23.07.2025 Subhash Singh Thakur, Aged About 55 years, S/o Shri Anirudh Singh Thakur, R/o v. 1 - Union of India Through the Secretary, Department of Higher Education Ministry of
Case Details
YOGESH TIWARI Digitally signed by YOGESH TIWARI Date: 2025.07.23 17:53:28 +0530 1 / 29 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR AFR WPS No. 8502 of 2022 Order Reserved on :11.07.2025 Order Delivered on : 23.07.2025 Subhash Singh Thakur, Aged About 55 years, S/o Shri Anirudh Singh Thakur, R/o Koni Tehsil District Bilaspur 495009 (C.G.).. ... Petitioner versus 1 - Union of India Through the Secretary, Department of Higher Education Ministry of Education 127-C, Shastri Bhawan New Delhi 110001. 2 - Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya Through its Vice Chancellor Koni, Bilaspur 495009 (C.G.). (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, Advocate For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Ashish Shrivastava, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Ashutosh Shrivastava and Mr. Udit Khatri, Advocates Hon'ble Smt. Rajani Dubey, Judge Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge Per Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. C A V Order 1. The petition as filed by the petitioner discloses that the respondent No.2 Guru Ghasidas Central University (hereinafter 'GGU') is not considering the case of the petitioner for reinstatement while 2 / 29 stating that as per Section 4(d) of the Central Universities Act, 2009 (in short Act, 2009’), the petitioner cannot be reinstated in service, as such the petitioner is also challenging Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009 while praying following reliefs :- “a) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, moreover in the nature of certiorari, quashing the Section 4 (d) of the Central Universities Act, 2009; OR Order the Respondents to consider the case of the Petitioner in light Ordinance 89 of B.H.U. (Non-teaching employees) & if any employee terminated working under the erstwhile GGU before enactment of the Central Universities Act, 2009 is exonerated by a competent court, he shall be considered for reinstatement in GGU by a competent committee; b) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, moreover in the nature of mandamus, directing the Respondent No.2 to consider the Petitioner for the purpose of reinstatement since he has been exonerated by all criminal charges by this Hon'ble Court; c) pass any other order(s) that may be deemed fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case including awarding of the costs to the petitioner.” 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was an employee of 3 / 29 an erstwhile Guru Ghasidas University as he was appointed as Lower Division Clerk way back on 13.05.1996. A criminal case was filed against the petitioner with an allegation that on 03.07.2005, at about 9:30 p.m., the petitioner, along with 9-10 other unknown persons entered into house of the complainants and assaulted them, due to which complainants sustained injuries on their bodies and they had also looted Mangalsutra of one of
Facts
the complainant. Due to the criminal prosecution, based on First Information Report, firstly vide order dated 02.01.2007, the petitioner was suspended by the erstwhile Guru Ghasidas University and thereafter, when the petitioner was convicted vide judgment dated 19.02.2007, by the 8th Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Bilaspur in Sessions Trial No. 111/2006 for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 450, 307/149 and 323/149 (2 counts) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’). 3. The petitioner vide order dated 23.11.2007 was removed from services under Rule 31 of the University Statutes read with Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966 ( in short ‘Rules, 1966’). Against his conviction, the petitioner has filed an appeal before this Court being Criminal Appeal No.159 of 2007. In the meanwhile, the Guru Ghasidas University has been declared as Guru Gasidas Central University by the Central Government and the erstwhile State University 4 / 29 came to an end. After becoming Central University, the Guru Ghasidas Cental University came under the Central Universities Act, 2009. The service and other benefits of the employees were governed under the Central Universities Act, 2009. 4. Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009 deals with regarding employment of earlier employees of Guru Ghashidas University. Section 4 of the Act, 2009 is reproduced below for easy reference:- “4. Effect of establishment of Universities.- On and from the dated of commencement of this Act,- (a) any reference to Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya, Doctor Harisingh Gour Vishwavidyalaya or Hemvati Nandan Bahuguna Garhwal University, in any contract or other instrument shall be deemed as a reference to Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya, Doctor Harisingh Gour Vishwavidyalaya, and Hemvati Nandan Bahuguna Garhwal University, respectively, established under this Act; (b) all properties, movable and immovable, of or belonging to Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya, Doctor Harisingh Gour Vishwavidyalaya and Hemvati Nandan Bahuguna Garhwal University, shall vest in Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya, Doctor Harisingh Gour Vishwavidyalaya or Hemvati Nandan Bahuguna Garhwal University, as 5 / 29 the case may be, established under this Act; (c) all rights and liabilities of Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya, Doctor Harisingh Gour Vishwavidyalaya and Hemvati Nandan Bahuguna Garhwal University, shall be transferred to, and be the rights and liabilities of, Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya, Doctor Harisingh Gour Vishwavidyalaya and Hemvati Nandan Bahuguna Garhwal University, respectively, established under this Act; (d) every person employed by Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya, Doctor Harisingh Gour Vishwavidyalaya and Hemvati Nandan Bahuguna Garhwal University, immediately before the commencement of this Act shall hold his office or service in Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya, Doctor Harisingh Gour Vishwavidyalaya and Hemvati Nandan Bahuguna Garhwal University, respectively, established under this Act by the same tenure, at the same remuneration and upon the same terms and conditions and with the same rights and privileges as to pension, leave, gratuity, provident fund and other matters as he would have held the same if this Act had not been enacted and shall continue to do so unless and until his employment is (terminated or until such tenure, remuneration and terms and conditions are duly altered by the Statutes:” 5. It has been specifically mentioned that the employees who were 6 / 29 working in the said University before the commencement of this Act shall hold his office or service in Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya, established under this Act by the same tenure at the same remuneration and upon same terms and conditions and with all the same rights and privileges such as, Pension, Leave Encashment, Gratuity, Provident Funds and other matters as he would have held the same if this Act had not been enacted and shall continue unless and until his employment is terminated. 6. This Act came into force on 20.03.2009. Subsequently, the criminal appeal filed by the petitioner against his conviction was decided by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.159 of 2007 vide judgment dated 04.01.2021. In the said criminal appeal, the conviction of the petitioner for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 325/149, 323/149 (Two times) of the IPC were compounded as the complainant as well the accused persons were amicably settled their dispute, however, Section 450 of the IPC is concerned, it could not compounded as it was not a compoundable offence. In the criminal appeal, the petitioner as well as other appellants have argued that they have already undergone for about 8 months, they are not having any other criminal antecedents, the dispute between the parties have already been settled and as such, their sentence part may be considered and the petitioner, namely Subhash Singh may be 7 / 29 sentenced to the period already undergone by him and the sentence may not affect adversely his employment as he was a Government Servant. This Court while considering the aforesaid submissions have passed the following judgment :- “10. As regards the offence under Section 450 IPC, it is submitted that the Appellants have already undergone for about 8 months, they have no criminal antecedent and they are facing the lis for the last 13-14 years. Both the parties have amicably settled their dispute and now no grievance exist between them. Therefore, it is prayed that for the offence under Section 450 IPC, the Appellants may be sentenced to the period already undergone by them. With regard to Appellant No.2, Subhash Singh (Criminal Appeal No. 159 of 2007), it is further prayed that Appellant Subhash Singh is a government employee and since the dispute has already been amicably settled between the parties and now no grievance exist between them, Appellant Subhash Singh may be sentenced to the period already undergone by him and while sentencing him it may be observed that his conviction under Section 450 IPC may not adversely affect his employment under the government. 11. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case including the facts that the Appellants have already undergone for about 8 / 29 8 months, they have no criminal antecedent, the dispute has already been amicably settled between the parties, I am of the view that the ends of justice would be served if the Appellants, for the offence under Section 450 IPC, are sentenced with the period already undergone by them. Ordered accordingly. The sentence of fine of Rs.1,000/- is affirmed. It is also ordered that the government employment of Appellant Subhash Singh and his employment related future prospects shall not adversely affect. 12. Consequently, both the appeals are allowed in part to the extent indicated above.” 7. After passing of the aforesaid judgment, the petitioner who has removed from service way back on 23.11.2007 on the basis of his conviction has filed an application before the respondent No.2 on 15.01.2021 and 11.06.2021, along with the the copy of judgment stating that he may be considered for reinstatement of his service and the matter was taken into consideration by the Guru Ghasidas Central University in its meeting of Executive Council held on 02.09.2022 and while considering the case of the petitioner vide Item No.22, it was resolved that the termination of
Legal Reasoning
Ammal, we are of the opinion that it does not lay down a different proposition. It was an 20 / 29 appeal from the decision of the Madras High Court striking down the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 as violative of Articles 14, 19 and 300-A of the Constitution. On a review of the provisions of the Act, this Court found that it provided a procedure which was substantially unfair to the owners of the land as compared to the procedure prescribed by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, insofar as Section 11 of the Act provided for payment of compensation in instalments if it exceeded rupees two thousand. After noticing the several features of the Act including the one mentioned above, this Court observed: (SCC p. 526, para 7) “7. When a statute is impugned under Article 14 what the court has to decide is whether the statute is so arbitrary or unreasonable that it must be struck down. At best, a statute upon a similar subject which derives its authority from another source can be referred to, if its provisions have been held to be reasonable or have stood the test of time, only for the purpose of indicating what may be said to be reasonable in the context. We proceed to examine the provisions of the said Act upon this basis.” 44. It is this paragraph which is strongly relied upon by Shri Nariman. We are, however, of the opinion that the observations 21 / 29 in the said paragraph must be understood in the totality of the decision. The use of the word ‘arbitrary’ in para 7 was used in the sense of being discriminatory, as the reading of the very paragraph in its entirety discloses. The provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act were contrasted with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and ultimately it was found that Section 11 insofar as it provided for payment of compensation in instalments was invalid. The ground of invalidation is clearly one of discrimination. It must be remembered that an Act which is discriminatory is liable to be labelled as arbitrary. It is in this sense that the expression ‘arbitrary’ was used in para 7.” 19. The High Court has not given any reason as to why the provision contained in clause (d) was arbitrary, unreasonable or irrational. The basis of such conclusion is not discernible from the judgment. The High Court has not held that the provision was discriminatory. When the provision enacted by the State Legislature has not been found to be discriminatory, we are afraid that such enactment could not have been struck down on the ground that it was arbitrary or irrational.” 21. The classification made by the legislature is reasonable; it protects only those employees who were in service at the relevant date. Such classification bears a rational nexus to the legislative 22 / 29 objective and is not arbitrary. 22. In the matter of State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala, (2014) 12 SCC 696, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that the burden lies on the person challenging the statute to demonstrate its unconstitutionality, which the petitioner has utterly failed to discharge. 23. The respondent-University considered the representation of the petitioner and rejected the claim of reinstatement vide reasoned order dated 15.09.2022, based on the minutes of the Executive Council dated 02.09.2022. The decision is grounded on the express provisions of Section 4(d) and cannot be said to suffer from arbitrariness or illegality warranting interference. 24. From the aforesaid, unless and until the petitioner is able to demonstrate that the Act is unconstitutional, suffers from bias, is oppressive and arbitrary to such an extent that it cannot be sustained even for a moment, no interference by this Court is warranted. 25. From the pleadings, evidence, and the provisions contained in Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009, nothing has been brought on record by the petitioner to establish that the said provision is either unconstitutional or arbitrary. Accordingly, the relief sought by the petitioner for declaring Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009 as unconstitutional cannot be accepted and stands rejected. 26. Insofar as the other relief sought by the petitioner, which is in the 23 / 29 nature of Mandamus, is concerned, the petitioner prays for his reinstatement into service on the strength of an observation made by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 159 of 2007, wherein it was recorded that the “Government employment of petitioner Subhash Singh and his employment-related future prospects shall not be adversely affected.” 27. At the outset, it is necessary to clarify the legal effect of such observations made in criminal proceedings. The mere observation regarding non-adverse impact on employment cannot be construed as a positive direction to reinstate the petitioner in service, especially when the service termination had already been finalized under the applicable rules well before the said observation was made. 28. The observation of this Court in the criminal appeal that the petitioner’s employment shall not be adversely affected cannot be construed as a positive directive for reinstatement. It merely noted the petitioner’s grievance without addressing the legal consequences under service law. 29. In the matter of Deputy Inspector General of Police and another v. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598, it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that mere acquittal or modification of sentence does not automatically entitle an employee to 24 / 29 reinstatement unless the dismissal order itself is found to be illegal and observed as follows :- “26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rule for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a Criminal Court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say in the instant case, 25 / 29 the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so.” 30. Very recently, in the matter of Pradip Kumar Banerjee v. Airports Authority of India (AAI), 2025 INSC 149, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an acquittal in a criminal trial, especially on the ground of benefit of doubt, does not automatically entitle an employee to reinstatement. It affirmed that disciplinary proceedings proceed on a preponderance of probabilities, whereas criminal trials require proof beyond a reasonable doubt and observed as follows :- “32. It is trite law that in disciplinary proceedings, it is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to deal with each and every ground raised by the delinquent officer in the representation against the proposed penalty and detailed reasons are not required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment if he accepts the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. Our view stands fortified by the decision of this Court in Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank, (2021) 3 SCC 806, wherein it was held:- “11. . . . Further, it is well settled that if the disciplinary authority accepts the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and passes an order, no detailed reasons are required 26 / 29 to be recorded in the order imposing punishment. The punishment is imposed based on the findings recorded in the enquiry report, as such, no further elaborate reasons are required to be given by the disciplinary authority. . . .” 33. All that is required on the part of the Disciplinary Authority is that it should examine the evidence in the disciplinary proceedings and arrive at a reasoned conclusion that the material placed on record during the course of enquiry establishes the guilt of the delinquent employee on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. This is precisely what was done by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority while dealing with the case of the respondent. 34. In our considered view, the Division Bench fell into grave error in substituting the standard of proof required in a criminal trial vis-a-vis the disciplinary enquiry conducted by the employer. It is a settled principle of law that the burden laid upon the prosecution in a criminal trial is to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. However, in a disciplinary enquiry, the burden upon the department is limited and it is required to prove its case on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. In this regard, we are benefitted by the judgment of this Court in the Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618., 27 / 29 wherein this Court held as follows: - “15. . . . A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official dealings with the respondent was one which a reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the case, the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on it. Where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials. If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court. . . .” 31. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the petitioner’s services were terminated on 23.11.2007, much before the Central Universities Act, 2009 came into force on 15.01.2009. Therefore, the petitioner cannot seek to invoke Section 4(d) of the Act of 2009, as the said provision only protects the rights of those employees who were in continuous employment as on the date of 28 / 29 commencement of the Act. The language of Section 4(d) is clear and unambiguous. It protects only those employees who were in existing service on the date of commencement of the Act. The clause “unless and until his employment is terminated” expressly clarifies that such protection is not available to a person whose services had already been terminated prior to the said date. 32. From the records, it seems that since the petitioner had been removed from service on 23.11.2007, prior to the enactment of the Act, 2009, there arises no question of reinstatement by relying upon the said provision. The petitioner’s reliance on the observations made in the criminal proceedings is thus wholly misplaced and unsustainable. 33. Furthermore, the records reveal that the Central University has duly considered the petitioner’s representations and has passed a detailed order vide memo dated 15.09.2022, on the basis of the minutes of the Executive Council meeting held on 02.09.2022 (Subject No. 22). Upon a careful consideration of the petitioner’s case, the authorities rightly concluded that the petitioner cannot be reinstated under Section 4(d) of the Act of 2009, as he was not in service on the date of its commencement. 34. The action of the University is well-reasoned, based on statutory provisions and relevant service records. This Court finds no 29 / 29 arbitrariness, illegality, or perversity in the decision rendered by the Executive Council. 35. In the matter of Rakesh Kohli (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in judicial review, the Court is concerned not with the correctness of the decision but with the decision-making process. As the authorities have followed due process, this Court finds no justification for interference. 36. In view of the discussion hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that: (i) The petitioner’s claim for reinstatement is without legal foundation. (ii) The observation made by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 159 of 2007 cannot confer a right to reinstatement contrary to statutory provisions. (iii) The University authorities have rightly rejected the petitioner’s claim after due consideration. (iv) The provisions contained in Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009 cannot be said to be arbitrary, unconstitutional, or violative of Articles 14 or 21 of the Constitution.
Arguments
Shri Subhash Singh Thakur vide order dated 23.11.2007 issued by the erstwhile State University cannot be reconsidered as his service is not protected under Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009. 9 / 29 Accordingly, while communication dated 15.09.2022, the petitioner was informed about the decision taken in the meeting of the Executive council while quoting provisions of Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009. The extract of communication dated 15.09.2022 reads as under :- "The Executive Council discussed and deliberated in details on the recommendation of the committee in its meeting held on 15-03- 2022 as well as the legal opinion taken in the matter. It was also noted that services of Shri Subhash Singh Thakur was terminated on 23-11-2007 by the then erstwhile state university. Resolved that the termination of Shri Subhash Singh Thakur vide order dated 23- 11-2007 issued to by the then erstwhile state university cannot be reconsidered as his services is not protected under Section 4(d) of Central Universities Act 2009. Resolved Further that request of Shri Subhash Singh Thakur (terminated) in his letters dated 15-01-2021 and 11-06-2021 be rejected." 8. Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the communication issued to the petitioner vide letter dated 15.09.2022, taking recourse of Section 4(d) of Act, 2009 is not in accordance with law. The provision under 10 / 29 Section 4(d) of the Act of 2009 is violative of principle of "Ubi jus ibi remidium" and it is fragrant violation of his right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India as in criminal appeal, this Court has made observation that his employment shall not be adversely affected, as such the respondent No.2 has committed illegality while denying the petitioner for his reinstatement and giving all his service benefits. The aforesaid provisions are violative of principals of natural justice as it takes away right of an employee in an illegal and arbitrary manner. He further submits that the petitioner was an employee of erstwhile University and as such, after passing of the judgment in which his future rights were protected, the petitioner cannot be victimized while taking recourse of Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009, which itself is violative of principles of natural justice as well as Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It has been contended that the services of the petitioner was being governed by Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966 and as such, subsequent enactment of Act, 2009 and taking recourse of Section 4(d) would not come into play because 4(c) clearly mandates that all rights and liabilities of the Guru Ghasidas University shall be transferred to and be the right and liabilities of Guru Ghasidas Cental University established under the Act of 2009. Since the aforesaid Section 4(c) relates to liability part, as such the petitioner is having right under Section 4(c) of the Act of 11 / 29 2009, however, only on the basis of Section 4(d) which is against the Constitutional mandate, the petitioner is being deprived from his valuable right for getting his service benefits and for his reinstatement. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of J.N. Tripathi v. Vice Cancellor, Banaras Hindu University, 1995 SCC OnLine ALL 839 to contend that Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009 is oppressive, unconstitutional and against the principles of natural justice, as such the same is required to be quashed and further, direction is required to be issued to the respondent No.2 for reinstatement of the petitioner while issuing appropriate writ in the nature of mandamus stating that the petitioner has been exonerated by all criminal charges by this Court. 10. On the other hand, Mr. Ashish Shrivastava, Senior Advocate Assisted by Mr. Ashutosh Shrivastava and Mr. Udit Khatri, Advocates for respondent No.2, has filed written while denying the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner was never being exonerated by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.159 of 2007, in fact the conviction of the petitioner under Section 450 of IPC was confirmed by this Court, however, the sentence part has been taken into consideration and looking to the fact that a settlement has arrived 12 / 29 between petitioner as well as other accused persons with the complainants therefore, the compoundable offences have been compounded and he has been sentenced for the period already undergone in Section 450 of IPC, as such, the claim of the petitioner that he has been exonerated from all the charges is incorrect on the face of the record. He further argued that the petitioner has already been removed way back on 23.11.2007 and according to Section 4(d) of Act, 2009, the petitioner was no more in service at the time when the Act came into force and as such, taking recourse of the Act, 2009, the petitioner was rightly been declined for reinstatement and other service benefits. It has been contended that the provisions of Section 4(d) is unconstitutional, oppressive and contrary to the natural justice for the reasons that the petitioner could not be reinstated taking recourse of Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009, the petitioner cannot say that the enactment oppressive and unconstitutional. It has been further contended that time and again, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the enactment cannot be held oppressive (ultra vires) on the basis of non-beneficial for an employee. The acts and enactments are made by large number of employees and not for individual person and if any individual person aggrieved by the Act, it cannot stated to be unconstitutional oppressive and against the constitutional frame work. For declaring any law unconstitutional time and again, the Hon’ble 13 / 29 Supreme Court has held that there must be reasonable grounds, which are lacking in this case. As such, taking into account the facts of the case, the present petition deserves to be dismissed. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 12. The primary issues before this Court are: • Whether the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement under the provisions of Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009 despite his removal from service prior to its commencement. • Whether Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009 suffers from any unconstitutionality on the grounds of arbitrariness or violation of fundamental rights. 13. Admittedly, the petitioner was an ex-employee of GGU who was removed from service on 23.11.2007 when a criminal case was pending against him under Sections 147, 148, 450, 325/149, and 323/149 (two counts) of the IPC. In the aforesaid offences, he was sentenced to a maximum of 7 years with a fine of Rs. 1,000/- with default stipulation. When the judgment was challenged before this Court, the offence punishable under Section 307/149 of the IPC was not found to be proved as the injured had sustained simple injuries. No grievous injuries were found; as such, Section 307/149 of the IPC was converted to Section 325/149 of the IPC. 14 / 29 The other offences under Sections 147, 148, and 323 read with 149 of the IPC (two counts) were amicably settled between the parties and thus were compounded. However, Section 450 of the IPC was found to be proved. For the offence punishable under Section 450 of the IPC, the petitioner was sentenced for a period of 07 years. However, this Court considered the entire aspect of the matter, including the amicable settlement of the matter between the parties outside of Court and accordingly, while convicting the petitioner under Section 450 of the IPC, the sentence part was considered and the sentence was accordingly reduced to the period already undergone, i.e., about 08 months on the prayer made by the petitioner. While convicting the petitioner under Section 450 of the IPC and sentencing him to the period already undergone by him, it was ordered that the government employment of petitioner Subhash Singh and his employment-related future prospects shall not be adversely affected. On the basis of said order, the petitioner had already been removed from service way back on 23.11.2007. An application for reinstatement in service was filed on 15.01.2021 and 11.06.2021. 14. It is also an admitted case that in the year 2009, by virtue of the Act, 2009, which came into force on 15.01.2009, the employees of the earlier University who were working in the said University and were continued in service were taken into service as per the 15 / 29 positions they were holding in their office and for the same tenure, at the same remuneration and upon the same terms and conditions and with the same rights and privileges as to pension, leave encashment, gratuity, and provident fund, which were available to them before the coming into force of the Act, 2009. However, a specific clause was incorporated in Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009, stating that they shall continue to do so unless and until “his employment is terminated.” This clause means that only if the employees were in continuous service in the earlier said University, could they continue with the New Central University. In the present case, since the petitioner had already been removed way back on 23.11.2007, the authorities have rightly informed the petitioner as per Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009. 15. The petitioner cannot be continued in service and accordingly, his reinstatement has been rejected in the meeting of the Executive Council, and the result of the same has already been informed to the petitioner by a separate memo. The petitioner made every endeavour to satisfy this Court, referring to the order passed by this Court, that the petitioner is required to be reinstated in service. However, when the petitioner could not convince this Court, he made a second prayer that the provisions incorporated under Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009 itself are unconstitutional and as such, it is required to be held oppressive and unconstitutional by quashing Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009. 16. Taking into account the facts of the case, we are afraid that the 16 / 29 petitioner is not seriously challenging this as in the entire petition as well as during the course of arguments advanced by the petitioner, nowhere has anything been brought to the knowledge of this Court to hold the provisions contained in Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009 as oppressive, unconstitutional, or violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner. 17. Rather, it seems that the petitioner, in order to establish his case, has commonly challenged the legality and propriety of the Act, 2009 as well as sought his reinstatement. 18. Section 4(d) of the Act, 2009 provides that “every employee holding any office under the University immediately before the commencement of this Act shall hold his office or service by the same tenure and shall continue to do so unless and until his employment is terminated." 19. The object of Section 4(d) is to ensure that the existing employees of the University, upon its conversion to a Central University, do not suffer loss of service conditions, rights, or privileges. However, the protection is explicitly conditioned upon the employee being in service on 15.01.2009. The petitioner having been removed from service on 23.11.2007 stood outside the protective ambit of this provision on the date the Act came into force. The provision cannot be interpreted to confer retrospective reinstatement 17 / 29 benefits on those who were not in employment when the Act commenced. 20. It is well settled that a statutory provision cannot be declared unconstitutional merely on the ground of hardship. The petitioner has not demonstrated how Section 4(d) violates any constitutional provision, including Articles 14 or 21. In the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rakesh Kohli and another, (2012) 6 SCC 312, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a legislation cannot be struck down merely on the ground of hardship or unreasonableness, unless it is shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory or violative of constitutional provisions by observing as follows:- “15. In our opinion, the High Court was clearly in error in declaring Clause (d), Article 45 of Schedule 1-A of the 1899 Act which as brought in by the M.P. 2002 Act as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is very difficult to approve the reasoning of the High Court that the provision may pass the test of classification but it would not pass the requirement of the second limb of Article 14 of the Constitution which ostracises arbitrariness, unreasonable and irrationality. The High Court failed to keep in mind the well defined limitations in consideration of the constitutional validity of a statute enacted by Parliament or a State Legislature. 18 / 29 16. The statute enacted by Parliament or a State Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional lightly. The court must be able to hold beyond any iota of doubt that the violation of the constitutional provisions was so glaring that the legislative provision under challenge cannot stand. Sans flagrant violation of the constitutional provisions, the law made by Parliament or a State Legislature is not declared bad. 17. This Court has repeatedly stated that legislative enactment can be struck down by Court only on two grounds, namely (i), that the appropriate Legislature does not have competency to make the law and (ii), that it does not take away or abridge any of the fundamental rights enumerated in Part – III of the Constitution or any other constitutional provisions. In Mcdowell and Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709, while dealing with the challenge to an enactment based on Article 14, this Court stated in paragraph 43 (at pg. 737) of the Report as follows : “……..A law made by Parliament or the legislature can be struck down by courts on two grounds and two grounds alone, viz., (1) lack of legislative competence and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. There is no third ground………. …….. if an enactment 19 / 29 is challenged as violative of Article 14, it can be struck down only if it is found that it is violative of the equality clause/equal protection clause enshrined therein. Similarly, if an enactment is challenged as violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by clauses (a) to (g) of Article 19(1), it can be struck down only if it is found not saved by any of the clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 and so on. No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that court thinks it unjustified. Parliament and the legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom…….” (Emphasis supplied) 18. Then dealing with the decision of this Court in State of T.N. and others v. Ananthi Ammal and others, (1995) 1 SCC 519, a three-Judge Bench in Mcdowell (supra) observed in paragraphs 43 and 44 [at pg. 739) of the Report as under : “……Now, coming to the decision in Ananthi
Decision
37. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merit. No case for interference is made out. The reliefs sought are hereby refused. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Yogesh