Bemetara, Chhattisgarh v. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Nawagarh, District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh
Case Details
BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2025.03.26 18:12:22 +0530 1 2025:CGHC:14064-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 2098 of 2023 Gopal Yadav S/o Late Mahil Yadav Aged About 23 Years R/o Ward No. 10, Bus Stand Nawagarh, P.S.- Nawagarh, District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh --- Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Nawagarh, District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent CRA No. 2137 of 2023 Gopi Yadav S/o Late Mahil Yadav Aged About 25 Years R/o Ward No.10, Bus Stand Nawagarh, P.S. Nawagarh, District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh ---Appellant Versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Nawagarh, District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent CRA No. 671 of 2024 Raju Yadav S/o Late Vinod Yadav Alias Banbaua Aged About 23 Years R/o-Ward No.-06 Sonipara Nawagarh, Police Station-Nawagarh, District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh ---Appellant 2 Versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station- Nawagarh, District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent CRA No. 1171 of 2024 Pramod Sinha S/o Late Shri Sarju Siha Aged About 21 Years R/o Ward No.07, Nawagarh, P.S. Nawagarh, District Bemetara (C.G.) ---Appellant Versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Nawagarh, District Bemetara (C.G.) For Appellant- Gopal Yadav For Appellant-Gopi Yadav For Appellant-Raju Yadav For Appellant- Pramod Sinha : : : : --- Respondent Advocate
Legal Reasoning
Mr.Vinay Dubey, No.2098/2023 Mr.Siddhant Tiwari, Advocate in CRA No.2137/2023 Mr.F.S.Khare, Advocate in CRA No.671/2024 in CRA Mr.Adhiraj No.1171/2024 Surana, Advocate in CRA For Respondent : Mr.Sanghrash Pandey, Government Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J . 24/03/2025 1. Since the aforesaid four criminal appeals have been filed against the impugned judgment dated 15.09.2023 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Bemetara in Sessions Trial 3 No.16/2023, they were clubbed & heard together and being
Decision
disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Appellants-Gopal Yadav, Gopi Yadav, Raju Yadav and Pramod Sinha have preferred these four criminal appeals under Section 374(2) of the CrPC questioning the impugned judgment dated 15.09.2023 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Bemetara in Sessions Trial No.16/2023, by which they have been convicted for offences under Sections 147, 148, 307/149 and 302/149 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for six months and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for 15 days, RI for six months and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for 15 days, RI for ten years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for 2 months and imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for 2 months. 3. Case of the prosecution, in nutshell, is that on 10.03.2023 complainant Arjun Yadav aloang with his associates Bullu Yadav, Latel Yadav and Akhilesh Sonkar appeared at Nawagarh Police Station and lodged a verbal report that on the night of 9.3.2023 at around 10.45 P.M. he called his son Satanand Yadav and asked where he was, if he had not reached home yet, then Satanand told that he was in the Government Hospital, Nawagarh, he was seriously injured, then after getting the above information he went to the Government Hospital where Satanand was seriously 4 injured. Then Satanand told that both he and Bhagau Yadav reached near the bus stand Nawagarh around 10 P.M., appellant Pramod Sinha along with other co-accused with common intension assaulted them by means of knife due to which they received injuries over their hands, abdomen region and chest and during the treatment, Bhagau Yadav died. On the basis of the above information, merg intimation was registered in Police Station Nawagarh vide Ex.P-1 and thereafter FIR was registered in Crime No.62/2023 vide Ex.P-2. Inquest was prepared over the body of deceased Bhagau Yadav vide Ex.P-4. Spot map was prepared by the investigating officer vide Ex.P-5. Bloodstained soil, plain soil, stone, brick and belt were seized from the spot vide Ex.P-6. Clothes of injured Satanand Yadav were seized vide Ex.P-7. Patwari also prepared the spot map vide Ex.P-8. Injured Satanand Yadav was sent for MLC to Community Health Center, Nawagarh, where Dr.Rahul Raj (PW-13) examined him vide Ex.P- 28 and found perforated wound on lower back with dimension 5x3x2 cm. Dead body of deceased Bhagau Yadav was sent for postmortem to Community Health Center, Nawagarh, where Dr.Rahul Raj (PW-13) conducted postmortem over the body of Bhagau Yadav vide Ex.P-35 and found following injuries:- “1. Penetrating wound present over left side of the chest at 5th and 6th intercostal space 2 cm below and medial to left nipple, shape of the wound is oval shape dimension of wound include length 5cm, width 2.5 cm and depth is 5 8 cm would extend from skin to subcutameous tissue to pericardium to left vertical of the heart. 2. Multiple scratch abrasion present over both side of nape of the neck with various dimensions seems to be nail scratches. 3. Abbrated wound of dimension 5x4cm present over left shoulder. 4. Lacerated wound present over right flank region.” The doctor has opined that cause of death is grievous vital organ injury with excessive haemorrhage. Mode of death is shock. Memorandum statement of appellant Pramod Sinha was recorded vide Ex.P-58 and on the basis of his memorandum statement, knife was seized at his instance vide Ex.P-59. Clothes were seized from appellant Pramod Sinha vide Ex.P-60. Clothes were seized from appellant Gopal Yadav vide Ex.P-61. Clothes were seized from appellant Gopi Yadav vide Ex.P-62. Clothes of appellant Raju Yadav were seized vide Ex.P-63. Appellants were arrested on 10.08.2023 vide arrest memos (Exs.P-72 to P-75). Seized articles were sent to FSL for chemical examination and as per FSL report (Ex.P-91), human blood was found on Article A, B1, B2, B3, C, F1, F2, H1, I1, I2,M1 and M2. 4. After due investigation, all the appellants were charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offences in which they abjured their guilt and entered into defence stating inter-alia that they have not 6 committed any offence and they have falsely been implicated in crime in question. 5. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 25 witnesses and exhibited 94 documents Exs.P-1 to P- 94. None was examined on behalf of the defence. 6. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 15.09.2023, proceeded to convict the aforesaid accused persons for the aforesaid offences and sentenced them as aforementioned, against which, these criminal appeals have been preferred. 7. Mr.Vinay Dubey, learned counsel for appellant Gopal Yadav in CRA No.2098 of 2023 submits that the appellant is innocent person and has been falsely implicated in the aforesaid crime. The allegation levelled against the appellant is against the settled principle of law. Learned trial Court ought to have seen that it is the complainant party who were aggressor and the first one to start the fight. He further submits that learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence of eyewitness Satanand (PW- 22) who has not stated any specific allegation against the present appellant. There is no material on record to connect the appellant in aforesaid crime. As such, the criminal appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment sofar as it relates to present appellant deserves to be allowed. 8. Mr.Siddhant Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellant Gopi Yadav 7 in CRA No.2137/2023 submits that the appellant is innocent person and has been falsely implicated in the aforesaid crime. The allegation levelled against the appellant is against the settled principle of law. Learned trial Court ought to have seen that it is the complainant party who were aggressor and the first one to start the fight. He further submits that learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence of eyewitness Satanand (PW- 22) who has not stated any specific allegation against the present appellant. There is no material on record to connect the appellant in aforesaid crime. As such, the criminal appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment sofar as it relates to present appellant deserves to be allowed. 9. Mr.F.S.Khare, learned counsel for appellant Raju Yadav in CRA No.671/2024 submits that the impugned judgment of conviction passed by the trial Court is against the principle of law applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. There are so many omissions and improvements in the statements of the prosecution witnesses and as such, their statements do not inspire confidence so as to convict the appellant. He further submits that learned trial Court has failed to see that the prosecution has failed to prove the case and eye witnesses of the present case are not reliable. He also submits that learned trial Court has committed error while convicting the appellant and failed to appreciate the evidence that the important witnesses have not 8 supported the prosecution case. As such, the criminal appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment sofar as it relates to the appellant deserves to be set aside. 10. Mr.Adhiraj Surana, learned counsel for appellant Pramod Sinha in CRA No.1170/2024 submits that the entire case of the prosecution is solely based on circumstantial evidence and the chain of event linking the appellant to the death of the deceased in incomplete beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has implicated the present appellant solely on the basis of postmortem report denoting the death to be homicidal, which circumstance cannot be said to be beyond reasonable doubt and does not discharge the burden of proof on the appellant. He further submits that even if the entire prosecution case is taken as it is, the appellant cannot be convicted for offences under Sections 147, 148, 307/149 and 302/149 of the IPC. As such, the criminal appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment sofar as it relates to the appellant deserves to be set aside. 11. On the other hand, Mr.Sanghrash Pandey, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent/State would support the impugned judgment and submit that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and the learned trial Court after considering all incriminating materials and circumstances available against the accused persons rightly convicted them for the aforesaid offences. Hence, the instant criminal appeals being 9 bereft of merits are liable to be dismissed looking to the commission of offence done by the accused persons. 12. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 13.The first question for consideration would be, whether death of deceased Chetan Bai was homicidal in nature ? 14. On behalf of the prosecution, Dr.Rahul Raj who conducted postmortem on the body of the deceased vide Ex.P-35 has been examined as PW-13 and opined that cause of death is grievous vital organ injury with excessive haemorrhage and mode of death is shock. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after considering the submissions, we are of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court that death of deceased Bhagau Yadav was homicidal in nature is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to record. We hereby affirm that finding. 15. In the present case, Satanand Yadav (PW-22) is injured eyewitness. Injured Satanand yadav has stated in para 3 of his evidence before the trial Court that when he and Bhagau Yadav reached Lees Biryani Center near Nawagarh bus stand, appellant Gopal Yadav stopped their motor-cycle and started abusing them by using obscene language against their mother and sister. When they stopped abusing him, he started abusing them again saying, 10 “What can they do to him?”. After that, appellant Raju Yadav, Pramod Sinha, Gopi Yadav and juvenile boy Deepak Yadav also came there and started beating them. At the same time, Devdas, Raj Sonkar and Dhanraj @ Desire also came there to intervene, then the appellants started abusing them too. After that, appellant Gopi Yadav took out his belt and started hitting him and Bhagau. After that, all the appellants together started hitting both of them with bricks and stones and a scuffle broke out them. In para 4, he has stated that appellants Gopal Yadav and Raju Yadav started strangulating Bhagau and he tried to free him but Gopi Yadav caught him from behind, at the same time, appellant Pramod Sinha took out a knife from his pant pocket and made a lethal attack on him. He bent down due to which appellant Pramod Sinha’s knife hit his waist. In para 5 he has stated that appellant Pramod Sinha in order to kill Bhagau Yadav caught hold of him from behind, then appellant Pramod Sinha attacked Bhagau with a knife on his chest and neck, due to which he fell down on the spot. Then all the appellants and juvenile Deepak Yadav started kicking and punching him. When he caught hold of Pramod Sinha to stop him, he got into a scuffle with him. After that all the appellants leaving Bhagau started beating him. 16. The Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355 held as under: 11 “26. When the evidence of an injured eye-witness is to be appreciated, the under-noted legal principles enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in mind: (a) The presence of an injured eye-witness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition. (b) Unless, it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused. (c) The evidence of injured witness has greater evidentiary value and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. (d) The evidence of injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions. (e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of injured, but not the whole evidence. (f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of time should be discarded. (emphasis supplied)” 12 17. In the present case, Doman Sonkar @ Raj (PW-5), Devdas Mahilange (PW-20) and Akhilesh Sonkar (PW-21) are eyewitnesses of the incident. 18. Doman Sonkar @ Raj (PW-5) has stated in para 2 of his evidence that on 9.3.2023 at around 8-9 P.M., he was sitting near Ganeshband pond with Akhilesh Sonkar, Dhanraj, Devdas, Dhanesh and Bhagau. After Akhilesh Sonkar and Dhanesh went home, Satanand Yadav came there on a motorcycle and took Bhagau Yadav towards bus stand Nawagarh and he, Devdas, and Dhanraj @ Desire followed them to the bus stand on another motorcycle. When they reached Nawagarh stand, the appellants present in the Court i.e. Gopal, Gopi, Raju and juvenile boy were fighting with injured Satanand and deceased Bhagau Yadav. In para 3, he has stated that then he called Akhilesh Sonkar and told him about the incident, on which Akhilesh Sonkar told him to send Dhanraj to pick him up. At that time also, the appellants present in the Court had beaten up injured Satanand and deceased Bhagau Yadav. After the fight escalated, appellant Gopal took out his belt and appellant Pramod Sinha took out a knife and attacked injured Satanand on the back of his waist. Thereafter appellants Gopi and Raju caught hold of deceased Bhagau and appellant Pramod Sinha stabbed Bhagau Yadav in the chest with the same knife. At the same time, appellant Gopi picked up a stone from there and killed Bhagau. He was present when the above incident happened. 19. Devdas Mahilange (PW-20) has stated in para 3 of his evidence 13 that the appellants and juvenile boy Deepak Yadav present in the Court surrounded and stopped the motorcycle of Satanand Yadav, the injured in this case and deceased Bhagau Yadav and started abusing them and fighting with them and said that you people are flying too high. At the same time, appellant Gopal Yadav took out his belt and started beating them. Then he and Doman Sonkar explained to them that they should not fight, but they did not listen and started fighting with Bhagau Yadav and Satanand. After the fight exaggerated, appellant Pramod Sinha took out a knife from his pant pocket and assaulted Satanand saying that he will kill him, then Satanand turned to save himself, then he was injured by the knife in his waist and back. Appellant Pramod Sinha went to Bhagau Yadav, then appellants Gopal and Raju caught Bhagau Yadav from behind and appellant Pramod Sinha attacked him with a knife. Bhagau fell down on the spot and appellant Gopal Yadav slammed Bhagau Yadav with a concrete stone lying on the spot and started beating him. All the appellants together slammed Satanand there too. 20. Akhilesh Sonkar (PW-21) has stated in para 3 of his evidence that at around 10 P.M. Doman called him and told him that there was a fight going on at Nawagarh bus stand. He immediately reached Nawagarh bus stand and saw that the appellants present in the court and juvenile boy Deepak Yadav were fighting with Bhagau Yadav and Satanand. When he reached the spot, 14 Bhagau Yadav was lying on the ground and Devdas had put his head in his lap and had pressed the wound on his chest with his hand. Devdas told him that appellant Pramod Sinha present in the Court had stabbed Bhagau in the chest with knife. After that he took Bhagau to the hospital and when he reached the hospital, he was dead. The injuries on Satanand’s body were treated in the hospital and after the doctor gave him first aid, he was referred to Raipur. 21. In the present case, the trial Court has convicted the appellants for offence under Sections 147, 148 and 307/149 and 302/149 of the IPC. 22. At this juncture, we may briefly survey the relevant legal provisions. 23. Section 141 IPC defines unlawful assembly. It says an assembly of five or more persons is designated as unlawful assembly if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is to commit an illegal act by means of criminal force. 24. As per Section 148 IPC which deals with rioting armed with deadly weapon, whoever is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon or with anything which, used as weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. Rioting is defined in Section 146 IPC. As per the said definition, whenever force or violence is 15 used by an unlawful assembly, or by any member thereof, in prosecution of the common object of such assembly, every member of such assembly is guilty of the offence of rioting. 25. This brings us to the pivotal section which is Section 149 IPC. Section 149 IPC says that every member of an unlawful assembly shall be guilty of the offence committed in prosecution of the common object. Section 149 IPC is quite categorical. It says that if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of committing of that offence, is a member of the said assembly; is guilty of that offence. Thus, if it is a case of murder under Section 302 IPC, each member of the unlawful assembly would be guilty of committing the offence under Section 302 IPC. 26. In Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka reported in (2012) 11 SCC 237, the Supreme Court while examining Section 149 IPC held as follows:- “20. It is now well-settled law that the provisions of Section 149 IPC will be attracted whenever any offence committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or when the members of that assembly knew that offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, so that every person, who, 16 at the time of committing of that offence is a member, will be also vicariously held liable and guilty of that offence. Section 149 IPC creates a constructive or vicarious liability of the members of the unlawful assembly for the unlawful acts committed pursuant to the common object by any other member of that assembly. This principle ropes in every member of the assembly to be guilty of an offence where that offence is committed by any member of that assembly in prosecution of common object of that assembly, or such members or assembly knew that offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. 21. The factum of causing injury or not causing injury would not be relevant, where the accused is sought to be roped in with the aid of Section 149 IPC. The relevant question to be examined by the court is whether the accused was a member of an unlawful assembly and not whether he actually took active part in the crime or not.” 27. Thus, this Court held that Section 149 IPC creates a constructive or vicarious liability of the members of the unlawful assembly for the unlawful acts committed pursuant to the common object by any other member of that assembly. By application of this principle, every member of an unlawful assembly is roped in to be held guilty of the offence committed by any member of that assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly. The factum of causing injury or not causing injury would not be relevant when an accused is roped in with the aid of Section 149 17 IPC. The question which is relevant and which is required to be answered by the court is whether the accused was a member of an unlawful assembly and not whether he actually took part in the crime or not. 28. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court in Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v. Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel reported in (2018) 7 SCC 743 has reiterated the position that Section 149 IPC does not create a separate offence but only declares vicarious liability of all members of the unlawful assembly for acts done in common object. The Supreme Court has held: 20. In cases where a large number of accused constituting an “unlawful assembly” are alleged to have attacked and killed one or more persons, it is not necessary that each of the accused should inflict fatal injuries or any injury at all. Invocation of Section 149 is essential in such cases for punishing the members of such unlawful assemblies on the ground of vicarious liability even though they are not accused of having inflicted fatal injuries in appropriate cases if the evidence on record justifies. The mere presence of an accused in such an “unlawful assembly” is sufficient to render him vicariously liable under Section 149 IPC for causing the death of the victim of the attack provided that the accused are told that they have to face a charge rendering them vicariously liable under Section 149 IPC for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. Failure to appropriately invoke and apply 18 Section 149 enables large number of offenders to get away with the crime. * * * * * 22. When a large number of people gather together (assemble) and commit an offence, it is possible that only some of the members of the assembly commit the crucial act which renders the transaction an offence and the remaining members do not take part in that “crucial act” — for example in a case of murder, the infliction of the fatal injury. It is in those situations, the legislature thought it fit as a matter of legislative policy to press into service the concept of vicarious liability for the crime. Section 149 IPC is one such provision. It is a provision conceived in the larger public interest to maintain the tranquility of the society and prevent wrongdoers (who actively collaborate or assist the commission of offences) claiming impunity on the ground that their activity as members of the unlawful assembly is limited. * * * * * 34. For mulcting liability on the members of an unlawful assembly under Section 149, it is not necessary that every member of the unlawful assembly should commit the offence in prosecution of the common object of the assembly. Mere knowledge of the likelihood of commission of such an offence by the members of the assembly is sufficient. For example, if five or more members carrying AK 47 rifles collectively attack a victim and cause his death by gunshot injuries, the fact that one or two of the members of the assembly did not in fact fire their weapons does not mean that they did not have the 19 knowledge of the fact that the offence of murder is likely to be committed.” 29. Therefore, as held by the Supreme Court in Yunis alias Kariya v. State of M.P. reported in (2003) 1 SCC 425, no overt act is required to be imputed to a particular person when the charge is under Section 149 IPC; the presence of the accused as part of the unlawful assembly is sufficient for conviction. 30. It is clear from the evidence of injured eyewitness Satanand Yadav (PW-22) that the appellants were part of the unlawful assembly which committed the murder and also caused injury to him. Though he was extensively cross-examined, his testimony in this regard could not be shaken. 31. Applying the aforesaid well settled principles of law and taking into consideration the facts in totality and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, in our considered view the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is just and proper warranting no interference of this Court. 32. In the result, the appeals being devoid of merit are liable to be and are hereby dismissed. 33. It is stated at the Bar that the the appellants are in jail, they shall serve out the sentence as ordered by the learned trial Court. 20 34. The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. 35. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellants are undergoing their jail term, to serve the same on the appellants informing them that they are at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of the High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge (Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice Bablu