Smt. Pushpalata Soni v. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Tribal And Scheduled Caste Caste

14 - Smt. Pushpalata Soni D/o Layminarayan Aged About 53 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Madded, Block Chhattisgarh. Bhopalpatnam, District Bijapur 15 - A. Nageshwar Rao S/o A. Bakkod, Aged About 54 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Bhopalpatnam, Block Chhattisgarh. Bhopalpatnam, District Bijapur 16 - Kode Madhu Rao S/o Late Bucha Rao Aged About 56 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Cherpalli, Block Chhattisgarh. Bhopalpatnam, District Bijapur 17 - Neelam Ganpat Rao S/o Kistaiya Aged About 56 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Rudraram, Block Bhopalpatnam, Chhattisgarh. District Bijapur 18 - Smt. Triveni Jhadi, D/o Late Ramlal Aged About 51 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Gollaguda, Block Chhattisgarh. Bhopalpatnam, District Bijapur 19 - Smt. Rajeshwari Thakur D/o Shri Papaiya Raj Aged About 57 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt.

Middle School Madded, Block Chhattisgarh. Bhopalpatnam, District Bijapur 3 20 - Smt. Jaina Dev D/o Tulja Ram Aged About 56 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Girls Middle School Bhopalpatnam, Block Chhattisgarh. Bhoalpatnam, District Bijapur 21 - Kaka Dhan Rao S/o Istari Aged About 50 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Lingapur, Block Bhopalpatnam, District Chhattisgarh. Bijapur 22 - Vijay Kumar Kode S/o Bakkaiya Aged About 54 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Kotapalli, Block Bhopalpatnam, Chhattisgarh. District Bijapur 23 - K. Banaiya S/o Ramaiya Aged About 54 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Sala Vardali, Block Bhopalpatnam, District Chhattisgarh. Bijapur 24 - Sahadev Ram Nishad S/o Late Manglu Ram Aged About 54 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Bhairamgarh, Chhattisgarh.

Block, Bhairamgarh District Bijapur 25 - Narendra Kumar Shori S/o Amar Shori Aged About 54 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Korremarka , Block Chhattisgarh. Bhairamgarh District Bijapur , 26 - Dev Ram Jain S/o Bisuram Jain Aged About 53 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Kodoli, Block, Bhairamgarh, Chhattisgarh. District Bijapur 27 - Manbhat Ram Kupal S/o Aasman Kupal Aged About 54 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Chhote Tumnar, Block Chhattisgarh. Bhairamgarh, District Bijapur 28 - Radheshyam Netam S/o Late Fulsingh Netam Aged About 55 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Pater Para, Chhattisgarh. Block Bhairamgarh, District Bijapur 29 - Ramprashad Mandavi S/o Puran Sing Mandavi Aged About 56 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Bail, Block Chhattisgarh. Bhairamgarh, District Bijapur 30 - Sukhram Sethiya S/o Ramraj Sethiya Aged About 54 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt.

Girls Higher Secondary School Bhairmgarh, Chhattisgarh. Block Bhairmgarh, District Bijapur 31 - Sadanandam Korram S/o Laxmaiya Korram Aged About 54 Years 4 Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Talnar, Block Chhattisgarh. Bhairamgarh, District Bijapur 32 - Kameshwar Dubba S/o Late Kistaiya Aged About 48 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Girls Res. Postakabin Kuturu Block Chhattisgarh. Bhairamgarh, District Bijapur 33 - Lalit Kumar Maravi S/o Vishwanath Maravi Aged About 45 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Ambeli, Block Chhattisgarh. Bhairamgarh, District Bijapur 34 - Ramesharan Manjhi S/o Late Meghnath Aged About 50 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Belnar, Block Chhattisgarh. Bhairamgarh, District Bijapur 35 - Vankateshnar Tokal S/o Late Buchaiya Aged About 49 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt.

Pota Cabin Resi Avapalli, Block Usoor, Chhattisgarh. District Bijapur 36 - Sayanarayan Tokal S/o Late Potti Aged About 50 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Ashram Shala Pamed Block District Bijapur Chhattisgarh. 37 - D. Mallaiya S/o Enka Aged About 56 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Basaguda, Blck Usoor, District Bijapur Chhattisgarh. 38 - Lubhan Singh Kashyap S/o Pitamber Singh Aged About 55 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Modakpal, Block Chhattisgarh. Usoor, District Bijapur 39 - Enja Venkateshwar S/o Late Nagajya Aged About 50 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Illimidi, Block Usoor, District Chhattisgarh. Bijapur 40 - Smt. A. Kanki D/o Late Pentaiya Aged About 52 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Murkinar, Block Usoor, District Chhattisgarh. Bijapur 41 - Smt. Prabharani Burka W/o B. Narendra Aged About 50 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt.

Middle School Awapalli, Block Usoor, Chhattisgarh. District Bijapur 42 - J. Kameshwar Rao S/o Jagaiya Aged About 50 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Kondapalli Block Usoor, District 5 Bijapur Chhattisgarh. 43 - B. Raghuwar S/o Late Gavraiya Aged About 54 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Engpalli, Block Usoor, District Chhattisgarh. Bijapur 44 - Shyam Singh Taram S/o G.R. Taram Aged About 53 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Pandripan, block Charama, Chhattisgarh. District Kanker 45 - Zakir Khan S/o Abdul Majid Aged About 49 Years Working As Head Middle School Reddy, Block Bijapur, District Bijapur Chhattisgarh. 46 - Kandik Chandraiya S/o Dasraiya Aged About 53 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Dugoli, Block Bijapur, District Chhattisgarh. Bijapur 47 - Kamal Das Jhadi S/o Sammaiya Aged About 45 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt.

Res. P. K. Toynar, Block Bijapur, District Bijapur Chhattisgarh. 48 - Brijlal Pujari S/o Ramlal Aged About 47 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Tumnar, Block Bijapur, District Bijapur Chhattisgarh. 49 - Ramgopal Sharma S/o Late R.S. Sharma Aged About 59 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Midle School Gagalur, Block Bijapur, Chhattisgarh. District Bijapur 50 - Gopal Telam S/o Panduram Aged About 55 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Toynar, Block Bijapur, District Chhattisgarh. Bijapur 51 - Bhupendra Singh Thakur S/o Late Prem Singh Aged About 57 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Etpal, Block Chhattisgarh. Bijapur, District Bijapur 52 - Budhram Sahani S/o Laxman Singh Aged About 55 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Pusnar, Block Bijapur, Chhattisgarh. District Bijapur 53 - Paldev Hanumaiya S/o Late Kistaiya Aged About 50 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt.

Middle School Burji, Block Bijapur, District Chhattisgarh. Bijapur 6 54 - Savitri Jhadi W/o Shri Bairandam Aged About 53 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Ashram School Usoor, Block Usoor, District Chhattisgarh. Bijapur 55 - Punem Satyam S/o Late Mutta Aged About 50 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Marudbaka, Block Usoor, District Chhattisgarh. Bijapur 56 - Telam Pandu Ram S/o Late Telam Bande Aged About 57 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Koitpal, Block Usoor, Chhattisgarh. District Bijapur 57 - Laxmi Narayan Chapdi S/o Late Kistaiya Aged About 46 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Darbha, Block Chhattisgarh. Bhairamgarh, District Bijapur 58 - Shiv Kumar Samrat S/o Jagnath Samrat Aged About 46 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Bandlapal, Block Chhattisgarh. Bhairamgarh, District Bijapur 59 - Jagbandhu Manjhi S/o Laxman Manjhi Aged About 46 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt.

Middle School Aded, Block Bijapur, District Chhattisgarh. Bijapur 60 - Kursam Shivram S/o Late Laliya Aged About 55 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Pedakodepal, Block Bijapur, Chhattisgarh. District Bijapur 61 - Budhram Kudiyam S/o Vangaram Kudiyam Aged About 58 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Peddakorma Chhattisgarh. Block Bijapur, District Bijapur 62 - M. Mara S/o M. Mutta Aged About 55 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Lingagiri, Block Usoor, District Bijapur Chhattisgarh. 63 - B. Maheshwar Rao S/o B. Narsingh Rao Aged About 50 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Sankan Palli, Block Usoor, Chhattisgarh. District Bijapur 64 - Manish Kumar Jhadi S/o Late Kistaiya Aged About 52 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Bechapal Block Chhattisgarh. Bhairamgarh, District Bijapur 65 - Shrivnarayan Alam S/o Late Laxmaiya Aged About 52 Years Working As 7 Head Master And Posted At Govt.

Middle School Bedre Block Bhairamgarh, Chhattisgarh. District Bijapur 66 - Krishna Rao Jhadi, S/o Pandu Ram Jhadi, Aged About 48 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Ketulnar, Block Chhattisgarh. Bhairamgarh, District Bijapur 67 - Smt. Laxmi Shah Mandavi W/o Late Tara Shah Aged About 45 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Lanya Parisar Bijapaur, Block Chhattisgarh. Bijapur, District Bijapur 68 - Angampalli Basmaiya S/o Kamlu Aged About 48 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Guddipal, Block Bijapur, District Chhattisgarh. Bijapur 69 - Ram Prasad Dhruv S/o G. L. Dhruv, Aged About 55 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Kuturu, Block Bhairamgarh, Chhattisgarh. District Bijapur, 70 - Omprakash Netam, S/o Guhar Ram Netam Aged About 46 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Chika, Block Chhattisgarh.

Bhairamgarh, District Bijapur 71 - Krishna Kumar Chapadi S/o Babu Rao, Aged About 56 Years Working As Head Master And Posted At Govt. Middle School Pusbaka, Block Usoor, District Bijapur Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Tribal And Scheduled Caste Caste Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya Atal Chhattisgarh. District Nagar, New Raipur, Raipur 2 - Director, Directorate Of Chhattisgarh Public Instruction Public Instruction Chhattisgarh Raipur Indravati Bhawan Raipur 3 - The Commissioner Tribal And Scheduled Caste Development Department, Chhattisgarh. Indirawti New Raipur, Bhawan, District Raipur 4 - Collector, (Tribal Development) District Bijapaur Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Shashi Kumar Kushwaha, Advocate, holding the brief of Mr. Satya Kumar Mandloi, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Keshav Prasad Gupta, Government Advocate 8 Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 18/08/2026

The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):-

10.(i) That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash impugned order dated 03.12.2021 (Annexure P-1) and direct the respondent authorities to consider and grant promotion on the post of Lecturers w.e.f. 02.02.2014 with all consequential benefit, as earliest, in the interest of justice. (ii) Any other relief which may be suitable in the facts and circumstances of the case, may also be granted.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would argue that the petitioners were initially appointed to the post of Upper Division Teacher (for short, UDT). He would further submit that instead of granting promotion to the post of Lecturers, the petitioners were promoted to the post of Headmasters, Middle School (Tribal) vide order 27.05.2013. He would further submit that according to the service rules, the UDT teachers, who possesses D.Ed/B.Ed/BTC and post- graduation qualification, would be promoted to the post of Lecturers. The petitioners made representations, but their claims were not not considered, therefore, they preferred W.P.(S) No. 1380/2015, which was disposed of with a direction to the respondent No. 2 to decide the representation submitted by the petitioners. He would contend that the representations made by the petitioners were rejected vide order dated

03.12.202, and against the said order, this writ petition has been preferred. He would further contend that the petitioners were eligible and qualified for promotion to the post of Lecturers in the year 2013 itself, but their names were omitted from consideration without sufficient cause. 9

On the other hand, learned State counsel would submit that in the year 2013, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Development Department Educational Cadre (Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules, 2011 were in existence. According to Schedule-II, the requisite eligibility qualification for promotion to the post of Lecturers from the post of Upper Division Teacher / Headmasters, Primary School was B.Ed., D.Ed., or B.T.I. The petitioners were lacking requisite eligibility criteria for the post of Lecturers, therefore, they were considered for promotion to the post of Headmasters vide order dated 27.05.2013. The petitioners remained in a state of slumber for eight years, and only in the year 2021 preferred this petition claiming promotion from the post of Upper Division Teachers to Lecturers; thus, the writ petition may be dismissed.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on file.

The petitioners have approached this Court with inordinate delay of eight years, and according to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Development Department Educational Cadre (Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules 2011, the petitioners were otherwise not eligible for promotion to the post of Lecturers.

In this petition, the petitioners have not placed any prerequisite documents on record to substantiate that they possessed the D.Ed./B.Ed./B.T.I. degree or diploma when their names were considered for promotion to the post of Headmasters, therefore, this Court does not find any good ground to interfere with the order passed by the respondent authorities.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 held as under:- ‘17. In the case at hand, though there has been four 10 years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remain unauthorizedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons -who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle” . In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.

Recently, the Apex Court in the matter of Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 64 held as under:- ‘9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace, though some contrary opinions have been expressed (in Nav Rattanmal Vs. state of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704). The courts have expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on the foundations of greater public interest for three reasons, namely, (a) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (b) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that persons with good causes of action (who are able to enforce them) should pursue them with reasonable diligence (State of Kerala Vs. V.R. Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3 SCC 657 relying on Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bichitrananda Behera Vs. State of Orissa and others reported in 2023 Livelaw (SC) 883, under relevant para 21 held as under:- “21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passagesfrom certain decisions of this Court: (A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648:

To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the 13 consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.

(emphasis supplied) (B) Union of India v N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25: "Delay, laches and acquiescence

The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court.

The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.

Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a 14 challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.

A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence. Acquiescence

24. We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other.

25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence.

When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis.” (emphasis supplied) (C) Chairman, State Bank of India v M J James, (2022) 2 SCC 301: 15 "36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four years and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time.

Without satisfactory explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the ground that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case. Xxx

38. In Ram Chand v. Union of India [Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44] and State of U.P. v. Manohar [State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126] this Court observed that if the statutory authority has not performed its duty within a reasonable time, it cannot justify the same by taking the plea that the person who has been deprived of his rights has not approached the appropriate forum for relief. If a statutory authority does not pass any orders and thereby fails to comply with the statutory mandate within reasonable time, they normally should not be permitted to take the defence of laches and delay. If at all, in such cases, the delay furnishes a cause of action, which in some cases as elucidated in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 765] may be continuing cause of action. The State being a virtuous 16 litigant should meet the genuine claims and not deny them for want of action on their part.

However, this general principle would not apply when, on consideration of the facts, the court concludes that the respondent had abandoned his rights, which may be either express or implied from his conduct. Abandonment implies intentional act to acknowledge, as has been held in para 6 of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 144] Applying this principle of acquiescence to the precept of delay and laches, this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v.Jaswant Singh [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] after referring to several judgments, has accepted the following elucidation in Halsbury's Laws of England : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, paras 1213) “12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, Para 911,p.

395 as follows: ‘In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.’

13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been 17 vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?”

39. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify distinction between “acquiescence” and “delay and laches”. Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress and after violation is completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain. [See Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149. Also, see Gobinda Ramanuj Das Mohanta v. Ram Charan Das, 1925 SCC OnLine Cal 30 : AIR 1925 Cal 1107] In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance, [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention. [See Krishan Dev v. Ram Piari, 1964 SCC OnLine HP 5 : AIR 1964 HP 34] Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and 18 sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and in spite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance. [See “Introduction”, U.N. Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures — Law of Limitation and Prescription, Vol. I, 14th Edn., 2016.] However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence.

40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation.”

It is the duty of the Court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. Remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons, such delay does not deserve any 19 indulgence and on the said ground alone this Court deems it appropriate to dismiss this petition at the very threshold. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties.

Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case in light of the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply (supra), Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak (supra) and Bichitrananda Behera (supra), it is quite vivid that the petitioners have approached this Court after a delay of about 8 years and in para 7 of the writ petition, it has been stated that there is no delay in filing the writ pettion. The petitioners utterly failed to explain the delay caused in filing the instant petition, therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, this petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed on account of delay and laches. No order as to cost(s). Sd/- Rakesh Mohan Pandey JUDGE Nadim