✦ Delhi High Court · 11 May 2026

MRS. KHUSHNUMA KHAN AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

Case at a glance

Key paragraphs

  • Para 1515. However, the aforesaid available amenities do not specifically address the grievances raised by the petitioners with respect to their livelihood and educational prospects. The petitioners have a fundamental right to adequate Signature Not Verified Signed By:AMIT KUMAR SHARMA Signing Date:11.05.2026 14:59:06 8 Signature Not…
  • Para 1818. Further, in Chameli Singh v. State of U.P.,5 the Supreme Court upheld the acquisition of land by the Government for developing housing units for the poor. The landowners had challenged the said action on the ground that they depended on their land for their…

Judgment

are aggrieved by the respondents’ action insofar as they seek to evict them from the present camps and relocate them to alternate accommodation at Savda Ghevra, Delhi (alternate accommodation). 2. W.P. (C) 17239/2025 (Khushnuma Khan’s petition) is by Mrs. Khushnuma Khan and twenty-eight other petitioners, whereas, W.P. (C) 2943/2026 (Rakesh Bansal’s petition) is by Mr. Rakesh Bansal and three hundred and twenty-eight other petitioners. The lead matter, Kushnuma Khan’s petition, was filed earlier, seeking the setting aside of eviction notice dated 29.10.2025, whereby, the petitioners were directed to vacate the present camps without being offered any alternative accommodation. Subsequent to the filing of the petition, however, the respondents have decided to relocate the petitioners to the alternate accommodation and have issued notices dated 19.02.2026 and 27.02.2026 directing the petitioners to obtain allotment letters for the flats at the alternate accommodation. In Rakesh Bansal’s petition, this subsequent decision of the respondents is assailed. I. CASE HISTORY 3. On 13.11.2025, the Court issued notice to the respondents and also directed that the petitioners shall not be evicted without adhering to the procedural safeguards laid down by the Supreme Court in Re: Directions in the matter of demolition of structures.1 1 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3291 Signature Not Verified Signed By:AMIT KUMAR SHARMA Signing Date:11.05.2026 14:59:06 3 Signature Not Verified Signed By:PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV

#4. The authorities have, thereafter, decided to relocate inhabitants of the present camps to the alternate accommodation, as approved on 29.01.2026 at its 4th Meeting by the High Powered Committee (HPC) constituted as per the directions of a Division Bench of this Court in Court on its own motion v. Union of India and Ors.2 The HPC was constituted to facilitate proper utilisation of housing units constructed under various Government-schemes. 5. Challenging notices issued pursuant to this decision, Rakesh Bansal and others filed their petition. Khushnuma Khan and others filed C.M. Appl 14197/2026 seeking directions to the respondents to refrain from taking any coercive action. 6. Both matters were listed before the predecessor Bench on 03.03.2026 and the petitioners submitted that they were being directed by the respondents to vacate their homes by 06.03.2026, without complying with the requirements as per Re: Directions. Considering the circumstances and the short time period for vacating, the Court extended the deadline up to

11.03.2026 and listed the matter before this Bench on 10.03.2026. It was also observed that considering alternate accommodation was being offered, prima facie, the eviction didn’t seem to be in contravention of the directions. 7. The parties were, thereafter, heard on 16.03.2026, 18.03.2026,

20.03.2026, 24.03.2026, and 30.03.2026. On the last date, the matter was reserved for judgment. The respondents then filed applications to bring on record, the minutes of DUSIB’s meeting dated 09.04.2026, whereby formal approval was accorded for relocation of the residents of the present camp to the alternate accommodation, as well as notice dated 08.04.2026 for the said 2Order dated 18.09.2023 in W.P. (C) 9470/2022 Signature Not Verified Signed By:AMIT KUMAR SHARMA Signing Date:11.05.2026 14:59:06 4 Signature Not Verified Signed By:PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV meeting. The said applications were listed on 20.04.2026 and 27.04.2026. Arguments were further heard and the cases were re-reserved on 27.04.2026. 8. At the outset, it is seen that the petitioners have not opposed the application for taking on record the aforesaid documents. They, however, contend that the documents would not have any effect on the outcome of the petition. Even otherwise, the documents sought to be brought on record relate to subsequent developments and they are being filed without any delay on the part of the respondents. Further, C.M. Appl No. 25701/2026 filed by the respondents in Rakesh Bansal’s petition for the said purpose had been allowed by the Court vide order dated 20.04.2026. In view thereof, even I.A. 28103/2026 in Khushnuma Khan’s petition deserves to be allowed. II. SUBMISSONS 9. Mr. Sandeep Sharma, learned senior counsel, and Mr. Pankaj Sinha, learned counsel, have advanced the following submissions on behalf of the petitioners: 9.1. The rehabilitation of the petitioners is in contravention of the applicable policy insofar as several procedural requirements have not been adhered to. 9.2. The proposed alternate accommodation is situated far away from the present camps without specifying any reason for the same. As per the applicable policy, rehabilitation ought to be in-situ and only in exceptional circumstances, it may be beyond a 5 kilometer radius of the present camps. 9.3. There is no urgency shown by the respondents for taking the impugned action, despite the livelihood of the petitioners being put in great Signature Not Verified Signed By:AMIT KUMAR SHARMA Signing Date:11.05.2026 14:59:06 5 Signature Not Verified Signed By:PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV danger. They submit that the petitioners are working as drivers or domestic workers in the vicinity of the present camps. If they are shifted beyond a reasonable distance, the same would definitely affect their right of livelihood. 9.4. Education and health facilities are not available at the proposed site of shifting. The same would lead to drop out from schools amongst the children of the petitioners. Further, there is no sewage treatment at the proposed site of shifting. 9.5. Rehabilitation is not an act of charity, but the petitioner’s right, under the Constitution of India. 9.6. In any event, the respondents are obliged to comply with the procedural safeguards laid down by the Supreme Court in Re: Directions in the matter of demolition of structures. In terms thereof, each occupant is entitled to a specific show cause notice, reasonable time to submit a reply, personal hearing, and a reasoned order prior to eviction. 10. Mr. Chetan Sharma, learned Additional Solicitor General, and Mr. Syed Abdul Haseeb and Mr. Anuj Chaturvedi, learned counsel, made the following submissions on behalf of the respondents: 10.1. The petitioners have now been deemed eligible for rehabilitation at the alternate accommodation. Therefore, the petitions are rendered infructuous. A joint survey had been conducted in the year 2024 by Land and Development Office (L&DO) and the Delhi Development Authority (DDA). Upon assessment, five-hundred and eighteen dwellers were found to be eligible and one hundred and eighty-four dwellers ineligible for relocation as per the Delhi Slum and JJ Rehabilitation Policy, 2015 framed Signature Not Verified Signed By:AMIT KUMAR SHARMA Signing Date:11.05.2026 14:59:06 6 Signature Not Verified Signed By:PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV by DUSIB (DUSIB Policy). However, subsequently, it was decided that all the residents of the present camps would be rehabilitated. 10.2. Pursuant to this decision, the impugned rehabilitation notice dated

19.02.2026 was pasted on the walls of the respective jhuggis over a period of two days, i.e., 19.02.2026 and 20.02.2026. Help desks were also set up at the present camps to enable dwellers to raise grievances over the course of these two days. The policy requirements with respect to financial contribution of the petitioners have been eased out substantially and the same would be covered by the Union. 10.3. Some residents of the present camps have accepted allotment letters, while some have even taken possession of the flats and have applied for electricity meters. Further, the alternate accommodation has a sewer line, water line, MCD Dhulao Ghar, and well developed parks and roads. 10.4. The decision the petitioners relocate the alternate accommodation was taken with the approval of the HPC which was constituted for the purpose of overseeing the allocation of housing units under various Government Schemes. Subsequently, formal approval of DUSIB has also been obtained. 10.5. The decision to evict the residents of the present camps have been taken considering the strategic location and with a view to strengthen defence infrastructure. III. ANALYSIS 11. The case of the petitioners revolves around the argument that the impugned action is in violation of their right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. They also contend that the respondents have not Signature Not Verified Signed By:AMIT KUMAR SHARMA Signing Date:11.05.2026 14:59:06 7 Signature Not Verified Signed By:PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV followed the procedure as per the applicable DUSIB policy and the ‘Draft Protocol for removal of Jhuggis and JJ Bastis in Delhi’ (DUSIB Protocol). 12. Therefore, the following questions arise for consideration of the Court. Whether the impugned action is violative of the petitioners’ fundamental rights, and whether the impugned action is in contravention of law/Government policy. A. VIOLATION OF RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION 13. The petitioners’ case is that their forefathers have been living in the present camps and had established their lives around this location. They earn their livelihood by working as domestic labourers and in other blue-collar jobs in nearby places and their children are also studying in nearby educational institutions. According to them, the alternate accommodation is far away from their workplaces and schools and therefore, would negatively impact their right to life under Article 21. 14. In response to this contention the respondents submitted that the following amenities are available at the alternate accommodation as on date: “A. Sewer line: Already laid inside EWS Housing at Savda Ghewra and temporary connected with the Septic Tank. Sewerage Treatment plant (S.T.P.) is under construction. B. Water line: Already laid inside EWS Housing at Savda Ghewra and UGR (Under Ground Reservoir) is also functional and connected with the DJB water line. C. MCD Dhalaoghar: Also available in this housing area. D. Well-developed parks and roads: Already available.”

#15. However, the aforesaid available amenities do not specifically address the grievances raised by the petitioners with respect to their livelihood and educational prospects. The petitioners have a fundamental right to adequate Signature Not Verified Signed By:AMIT KUMAR SHARMA Signing Date:11.05.2026 14:59:06 8 Signature Not Verified Signed By:PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV and reasonable shelter under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The respondents, therefore, ought to ensure that the necessary amenities are made available to the petitioners at the alternate accommodation. 16. It is settled law that the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India does not connote mere animal existence but envisages a right to lead life with dignity. The Supreme Court, in Olga Tellis and Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors.,3 has held that the right to livelihood is intricately connected to the right to life under Article 21, and has held as follows: “Two conclusions emerge from this discussion: one, that the right to life which is conferred by Article 21 includes the right to livelihood and two, that it is established that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood. But the Constitution does not put an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life or personal liberty. By Article 21, such deprivation has to be according to procedure established by law. In the instant case, the law which allows the deprivation of the right conferred by Article 21 is the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, the relevant provisions of which are contained in Sections 312(1),313(1)(a) and 314.”

#17. Further, in Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Kaimalal Totame,4 the Supreme Court has highlighted the need for adequate and suitable shelter, in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution. The relevant portion of the decision is extracted below, for reference: “9. Basic needs of man have traditionally been accepted to be three food, clothing and shelter. The right to life is guaranteed in any civilized society. That would take within its sweep the right to food, the right to clothing, the right to decent environment and a reasonable accommodation to live in. The difference between the need of an animal and a human being for shelter has to be kept in view. For the animal it is the bare protection of the body; for a human being it has to be a 31986 AIR 180, 4(1990) 1 SCC 520 Signature Not Verified Signed By:AMIT KUMAR SHARMA Signing Date:11.05.2026 14:59:06 9 Signature Not Verified Signed By:PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV suitable accommodation which would allow him to grow in every aspect physical, mental and intellectual. The Constitution aims at ensuring fuller development of every child. That would be possible only if the child is in a proper home. It is not necessary that every citizen must be assured of living in a well-built comfortable house but a reasonable home particularly for people in India can even be mud-built thatched house or a mud-built fireproof accommodation."

#18. Further, in Chameli Singh v. State of U.P.,5 the Supreme Court upheld the acquisition of land by the Government for developing housing units for the poor. The landowners had challenged the said action on the ground that they depended on their land for their livelihood, and therefore, the impugned action was violative of their fundamental rights. The Court held that the acquisition was justified considering that it was for providing housing to the poor in recognition of their right to shelter. 19. In Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan,6 the Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether the respondents, who were pavement dwellers, were liable to ejectment action and whether the principles of natural justice had to be followed in the process. The Court answered the said questions as follows: the Constitutional duty “"It would...be clear that though no person has a right to encroach and erect structures or otherwise on footpath, pavement or public streets or any other place reserved or earmarked for a public purpose, the State facilities and opportunities by distributing its wealth and resources for settlement of life and erection of shelter over their heads to make the right to life meaningful, effective and fruitful. It would be the duty of the State to provide right to shelter to the poor and indigent weaker sections of the society in fulfilment of the Constitutional objectives.” to provide adequate

Questions this judgment answers

Which statutory provisions did this judgment involve?

Constitution of India — arts. 21, 136, 142, 226; Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888; Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board Act, 2010.

Which court decided this case, and when?

Delhi High Court, on 11 May 2026. The bench was PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV.

Precedent status how later indexed judgments have treated this case

No known negative treatment found in the Courts & Cases corpus.

This is a result about the indexed corpus, not a finding that the judgment remains good law. Coverage may be incomplete.

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