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Case Details

1 MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2025.09.12 19:10:18 +0530 2025:CGHC:46693-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 27 of 2024 Parmeshwar Patel S/o Dwarika Patel Aged About 27 Years R/o Saristal, P.S. Lormi, District Mungeli Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Lormi, District Mungeli Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Raj Kumar Gupta, Advocate For : Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, Panel Lawyer Respondent(s) Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge. Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, CJ 12.09.2025 1. Today, the matter is listed for hearing on I.A. No. 04/2025 i.e. application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail to the appellant. However, considering the fact that the appellant is in jail since 10.05.2022 and this is the second 2 application for grant of bail to the appellant as the first application for grant of bail was dismissed on 02.04.2024 and application for grant of temporary bail was dismissed on 24.09.2024, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, I.A. No. 04/2025 stands disposed of and the appeal is heard finally. 2. This appeal arises out of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 07.12.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge (POCSO Act), Mungeli, District- Mungeli (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case No. 34/2022, whereby the appellant has been convicted for offence under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter called as ‘POSCO’) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.1,500/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for two months. 3. The prosecution story, in brief, is that on 10.01.2022, the victim submitted a written complaint before the Superintendent of Police, Mungeli. In her complaint, she stated that the accused used to frequently visit her house, molest her, and assure her that he would marry her and keep her like a queen. When she resisted and threatened to inform her parents, the accused allegedly told her that he would end his life by consuming poison. On one occasion, 3 when she was alone at home, the accused entered her house and forcibly established physical relations with her. She was threatened with dire consequences if she disclosed the matter to anyone, and therefore she remained silent. It is further alleged that the accused thereafter continued to have physical relations with her on several occasions, particularly when she used to go for agricultural work. At times, he also called her to his tubewell, where similar acts were committed. The accused also remained in contact with her over mobile phone. As a result of such repeated acts, she became pregnant. On informing the accused about her condition, he allegedly took away her mobile phone and reassured her that he would marry her. 4. Thereafter, when her pregnancy became visible, the victim informed her parents. Under pressure from her father, a community meeting was called, where the accused, in front of the villagers, accepted her as his wife and took her to his home. She stayed there for about a week, but thereafter the accused went away for work. In the meantime, his parents and other family members allegedly abused her and turned her out of the house, demanding a motorcycle and Rs.50,000/-. Later, on the occasion of Diwali, the victim gave birth to a daughter. Despite intimation being sent to 4 the family of the accused, they refused to keep her and the child in their house. 5. Thereafter, the victim along with her father approached the Lormi Police Station to lodge a report. However, she was allegedly asked to return the next day. Even on the following day, her complaint was not recorded. Subsequently, she submitted a written complaint before the Superintendent of Police, Mungeli. On his directions, the matter was referred to the In-charge of the Women’s Cell, Mungeli, for inquiry. Upon inquiry, it was found that the accused had forcibly established physical relations with the victim on the pretext of marriage. Since the incident fell within the jurisdiction of Lormi Police Station, the

Facts

complaint was forwarded there, and FIR No. 30/2022 was registered against the accused under Sections 376(2)(N), 506 of the IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act. 6. During investigation, the victim was medically examined by Dr. Geetanjali Ratre (PW-2), and her medical report was prepared. Statements of the victim and her mother were recorded under Section 161 CrPC, and the victim’s statement under Section 164 CrPC was also recorded before the Judicial Magistrate. Blood samples of the accused, the victim, and the child were collected and sent for DNA profiling. The report received from the State 5 Forensic Science Laboratory confirmed the DNA matching, and the report was exhibited as Ex. P-28. 7. Thereafter, accused was arrested on 10.05.2022, and his arrest was duly recorded. His medical examination was also conducted, and relevant reports were prepared. The spot map of the place of occurrence was drawn. Various seizures, including sealed samples, were made and duly exhibited. After completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused for offences under Sections 376(2)(N), 506 of the IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act. 8. In support of its case, the prosecution examined 11 witnesses, including the victim, her parents, medical officers, and police officials, and exhibited 37 documents. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 CrPC, wherein he denied all incriminating circumstances and claimed false implication. Two witnesses were examined in his defence. 9. After appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has convicted the accused/appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in para 2 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal.

Legal Reasoning

sexual abuse. In our view, exploitation of children in such a manner is a crime against humanity and the society. Therefore, the children and more particularly the girl child deserve full protection and need greater care and protection whether in the urban or rural areas. As observed and held by this Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, (2002) 5 SCC 745, children need special care and protection and, in such cases, responsibility on the shoulders of the Courts is more onerous so as to provide proper legal protection to these children. In the case of Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 703, it is observed by this Court that a minor who is subjected to sexual abuse needs to be protected even more than a major victim because a major victim being an adult may still be able to withstand the social ostracization and mental harassment meted out by society, but a minor victim will find it difficult to do so. Most crimes 24 against minor victims are not even reported as very often, the perpetrator of the crime is a member of the family of the victim or a close friend. Therefore, the child needs extra protection. Therefore, no leniency can be shown to an accused who has committed the offences under the POCSO Act, 2012 and particularly when the same is proved by adequate evidence before a court of law.” 40.When considering the evidence of a victim subjected to a sexual offence, the Court does not necessarily demand an almost accurate account of the incident. Instead, the emphasis is on allowing the victim to provide her version based on her recollection of events, to the extent reasonably possible for her to recollect. If the Court deems such evidence credible and free from doubt, there is hardly any insistence on corroboration of that version. In State of H.P. v. Shree Kant Shekar (2004) 8 SCC 153 the Hon ble‟ Supreme Court held as follows:“ “21. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars. She stands on a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is physical as well as psychological and 25 emotional. However, if the court on facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration, as understood in the context of an accomplice, would suffice.” 41.On these lines, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivasharanappa and Others v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 5 SCC 705 observed as follows: “17. Thus, it is well settled in law that the court can rely upon the testimony of a child witness and it can form the basis of conviction if the same is credible, truthful and is corroborated by other evidence brought on record. Needless to say as a rule of prudence, the court thinks it desirable to see the corroboration from other reliable evidence placed on record. The principles that apply for placing reliance on the solitary statement of the witness, namely, that the statement is true and correct and is of quality and cannot be discarded solely on the ground of lack of corroboration, apply to a child witness who is competent and whose version is reliable.” 26 42.The Supreme court in the matter of State of UP v. Sonu Kushwaha, (2023) 7 SCC 475 has held as under : “12. The POCSO Act was enacted to provide more stringent punishments for the offences of child abuse of various kinds and that is why minimum punishments have been prescribed in Sections 4, 6, 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act for various categories of sexual assaults on children. Hence, Section 6,on its plain language, leaves no discretion to the Court and there is no option but to impose the minimum sentence as done by the Trial Court. When a penal provision uses the phraseology “shall not be less than….”, the Courts cannot do offence to the Section and impose a lesser sentence. The Courts are powerless to do that unless there is a specific statutory provision enabling the Court to impose a lesser sentence. However, we find no such provision in the POCSO Act. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent may have moved ahead in life after undergoing the sentence as modified by the High Court, there is no question of showing any leniency to him. Apart from the fact that the law provides for a minimum sentence, the crime committed by the respondent is very gruesome which calls for very stringent punishment. The impact of the obnoxious act on the mind of the victim/child will be lifelong. The impact is bound to adversely affect the healthy growth of the victim. There is no dispute that the age of the victim was less 27 than twelve years at the time of the incident. Therefore, we have no option but to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of the Trial Court.” 43. On the basis of analysis of evidence presented by the prosecution, it is evident that at the time of the incident, the victim was only 14 years, 5 months and 20 days old girl and is a minor below 16 years of age. It is proved that the victim is a girl child and that the accused, knowing that the victim was a girl child below 16 years of age at the time of the incident, committed the crime of rape, forcible penetration, sexual assault on the girl/victim below 16 years of age. Thus, the said crime of rape, penetrative sexual assault on a minor girl below 16 years of age by the accused falls under the category of aggravated penetrative sexual assault. 44. In the present case, the prosecution has established the following facts beyond reasonable doubt: 1. The victim was a minor girl aged about 14 years, 5 months and 20 days i.e. below the age of 16 years at the time of incident. 2. The accused had repeated sexual intercourse with the minor victim (PW-05), resulting in pregnancy and the birth of a daughter. 28 3. The victim, her parents, and DNA evidence (Ex.P-28) consistently confirmed the accused as the father. 4. Medical evidence (Ex.P-03) and sexual potency report of the accused (Ex.P-09) corroborate the occurrence of sexual intercourse. 5. Defence evidence is based on hearsay and fails to disprove the prosecution’s case. 45. On a careful appraisal of the evidence, it is evident that the victim (PW-05), her parents (PW-04 and PW-06), and other witnesses have consistently testified that the accused had repeated physical relations with the minor victim. These relations resulted in pregnancy, and the child born is biologically the offspring of the accused, as confirmed by the DNA report (Ex.P-28). The statements of the witnesses remain uncontradicted and are corroborated by the medical evidence (Ex.P-03) and the investigation reports (Ex.P-29, Ex.P-30). 46. Though, the counsel for the appellant argued that the relations were consensual and that the victim and accused were husband and wife, disputing any criminality. However, it is well settled that a minor cannot legally consent to sexual intercourse under the POCSO Act, irrespective of claimed consent or purported marriage. 29 Consequently, the accused’s arguments regarding consent do not absolve him of criminal liability. 47. Considering the above-stated facts and the material available on record and the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments, we are of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for offence under under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. It is clarified that the trial court did not convict under Section 376(2)(N) IPC, which is appropriate, as the offence is specifically covered under the provisions of the POCSO Act, designed to protect minors from sexual assault. We do not find any illegality and irregularity in the findings recorded by the trial Court.

Arguments

10. Mr. Raj Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant 6 submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court is contrary to the facts and evidence available on record and is therefore liable to be set aside. The appellant has been falsely implicated in the present case as the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt and the complaint itself is based on false and baseless allegations without any cogent reason. There is no independent or reliable witness to support the prosecution version, and the learned trial Court has wrongly relied upon the testimonies of the father (PW-4) and mother (PW- 6) of the victim, who are highly interested, unreliable and untrustworthy witnesses, whose depositions do not inspire confidence. The medical evidence also does not support the prosecution story inasmuch as the doctor has opined that at the time of examination, no external or internal injury was found on the body of the victim, and her health was normal, which clearly counter the allegation of rape and establishes that the appellant has been falsely implicated. The learned trial Court further failed to properly appreciate that there are material contradictions and omissions in the statements of several prosecution witnesses which go to the root of the case, but such inconsistencies have been 7 brushed aside without proper scrutiny. It is further submitted that nothing incriminating was found during police investigation from the place of occurrence, and in absence of such corroborative material, the conviction of the appellant is wholly unsustainable. The prosecution has not been able to establish the ingredients of the offence under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 or even under Section 376 IPC, and the essential ingredients of the offences alleged stand unproved. The conviction is thus illegal, arbitrary and perverse, being based on unreliable evidence and misappreciation of facts, and in view of the settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt and consequently acquittal. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and submits that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and the victim (PW-5) has clearly deposed the conduct of the appellant in her statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC and in the Court statement and the learned trial Court after considering the material available on record has rightly 8 convicted and sentenced the appellant, in which no interference is called for. 12. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 13. The issue that arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the testimony of the victim/prosecutrix deserves acceptance and whether the prosecution has established the case of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 14. It is pertinent to observe that the question whether conviction of the accused can be based on the sole testimony of the victim in cases of sexual assault/rape is no longer res integra. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue in a catena of judgments and has held that the sole testimony of the victim if found reliable can be the sole ground for convicting the accused and that the creditworthy testimony of the victim in cases of such nature deserves acceptance. 15. The next issue that arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the age of the victim on the date of commission of the offence concerned, was below 18 years of age. 16. Regarding the age of the victim, the prosecution has relied 9 upon the statements of the victim’s father (PW-04), the victim herself (PW-05), her mother (PW-06) and Assistant Teacher Rupendra Kumar Banjare (PW-01). Along with their oral evidence, the school admission register (Ex.P- 02C) containing the date of birth of the victim was produced. 17. On consideration of the material, it is seen that Assistant Teacher Rupendra Kumar Banjare (PW-01) has clearly stated that as per the school register (Ex.P-02), the victim’s date of birth is recorded as 14.02.2006, and has categorically stated that the entry in Ex.P-02 was made by him, thereby authenticating the record. The father and mother of the victim have also deposed that their daughter’s present age is about 16-17 years, and the victim herself has stated her present age to be about 16 years. These statements remained unshaken in cross- examination, and no adverse material has been brought to suggest that the school entry was manipulated or that her date of birth was deliberately reduced by 2-3 years. 18. Section 34 of the POCSO Act read with Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 lays down the procedure for presumption and 10 determination of a child’s age, giving priority to documents such as matriculation certificates, birth certificates issued by schools or civic authorities, and, in their absence, medical opinion. Unless the contrary is proved, such documentary evidence is to be treated as correct. The defence, in order to dislodge this presumption, must lead convincing material to show that the date of birth recorded in school records is unreliable, which has not been done in this case. 19. Sub-section (2) of Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act 2015 provides that – 94(2)- In case, committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining- (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available, and in the absence thereof. (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; 11 (iii) and only in the absence of (1) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board: Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order. 20. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jarnail Singh vs State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 263, whereby it has been determined that the age of the victim in POCSO cases shall be determined as per the provision mentioned in Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act 2015 on the basis of Rule 12 (3) of the POCSO Rules, 2007. Applying these principles, the evidence of Rupendra Kumar Banjare (PW-01), Assistant Teacher coupled with Ex.P-02C clearly establishes the victim’s date of birth as 14.02.2006. Since the incident took place on 03.08.2020, the victim was 14 years, 5 months and 20 days old at that time. Accordingly, the prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was a minor on the date of the incident. 21. As such, this Court finds no infirmity in the conclusion 12 drawn by the learned trial Court, which has rightly held that the victim was a minor on the date of the incident, the same being fully supported by the oral testimonies of her parents and the Assistant Teacher as well as the documentary evidence in the form of the school admission register. 22. The next question that now arises for consideration is whether the prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the alleged offence against the minor victim? 23. In this regard, the victim (PW-5) stated that when her parents were away for work, the appellant repeatedly came to her house and engaged in sexual relations with her, both inside and outside her home. She further stated that the appellant threatened to kill her if she disclosed these incidents to her parents, which is why she initially remained silent. As a result of these repeated encounters, she became approximately eight months pregnant. Upon informing the appellant about her pregnancy, he instructed her to come to his house. When she later informed her parents, they advised her to visit the 13 appellant’s house as he was the father of her child. However, when she did so, the appellant refused to keep her and sent her back home. Approximately fifteen days later, the appellant came and took her to his house again, where he kept her for four days before returning her to her parents. Thereafter, she delivered a daughter at her parental home. The victim also stated that when her father attempted to leave the child at the appellant’s house, the appellant’s father and grandfather threatened her and refused to accept the child. Following this, the victim and her father, along with her cousin, reported the incident to the Lormi Police Station. Prior to filing the FIR, her statement was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Judicial Magistrate, Lormi. 24. Victim’s Father (PW-04) deposed that when his daughter was approximately six to seven months pregnant, his wife noticed the pregnancy, and they took the victim to a doctor for confirmation. Upon questioning, the victim revealed that the appellant had been sexually abusing her, resulting in her pregnancy. 14 They took the victim to the appellant’s house, where he temporarily kept her but subsequently beat her and expelled her after four days. After a few days, the victim gave birth to a child. Despite informing the appellant about the delivery, he again refused to accept the child, and the family returned home. Following this, the father filed a complaint at the Lormi Police Station, after which the police recorded statements of the victim, her parents, the appellant, and other witnesses. 25. Victim’s Mother (PW-06) stated that she initially noticed a change in her daughter’s abdomen but the daughter was reluctant to explain. After two to three days, the victim disclosed that the appellant had sexually assaulted her, resulting in seven months of pregnancy. She also confirmed that when they attempted to leave their daughter at the appellant’s house, the appellant’s family refused to keep her. Later, the victim gave birth to a daughter at her parental home. The victim explained that she had remained silent initially because the appellant threatened to beat her. The mother confirmed that the police interrogated and recorded the statements of both her and her daughter. 26. Now coming to the medical evidence adduced, Dr. Geetanjali Ratre (PW-02) conducted a comprehensive medical examination of the victim. On external 15 examination, no signs of injury, bruising, or trauma were observed. Similarly, internal examination revealed no lacerations or abrasions. The hymen was found to be torn and had healed, consistent with prior sexual activity. The vaginal canal showed changes expected post-childbirth, including stretching. Secondary sexual characteristics were fully developed, consistent with her age. A UPT test was negative, confirming that she was not currently pregnant at the time of examination. Dr. Ratre produced the report (Ex.P-3) and opined that there were no indicators of recent forceful sexual intercourse, although the victim had previously engaged in sexual activity, which resulted in childbirth. The doctor prepared two vaginal slides during the examination, sealed them, and handed them over to the lady constable for chemical analysis. This evidence corroborates the victim’s statements regarding her prior pregnancy and childbirth. The absence of fresh injuries does not preclude prior sexual activity, particularly with consent. 27. So far as examination of the accused is concerned, Dr. R.S. Ayam (PW-07) conducted an examination of the accused to determine his sexual capacity and produced the report (Ex.P-9). The examination concluded that the accused was 16 physically capable of performing sexual intercourse. This finding was confirmed by a sexual potency report. No contradiction arose during cross-examination, reinforcing that the accused had the physical capability to commit the sexual acts described by the victim. 28. Now coming to the DNA Evidence, Dr. K.S. Kanwar (PW-08) collected and preserved blood samples for DNA analysis from three individuals: 2 ml from the victim, 1 ml from the seven-month-old daughter, and 2 ml from the accused. The samples were sealed, properly labeled, and transmitted to the police for testing. Identification forms were duly signed by witnesses and the examining officer vide Ex.P-17, Ex.P- 14, Ex.P-15, Ex.P-16 29. The DNA report (Ex.P-28) conclusively established that the accused is the biological father of the child born to the victim. This evidence directly corroborates the statements of the victim and her parents. The defence did not contradict the DNA results during cross-examination, and therefore, the court accepts this evidence as reliable and conclusive. 30. The statements of the victim (PW-05) and her parents (PW- 04 and PW-06) describe repeated sexual activity by the accused, resulting in the victim’s pregnancy. These 17 statements are fully corroborated by the DNA evidence (Ex.P-28) and medical reports (Ex.P-03). The conduct of the accused and his threat to the victim, as described in these statements, supports the prosecution’s case of aggravated penetrative sexual assault. The DNA report leaves no doubt that the child is of the accused, strengthening the credibility of the victim’s testimony. 31. This scientific evidence is critical because it directly proves the victim’s claim that the appellant fathered the child. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that DNA evidence is highly reliable and can decisively determine parentage or exclude suspects. In the present case, the DNA results serve as a definitive justificatory evidence for the victim. 32. Furthermore, in cases of alleged sexual assault, where the victim is a minor, the Supreme Court has emphasized that medical and forensic evidence must corroborate the allegations to sustain a conviction. In this matter, both medical evidence and DNA evidence links the appellant to the crime. 33. In view of the above, the DNA evidence (Ex.P-28) and medical evidence (Ex.P-03) decisively establish that the accused had sexual relations with the minor victim, 18 resulting in pregnancy and childbirth. While the medical report does not show signs of immediate physical injury, the DNA results incontrovertibly confirm the accused’s involvement. These findings, in combination with the consistent statements of the victim and her parents, conclusively support the charges under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 34. The absence of recent trauma does not diminish the credibility of the victim’s statements. In cases involving minor victims, consent is immaterial under the POCSO Act; the focus is on the occurrence of sexual acts, which is clearly proven here. 35. The investigating officers, including Deputy Superintendent of Police Madhuri Dhirahi, Sub-Inspector Rajkumar Sahu (PW-9), Assistant Sub-Inspector Sharda Singh (PW-10), and Inspector N.B. Singh (PW-11), recorded statements, collected evidence, and submitted the investigation report (Ex.P-29) to the Superintendent of Police, Mungeli. They confirmed that all procedures were duly followed, and exhibits were properly documented and sealed. 36. So far as defence evidence is concerned, Parmeshwar Patel (DW-1) testified that the victim voluntarily stayed at the accused’s house, later returning to her maternal home, and 19 gave birth to a daughter. He claimed the victim’s parents demanded Rs. 50,000 and a vehicle, but this was based solely on hearsay. Mahendra Jaiswal (DW-2) confirmed the village meeting discussing the alleged dispute but admitted he had no personal knowledge of any forcible sexual acts. In cross-examination, both defence witnesses conceded their statements were based on hearsay and could not refute the prosecution’s evidence. 37. The Supreme Court in the matter of Rai Sandeep @ Deenu v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2012 (8) SCC 21 held as under:- “22. In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling witness’ should be of a very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The Court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the Court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be 20 in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as, the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and everyone of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other similar such tests to be applied, it can be held that such a witness can be called as a ‘sterling witness’ whose version can be accepted by the Court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the Court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 21 38. In the matter of Alakh Alok Srivastava v. Union of India & Ors., (2018) 17 SCC 291, in paras 14 and 20, it is observed as under: “14. At the very outset, it has to be stated with authority that the Pocso Act is a gender legislation. This Act has been divided into various chapters and parts therein. Chapter II of the Act titled “Sexual Offences Against Children” is segregated into five parts. Part A of the said Chapter contains two sections, namely, Section 3 and Section 4. Section 3 defines the offence of “Penetrative Sexual Assault” whereas Section 4 lays down the punishment for the said offence. Likewise, Part B of the said Chapter titled “Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault and Punishment therefor” contains two sections, namely, Section 5 and Section 6. The various subsections of Section 5 copiously deal with various situations, circumstances and categories of persons where the offence of penetrative sexual assault would take the character of the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Section 5(k), in particular, while laying emphasis on the mental stability of a child stipulates that where an offender commits penetrative sexual assault on a child, by taking advantage of the child's mental or physical disability, it shall amount to an offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault.” 22 “20. Speaking about the child, a three Judge Bench in M.C. Mehta v. State of T.N. (1996) 6 SCC 756 “1. … “child is the father of man”. To enable fathering of a valiant and vibrant man, the child must be groomed well in the formative years of his life. He must receive education, acquire knowledge of man and materials and blossom in such an atmosphere that on reaching age, he is found to be a man with a mission, a man who matters so far as the society is concerned.” 39. The Supreme Court in the matter of Nawabuddin v. State of Uttarakhand (CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.144 OF 2022), decided on 8.2.2022 has held as under:- “10. Keeping in mind the aforesaid objects and to achieve what has been provided under Article 15 and 39 of the Constitution to protect children from the offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment, the POCSO Act, 2012 has been enacted. Any act of sexual assault or sexual harassment to the children should be viewed very seriously and all such offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment on the children have to be dealt with in a stringent manner and no leniency should be shown to a person who has committed the offence under the POCSO Act. By awarding a suitable punishment commensurate with the act of sexual assault, sexual harassment, a message must be conveyed to the society at large that, if anybody commits any offence under the POCSO Act of sexual assault, sexual harassment or use of children for pornographic purposes they shall 23 be punished suitably and no leniency shall be shown to them. Cases of sexual assault or sexual harassment on the children are instances of perverse lust for sex where even innocent children are not spared in pursuit of such debased sexual pleasure. Children are precious human resources of our country; they are the country’s future. The hope of tomorrow rests on them. But unfortunately, in our country, a girl child is in a very vulnerable position. There are different modes of her exploitation, including sexual assault and/or

Decision

48. In the result, this Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the appellant. The conviction and sentence as awarded by the trial court to the appellant is hereby upheld. The present criminal appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. 49. It is stated at the Bar that the appellant is in jail. He shall serve out the sentence as ordered by the trial Court. 50. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the Appellant is 30 undergoing the jail term, to serve the same on the Appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet