Sanjay Nihichalani S/o Kanhaiyalal Nihichalani Aged About 52 Years R/o Ward No. 13, Sindhi v. 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Police Station - Dharsiwa, Raipur, District- Raipur
Case Details
1 ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2025.09.26 16:00:57 +0530 2025:CGHC:49362-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 3015 of 2025 Sanjay Nihichalani S/o Kanhaiyalal Nihichalani Aged About 52 Years R/o Ward No. 13, Sindhi Camp, Near Neha Medical, Police Staion - Tilda Nevra, District- Raipur (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Police Station - Dharsiwa, Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Ajay Nihichalani S/o Late Idandas Nihichalani Aged About 50 Years R/o Tilda, Raipur, District- Raipur, (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Sr. Adv. Along with Mr. Arpan Verma, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Dy. G.A. and Mr. Awadh Tripathi, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 26.09.2025 1. Heard Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Advocate Along with 2 Mr. Arpan Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Deputy Government Advocate for respondent No.1/State and Mr. Awadh Tripathi learned counsel for respondent No.2. 2. The petitioner has filed this petition with the following prayer: “I. That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the instant petition under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, filed by the petitioner. II. That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the F.I.R. bearing No. 05/2023 registered at Police Station Dharsiwa, District Raipur (C.G.) on 02.01.2023 under section 420, Indian Penal Code. III. That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash entire charge sheet bearing No. 99/2025 filed on 06.04.2025 (ANNEXURE
Facts
P/1) before Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur District Raipur (C.G.), under section 420, 467, 468 and 471 Indian Penal Code. IV. That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the impugned order dated 23.04.2025 (ANNEXURE P/2) whereby the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur has taken cognizance of the impugned Chargesheet and registered the impugned criminal proceeding as Criminal Case no. 14577/2025 against the Petitioner. V. That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be 3 pleased to quash the impugned order dated 12.09.2025 (ANNEXURE P/2), whereby learned trial court has decided the application under section 320(2) & 320(8) of CRPC and has compounded the offence under section 420 of IPC and since 467, 468 & 471 of IPC is non-compoundable it has not been compounded. VI. And to kindly grant any other relief to the petitioner as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in facts and circumstances of the case, may also granted to the Petitioner..” 3. The instant petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking quashment of the FIR bearing No. 05/2023 registered at Police Station Dharsiwa, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) for the offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner has also sought quashment of the entire charge-sheet bearing No. 99/2025 dated 06.04.2025 filed for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC. Further, the petitioner challenges the criminal proceedings registered as Criminal Case No. 14577/2025, pending before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur (C.G.), including the order dated 23.04.2025 by which cognizance of the offences has been taken by the learned trial Court. 4. The genesis of the prosecution case lies in the complaint lodged by respondent No. 2, who alleged that the petitioner, by playing fraud and entering into a criminal conspiracy, had forged the 4 signatures of their grandfather, Late Nanakram Nihichalani, and thereby managed to have the land in question recorded in his own name. According to the FIR, Nanakram Nihichalani was the original owner of lands bearing Khasra No. 818/5, 839/3 and 839/5, admeasuring 0.424 hectare, situated at Village Silyari, Tehsil Dharsiwa, District Raipur. The complainant asserted that Nanakram Nihichalani had expired on 29.12.2015 at the age of 90 years at Tilda, leaving behind four sons, namely Kanhaiyalal (the father of the present petitioner), Idandas (the father of complainant Ajay Nihichalani), Omprakash and Ashok Nihichalani, along with three daughters namely Asha, Madhu and Dropati. 5. The complainant further alleged that after the death of his father Idandas, he came to know that his cousin, Sanjay Nihichalani (the petitioner herein), by way of fraudulent means and by forging the signatures of Late Nanakram Nihichalani, had got his name recorded in the revenue records. It was alleged that all the proceedings before the Tehsildar were fabricated, that their grandfather had never appeared before the revenue Court, and that he had never signed any document before the Tehsildar. According to the complainant, the Tehsildar wrongly recorded in the order-sheets that the other legal heirs had no objection to such transfer, even though no such consent was ever given. 6. From a plain reading of the FIR, it is evident that a purely civil and family property dispute has been deliberately given a criminal 5 colour by the complainant, who happens to be the cousin of the petitioner. It is undisputed that Nanakram Nihichalani was the owner of the property in question. The property was his self- acquired property and not ancestral in nature. On 27.12.2014, during his lifetime, Nanakram Nihichalani himself filed an application before the Additional Tehsildar, Dharsiwa, Raipur, under Section 178-A of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code. In the said application, he clearly stated that he was the sole owner of the property in question and was desirous of bequeathing it in favour of his grandson, namely Sanjay Nihichalani, the petitioner herein. He further stated that he had, as far back as in 2009, appointed his grandson as his power of attorney holder and had entrusted him with possession and management of the property. He also categorically mentioned that his sons and daughters had no objection to such transfer, and therefore prayed that his property be recorded in the name of his grandson. 7. The said application was duly considered, and vide order dated 23.11.2015, the Additional Tehsildar, Dharsiwa, Raipur, passed a final order directing that the disputed property be recorded in the name of Sanjay Nihichalani, the petitioner. The record of the proceedings before the revenue authority shows that public objections were duly invited through paper publication. No objection was ever filed by any of the legal heirs or interested persons. It is also significant to note that in his application, Nanakram Nihichalani had correctly mentioned that he had three 6 surviving sons at the time of filing, since his son Idandas (the complainant’s father) had already predeceased him. 8. It is pertinent to mention that the order dated 23.11.2015 was passed by the Tehsildar, who, under Section 31 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, functions as a court of law. Thus, the proceedings culminating in the transfer of the property in favour of the petitioner were carried out in due process of law and have the character of a judicial order. 9. Further, on 06.03.2025, a compromise deed was executed between the petitioner and the complainant, whereby all disputes with respect to the property in question were amicably settled. Under the terms of the compromise, the complainant has already received an amount equivalent to his share in the property, thereby bringing the dispute to an end. 10. In compliance with the order dated 10.09.2025 passed by this Court, the petitioner also moved an application before the learned trial Court on 11.09.2025 for compliance of the said order, along with an urgent hearing application. Notably, the petitioner’s application under Sections 320(2) and 320(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, was already pending before the learned trial Court since 25.06.2025. Thereafter, the learned trial Court, vide order dated 12.09.2025, allowed the application under Sections 320(2) and 320(8) of the Cr.P.C. and accordingly compounded the offence under Section 420 of the IPC. However, 7 since the offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC are non- compoundable in nature, the said offences were not compounded. Hence this petition. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, even if the prosecution story is accepted in its entirety, no offence whatsoever is made out against the petitioner. The allegations contained in the FIR, even if taken at their face value and presumed to be true, do not disclose the commission of any
Legal Reasoning
him from the consequences of criminal liability. It is settled law that offences involving forgery of public documents and cheating are not compoundable in nature, and mere payment of some 13 amount cannot wipe out the criminality involved in such acts. The trial court has rightly compounded only the offence under Section 420 IPC and declined to compound the offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC. Hence, the proceedings are legally sustainable. 17. Learned State counsel would submit that considering the material available on record, it cannot be held that no prima facie case against the petitioner for offence punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC is made out. He would further submit that jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘BNSS’) is extremely limited as FIR cannot be quashed particularly when there is sufficient material available on record. 18. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with this petition. 19. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 laid down the principles of law relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the first information report and it has been held that such power can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 20. The Supreme Court in the matter of Manoj Kumar Sharma and others v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, (2016) 9 SCC 1 14 held as under:- “35. While discussing the scope and ambit of Section 482 of the Code, a similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Rajiv Thapar and others vs. Madan Kal Kapoor (2013) 3 SCC 330 wherein it was held as under:- “29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far-reaching consequences inasmuch as it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out 15 and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC: 30.1. Step one: whether the material relied 16 upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2. Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? 30.3. Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arisingt therefrom) specially when it is clear that the 17 same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” 21. In the matter of Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673, the Supreme Court recognized that although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature. It was held as under: “12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.” (emphasis supplied) 22. Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra), the Supreme Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 18 SCC 626, observed that criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. In Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90, relying upon Paramjeet Batra (supra) it was again held that where a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature, is given a cloak of a criminal offence, then such disputes can be quashed, by exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 23. Reverting to the facts of the present case, upon careful consideration of the rival submissions and on perusal of the FIR, charge-sheet, and documents placed on record, this Court finds considerable force in the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner. A plain reading of the FIR makes it abundantly clear that the dispute essentially arises out of inheritance and recording of property left behind by late Nanakram Nihichalani. The allegations pertain to mutation proceedings before the revenue authority, in which the name of the petitioner came to be recorded. Such proceedings, even if assumed to be erroneous or illegal, are civil and revenue in nature and cannot, by themselves, give rise to criminal liability. 24. It is further observed that the order of mutation in favour of the petitioner was passed by the Additional Tehsildar in exercise of powers under the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code. Under Section 31 of the said Code, the Tehsildar functions as a revenue 19 court, and the order passed by him is a judicial order, subject to appeal and revision. If at all the complainant was aggrieved, the proper remedy was to approach the appellate or revisional forum under the Code and not to invoke criminal jurisdiction. The law is well settled that a wrong order by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority cannot, without more, give rise to a presumption of commission of a criminal offence. 25. It is also not in dispute that late Nanakram Nihichalani had, during his lifetime, moved an application for recording the property in favour of the petitioner and that objections were duly invited through public notice. No objections were raised by any of the heirs, and the order dated 23.11.2015 attained finality. The FIR in the present case was lodged only on 02.01.2023, nearly eight years after the passing of the mutation order. This long and unexplained delay lends credence to the petitioner’s contention that the FIR is motivated and constitutes an abuse of the process of law. 26. The subsequent compromise deed dated 06.03.2025, whereby the complainant accepted the monetary value of his share, further shows that the dispute has been amicably resolved. The trial court has already compounded the offence under Section 420 IPC, and the remaining offences under Sections 467, 468, and 471 IPC are not substantiated by any specific or credible material. The allegations of forgery are vague, unsupported by evidence, and do 20 not disclose the essential ingredients required to constitute those offences. 27. In the backdrop of these facts, continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner would amount to harassment and gross abuse of process of Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal (Supra) has held that where allegations in the FIR, even if taken at face value, do not disclose the commission of any offence, or where proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fides, the High Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash them. The present case squarely falls within those parameters. 28.
Arguments
cognizable offence. It is contended that the entire dispute arises purely out of a civil nature concerning inheritance of property, and the complainant has deliberately sought to convert it into a criminal case with an intent to harass and pressurize the petitioner. It is urged that the nature of the allegations squarely falls within the domain of civil law, and the private respondent ought to have approached the appropriate civil forum for adjudication of his alleged grievances, instead of lodging a criminal complaint. The respondent has not placed on record any substantive material to establish forgery, and the complaint is vague and bereft of particulars. Continuation of such criminal proceedings against the petitioner would amount to nothing but an abuse of the process of Court. The complainant, by resorting to criminal prosecution, is clearly misusing the process of law and attempting to create undue pressure to settle the property dispute. 12. It is further submitted that the documents produced by the 8 petitioner are unimpeachable and can be looked into at this stage for determination of the real controversy. The entire complaint has been lodged only with a view to create pressure on the petitioner and to coerce him into submission. A given set of facts may, in certain situations, constitute a civil wrong, a criminal offence, or both, however, in the present case, even if the allegations are assumed to be correct, no criminality is made out. Reliance is placed on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar & Ors. and Indian Oil Corporation, wherein it has been held that proceedings of such nature, which are essentially civil disputes cloaked as criminal cases, deserve to be quashed. The learned counsel also relies upon the dictum of Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 2 SCC 1, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that preliminary enquiry is necessary in cases involving commercial or property disputes, particularly where there is abnormal delay in initiation of prosecution. In the present case, no such preliminary investigation was carried out by the police authorities, and the FIR was registered in a mechanical manner without due compliance of law. 13. It is also submitted that the allegations made in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence against the petitioner. The registration of the FIR itself is a result of mala fides, as the informant is a politically influential person with money and muscle power, who has misused his position to get the FIR registered after an inordinate and unexplained delay of almost eight years. 9 This clearly indicates that the criminal proceedings have been initiated with ulterior motives, and judicial interference at this stage is warranted. The learned counsel further submits that the petitioner has never committed any fraud upon the revenue authorities. On the contrary, the petitioner had approached the revenue court with clean hands, and the order of mutation was passed by the Additional Tehsildar, who, under Section 31 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, is deemed to be a court. Under the said provision, revenue officers exercise powers of a civil court and are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance is placed on 1973 MPLJ 796 and 2004 RN 31 (High Court), wherein it was held that orders passed by a Tehsildar are judicial in nature. In this backdrop, the order dated 23.11.2015 enjoys protection under Section 3 of the Judges Protection Act, 1985, the Tehsildar being deemed a Judge under Section 2 of the Land Revenue Code, 1959. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner also urged that in light of Section 193 read with Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no cognizance can be taken by the criminal court in respect of allegations relating to false evidence or forged documents produced before a judicial or revenue authority. Reliance is placed on Narendra Kumar Shrivastava v. State of Bihar (2019) 3 SCC 318, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that no offence can be registered on such allegations. At best, the allegations in the FIR are that the 10 petitioner obtained an order of mutation on incorrect facts. Even if such a contention is accepted for the sake of argument, the remedy of the complainant was to challenge the order in appeal or revision before the competent authority, as provided under the Land Revenue Code. Merely alleging that a wrong order has been passed by the Tehsildar does not, by itself, constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC. The lodging of the FIR, therefore, is nothing but an attempt to misuse the criminal process. It is of particular significance that the impugned order was passed on 23.11.2015, and the period of limitation for filing an appeal or revision has long expired. The complainant, instead of availing his statutory remedy at the appropriate time, has lodged the FIR belatedly on 02.01.2023, i.e., after nearly eight years. Such unexplained delay in lodging of the FIR itself is a ground for quashing the proceedings. Moreover, Nanakram Nihichalani himself had moved the application for recording the petitioner’s name, his statement was recorded by the Tehsildar, objections were invited through publication, no objections were filed by any heir, and the order has never been challenged before any appellate or revisional authority till date. The validity of the said order cannot be questioned indirectly by lodging a criminal case. In fact, neither the FIR nor the charge-sheet discloses any cogent evidence against the petitioner. The allegations are vague, unsupported by material, and appear to be driven by malice. The charge-sheet is devoid of any specific material to show that the 11 petitioner has committed an offence under Section 420 IPC or any other provision. A bare perusal of the entire record demonstrates that this is essentially a civil dispute that has been given the cloak of a criminal proceeding with the sole intent of harassing the petitioner. Accordingly, the FIR and subsequent proceedings are liable to be quashed as an abuse of the process of law. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent No.2/complainant submits that the instant petition is wholly misconceived and is liable to be dismissed at the very threshold. It is contended that the FIR has been registered on the basis of clear and specific allegations of fraud and forgery committed by the petitioner in collusion with revenue officials. The complainant has categorically alleged that the petitioner forged the signatures of late Nanakram Nihichalani and fabricated proceedings before the revenue authority in order to usurp valuable family property. These allegations, on their face, disclose the commission of cognizable offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC, and therefore the plea of the petitioner that no offence is made out is baseless. It is further submitted that the matter is not merely a civil dispute as portrayed by the petitioner. The forgery of documents and fabrication of proceedings before the Tehsildar cannot be considered as a simple civil wrong. Forgery and use of forged documents are serious criminal offences punishable under law, and merely because such acts relate to property do not take away their criminal character. Thus, the contention that the case is civil in 12 nature and ought to have been agitated before the civil court is without any substance. He further submits that the petitioner has obtained the order of mutation by misleading the revenue authority and by producing fabricated documents purporting to bear the signature of late Nanakram Nihichalani, even though he was not present before the Tehsildar and had not given any such consent. The very act of misrepresentation before a statutory authority constitutes fraud upon the Court and upon the other co- heirs of the deceased. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that fraud vitiates even the most solemn proceedings, and therefore once forgery and fraud are alleged, the criminal law is rightly set into motion. 16. It is also contended that the delay in lodging the FIR cannot be taken as a ground to quash the proceedings. The complainant became aware of the fraud only upon perusal of the revenue records after the death of his father Idandas. Thereafter, necessary steps were promptly taken to bring the matter to the notice of the authorities. In cases of fraud, the limitation begins to run from the date of discovery of the fraud, and therefore the plea of delay raised by the petitioner is untenable. The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant further submits that the compromise deed referred to by the petitioner does not absolve
Decision
In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the FIR bearing No. 05/2023 registered at Police Station Dharsiwa, Raipur (C.G.), the consequent charge-sheet bearing No. 99/2025 dated 06.04.2025, and the criminal proceedings in Criminal Case No. 14577/2025 pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur, as well as the order dated 23.04.2025 taking cognizance, are liable to be and are hereby quashed. 29. The petition is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu