Nafr High Court
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:2391 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPL No. 14 of 2025 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Forest, Mantralaya, Aranya Bhawan, Medical College Road, Shyam Nagar, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2. The Divisional Forest Oficer Janjgir-Champa, Forest Division, Champa, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 3. The Forest Range Officer Forest Range Baloda, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh versus ... Petitioner(s) Pawan Kumar Jaiswal S/o Late Vishram Prasad R/o Village And Post- Pantora, Via- Hardi Bazar, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh (Cause Title is taken from Case Information System) ... Respondent(s) For State/Petitioners For Respondent
Legal Reasoning
: Mr. Rajeev Bharat, Government Advocate : Mr. Luv Sharma, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 15. 01.2025 1. The instant petition has been filed against the order dated 02.04.2022 passed by the learned Court, Judge under IDA-cum-Labour Court, Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa (C.G.), wherein the order of reinstatement was passed in favour of the respondent on the ground that the opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the respondent. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that a Forest Management Committee was constituted by the Forest 2 Department/petitioners for the purpose of the plantation at village Pantora, Baloda. He would further submit that some villagers, including the respondent, were hired by the Committee to take care of those plants as daily-rated employees. He would also submit that the respondent has not been appointed by the petitioner on any vacant or sanctioned post and no appointment letter has been issued in favour of the respondent. It is contended that the petitioners are not responsible for the termination as well as reinstatement of the respondent. It is further contended that the learned Labour Court committed an error of law in passing the order of reinstatement in favour of the respondent. Thus, he would pray to quash the order dated 02.04.2022 passed by the learned Labour Court, Janjgir Champa. 3. On the other hand, Mr. Luv Sharma, counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that the respondent was appointed to the post of “Chowkidar” under the petitioners on a permanent post at Forest Range, Baloda in the year 2013 and he was removed from services on 01.12.2016 by petitioner No. 3. He would further submit that though the order of reinstatement was passed in favour of the respondent in the year 2022 but this petition was
Decision
filed in the year 2024 and in para 7 of the writ petition, the petitioners have stated that there is no delay in filing the instant petition. He would lastly submit that the present petition is liable to be dismissed on the grounds of delay and laches. 4. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents placed on the record. 5. As per the pleadings, the respondent was appointed to the post of “Chowkidar” under the petitioners at Forest Range, Baloda in the year 2013 and the respondent was removed from services on 01.12.2016 by 3 petitioner No. 3. Thereafter, the respondent filed a Case No. 10/IDA/2018 before the learned Labour Court and vide order dated 02.04.2022, the respondent was reinstated in services. The petitioners waited for 2 years to approach this Court. In para 7 of the writ petition, the petitioners have categorically stated that there is no delay in filing the present petition. 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108, has held as under: “17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remain unauthorizedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons -who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle” . In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 7. Recently, the Apex Court, in the matter of Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation, 2022 SCC Online SC 64, held as under:- “9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace, though some contrary opinions have been expressed (in Nav Rattanmal Vs. state of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704). The courts have expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on the foundations of greater public interest for three reasons, namely, (a) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (b) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that persons with good causes of action (who are able to 4 enforce them) should pursue them with reasonable diligence (State of Kerala Vs. V.R. Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3 SCC 657 relying on Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, para 605; Halsbury’s Laws of England , Vol. 68 (2021) para 1005. Equally, change in de facto position or character, creation of third party rights over a period of time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in dealings, are equitable public policy considerations why period of limitation is prescribed by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a constitutional court is exercised with caution as delay and laches principle is applied with the aim to secure the quiet of the community, suppress fraud and perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent oppression.(see Popat and Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association (2005) 7 SCC 510).Therefore, some decisions and judgments do not look upon pleas of delay and laches with favour, especially and rightly in cases where the persons suffer from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts for relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the rules of limitation as well as delay and laches, have observed that such rules are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger public interest and are founded on public policy. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. (See N. Blarkrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998)7 SCC 123. Referring to the principle of delay and laches, this Court, way back in Moons Mils Ltd Vs. M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial Court, Bombay AIR 1967 SC 1450, had referred to the view expressed by Sir Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum Company and Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp, (L.R.) 5 P.C.221 in the following words: “ Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine, Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by this conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case,if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.” 8. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be 5 ignored without any justification. Remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone this Court deems it appropriate to dismiss this petition at the very threshold. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. 9. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case in light of the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply (supra), Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak (supra), it is quite vivid that the petitioners have approached this Court after a delay of 2 years and in para 7 of the writ petition, the petitioners have stated that there is no delay in filing the instant petition. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, this petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed on account of delay and laches. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge $iddhant