Nafr High Court
Case Details
1 Digitally signed by RAMESH KUMAR VATTI 2025:CGHC:19592 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 8431 of 2018 • Chhotelal Hemchandra Tripathi S/o Hemchandra Tripathi Aged About 83 Years Retired Principal Government High School Dongripali, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh. R/o Rajeev Colony Ward No. 18, Devdara Mandla Distrit Mandla (Madhya Pradesh) ... Petitioner Versus 1. The State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Principal Secretary, Tribal Welfare Education Department, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2. The Commissioner Tribal Welfare Education Department, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3. Assistant Commissioner Tribal Welfare Development Raigarh Division Bilaspur, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 4. Collector (Tribal Welfare), District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh 5. Treasury And Pension Officer (Pension Deptt) Raigarh, District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh 6. Treasury And Pension Officer (Pension Deptt.) Mandla (Madhya Pradesh) 7. The State Of Madhya Pradesh Through The Secretary, Tribal Welfare Education Department Vallabh Bhawan, District : Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh For Petitioner For Respondents No. 1 to 5 For Other Respondents ... Respondents
Legal Reasoning
Mr. Vijay Shankar Mishra, Advocate holding the brief of Mr. Ashok Soni, Advocate Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas, Addtional Advocate General None : : : Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 30/04/2025 Heard on admission. 1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):- 2 “10.1 That this Hon'ble court be pleased to decide the representation. 10.2 That this Hon'ble court be pleased to direct the respondents to sanction the salary in the pay scale of Rs.2375- 4125. 10.3 Any other relief which deems fit and proper be also granted.” 2. Mr. Vijay Shankar Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner was appointed to the post of Assistant Teacher on 17.09.1956. Thereafter, he was promoted to the post of High- Grade Teacher on 04.10.1962. Mr. Mishra would further submit that the petitioner was promoted to the post of Lecturer on 23.12.1972 on the pay-scale of Rs.1540-2760. He would contend that the petitioner completed 12 years of services on 20.12.1984, therefore, he was entitled to get the pay scale of Rs.2000-3500. He would also submit that the petitioner was promoted to the post of Principal and got retired from the services on 31.03.1996. He would also contend that the petitioner is entitled to get the pay scale of Rs.2375-4125 from 01.02.1992 till the date of his retirement. 3. On the other hand, Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State would submit that the petitioner got retired from services on 31.03.1996 and this petition was filed on 03.12.2018 without explaining the delay part. He would further submit that the petitioner was promoted to the post of Principal on 01.01.1996, whereas he claimed a higher salary from 01.02.1992. He would contend that the petitioner has filed this petition in light of the order passed by the State Administrative Tribunal on 03.02.2005 in the 3 case of a similarly situated person. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 5. Admittedly, the petitioner got retired on 31.03.1996 and after 22 years, he has filed this petition claiming therein the benefit extended by the learned State Administrative Tribunal vide order dated 03.02.2005 in
Decision
respect of different government servants. In Para- 7 of the writ petition, the petitioner stated that there is no delay in filing the instant petition. Though the petitioner has claimed a higher salary from 01.02.1992, but the petitioner failed to approach this Court at an appropriate stage. 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bichitrananda Behera Vs. State of Orissa and Others reported in (2023) 18 SCC 420 while dealing with the issue of delay and laches in Para-29 held as under:- “29. Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25: (SCC pp.37-38, paras 20-25) “Delay, laches and acquiescence 20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also and important issue to be taken note of by the court. Laches 4 21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning *“remissness and slackness”*. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy. 23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence. Acquiescence 24. We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other. 25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal 5 to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis.” (emphasis supplied) 7. Taking into consideration the facts of the present case and the unexplained delay, in the opinion of this Court, no relief can be granted to the petitioner. 8. Consequently, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed at the admission stage. No costs. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge vatti