Dr. Divya Swamy, Standing Counsel with Ms. Akriti Singh and Mr. Rishav Ranjan, Advocates v. KRISHAN KUMAR & ORS

Judgment

1. We are not inclined to entertain this appeal either on the aspect of maintainability or on merits.

2. The appeal preferred under Clause X of the Letters Patent as applicable to this Court, assails an ad interim order dated 6 December 2024 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in WP (C) 12045/2024.

3. WP (C) 12045/2024 emanated out of an award dated 18 March 2020 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, which in turn Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:22.01.2025 19:30:59 LPA 11/2025 adjudicated a claim by the respondents workmen for regularization of their services on the post of Driver from the date of initial joining.

5. The Industrial Tribunal held in favour of the workmen. Aggrieved thereby, the MCD approached the learned Single Judge of this Court by way of WP (C) 12045/2024.

The writ petition was accompanied by CM APPL. 50168/2024 which stayed the operation of the award passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal.

7. On 6 December 2024, the learned Single Judge issued notice on the stay application and passed certain ad interim directions. It is against the said order that the present appeal has been filed.

8. We deem it appropriate to reproduce the impugned order in its entirety thus : “CM APPL. 50169/2024 (exemption from filing of complete trial court record)

1. The petitioner is directed to place on record the complete trial court record within two weeks. Accordingly, the application stands disposed of. CM APPL. 50168/2024 (stay)

2. Learned counsel for petitioner/MCD presses for interim relief, stating that recovery certificate has already been issued. Although according to learned counsel for respondents, that is not so, but he is not averse to addressing the preliminary submissions today. As such I have heard learned counsel for both sides.

3. The petitioner/MCD has challenged the award dated 18.03.2020 passed by the learned presiding officer of the Industrial Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:22.01.2025 19:30:59 LPA 11/2025 Tribunal, whereby the present petitioner was directed to regularize services of the six workmen on the post of driver with effect from their respective initial date of joining in the regular pay scale with all consequential benefits. Learned counsel for petitioner/MCD contended that the 4. impugned award is liable to be set aside since the petitioner has already regularized services of the said respondents/workmen in accordance with their regularization policy with effect from 2003- 04. On learned counsel

5. hand, respondents/workmen has taken me through cross examination of the Administrative Officer of MCD, who was examined as MW-1 before the tribunal. The said witness admitted in his cross examination that the management of the MCD prepares their financial budget based on total number of sanctioned posts and that phased manner of the salaries accordingly; and regularization policy of MCD pertains to Class-IV daily wagers/muster roll employees while the post of the driver is a „Group-C‟ post; and that job of the driver with MCD is of permanent respondents/workmen also took me through the said policy of the MCD and pointed out that the same, issued in the year 1978 was only till the year 1982-83 whereas in the present case the respondent workmen were engaged in the year 1995. and perennial nature. Learned counsel

6. The issue needs detailed deliberations. Considering the overall circumstances, the operation of the impugned award as regards the date of regularization is stayed till next date, subject to the petitioner/MCD releasing respondents/workmen within six weeks, provided each of the respondents/workmen files an affidavit of undertaking to refund the entire amount to MCD depending upon outcome of this petition. the monetary benefits

7. It appears that few more writ petitions of the similar nature filed by MCD are pending before this Court. It would be appropriate to club all those petitions for expeditious disposal and uniformity of decision. Therefore, both sides are requested to furnish list of all those cases to the court master, who shall initiate process to get all those matters listed on same date for arguments.

8. Relist on 05.03.2025.”

9. To our mind, the present appeal in the first place is not maintainable and even otherwise would not sustain a legitimate Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:22.01.2025 19:30:59 LPA 11/2025 challenge, given the parameters of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with discretionary interim orders passed by Courts below, as explained by the Supreme Court in judgment in Wander Ltd. v Antox India (P) Ltd1.

10. The contours of the expression “judgment” as implied in Clause X of the Letters Patent stand exhaustively delineated by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v Jayaben D Kania2, We have had an occasion recently to examine this position in Shiv Prakash Katiyar v Jawahar Lal University3. The following passages from the said decision may be reproduced:

8. Thus, an LPA lies only against a judgment. On being further queried as to how the impugned order of the learned Single Judge qualifies as a judgment for the purposes of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, Mr. Saini places reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v Jayaben D. Kania, which is generally regarded as the authority on the point. Mr. Saini has drawn attention to para 106 of the decision in Shah Babulal Khimji, which reads thus: “106. Thus, the only point which emerges from this that whenever a Trial Judge decides a decision controversy which affects valuable rights of one of the parties, it must be treated to be a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent.” A bare reading of para 106 of Shah Babulal Khimji reveals 9. that, in order for an order to constitute a “judgment” within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, it has to satisfy two indicia. It must decide a controversy, and the decision must affect valuable rights of one of the parties. Cumulative satisfaction of both these conditions alone would render an order a “judgment”, as would be appealable by way of LPA.

10. Mr. Saini’s contention is that a holistic reading of the 1 1990 Supp SCC 727 2 (1981) 4 SCC 8 3 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7339 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:22.01.2025 19:30:59 LPA 11/2025 decision in Shah Babulal Khimji would reveal that any decision which affects the valuable rights of one of the parties to the litigation would qualify as a “judgment”, even if it is not determinative of any issue before the Court.

11. We cannot agree, as that would conflict with the plain words of para 106 of the decision in Shah Babulal Khimji.

12. The scope and ambit of the expression “judgment”, within the meaning of Clause X of the Letters Patent, came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in UOI v Usha Sodhi4. Paras 7 to 16 of the report address the issue, thus: “7. At this juncture, we think it necessary to deal in some detail as to what a judgment signifies. Clause 10 not only makes the High Court a Court of appeal from other Civil Courts and Courts subject to the High Court's special superintendence but also it with appellate jurisdiction in such cases as may, after the date of publication of Letters Patent, be made subject to appeal to it by any law made by a competent legislative authority for India. invest “Judgment” has been defined in the Code of Civil 8. Procedure, 1908 (in short CPC) indicating that it is a statement of grounds of decree or order. It is judicial determination, decision of a Court. It denotes the reasons given for its decision. The words "Judgment" and "Final Order' have acquired a technical meaning. "Judgment" means "the declaration or final determination of the rights of the parties in the matter brought before the Court" and "final Order" means an order which finally determines the rights of the parties and brings the case to end." (See S. Kuppuswami Rao v King5). These words were given the same meaning by the Privy Council in construing Section v 109 of Goverdhandas6). By the federal Court in construing Section 205 of the government of India Act of 1935 (in S. Kuppuswami's case supra) and by the Apex Court in construing Articles 133 and 134 of the Constitution (See. Sardar Syendna Tahar Saifuddin v State of Bombay7, Jethanand & Sons v State of U.P.8, and State of U.P. v Sajan Singh (Col)9) Encyclopedia of Laws of (See. Ramchand Maujimal the CPC