Nafr High Court
Case Details
1 VAISHALI LUCKY NAGARIA Digitally signed by VAISHALI LUCKY NAGARIA Date: 2025.03.05 18:23:52 +0530 2025:CGHC:9458 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 2266 of 2024 • Ramgopal Yadav S/o Mohan Lal Yadav Aged About 21 Years R/o Pat, Police Station - Kosir, District - Sarangarh-Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh versus ... Appellant • State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station - Kosir, District - Sarangarh-Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh (District Not Mentioned In The Cause Title of The Judgment) ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Siddharth Pandey, Advocate For Respondent
Legal Reasoning
The aforesaid legal proposition stands fortified by the judgments of this Court in Ram Prasad Sharma v. State of Bihar [(1969) 2 SCC 359 AIR 1970 SC 326] Ram Murti v. State of Haryana [(1970) 3 SCC 21: 1970 SCC (Cri) 371: AIR 1970 SC 1029]. Dayaram v. Dawalatshah [(1971) 1 SCC 358 AIR 1971 SC 681]. Harpal Singh v. State of H.P. [(1981) 1 SCC 560 1981 SCC (Cri) 208 AIR 1981 SC 361), Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 584 (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 632], Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand [(2008) 13 SCC 133 (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 266] Desh Raj v. Bodh Raj [(2008) 2 SCC 186 AIR 2008 SC 632] and Ram Suresh Singh v. Prabhat Singh [(2009) 6 SCC 681 (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1194]. In these cases, it has been held that even if the entry was made in an official record by the official concerned in the discharge of his official duty, it may have weight but still may require corroboration by the person on whose information the entry has been made and as to whether the entry so made has been exhibited and proved. The standard of proof required herein is the same as in other civil and criminal cases. 6 20. So far as the entries made in the official record by an official or person authorised in performance of official duties are concerned, they may be admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act but the court has a right to examine their probative value. The authenticity of the entries would depend on whose information such entries stood recorded and what was his source of information. The entries in school register/school leaving certificate require to be proved in accordance with law and the standard of proof required in such cases remained the same as in any other civil or criminal cases. 21.For determining the age of a person, the best evidence is of his/her parents, if it is supported by unimpeachable documents. In case the date of birth depicted in the school register/certificate stands belied by the unimpeachable evidence of reliable persons and contemporaneous documents like the date of birth register of the Municipal Corporation, government hospital/nursing home, etc., the entry in the school register is to be discarded. (Vide Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain Sinha [AIR 1965 SC 282], Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit [1988 Supp SCC 604 : AIR 1988 SC 1796], Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra [(2006) 1 SCC 283 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 217] and Satpal Singh v. State of Haryana [(2010) 8 SCC 714 JT (2010) 7 SC 500]) 12. Further the Supreme Court in the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi vs. State of U.P. (2006) 5 SCC 584, has held in para 26 as under- "26. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded." 13. In case of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2)SCC-385, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer 7 certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the prosecutrix in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The Hon'ble Supreme court held that the date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. In paragraphs 40, 42, 43, 44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under: "40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years I month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohitl, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth 18 examined.... Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents 8 were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by thi Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendr Kumar Jaiswal, where this Court observed as follows: The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue". 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the 9 Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 14. In view of the facts of this case it appears that the actual date of birth of the victim has not been proved and the reliance is placed only on the Dakhilkharij register Ex. P/16 in which the date of birth of the prosecutrix was mentioned as 08/08/2003 but the author of the Dakhil Kharij Register has not been examined before the trial Court. Birth certificate of the prosecutrix has not been produced by the prosecution before the trial Court and there is no ossification test conducted by the prosecution, therefore, the age of the victim has not been proved as per the provisions of Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act. 15. Now the Second question is that whether prosecutrix was consenting party? 16. Now coming back to the statement of the victim (PW-1) and from reading of deposition of the prosecutrix, it appears that the prosecutrix was consenting party, therefore, from the deposition of the prosecutirx it is crystal clear that it is a case of elopement. 17. Primarily if the age of the victim was not proved beyond 10 the reasonable doubt the entire reliance cannot be placed on the Dakhilkharij register and the author of the Dakhilkharij Register has not been examined. The statement of the Victim PW-1 would show that she was a consenting party then in such case the benefit of doubt has to lean in favour of the appellant to hold that the prosecution was not able to prove the date of birth of the victim below 18 years apart from the fact that the statement of the Victim PW-1 would show that she was a consenting party. 18. It is a settled proposition that when 2 views came to fore and the evidence which favours the accused is required to be admitted. This proposition has been been laid down in the matter of Kali Ram vs. State of H.P. reported in (1973) 2 SCC 808 and has been reiterated in the matter of Pradeep Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported in (2023) 5 SCC 350 wherein, relevant para-27 reads as under :- 27. It is important to note that the cardinal principles in the administration of criminal justice in cases where heavy reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence, is that where two views are possible, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other towards his innocence, the one was is favourable to the accused must be adopted." 19. Applying the aforesaid well settled principles of law and for the reasons stated hereinabove, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment dated 11 05.12.2024, appellant stands acquitted of the charges leveled against him. Appellant is reported to be in jail, he be set at liberty forthwith if not required to be detained in any other case.
Arguments
: Mr. Karan Kumar Behrani, P.L Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma Order on Board 24/02/2025 1. Today the case is listed for order on application I.A. No.1 of 2024, application of sentence and grant of bail under Section 430 of the BNSS, in-complainace of the order dated 21.01.2025, the mother of the victim is present before this Court today and she has stated that she has no objection for grant of bail to the appellant. However, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is heard finally. 2. The appeal arise out of the judgment of conviction and 2 sentence dated 05.12.2024 passed by Additional Sessions Judge Fast Track, Special Court (POCSO Act) Sarangarh, Sessions Division – Raigarh, District – Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, (C.G.) in Special Criminal (POCSO) Case No.6/2020 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner:- CONVICTION SENTENCE PUNISHMENT IN DEFAULT OF PAYMENT OF FINE Section 363 R.I for 4 years with R.I. for four of IPC fine of Rs. 500/- months. Section 366 R.I for 7 years with R.I. for one year. of I.P.C. fine of Rs. 1,000/- Section 4 (1) 10 years of R.I. R.I. for one year. of POCSO with fine of Act,2012 Rs.1,000/- All the sentences are directed to run concurrently. 3. As per the prosecution case, the appellant allegedly kidnapped the victim, a minor girl aged about 16 years and 6 months from the lawful guardianship of her parents without consent on the night of 04.03.2020. It is further alleged that the appellant induced the victim with the promise of marriage, took her to various locations, and committed sexual assault on 06.03.2020. On the complaint of the victim's mother (PW2) on 05.03.2020, FIR No. 22/2020 was registered at Police Station Kosir, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, CG. for the 3 offence punishable under Section 363 of IPC, following which her statements under Sections 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C. were recorded. The victim confessed to willingly accompanying the appellant due to their love affair and stated that they had married at Korba on 06.03.2020. After recovery of the victim on 07.03.2020 and subsequent investigation. The charge sheet for the offence punishable under Sections 363. 366, 376 of IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act was filed against the appellant. 4 The learned trial court framed charges for the offence punishable under Sections 363, 366, and 376(1) of IPC, and Section 4 of the POCSO Act against the appellant. The appellant abjured the charges. The prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/24 documents as well as Articles 1 to 2 in support of the case. The appellant in examination under Section 313 of CrPC denied all charges and claimed innocence during the trial. The appellant did not examine any defence witness. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove the age of the victim that she was a minor on the date of incident i.e. on 04.03.2020. He would further submit that the appellant and the prosecutrix was a consenting party. He would next contend that the author of the Dakhil Kharij Register has not been examined and on medical 4 examination of the prosecutrix no external or internal injuries were found. He would next contend that the prosecutrix has not stated anything against the appellant and she has not supported the case of the prosecution. Therefore, no offence would be made out against the appellant and he prays that the judgment of conviction and order of sentence may be set aside and the appellant may be released by allowing the appeal. 6. Per contra, learned State counsel would submit that the prosecution has proved the age of the victim to be below 18 years by producing the Dakhil Kharij Register as also the statement of the prosecutrix wherein she stated that her date of birth is 08/08/2003 and the alleged incident since was stated to be in the year 2020 at that time she was below the age of 18 years and therefore, would be within the meaning of POCSO. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial Court is well merited which do not call for any interference. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the evidence. 8. The primary question which comes to fore for adjudication is that as to whether the victim was minor or major on the date of incident? 9. The Statement of (PW-7) Assistant Teacher would show that he do not know on what basis the date of birth of the prosecutrix 5 was recorded in the School. He is not the author of Dakhil Kharij Register and he do not know who has recorded the date of birth of the prosecutrix. 10.That, in the instant case the father of the prosecutrix (PW-3) states that the date of birth of her daughter is 08.08.2003 and he lodged the missing report of his daughter. 11. The Supreme Court in the matter of Madan Mohan Singh and others v. Rajni Kant and Another {(2010) 9 SCC 209} has held that the Dakhilkharij register has a probative value which may be required to be examined from facts & circumstances of a particular case. The Court has held thus in para 18, 20 & 21 which are reproduced hereinbelow:- 18. Therefore, a document may be admissible, but as to whether the entry contained therein has any probative value may still be required to be examined in the facts and circumstances of a particular case.
Decision
21. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the appellant is acquitted of the charge under Sections 450 and 376 (2) (n) of the IPC. The appellant is reported to be on bail. His bail bonds shall continue for a period of six months as prescribed under Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C. 22. The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- vaishali (Arvind Kumar Verma) JUDGE