Bhagwat Prasad Sinha v. State Of Chhattisgarh & Ors.

Judgment

1. Heard Mr. S.B. Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN 2 Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, Deputy Govt. Advocate, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the State submits that, in compliance with the Court’s order dated 15.01.2026, respondent No. 2 has been apprised of the pendency of the present petition. The said notice was served upon respondent No. 2 on 19.01.2026. It is further submitted

that the earlier counsel, Mr. Vineet Kumar Pandey, has since expired. When the matter was taken up, respondent No. 2 was not present despite service of notice. In view of the above, this Court deems it fit to proceed to hear the matter on merits.

3. The present petition has been filed by the petitioners being aggrieved by the final report/charge-sheet filed under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 03.08.2021 before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patan, District Durg (C.G.), arising out of FIR No. 81/2021 registered at Police Station Patan, District Durg (C.G.), for offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 377, 406, 323, 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, seeking quashment of the said charge-sheet and the consequential criminal proceedings.

4. The petitioners have filed the present petition with the following prayer:- “It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to Quash the entire charge sheet and the consequent criminal case pending 3 before the learned J.M.F.C. Patan, District Durg, (C.G.) and the petitioners may kindly be set free, in the interest of justice.”

5. The facts of the case in brief are that, the respondent No.2/ complainant and petitioner No.1 became acquainted with each other through Facebook in the year 2018 and subsequently solemnized their marriage on 10.02.2019. Petitioner No.1 is the husband of the complainant, petitioner No.2 is the maternal uncle-in-law and petitioner No.3 is the mother-in-law of the complainant. It is alleged that initially the couple resided peacefully for a short period of about 10–15 days, whereafter matrimonial discord arose. Allegations of mental and physical cruelty, dowry demand, misappropriation of articles and forceful unnatural physical relations were levelled, pursuant to which FIR No. 81/2021 was registered at Police Station Patan and, after investigation, the charge-sheet dated 03.08.2021 was filed before the learned JMFC, Patan.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that petitioner No.1 is a government servant employed in the police force. The marriage between petitioner No.1 and respondent No.2 was solemnized on

10.02.2019 and after about seven months of marriage, respondent No.2 left the matrimonial home and started residing at her parental house, after which the relationship between the parties became irretrievably strained. It is further submitted that much prior to the registration of FIR No. 81/2021 at Police Station Patan, respondent No.2 had already lodged a complaint at Police Station Ranchirai, 4 District Balod (C.G.), making substantially similar allegations against the petitioners. In the said complaint, statements of the complainant and other witnesses were recorded and, after due investigation, the allegations relating to dowry demand, cruelty and suspicion on character were found to be false and incorrect. It was revealed that the complainant was not willing to reside with petitioner No.1, whereas petitioner No.1 was always ready and willing to cohabit with her. The documents relating to the earlier complaint and investigation have been placed on record as Annexure P/2.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that after failure of her complaint at Police Station Ranchirai, respondent No.2, with a mala fide intention to harass and blackmail the petitioners, approached the Director General of Police by suppressing the earlier investigation and deliberately sought registration of the offence at Police Station Patan, District Durg. It is pointed out that even in the said application, respondent No.2 made a specific endorsement seeking legal action only from Police Station Patan, as she was aware that no case would be registered at Police Station Ranchirai in view of the earlier adverse findings.

8. Learned counsel submits that the FIR is delayed by more than one year and six months from the alleged incidents, without any plausible explanation. It is also argued that the present prosecution is an outcome of misuse of criminal law for settling matrimonial scores and is manifestly malicious. It is further brought to the notice of this Court that petitioner No.1 had filed an application under Section 9 of the 5 Hindu Marriage Act, which was allowed by the Family Court by common order dated 24.09.2025. The application filed by respondent No.2 under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. was also rejected by the same order. Copies of the said order have been placed on record.

9. Learned counsel appearing for the State opposes the petition and submits that the FIR in question was registered on the basis of a written complaint made by respondent No.2 alleging cruelty, dowry demand and commission of other cognizable offences by the petitioners. It is submitted that upon receipt of the complaint, the police conducted investigation in accordance with law and, after recording statements of the complainant and other witnesses and collecting relevant material, found a prima facie case to be made out against the petitioners. Consequently, the charge-sheet was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patan, District Durg (C.G.).

10. Learned State counsel would further submit that the allegations levelled in the FIR and the charge-sheet disclose the commission of cognizable offences under Sections 498-A, 377, 406, 323, 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, which require appreciation of evidence and determination of disputed questions of fact, and the same cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is further submitted that the defence raised by the petitioners, including the plea regarding an earlier complaint and the findings recorded therein, as well as the alleged delay in lodging the FIR, are matters which may be examined by the trial Court during trial and do not, by themselves, constitute a ground 6 for quashment of the criminal proceedings at the threshold.

11. Learned State counsel would also submit that the mere pendency or outcome of matrimonial proceedings, including the application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act or proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C., does not automatically render the criminal prosecution non- maintainable, particularly when allegations of cruelty and dowry demand have been made. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel for the State prays that the petition be dismissed, leaving it open for the petitioners to raise all permissible defences before the trial Court.

12. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and have perused the documents appended with these petitions.

13. At the outset, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of interference in charge-sheet filed by the police against accused in extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC/528 of the BNSS.

14. In the matter of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, 1998) 5 SCC 749 the Supreme Court has held that the accused can approach the High Court either under Section 482 of the CrPC/528 of BNSS or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him.

15. The Supreme Court in the mater of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 laid down the principles of law relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under 7 Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the first information report and it has been held that such power can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In paragraph 102 of the report, their Lordships laid down the broad principles where such power under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 of the CrPC/528 of BNSS should be exercised, which are as under: - “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first 8 information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the 9 Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 10

103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.”

16. The principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) has been followed recently by the Supreme Court in the matters of Google India Private Limited v. Visaka Industries, (2020) 4 SCC 162, Ahmad Ali Quraishi and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, 2020) 13 SCC 435 and Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2019) 18 SCC 191. The Supreme Court in Google India Private Limited (supra), explained the scope of dictum of Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and “that too in the rarest of rare cases” as indicated in paragraph 103 therein of the report.

17. Having noticed the scope of interference by this Court in the petition relating to quashment of FIR/charge-sheet, reverting to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that in the impugned charge-sheet, four 11 petitioners have been charged for offences under Sections 498-A/34 of the IPC.

18. Chapter XXA of the IPC deals with offence of cruelty by husband or relatives of husband. Section 498A of the IPC defines the offence of cruelty as under:- “498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” 12

19. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that in order to establish offence under Section 498A of the IPC, the prosecution must establish- (i) That, woman must be married; (ii) She has been subjected to cruelty or harassment and (iii) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by husband of the woman or by relative of her husband.

20. The word 'cruelty' within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC has been explained in Explanation appended to Section 498A of the IPC. It consists of two clauses namely clause (a) and clause (b). To attract Section 498A of the IPC, it must be established that cruelty or harassment to the wife to coerce her or cause bodily injury to herself or to commit suicide or the harassment was to compel her to fulfill illegal demand for dowry. It is not every type of harassment or cruelty that would attract Section 498A of the IPC. Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC contemplates harassment of woman to coerce or any relation of her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. The complainant if wants to come within the ambit of Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC, she can succeed if it is proved that there was an unlawful demand by the husband or any of his relatives with respect to money or of some valuable security.

21. The Supreme Court in the matter of Priya Vrat Singh and others v. 13 Shyam Ji Sahai, (2008) 8 SCC 232 considered the issue of delay in lodging the complaint as well as role that has been ascribed to the accused therein and quashed the complaint holding the delay of two years in lodging FIR to be fatal and further held that no role has been ascribed to the petitioner/accused therein. It was observed as under:- “8. Further it is pointed out that the allegation of alleged demand for dowry was made for the first time in December, 1994. In the complaint filed, the allegation is that the dowry torture was made some times in

1992. It has not been explained as to why for more than two years no action was taken.

9. Further, it appears that in the complaint petition apart from the husband, the mother of the husband, the subsequently married wife, husband's mother's sister, husband's brother in law and Sunita's father were impleaded as party. No role has been specifically ascribed to anybody except the husband and that too of a dowry demand in February 1993 when the complaint was filed on 6.12.1994 i.e. nearly after 22 months. It is to be noted that in spite of service of notice, none has appeared on behalf of Respondent No.1.”

22. Similarly, in the matter of Sunder Babu and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2009) 14 SCC 244 delay in filing complaint against accused therein was taken note of by their Lordships of the Supreme Court holding the case to be covered by Category Seven of para-102 highlighted in Bhajan Lal's case (supra), the prosecution for offence under Section 498A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was quashed. 14

23. Similarly, in the matter of Geeta Mehrotra (supra), the Supreme Court held that casual reference to the family member of the husband in FIR as co-accused particularly when there is no specific allegation and complaint did not disclose their active involvement. It was held that cognizance of matter against them for offence under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC would not be justified as cognizance would result in abuse of judicial process.

24. In the matter of K. Subba Rao and others v. State of Telangana represented by its Secretary, Department of Home and others, 15 (2018) 14 SCC 452 their Lordships of the Supreme Court delineated the duty of the criminal Courts while proceeding against relatives of victim's husband and held that the Court should be careful in proceeding against distant relatives in crime pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths and further held that relatives of husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations, unless specific instances of their involvement in offences are made out.

25. In the matter of Rashmi Chopra (supra) it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court relying upon the principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) that criminal proceedings can be allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed and further held that judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment and the High Court should not hesitate in exercising the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings if the proceedings deserve to be quashed in line of parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in 15 Bhajan Lal's case (supra) and further held that in absence of specific allegation regarding anyone of the accused except common and general allegations against everyone, no offence under Section 498A IPC is made out and quashed the charges for offence under Section 498A of the IPC being covered by category seven as enumerated in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) by holding as under:- “24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. A perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations against the appellants for offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after proceeding for divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in State of 16 Michigan by Nayan Chopra.

25. There being no specific allegation regarding any one of the applicants except common general allegation against everyone i.e. “they started harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry of one crore” and the fact that all relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother’s sister and husband of mother’s sister have been roped in clearly indicate that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the applicants..…”

26. Having noticed the legal position governing the quashment of FIR and charge-sheet, the question that arises for consideration is whether, taking the allegations made in FIR No. 81/2021 and the charge sheet at their face value, any prima facie offence under Sections 498-A, 377, 406, 323, 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 is made out against the petitioners.

27. It is the case of the prosecution that the marriage of respondent No.2 was solemnized with petitioner No.1–Bhagwat Prasad Sinha on

10.02.2019 as per Hindu rites and rituals, and that soon thereafter she was subjected to cruelty, harassment and demands for dowry by the petitioner No.1-husband and his family members. On the basis of her written complaint, FIR No. 81/2021 was registered at Police Station Patan, District Durg and after completion of investigation, the police 17 filed charge-sheet for the aforesaid offences before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patan, District Durg.

28. However, a careful examination of the FIR and the statements forming part of the charge sheet reveals that the allegations made by respondent No.2 are general, omnibus and lacking in specific particulars regarding dates, instances, or overt acts attributable to each of the petitioners. The later allegations made in the FIR reflect substantial improvements and embellishments inconsistent with her earlier version. Except broad and vague assertions that the petitioners demanded dowry and ill-treated her, no specific allegation is made against the parents or brother of the petitioner-husband to constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC.

29. Considering the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and the material placed on record, particularly the nature of allegations in the FIR and charge sheet, which are bald, omnibus and inherently inconsistent with earlier proceedings, this Court is of the considered opinion that no prima facie offence under Sections 498-A, 377, 406, 323, 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 is made out against the petitioners. The allegations do not disclose any specific conduct amounting to cruelty as defined under Section 498-A IPC, nor do they disclose any unlawful demand of dowry so as to satisfy Explanation (b). The prosecution appears to be covered by Category 1, 3 and 7 of paragraph 102 of Bhajan Lal (supra), being based on vague assertions, improvements, and indications of mala fide arising out of matrimonial discord and 18 parallel civil proceedings. Accordingly, continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of law.

30. As a natural consequence of the above analysis, Criminal Case No. 283/2021 pending before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patan, arising out of Crime No. 81/2021 registered at Police Station Patan, District Durg under Sections 498-A, 377, 406, 323, 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 against the petitioners, is hereby quashed.

31. The present petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is accordingly allowed, to the extent indicated hereinabove.

32. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice