the initiation of the inquiry, and continued until

13.02.2023, i.e., the date on which the plaintiff/non-applicant‟s services were formally terminated by defendant no.1/applicant. It was, therefore, contended that the institution of the present suit on 07.03.2024 is patently beyond the prescribed limitation period of one year. Accordingly, he submitted that the suit is not only devoid of merit but also constitutes an abuse of the process of law, ostensibly intended to exert undue pressure upon defendant no.1/applicant.

5.6 To bolster his submissions, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the cases of Pearlite Liners (P) Ltd. v. Manorama Sirsi1, J. Tiwari v. Jwala Devi Vidya Mandir2, Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma3and S.S. Shetty v. Bharat Nidhi Ltd.4,and by this Court inPawan Kumar Dalmia v. HCL Infosystems Ltd.5,Satya Narain Garg v. DCM Ltd.6and Naresh Kumar v. Hiroshi Maniwas7.

6. Per contra, while vehemently opposing the aforesaid submission, Ms.