• Arvind Bahardwaj S/o Late Baratu Ram Bhardwaj Aged About 37 Years R/o House v. 1. Heritage Hospital Through Its Director, Devendra Nagar, Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur
Case Details
1 SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Digitally signed by SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Date: 2025.07.17 17:16:58 +0530 2025:CGHC:32381 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 924 of 2024 • Arvind Bahardwaj S/o Late Baratu Ram Bhardwaj Aged About 37 Years R/o House No. 237, M-Ii, Sector-1, Dindayal Upadhyay Nagar, Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur (C.G.), At Present R/o Hardidih, Block, Police Station And Tahsil - Jaijaipur, District Sakti (C.G.), Mo. No. 9039393081 ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. Heritage Hospital Through Its Director, Devendra Nagar, Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur (C.G.) 2. Dr. Sanjay Pandey (Ortho - Specialist), Heritage Hospital Devendra Nagar, Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur (C.G.) 3. Dr. Nishchal Tiwari (Gastrologits) Heritage Hospital Devendra Nagar, Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur (C.G.) 4. Dr. Amir Hussain (Pathologist), Heritage Hospital Devendra Nagar, Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur (C.G.)
Legal Reasoning
5. Shri Balaji Super Speciality Hospital Through Its Director, Dubey Colony, Mova, Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur (C.G.) (Cause Title is taken from Case Information System) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner For Respondents No. 1 to 4 : Mr. Ratnesh Agrawal, Advocate : Mr. Shobhit Mishra, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 11. 07.2025 1. The petitioner has challenged the order passed by the learned National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”), in First Appeal No. 1934/2019, dated 27.03.2023, whereby the application preferred by the petitioner for 2 condonation of delay has been rejected and consequently the appeal has been dismissed. 2. The facts of the present case, are that the petitioner made a complaint against the respondents under the provisions of Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 before the C.G. State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Raipur (hereinafter referred as “Commission, Raipur”) on the ground that due to negligence of the respondents, he lost his leg and became disabled. The claim of the complainant was dismissed by the Commission, Raipur vide order dated 13.03.2018 on the ground that complainant/petitioner failed to prove the fact that respondents committed any negligence. 3. The petitioner filed first appeal (First Appeal No. 1934 of 2019) before the Commission, New Delhi, with a delay of 527 days. The learned Commission, New Delhi rejected the application for condonation of delay on the ground that the petitioner failed to explain sufficient cause of huge delay. It is further held that the ground of Covid-19 was taken but same is not available as free copy of the order of the State Commission was provided on 19.03.2018 and the appeal was preferred on 27.09.2019. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that he would further submit that an application for condonation of delay was moved before the learned Commission and the delay of 527 days was sufficiently explained. He argued that the learned Commission ought to have taken a liberal view while considering the application for condonation of delay. 5. On the other hand learned counsel appearing for respondent would oppose. Mr. Mishra would submit that there was inordinate delay of 527 days and same was not properly explained, therefore learned Commission rightly rejected the application for condonation of delay. He has placed 3 reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. 7. Perusal of the documents and the application for condonation of delay would show that the petitioner has failed to explain the delay properly. The reasons assigned by the petitioner in the application for condonation of delay is not a matter of right and the person has to set out the case showing sufficient reasons which prevented him to approach the Court within the stipulated period of limitation. 8. In the application for condonation of delay, the petitioner stated that the petitioner received a copy of order dated 13.03.2018 on 19.03.2018. It is further pleaded that the petitioner took considerable duration to find out a suitable counsel in New Delhi. It was also stated in the application that the petitioner is physically challenged and was keeping unwell. The petitioner pleaded that in the application that one of the reasons for delay was translation of documents from Hindi to English, and thereafter, there was vacations from 04.06.2018 to 30.06.2018. Documents were sent for translation on 06.07.2018 and the same were returned after translation in the month of July, 2018. The mother of the Advocate was not keeping well and that was another reason for delay. In the month of August to September, 2018 on account of death of grant father of the Advocate, the appeal could not be filed before the commission. The petitioner requested to the Advocate to return the documents and appointed a new Advocate in the month of June, 2019. It is stated that the final draft was prepared on 4 17.09.2019 and it was sent to the Office of the Advocate on 23.09.2019. It is a well-settled principle of law that consumer complaints are to be decided in a time-bound manner. A litigant approaching the court for condonation of delay must properly explain the delay. Before the Commission, the petitioner failed to properly explain the delay. 9. The learned commission has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of R.B. Ramlingam vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, (2009) CLT 188 (SC), Ram Lal and Ors. vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 SC 361 and Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC). In the matter of Anshul Aggarwal (supra), it is held that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if the court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the order of the Consumer Forums. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:- “10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about 5 suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.” 11. The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & 6 Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.” 12. In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised 7 even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 14. Taking into consideration the reasons assigned by the petitioner in the application for condonation of delay; the findings recorded by the learned Commission and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above-cited judgment, in my opinion, no case is made out for interference. 15. Accordingly, this writ petition is hereby dismissed at the admission stage itself. No cost(s). $iddhant Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge