Pawan Singh Parihar v. State Of Chhattisgarh

: Ms. Aditi Singhvi, Advocate For State For Respondent No. 2 to 12 : : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Govt. Advocate Mr. Avinash Chand Sahu, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 21/08/2026

Heard Ms. Aditi Singhvi, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Govt. Advocate, for the State/Respondent 3 No.1. Mr. Avinash Chand Sahu, learned counsel for the Respondent No. 2 to

The petitioners have filed the present petition with the following prayer: "A. The Hon'ble High Court may kindly be pleased to quash the FIR bearing No. 350/2016 registered at P.S.- Mohan Nagar, District Durg (C.G) dated 12.07.2016 at 19:45 hours under Sections 420, 467 and 468 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 which was registered against the petitioners. B. The Hon'ble High Court may kindly be pleased to quash and set aside the order dated 11.07.2016 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) in RCC No- Unregistered namely "Smt. Triveni Bai Sahu v. Smt. Pratibha Borode and others" wherein it has been directed to the Station Incharge Mohan Nagar to register FIR against the petitioners. C. That, The Hon'ble High Court may kindly be pleased to quash the chargesheet bearing No. 98/2024 dated 31.03.2024 filed under Sections 420,467,468,471 and 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 by Police Station- Mohan Nagar District Durg (C.G) filed pursuant to FIR bearing No. 350/2016, Police Station- Mohan Nagar District Durg (C.G) dated 12.07.2016 at 19:45 hours under Sections 420, 467 and 468 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. D. That, the petitioners are also challenging the order dated 12.09.2025 passed in Criminal Case No. 30511/2025 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Durg (C.G) wherein cognizance has been taken by the Learned Trial Court against the petitioners for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 34 Indian Penal Code, 1860. E. The petitioners are also challenging the Case No. in Criminal proceedings 4 30511/2025 pending before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Durg (C.G) pending against the petitioners for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 34 Indian Penal Code, 1860. F. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief, which it deems fit and proper. "

The prosecution case, in brief, is that the petitioners are accused in FIR No. 350/2016 registered at Police Station Mohan Nagar, District Durg, for offences under Sections 420, 467 and 468 of the IPC, pursuant to the order dated 11.07.2016 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Durg on a complaint filed by deceased complainant Triveni Bai. The dispute arises out of a registered sale deed dated 10.05.2013 executed in favour of co-accused Pratibha Borode in respect of Plot No. 43, Audhyogik Nagar, Durg, wherein the petitioners were merely attesting witnesses. The complainant alleged that her signatures had been forged and that the property had been transferred fraudulently. However, the District Industries and Trade Centre subsequently confirmed that the property stood transferred in favour of Pratibha Borode on the basis of the registered sale deed. The complainant also instituted a civil suit seeking declaration of the sale deed as null and void, which was dismissed by the competent Civil Court vide judgment dated 13.12.2020 for failure to prove that the sale deed was invalid; the first appeal is stated to be pending. During investigation, no questioned-document expert report was obtained to establish forgery, and the charge-sheet contains no specific material or allegation demonstrating the petitioners' involvement in cheating or forgery apart from their being attesting witnesses to the sale deed. The petitioners have already been granted anticipatory bail. They had earlier challenged the FIR and order directing 5 registration of the FIR, but withdrew the petition after filing of the final report, with liberty to take recourse to law. Hence, the petitioners seek quashing of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the dispute is essentially civil in nature and no prima facie offence is made out against them.

Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the entire dispute arises out of a registered sale deed dated 10.05.2013 and is essentially civil in nature, in which the petitioners had merely stood as attesting witnesses and there is no specific allegation of cheating, forgery or any dishonest inducement against them. It is submitted that the FIR has been lodged after an unexplained delay of about three years with the ulterior motive of harassing the petitioners, and even the application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. does not disclose any specific overt act attributable to them. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, while directing registration of the FIR, has also failed to assign any cogent reason and has merely observed that the signatures appeared to be different. It is further submitted that the complainant had already received the consideration amount through cheque and, significantly, no report of a questioned-document expert has been obtained during investigation to establish that her signatures were forged. The civil suit instituted by the complainant seeking declaration of the registered sale deed as null and void has already been dismissed by the competent Civil Court, and the subsequent material collected during investigation, including the reply of the District Industries and Trade Centre, supports the validity of the transfer in favour of the purchaser. Learned counsel therefore submits that even if the entire prosecution case is taken at its face value, no ingredients of Sections 420, 467 or 468 of the IPC are made out against the petitioners, particularly when their only connection with the transaction is that they were attesting witnesses to the sale deed; hence, 6 continuation of the criminal proceedings against them would amount to an abuse of the process of law and the FIR and consequential proceedings deserve to be quashed.

Learned State counsel, opposing the petition, submits that the petitioners are named as accused in the charge-sheet for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and that the investigation conducted by the police has resulted in collection of several documents and statements which, according to the prosecution, require consideration at the stage of trial. It is submitted that the allegation relates to execution of the sale deed on the basis of allegedly forged signatures and documents and that the petitioners, along with the other accused persons, have been implicated in the transaction. Learned State counsel further submits that during investigation the relevant sale deed, documents relating to transfer of the industrial plot, bank documents, specimen signatures and other connected documents were collected and the disputed documents were forwarded to the competent questioned-document authority for examination. It is therefore contended that the absence of a final expert opinion, by itself, cannot be a ground for quashing the proceedings at the threshold, particularly when investigation has culminated in filing of the charge-sheet and the evidentiary value of the documents is a matter to be examined during trial. It is further submitted that the pendency of the civil dispute or dismissal of the civil suit does not bar criminal prosecution where the allegations disclose commission of offences of cheating and forgery.

Learned counsel appearing for the private respondent/complainant, while opposing the petition, submits that the grievance of the deceased 7 complainant was not merely with regard to the validity of the sale transaction but specifically related to fraudulent use of her signatures and execution of documents concerning the property. It is submitted that the registered nature of the sale deed cannot, at the stage of consideration of the criminal proceedings, conclusively establish that the transaction was free from fraud or forgery. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioners cannot seek their discharge merely by describing themselves as attesting witnesses, since the question whether they had knowledge of, or participated in, the alleged fraudulent transaction is a matter dependent upon the evidence collected during investigation. It is also submitted that the final report contains reference to the disputed sale deed, documents relating to transfer of the plot, bank records, specimen signatures and the steps taken for examination of the disputed documents, and therefore the prosecution cannot be said to be wholly baseless. The private respondent accordingly submits that the disputed questions concerning execution of the sale deed, genuineness of the signatures, receipt of consideration and the respective roles of the accused persons are matters for trial and that no case for exercise of inherent jurisdiction for quashing the criminal proceedings is made out. It is, therefore, prayed that the petition be dismissed and the petitioners be relegated to the remedy available before the learned Trial Court.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with this petition.

The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 laid down the principles of law relating to the exercise of extraordinary/inherent jurisdiction to quash the first information report and criminal proceedings and it has been held that 8 such power can be exercised where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, or where the allegations are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, or where the criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or has been instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Manoj Kumar Sharma and others v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, (2016) 9 SCC 1 held as under:- “35. While discussing the scope and ambit of Section482 of the Code, a similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Rajiv Thapar and others vs. Madan Kal Kapoor (2013) 3 SCC 330 wherein it was held as under:- “29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred far-reaching to hereinabove, consequences inasmuch as it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence.

Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC:

30.1 Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality?

30.2 Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false?

30.3 Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?

30.4 Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 10

30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.”

In the matter of Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673, the Supreme Court recognized that although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature. It was held as under:

12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.

(emphasis supplied)

Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra), the Supreme Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 18 SCC 626, observed that 11 criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to be used as a weapon of harassment. In Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90, relying upon Paramjeet Batra (supra), it was again held that where a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of a criminal offence, the same can be quashed by exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The aforesaid principle is squarely applicable to the present case, as the dispute arises out of a registered sale deed, the validity of which was already challenged before the competent Civil Court, and the petitioners are merely attesting witnesses to the said sale deed, with no specific allegation or material disclosing their participation in the alleged offence.

The allegation against the petitioners is that they were involved in the execution of the registered sale deed dated 10.05.2013 in favour of co- accused Pratibha Borode in respect of Plot No. 43, Audhyogik Nagar, Durg, and that the said sale deed was executed by fraudulently using the signatures of the deceased complainant, Triveni Bai. The petitioners, however, are admittedly only attesting witnesses to the said sale deed. The deceased complainant had alleged that her signatures were obtained fraudulently and that the property was transferred in favour of the purchaser. Pursuant to the complaint, FIR was registered and, after completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 34 of the IPC. The record further reveals that the complainant had received the sale consideration through cheque, that the District Trade and Industries Centre had recognized the transfer in favour of the purchaser, and that the civil suit instituted by the complainant challenging the validity of the registered sale deed had already been dismissed by the 12 competent Civil Court. So far as the present petitioners are concerned, there is no specific allegation or material in the charge-sheet demonstrating their participation in the alleged forgery or cheating, except that they had signed the sale deed as attesting witnesses, nor is there any conclusive questioned- document expert opinion establishing that the signatures were forged or that the petitioners had any role in such alleged forgery.

The principal question for consideration is whether the allegations contained in the FIR and the material collected during investigation disclose the essential ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 34 of the IPC against the present petitioners, or whether the dispute is essentially civil in nature arising out of the registered sale deed. From a plain reading of the complaint, FIR and the charge-sheet, it appears that the entire dispute revolves around the registered sale deed dated

10.05.2013 executed in favour of co-accused Pratibha Borode in respect of Plot No. 43, Audhyogik Nagar, Durg, and the allegation that the signatures of the deceased complainant were fraudulently obtained or forged in connection therewith. The petitioners are admittedly only attesting witnesses to the said sale deed and there is no specific allegation that they had prepared, forged, used or induced the complainant to execute any document. The complainant had also pursued her civil remedy by filing a suit seeking declaration of the said sale deed as null and void, which came to be dismissed by the competent Civil Court. Thus, the dispute substantially relates to the validity and execution of the registered sale deed and the rights arising therefrom, and in the absence of any specific material demonstrating the dishonest or fraudulent participation of the petitioners, the allegations do not prima facie disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged against them. 13

It is well settled that in order to constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC, there must exist dishonest or fraudulent intention at the very inception of the transaction and the accused must have induced the complainant to part with property or to act to his prejudice by such dishonest or fraudulent inducement. In the present case, a careful reading of the FIR, the complaint and the charge-sheet does not disclose any specific material to indicate that the present petitioners had any dishonest or fraudulent intention at the inception of the transaction. The petitioners are admittedly only attesting witnesses to the registered sale deed dated 10.05.2013 executed in favour of co-accused Pratibha Borode. There is no specific allegation that the petitioners negotiated the transaction, induced the deceased complainant, received the sale consideration or dishonestly caused her to part with any property. The allegations against the petitioners, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie satisfy the essential ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 420 IPC.

So far as the offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC are concerned, the prosecution case is founded upon the allegation that the signature of the deceased complainant was forged in connection with the registered sale deed. However, a perusal of the charge-sheet does not disclose any specific material demonstrating that the present petitioners themselves forged the signature, prepared the alleged forged document or knowingly used any such document as genuine. The mere fact that the petitioners signed the sale deed as attesting witnesses, without any further allegation or material indicating their knowledge or participation in the alleged forgery, cannot by itself constitute the aforesaid offences. Though the investigating agency appears to have forwarded the disputed documents and 14 specimen signatures for examination, no conclusive questioned-document expert opinion establishing the alleged forgery and connecting the present petitioners with such forgery has been brought on record. Thus, the foundational material necessary to attribute the offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC to the present petitioners is conspicuously absent.

It is also pertinent to note that the deceased complainant had instituted a civil suit seeking declaration of the registered sale deed dated 10.05.2013 as null and void. The said civil suit was dismissed by the competent Civil Court vide judgment dated 13.12.2020 on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the registered sale deed was null and void. It is true that dismissal of the civil suit by itself may not automatically extinguish criminal liability; however, the said circumstance assumes significance in the present case when considered along with the fact that the dispute emanates from the very same registered sale transaction. Further, during investigation, the District Trade and Industries Centre informed the police that the land stood transferred in favour of co-accused Pratibha Borode on the basis of the sale. The material further indicates that the sale consideration was paid through cheque. These circumstances demonstrate that the dispute essentially concerns the validity and execution of the registered sale deed and the rights arising therefrom, rather than any independent criminal act attributable to the present petitioners.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana & Others v. Bhajan Lal & Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, has held that where the allegations made in the FIR, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence, or where the criminal proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fides or are otherwise an 15 abuse of the process of the Court, the High Court would be justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction to quash the proceedings. Likewise, in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma & Others v. State of Bihar & Another, (2000) 4 SCC 168, it has been held that the distinction between mere breach of obligation and the offence of cheating depends upon the existence of dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction. Similar principles have been reiterated in Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673, wherein it has been held that where a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence, the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of the process of law. Relying upon the aforesaid principle, the Supreme Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 18 SCC 626, observed that criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to be used as a weapon of harassment. The same principle has again been reiterated in Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90, holding that where a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence, such proceedings can be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the considered view that the allegations made in the FIR and the material collected during investigation do not disclose any specific overt act on the part of the present petitioners constituting the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC. The petitioners are admittedly merely attesting witnesses to the registered sale deed and there is no material demonstrating that they had dishonest or fraudulent intention, participated in forging the signature of the deceased complainant, prepared 16 the alleged forged document or knowingly used the same as genuine. The subsequent investigation also does not bring on record any conclusive material connecting the petitioners with the alleged forgery. In these circumstances, the mere presence of the petitioners as attesting witnesses to the sale deed cannot furnish the foundation for their criminal prosecution.

It is further relevant that the impugned order dated 11.07.2016 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate directing registration of the FIR does not assign any specific reason or disclose the particular role attributable to the present petitioners. Even the application submitted under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., as pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioners, does not contain any specific allegation against them except their being witnesses to the sale deed. Thus, the very foundation of the criminal prosecution against the petitioners lacks the necessary factual foundation. Continuation of such proceedings, in the absence of any substantive material demonstrating their participation in the alleged offences, would serve no useful purpose and would amount to permitting the criminal process to be used for a dispute arising out of the validity of a civil transaction.

In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the allegations contained in FIR No. 350/2016 registered at Police Station Mohan Nagar, District Durg, for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the essential ingredients of the aforesaid offences against the present petitioners. The dispute predominantly arises out of the registered sale deed dated 10.05.2013 and the petitioners' limited role as attesting witnesses thereto. In the absence of any specific allegation or material demonstrating their dishonest or fraudulent participation in the 17 transaction or their involvement in the alleged forgery, continuation of the criminal proceedings against them would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Accordingly, the FIR bearing No. 350/2016, the charge-sheet arising therefrom and all consequential criminal proceedings pending against the present petitioners before the competent Court are hereby quashed.

The petition is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice sagrika